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Summary
The "background of this work is the problem of growth - or stagnation — 
with stability - or instability* The main interest is price instability 
in the context of underdevelopment* Initially the work starts with a uni­
verse, in the present case Latin America and the post-war period (1946-65)*
An abstraction follows, with price instability and industrialisation indi­
cators, from the relatively stable countries of the region (Venezuela, Cen­
tral America and the Caribbean). The next step is to re-state the complete- 
relationshij) between the growth of output and inflation in the selected 
countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Pa­
raguay, Peru, and Uruguay). This relationship is then examined - empirical­
ly and with the aid of simple statistical tests - in terms of the causes of 
inflation and its policy cures. With respect to the last point - stabilisa­
tion programmes - the study is eventually reduced to certain periods in the 
policy-making experience of Argentina, Chile, and Peru. Resuming, this work 
states a general case, selects certain tools and examples, and moves into 
specific issues.
The nature of Latin-American inflation and the search for its remedies 
are highly controversial subjects. Throughout the past two decades they 
have taken the form of what is known as the *Monetarist-Structuralist' con­
troversy. The controversy is an irregular intellectual body, not obviously 
symmetrical, theoretically ambitious, and perhaps too widespread. Still, it 
is the natural setting to approach the subject of inflation in these countries 
Thus this work has tried to make a framework out of the controversy that lends 
itself to the study of the problematic. The causes of inflation are then div­
ided according to monetarism and structuralism and studied in different chapt­
ers, although not in isolation from one another.
The monetary, propagating or orthodox causes of inflation are in.the 
supply of money, budget deficits, and wage escalation (here the term has to 
"be stretched). Monetarist analysis, however, has also come to give signifi­
cant importance to the price instability effects of the devaluation of the 
exchange rate and induced supply bottlenecks; and it is very concerned with 
the effects of inflation on savings and investment. Structuralism is a pecu­
liar emphasis on the cost-push causes of inflation, which simultaneously 
stresses changes in the growth and composition of demand. The structural or 
fundamental causes of inflation take the form of supply bottlenecks: foreign 
exchange, agricultural output, import-substitution industrialisation, and 
infrastructure; although importance is also given to the factor distribution 
of income.
The cures for inflation are again examined within the framework of the 
controversy. Attention is concentrated, however, on orthodox policy measures 
— monetary, fiscal, incomes and exchange rate - and only marginal comments are 
made on domestic and foreign sector structural policies. Lastly, the contro­
versy is carried to the confrontation between structuralism and the IMF1s 
sponsored stabilisation programmes. Special attention is given to the 'Fron- 
dizi Plan* in Argentina, the Klein Sacks Mission and the *Alessandri Plan* 
in Chile; and to the IMF's stabilisation measures of 1958-1960 in Peru.
INTRODUCTIon
PART I
CHATTER I 
Scope, Approach and Limitations
The object of the work is the well known problem of inflation in Latin 
America, This problem is approached following the so-called "Monetarist-Struc­
turalist Controversy"; something which priori sets certain theoretical implic­
ations, as well as an ambitious scope. Thus, as a consequence of adopting the 
theme of the controversy, several specific objectives have to be examined:
1.- The theoretical and policy problem of growth with stability, the main interest 
of the controversy.
2.- The ordering of the polemics into a relatively abstract frame of reference.
This means selecting and qualifying the main causes (or variables) of infla­
tion, and explaining further implicit assumptions or issues which may have
b been mentioned in the literature but which are not really studied.
3.- The simple empirical testing of these variables, whether explicit or implicit.
4.- The interest on economic policy cures; and, particularly, the conflict 
between orthodox stabilization programmes and academic structural reforms.
Thus the study of the monetarist-structuralist controversy involves j>er se
the analysis of the interrelated problems of stability or inflation and growth or
stagnation. This work, however, places emphasis on the causes of inflation and its
cures, and only secondarily of the underdeveloped mature of Latin America. The
study is on the theory of inflation, and not on growth or development theories.
But, abstraction from the subject of growth may be difficult and from our point 
\
of view, undesirable. One has thus been willingly forced into the study of 
inflation with a closely undercurrent streak of the growth priority ojective. On 
the other hand, inflation has been traditionally a subject for monetary and budget­
ary theories; something which, in the view of some, is unacceptable for these 
.countries. The later oppinion, for our purpose, is too extreme in the sense that 
the financial causes of inflation also merit careful attention. For example, the 
controversy has really neglected, with exception, the subject of income velocity 
of circulation. It is thought useful, however, to introduce the topic into the 
controversy and to try to interpret the experience of Latin America with reference 
to monetary theory.
Apart from the above background, the scope of this work may appear to be too 
wide. It is necessary to justify both the scope and the approach. The specific 
objectives are a reflection of what the controversy is and is not • The controversy 
is on Latin-America's inflation as a whole; first!}', with reference to the 
theoretical neecl of studying the causes of inflation (or variables) with reference
to one another; and, secondly, its object is to generalize for the region as a 
whole, so that for empirical purposes inter-country comparisons become a pre­
requisite. It was felt, perhaps optimistically* that at this level the empirical 
possibilities of exploring the controversy and establishing inter-comparissons 
offered an opportunity for original research. Conversely, the controversy "so far" 
is a series of oppinions of the authorities on the region. These oppinions to a 
large extent have taken the form of general theoretical essays. Of course, there 
are also numerous works which, within the controversy and although statistically 
minded and specific, only stress the role of partial variables in the multiple 
relationships the problems of inflation and growth present. But, since the general 
controversy is valid -judgying by the interest and work it has produced for at 
least two decades- it may he helpful to understand partial studies within our 
framework for the controversy. This work, besides trying to sistematize the 
issues, takes a first approach into the challange implicit in the controversy;
the simple empirical testing of the related key variables in the region*s inflation
* , .
and, sometimes, the introduction and examination of issues that have been left 
aside by others.
As a consequence of the study of the above cquses of inflation, the economic 
policy aspect of the problem has to be considered. The main interest here is the 
conflict between short-term and orthodox policies that aim at stabilization and 
structural policies in the context of a serai-industrialized Latinamerican country. 
But the interest is also on discussing the possibility of divising shor-term 
financial policies which aim at stabilization in terms of a growth priority. The 
fact that vthe study of the controversy has to he taken for Latin America as a whole 
led to two further interests and tentative conclusions. Generali^ations about the 
region may he quite valid and important if they are based on the research of case 
studies. Because such research gives the possibility of significant interregional 
comparisons in the fields of inflation, growth, and policy making. The study of 
short-tferm measures -orthodox or unorthodox- at the case level may result in inter­
comparisons and generalizations with the aim of discussing the financial compat­
ibility of growth and stability in Latin America (This could prove to he an 
interesting field of specialization).
Moreover, these successive steps start on a general level that develops 
towards specific issues and more detailed case studies. Hence it is an exercise 
on an over-all problem which selects certain means and moves towards a more 
specialized field: a closer look into short-term stabilization measures* The
experience ought to result ir some conclusions and suggestions of more and. new 
studies on the subject.
3Lastly, the interest is not limited to the "contents” of the controversy; 
it is also involved with the "existence” of the controversy. Fhy did the 
controversy start to "begin with? Why has it been raging over the past twenty 
years? Is it over? if not -when is it going to? Are the opponents irreconcil- 
Jable? Has it served any purpose? Is it a fundamental background for the future 
of Latin America's economic policy? Can it lead the way towards a General Theory 
suited to the conditions of the region?
In summary, as it was said, the approach has three parts: an introduction,
the discussion of the controversy, and a last part on economic policy and actual
stabilization programmes. Part I states the problem of growth and stability in
Latin &nerica; firts it generalizes about the region and later it abstracts from
the relatively stable countries and discusses the magnitude of the problem. Part
II deals, empirically and in theory, with both sides of the polemics. (The
statistical limitations are discussed in the resx?ective Chaptex*). It concentrates
on the "monetarist” variables:the supply of money and velocity, budget deficits,
devaluation of the exchange rate, and wage escalation (here the term monetarism
has to be stretched). There is also a brief exposition of some of the effects of
chronic inflation on savings and investment, as well as on the role of "induced”
supply bottlenecks and price distortions on the inflationary spiral. Later it
discusses the structuralist variables: agricultural output, foreign exchange,
import-substitution industrialization, public investment, and income distribution.
In Part III -with the above information- the controversy is carried to economic
policy and to the experience with stabilization programmes in Argentina, Chile, and 
\
Peru.
The bibliography on the Latin-American dilemma of stability versus growth is 
massive. Thus this simple study cannot pretend in any sense to he comprehensive. 
The position adopted was one of selecting works which illustrate the main issues. 
However, a bibliography, which was compiled, is presented. The exposition uses 
abundantly both the works of Latin?American economists and policy makers and those 
works of Anglo-Saxon and French authors who have studied Latin America at some 
point. The main bo4y of literature on structuralism is that around ECLA and Dr. 
PreMsch; hut special mention should also be made to the Chilean and Mexican 
schools and partidularly to some important British contributions. Monetarist 
literature is particularly strong in Brazil -perhaps rightly so- and popular with 
North-Anerican economists. There are, of course, numerous exceptions to these 
generalities.
Chapter 2
Growth and Stability in Latin America: The Problem in General Terms
The specific object of this work, as it has been said, is to discuss empiric
ally the causes of Latin America's inflation and the policy cures proposed. The
general background to the subject, for reasons that will be presented along the
exposision, is the problem of price instability in the context of growth -or, 
more frequently, stagnation. The general problem may be approached, broadly 
speaking, from two angles:
1.- The theoretical background of the subject -abstracting from the dynamics of 
growth- lies in the persistent controversy between classic economics and 
unorthodox theories; with special reference to Keynesianism and Merxism in the 
latter. Firstly, the problem could be reduced, to the economics of Milton 
Friedman and the different writers that form the neo-Keynesian tradition. The 
problem relates not only to the possible relationship between the supply andi
the demand for money and the price level, but to the incorporation of the
*financial market into the real-income market . Secondly, the problem could
be followed with respect to inflationary theories and the demand-pull or cost- **push controversy . The problems of growth and the price level, on the other 
hand, is >a relatively new subject. Its point of departure, however, is the 
contemx^orary interest on development theories and, specifically, the construe 
tion of growth models. Growth models start from the convention of "real" 
growth relationships. They usually postulate a constant ratio of savings to 
income and proceed to determine the conditions under which the moddl would 
result in a steady growth path; the rate of growth being determined by the 
exogenous rates of population growth and technological progress and the endo­
genous savings rates which wo^ld maximize consuption per capita along the 
steady growth path. Now, the problem of introducing money into such a model 
lies in incorporating money and monetaiy growth into the concept of income; 
and deducing the influence of variations in the rate of monetary expansion in
terms of the rate of changes in prices and the proportion of resources avail-
***able.for investment. A starting point has been to consider money -as an
instrument of exchange and a store of value- as socially virtually costless 
to create and hence that its stock would be maintained at a socially satietal
' * For summary exposision of the subject see II. Jolmson's Essays in monetary econ 
omics (Allen and Unwin, London).
** For a summary exposision of the subject see M. Bronfenbrenner and F.D. Holzman's 
Survey of inflation theory in Am. Econ. Rev., 1963.
*** For a discussion on the subject see J. Tobin, Money and economic growth, Econo- 
metrica 1968.
5
ITlevel • With reference to monetary policy it implies that the controls on r- 
money and quasi-moneys reduce the use of money and money substitutes as a 
source of investment opportunities and hence reduce the growth of the econ- 
ony* But, the proposition refers to the optimalization of the holding of 
real balances, where the gains of using costless paper as a medium of exchan­
ge and store of value could be dissipated through inflation. The conclusion 
emerges that monetary efficiency, growth and social welfare require the mana­
gement of money and quasi-moneys so as to 11 influence” the price level and 
prevent or check inflation.
2.— The general problems of growth and stability has also been approached, both 
in advanced countries and in Latin America, from the angle of general econo­
mic policy: ideally to reach a compatible set of economic policies and econo­
mic objectives where a steady growth in output and technology is compatible 
with full employment, external and internal stability, and the management of 
public finance. The emphasis of the Latin-Araerican literature, -in general 
terms, but also with special reference to the problem of inflation- on this 
approach has been very great • It is for this reason -as well as for the 
purpose of studing inflation as seen be the "monetarist-structuralist" con-
^ y  y
troversy -that this work will follow this approach . Indeed the over­
all intellectual desire in Latin America, at least for the past forty years, 
has been the elaboration of a development policy. This is present both in the 
work of economists and public administrators. Though the situation may vary 
from country to country, and from period to period, it is safe to assume that 
the long term objectives of a development policy, although more academic than 
of a practival nature, are everywhere the following: to maximize the rate of 
growth and incorporate modern technology; to increase employment, and distribute 
income more equally; and, to achieve and maintain "a reasonable" degree of 
domestic and external stability. It may be argued that these policy objectives 
differ in approach from those of advanced countries. This is not to say that 
they are not present in, say, the United States or Yiester Europe, but that the 
order of priorities is different and perhaps less ambitious in these last 
countries.
* For a discussion on this avant-garde proposition see A.H. Meltzer, Money, 
intermediation and growth, Journal of Econ. Literature, 1969.
** For an introduction into the subject of growth and the development policy 
approach see ECIA (l).
*** This does not mean to say that the region*s literature does not represent an 
important -end sometimes disregarded- contribution to economic theory. The 
relation between the problem of growth and stability and the balance of pay­
ments and import substitution industrialisation are but two subjects in which 
the region has takpn a lead.
6The difference in the i>olicy approach may v/ell lie in the fact that Latin 
America aims at growth with stability in a setting of widely fluctuating rates of 
growth, considerable unemployment, a high concentration of income, and bewildering 
domestic and external desequilibria and that this instability is "severer11 than 
in advanced countries. Moreover, this has led, as it will be seen, to the idea 
that the problem of instability has to be studied strictly in terms of the growth 
objective; or, alternatively, to place the problem in the context of underdevelop­
ment (an ambitious term which, nonetheless, is useful to understand the region's 
inflation). But, from the theoretical point of view, this "local discussion" on 
economic objectives and priorities may be considered an academic extension of the 
problems faced by western capitalist economies. Both in Latin America and abroad 
there is a disagreement with respect to the causes of slow growth or stagnation 
and instability, and with respect to the economic tools to diagnose and cure the 
problems.
Having selected the second approach -which abstracts only superficially from 
the monetary and demand-pull cost-push controversies in advanced countries and 
totally from growth models -it is convenient to qualify its content:
1.- The approach is then a consequence of three things: the literature of the
region -3ee ECLA again (2)- the specific interest on inflation, its causes and
• cures; and, the adoption of the monetarist-structuralis controversy as a guide­
line into the subject (parts II and III of the thesis develop the argument).
2.- The derived interest on the close interrelationship between the growth perfor­
mance and inflation. That is, for the purpose of this work, the focus on 
inflation and stabilization policies serves as an empirical guideline to under­
stand the region's growth performance and relative failure in the use of 
economic policy,
3.- A starting point would be first to describe the poor growth performance and
second to incorporate the approach based on the causes of inflation and its
cures.
Latin America expanded at a considerable rate until the early 1950's as a 
consequence of the expansionary trends in the world economy due to the recovery 
from the Great Depression, Second World War, the postwar boom and Korea. Table 
I, shows that between 19^5 and 1955 rather high rates of growth were achieved
7Particularly when compared to latter and previous periods. The trend, however,
has been reversed in the next decade and its aftermath. The negative impact of
this tendency on per capita income has been meanwhile aggravated by the acceler
ation of population growth. Turning to Table II, it may be seen that by 1955-61,
in per capita terms, only Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela exceeded the Latin-american
average rate of growth, which was only 1.4$. The slowness of growth has continued
during the last four years of the period. Two facts ought to be distinguised.
Firstly, Brazil*s growth rate has declined, Perufs has been maintained, and
Mexicovs has increased (it is useful to distinguish these three countries because
throughout the exposition they represent the more favourable trends in the region).
Second^ during 1964-65 most countries showed a remarkable recovery in GNP. This
boom, caused by an abnormal recovery in world markets for primmary products, may
well stop when such markets return to normality. In fact, the growth performances
deteriorated again in 1966. Therefore this should not be taken as the indication
of the beginning of another period of high long-term growth trends, but only as a *cyclical spurt.
The trends in per capita product only reflect the real failure in Latin-ame-
rican growth and growth policies. The serious problems underlying the poor rate
of growth are better revealed through the behaviour of the export sector, the\chronic devaluations, the level of international reserves, and the degree of exter­
nal disequilibrium; through unemployment and the concentration of income; through 
the performance of the agricultural sector and the obstacles and price contradic­
tions the incipient industrialization effort uncounters; through the defficient 
money and capital markets and ill-managed financial policies; and, in general, 
through the underdeveloped nature of the economy.
It is both fortunate and complex that price instability is related to the 
above factors. Indeed the relationship between inflation and the above factors 
-something which entails the explanation of its causes- is what interests us here 
as a clue to the understanding, of the growth process. Perhaps the best known 
Latin-american economic problem is that of its economic instability, both domestic
* In some countries like Argentina and Chile the 1964-65 increase, writes Dr. 
Sunkel, is mainly the consequence of the resumption of expansionary policies 
after years of restriction. The rate of growth of GNP per capita did achieve 
ratheir high levels for a short period in the early 50's (4.6$) but has been 
declining substantially ever since in almost all countries, including those few 
like Brazil, Venezuela, and Ecuador, which have had very dynamic economics (3)*
TABLE. I
Hates of Growth of GNP and Population, 1935-1965* in Latin America
Period GNP Population
GNP 
Per Capita
1935-40 3.3 1.9 1.3
1940-45 4.3 2.1 2.2
1945-60 5.7 2.5 3.2
1950-55 4.7 2.7 2.0
1955-61 4.3 2.8 1.4
1 9  6 2 3.5 2.8 0.7
1 9  6 3 1.8 2.9 -1.2
1 9  6 4 5.4 2.9 2.5
1 9  6 5 5.0 3.0 2.0
1 9 6 6' 3.1 3.0 0.1
Source: Economic Survey of Latin America, 1965-1968, UN, N. Y.
a) Excludes Cuba
b) GNP in 1950 Prices
TABLE II
Growth of Total and Per Capita GNP in Latin American Countries
Country 1945
(1945-50-1965) 
1950 1955 1962 1963 1964 1965
Latin Americaa
-50
5.7
-55
4.7
-61
4.3 3.5 1.8 5.4 6.2
Argentina 5.0 2.0 1.9 -3.3 -5.2 8.2 7.8
Brazil 6.1 5.7.. 6.1 5.3 1.6 1.4 3.8
Chile 2.8 3.1 3.7 6.5 1.7 4.4 4.1
Colombia 4.7 5.3 4.0 5.0 3.5 4.5 3.2
Peru 4.4 5.1 5.3 7.5 3.7 5.5 5.8
Uruguay 4.2 0.3 -2.2 -1.0 1.1
•
1.2
Bolivia 1.9 0.9 0.7 4.1 6.2 6.2 5.5
Ecuador 9.2 5.4 4.2 4.6 3.3 4.5 3.3
Mexico 6.3 6.7 5.4 5.0 6.3 10.0 5.4
Venezuela 10.6 8.7 5.7 6.3 5.9 7.6 6.2
Central America 5.8 4.6 4.1 6.3 5.7 6.7 6.8
Latin America 3.2
GNP PER CAPITA 
2.0 1.4 0.7 -1.2 2.5 3.3
Argentina 2.8 -0.2 0.1 -5.0 -6.8 6.2 6.3
Brazil 3.4 2.6 3.0 2.4 -1.5 -1.5 0.7
Chile 1.0 0.9 1.2 4.1 0.8 2.1 1.7
Colombia 2.0 2.4 1.2 2.2 0.5 1.6 0
Peru 2.6 2.8 2.7 4.3 1.2 2.4 3.2
Uruguay
Bolivia -1.1
-0.9
-1.6
-3.4
1.9
-2.2
3.8
-0.2
3.7
-0.3
3.2
Ecuador 6.2 2.5 1.1 2.1 —0.1 1.0 -0.1
Mexico 3.5 3.6 1.4 1.6 2.9 6.5 2.0
Venezuela 7.3 4.6 1.7 2.6 2.2 4.0 2.7
Central America 3.1 1.6 0J8 3.1 2.3 3.4 3.4
a) Except Cuba
b) Source: Economic Survey of Latin America, 1963-68, United
Nations, New York.
8and external. The record shown by price and exchange indices is not only very 
bad in a historical sense for most countries, but it has also become worse in 
recent years (for a discussion turn to chapters 3 and 4), Inflation is thus a 
a complex phenomenon that in the extreme characteristics of Latin America ’’brings 
forth many of its facets”. Movements in prices are associated in various ways 
with changes in the supply of money, its velocity of circulation, the rate of in­
terest, and budgetary policies; movements in savings, investment, and output; 
variations in wages, profits, and incomes; and, deterioration in foreing trade, 
the rate of exchange, and international capital movements. ”In this profussion 
of cross-correlations, writes D. Seers, it is easy to indulge in one as a comple­
te explanation, and such over-simplified views are widespread” (5)* Chronic pri­
ce increases are,of course, a result of both economic and financial maladjustment. 
The causal relationship is, however, so complex that it lends itself to such 
controversy. In Latin America, as it has been repeatedly said, it shapes into 
two groups. Let us only say here, that monetarists stress the financial and glo­
bal aspects of the causal effects with emphasis on demand-pull and the stability • 
advantages of the price system; while structuralists rely on the cost-push or 
•’real” causes of inflation with a marked interest for introducing basic economic 
changes at the policy level.
The relationship between inflation and the different economic sectors, apart 
from causability, creates two further problems: its dependance on the output 
growth behaviour; and, its resulting policy recomendatbns. Because whatever 
standing is adopted in the controversy will result in conflicting policy measures 
and in political bias.
It has been more or less agreed that, since the problems of inflation and 
growth are related in a complex fashion, any stabilisation efforts should not 
proceed in abstraction of the growth objective. But here agreement may stop.
In the view of some the same factors which have led to a decline in the rate of 
growth, an increase in unemployment, and concentration of income are also, in 
asociation with secondary financial mechanisms, the fundamental determinants of 
inflation. The determinants behind this dual process are: (l) a low per capita 
income and a regressive distribution of income between sectors and factors; (2) a 
radical increase in population, urbanization, and the demostration effect or a 
change in the structure of demand; (3) the level of activity depending on a few 
export comnodities, that do not only face a highly unstable demand but show seve­
re over-supply, despite prosperity in advanced countries; (4) the necessity to
*^this classicapproach is best represented by Dr. Prebisch (6).
9import all sorts of goods, including foodstuffs which in the ahove circumstances
cannot be al afforded and lead to external disequilibrium; (5) failure to make
an "industrial headway” where mgss production industries fail to appear and any
equilibrium is precarious; and (6) agricultural and public services supply 
*regidities •
Eut these "determinants" also appear in financial factors, and this is 
where monetarism comes into the picture. Inflation can be attributed to monetary, 
fiscal, incomes, and exchange rate policies. The fact is that there are both 
monetary and supply and demand factors behind inflation. But, in the view of 
some, the former are attributed to the latter. While there is truth in this, it 
is claimed that probing deeper is essential -as theory has done in advanced 
countires* One has to answer the Latin-american permissiveness towards money 
increases, budgetary deficits, wage increases, mark-ups, and so on. But to 
answer these financial questions account must be taken in changes of demand, 
fluctuations and trends in the supply of foreign exchange, the behaviour of 
agricultural and industrial markets, movements in real wages, and so on. It is 
stressed, by professor Seers for example, that to explain the behaviour of the 
monetary sphere it is necessary to study economic or real factors. In synthesis, 
this means stating^ the problem inflation in terms of growth. It is in this sense 
that the region's literature represents a contribution to the economics of 
inflation and growth in the acute circumstances of underdevelopment*
Does the above mean that inflation is inevitable? Not necessarily. The 
growth of income could in principle take place without these real and financial 
failures provided output grew sufficiently fast in relation to population, income 
rose without further concentration, and the balance of payments deficit did not 
become chronic. The proposition repeats itself in terms of economic policy 
measures designed to reduce inflation and stimulate growth.
As with advanced countries it is agreed that stabilization should not be 
achieved in isolation from growth, but there is nothing like a consensus of 
opinion on how to do it. It is agreed th^t at times the objectives of equilibria 
and growth may be conflictive, but also that if in the long-run they are incon­
sistent it is difficult to imagine sustained growth. There is, moreover a 
conflict between the policies selected to reach a future compatibility. The 
irm>ortant issue lies in the fact that particular objectives -like price stability, 
industrialization or the reduction of external vulneravility- are not ends but 
means of obtaining the over-all one. For example, industrialization is not
* The subject has been amply discussed by Prebisch, Seers, Sunkel and many others 
working with ECLA (see the bibliography already cited).
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*itself, but as a means to growth without chronic imbalances, higher employment, 
a better standard of living, and less social and political discontent. Price 
stabilization and financial policies are also in the category of means rather 
than ends; and, they can sorely contribute to growth.
The Latin-american controversy, at the policy level, arrisses because while 
there are reasons for avoiding inflation in the pursuit of growth (there is no 
need to list them here), price stability is not always accompanied by growth nor 
doest it necessarily result in a sufficiently high level of savings and invest­
ment, Moreover, the main ultimate justification for the price system is its 
role in shifting factors of production by variations of prices. In Latin America 
an important role in stimulating growth (for example, througli industrialization) 
should be played by price changes. Yet in the context of an underdeveloped 
economy the rigidity in various prices -the reluctance to accept a fall in 
income or supply inelasticities, due to lack of factor mobility- the price 
mechanism may well produce more price rises than falls, and severer than those 
of advanced countries. But, it appears to he a mistake to conlcude that inflation 
is a by-product of the effort to grow. It is agreed in the region, despite 
frequent misinterpretations, that economic growth would be easier if chronic 
inflation could be avoided , Superficially, this is not what the controversy 
is about. The role of the x>rice mechanism, however, has frequently led to the 
following question: are price stability and growth incompatible objectives, and 
if so, which is preferably? One can fall into a logical fallacy here. The 
choice is between various objectives and not between the means of obtaining them. 
The damage done by inflation has to he judged in its effects on growth, income 
equality, and external vulnerability. The question is then whether the total 
effects of one policy -say an inflationary one, fiscal and monetaiy-wese- on 
the above objectives is better than those of another policy -say, an orthodox 
stabilization programme-. Still, the answer to the dilemma is in terras of growth. 
Professor Seers writes: ”... only through economic development can ghe economy 
be made more flexible and strengthened, so that it becomes less prone to inflation. 
If growth were slowed down in the attempt to avoid inflation the day would he 
postponed when the econony could develop with less strain and thus less danger 
of inlfation. A country that pursues stability at the expense of growth, may 
find that it ends up with neither” (?)• The implication of the statement are,
* For the structuralist opinion see again Prebiseh and Seers; and for the 
monetarist position, professor P. Mikesell.
** IToever, the subject is a conirovertial one (-turn to Part II, Chapter 3> 
Section C).
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hoever, a growth priority and presumably the necessity of stablishing at some
point a stabilization compatibility* This is a complex subject which may
"obscure" the fallacy* Eecause though it may be true that both structuralists
and monetarists suscribe to the conclusion, it is clear that the former emphasize
the growth priority, which the latter insist on the "initial” compatibility
between stability and growth. If this is true, there is a radically different
emphasis on the means of putting a stop to inflation, aside from what causes it:
in simply terms those policies conducive to growth may not bring "immediate"*price stability, and viceversa * It is here where deep disagreement exists and 
where the question of the inevitability of inflation appears* Whether this 
happens or not, according to Lord Balogli, depends on the following factors: a)  . 
the pace at which economic change occurs (in income and in supply and demand 
functions); (2) the degree of mobility in factors of production: (3) whether 
external factors are favourable or otherwise; (4) and the efficiency of 
government policy (8). Obviously these requisites have not been fulfilled in 
Latin America nor has there been general agreement in explaining theoretically 
their relative weights with respect to inflation and growth. Monetarists and 
structuralists would agree in broad terms that Latinamerican economies, for 
whatever reason, have been rather inflexible; but the first would again emphasize 
poor economic policy performance and the second real or supply factors.
Before going into the subject in terms of the controversy, it.is useful to 
set the frame for its study. This frame shall comprise the justification of the 
generalizations all ready made with respect to the whole region. Secondly, with 
"instability and industrialization" criteria, the analysis will be reduced to 
the countries that fit better into the controversy. And, thirdly, it will 
include a description of the magnitude of the inflationary problem for the 
countries chosen, with reference to economic indicators, and a delimitation of 
the historical period involved.
* The statement is, of course, open to much debate (turn to Part III, Chapter l).
y •
Chapter 3
A. Generalization about Latin America
It may be argued that it is not justified to speak of Latin America as a 
whole. According to ECLA (9), despite the great differences among the countries 
of the region, it is legitimate to do so at this level of generality because of 
similarities in basic economic characteristics. That is, the problem of under­
development and growth policies is a universal one for Latin America. Moreover, 
as it was seen in the previous tables, almost all countries show a long-run post 
war decline in the rate of growth. "Each country of Latin America, says Dr.
Sunkel, has its own particular characteristics and mix of problems due to differ 
ences in size, natural resource endowment, location, political set-up, and the 
level of industrialization and development achieved (see Table IV). But in spite 
of these circumstances and of the different dynamic impulse of the various econo 
noraies as well as the different levels of economic development, some of the basic 
economic and social characteristicas and problems are to a large extent alike" (lO),
The roots of these common characteristics are to be found in the colonial 
background, in the characteristics way in which these countries were incorpora­
ted into the international economy of the late XIX and early XX centuries, in the 
process of industrialization and diversification which accelerated in some coun­
tries during the 1930’s, and in the low rate of growth during the last two decades. 
The common characteristics are said to be structural. They are to he found in 
agricultural sector, where because of institutional reasons there is a large con 
centration of land ownerships (with the exception of Mexico, Cuba and Bolivia).
The heavy regional dependence are only a few exports of primniary products which 
entail an unstable and sometimes stagnating foreign exchange revenue. The fact 
that a major proportion of investment depends on the import of capital goods; 
current manufacturing production, on the import of fuels, row materials, and 
intermediate goods; and, consi?mption relies on the import of foodstuffs (the si 
ze of the external sector might not be so important as the structure of exports 
and imports). The industrialization process which has resulted in relatively 
small and highly protective markets, with monopolistical tendencies and lack of 
competitiveness in external markets. Also, throughout Latin America, the distri_ 
bution of income -be it by factor share, income group, or by regional within each 
country- is very enequal. This is explained through the concentration of land 
and mineral ownership; the peculiarities of the industrial and external sectors; 
the elastic supply of unskilled labour; the scarcity of professional and skilled 
workers which favour high incomes in small well-organized groups; a large rural 
population which lives of subsistence agriculture, since the concentration of land 
entails at the opposite extreme minifundia; and, the unsuccessful financial pol­
icies.
B« Two groups of countries
However, if it is justified to speak of Latin America as a whole, in so far as 
its growth problematic and its structural characteristics are alike, as we shall 
see, it may also be valid to stress differences between countries with respect to 
the disequilibria present in this growth process - or stagnation - and the dif­
ferent policy approaches adopted. This is specially true as reflected in the rate 
of inflation and the general instability of some countries in the region. On this 
basis a broad distinction can be established in Latin America:
a) One group of countries -in a historical sense - has suffered both internal and 
external disequilibria. It is composed by countries which, for reasons which 
will become obvious below, are arranged as follows:
(1) Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay.
(2) Mexico.
(3) Bolivia find Paraguay.
(4) Ecuador.
b) A second group of countries, in so far as relative external and internal sta­
bility, has maintained the opposite tendencies. They in turn may be super­
ficially arranged as follows:
(1 ) Venezuela.
(2) Central America.
(3) The Caribbean (including the Guianas).
Instability in the one group and relative stability in the other are further 
reflected in the use of different economic policies - orthodox and unorthodox - 
and their alternative objectives -general stability and induced growth — . Further, 
what is just as interesting, there seems to be a striking relationship between the 
process of industrialisation and inflation as such (except in Bolivia, Paraguay, 
and Ecuador). That is, industrialisation, which has been adopted as a means to­
wards growth, has been accompanied by various degrees of chronic inflation in the 
semi-industrialised countries (with the qualification that there has been three 
relatively non-industrialised countries with mild and almost hyper inflation).
Hence this study will cover the first group of inflationary countries - and place 
emphasis on their industrialisation process - and will abstract from the second
group where there has been relative price stability and a lesser industrialisation
\ **effort (again, in a historical sense).
*The point has been discussed by ECLA in The Economic Development of Latin America 
in the post-war period (12).
** »The abstraction and the grouping, however, can be considered more analitical and
empirical than theoretical. In Latin America the following idea is not uncommon: 
when and if the stable economies embark in a sustained process of industrial isatioi 
it may well happen that they develop similar desequilibria and policy dilemmas 
that the semi-industrialised have. The Venezuelan case, in the words of Mr. Felix 
illustrates the point: *Venezuela with its prolonged oil boom is clearly a special 
case, turned somewhat sour, moreover, since 1958 when the oil boon slackened and
14.
Thus the purpose of this section ana the next is to explain and justify such
an abstraction and the interest in industrialisation as a link with inflation.
Economic indicators are important (See Table III and IV and Diagrams I to III);
but it is also fundamental to understand, however superficially, the historical*experience that underlines this simplistic classification.
In general, the explanations of Latin-American inflation tend to go back to 
the times of the Great Depression when the distinction between the two groups of 
countries may start to become clear. This is, of course, a generalisation in 
time that does not account for the different industrialisation efforts that oc- 
cured in each country. Nonetheless it is valid to argue, as Dr. Sunkel does (13), 
that with the 1929 Crisis the especialisation in primary exports and the tradi­
tional dependence on imports was badly shattered in Latin America, One group of 
less developed countries - for whatever reason one desires;— essentially Venezue­
la, Central America, and the Caribbean colonies and independent countries - accept­
ed the shock and continued with their traditional pattern of economic growth and 
orthodox policies and waited until the international markets reassumed ’normal - 
ity*, Some of the other countries - Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay 
where some pre-1929 start had been made in manufacturing, were too severly affect­
ed by the Depression - economically, socially, and politically - to impose a fur­
ther downward adjustment process, ’Prior to 1930, writes D. Felix, when Latin- 
American countries were export economies oar excellence, it is pointed out that 
the inflationary trends were milder. The crisis of the 1930’s was more than an 
economic depression set off by a sharp drop in demand for Latin-American exports 
and worsened by unsuccessful attempts to service the heavy foreign debt... the
e
crisis in the more advanced Latin-American countries was also a crisis of the 
political and social order. This was resolved, however, by a somewhat shaky com­
promise, Grudgingly, the ’oligarchy* made room for a more pluralistic political 
system in which the demands of the white collar and professional classes and the 
urban workers could find expression* (14).
Mexico is a somewhat different case since its Revolution (1910-1917) brought 
a change in the economic policies of the 1920’s and in the export sector. Thus 
the effects of the Depression were secondary to economic and social change imposed 
by the Revolution. Moreover, economic changes first appeared in the agricultural
••domestic prices started rising (ll)* That is, Venezuela is a case of rapid 
growth and little inflation because of rising exports. When export revenue de­
clined and Venezuela tried to compensate the decline in income by accelerating 
her import substitution process she found herself with rising prices; for the 
temporary period when this was true (see table III),
■ j ' v. . ' - '■
15.
In this we shall follow ECLA and several authors, with special reference to 
professor Seers (see footnotes) (5).
This point and several of its developments were suggested to me by Mr, N, 
Warnan of the University of Glasgow,
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TABLE II
m m
Growth of Total and Per Capita GNP in Latin American Countries
(1945-50-1965)
Country 1945 1950 1955 1962 1963 1964 1965
-50 -55 -61
Latin Americaa 5.7 4.7 4.3 3.5 1.8 5.4 6.2
Argentina 5.0 2.0 1.9 -3.3 -5.2 8.2 7.8
Brazil 6#1 5.7.. 6.1 5.3 1.6 1.4 3.8
Chile 2.8 3.1 3.7 6.5 1.7 4.4 4.1
Colombia 4.7 5.3 4.0 5.0 3.5 4.5 3.2
Peru 4.4 5.1 5.3 . 7.5 3.7 5.5 5.8
Uruguay 4.2 0.3 -2.2 -1.0 1.1 1.2
Bolivia 1.9 0.9 0.7 4.1 6.2 6.2 5.5
Ecuador 9.2 5.4 4.2 4.6 3.3 4.5 3.3
Mexico 6.3 6.7 5.4 5.0 6.3 10.0 5.4
Venezuela 10.6 8.7 5.7 6.3 5.9 7.6 6,2
Central America 5.8 4.6 4.1 6.3 5.7 6.7 6.8
GNP PER CAPITA
Latin America 3.2 2.0 1.4 0.7 -1.2 2.5 3.3
Argentina 2.8 —0.2 0.1 -5.0 -6.8 6.2 6.3
Brazil 3.4 2.6 3.0 2.4 -1.5 -1.5 0.7
Chile 1.0 0.9 1.2 4.1 0.8 2.1 1.7
Colombia 2.0 2.4 1.2 2.2 0.5 1.6 0
Peru 2.6 2.8 2.7 4.3 1.2 2.4 3.2
Uruguay -0.9 -3.4 -2.2 -0.2 -0.3
Bolivia - -1.1 -1.6 1.9 3.8 3.7 3.2
Ecuador 6.2 2.5 1.1 2.1 -0.1 1.0 -0.1
Mexico 3.5 3.6 1.4 1.6 2.9 6.5 2.0
Venezuela 7.3 4.6 1.7 2.6 2.2 4.0 2.7
Central America 3.1 1.6 0J8 3.1 2.3 3.4 3.4
a) Except Cuba
b) Source: Economic Survey of Latin America, 1963-68, United
Nations, New York#
sector through, the ’Reform’; and it was until the late 1930's and more so during 
Second World War when import substitution industrialisation and inflation advanced 
(see Table III). Colombia also reacted to the depression with quite a lag, as 
compared with the southern countries. Import substitution, accompanied by an in­
crease in the rate of inflation, becomes apparent in the late 1930‘s. With Peru, 
on the other hand, one cannot really speak of significant industrialisation until 
well into the 1940’s* However, Peruvian authorities had departed from orthodox 
policies by 1940 and this was marked by severe inflation (see again Table III).
On any event, between 1930 and 1940, these Latin-Anerican countries which to­
day we call semi-industrialised began to isolate their economies through various 
protective devices (tariffs, devaluation, exchange controls, and other industrial­
isation incentives). Thus they responded to the decline in the export sector with 
measures that tried to maintain the level of income by deficit financing and mea­
sures to cope with unemployment, something that advanced countries were doing too.
An import gap was created, but expected to close with the development of internal 
production, mainly manufacturing. But since the pre-crisis level of exports was 
not restored until after the war, while income levels were high and expanding and 
industry could not increase substantially in the short run, the adjustment between 
total demand and supply involved a strong rise in the price level but also a major 
change of relative prices in favour of manufactures. The industrial sector was re­
ceiving in this way further stimulus - in addition to protection - and proceeded 
with import substitution. Industrialisation then brought a new kind of dependence:
certain types of intermediate and capital goods had to be imported to maintain the 
*level of income .
With respect to the second historical difference between semi-stable and in­
flationary countries - monetary and financial policies - there were important
changes in the latter as far back as the XIX century. It is outside the scope of
*•*this work to go into the financial history of Latin America 9 although some rel­
evant comments should be made to support the classification following professor 
Seers. The point is, that even before the Great Depression, some of the selected 
Latin-American countries had begun to devalue and often to suspend convertibility 
into gold to alleviate slumps in their exports. National central banks were being 
formed and there were moves towards monetary independence in the authorities, but 
this was also accompanied by inflation. An example of this is Chile (a subject well 
discussed by professor Hirschman (16). Nonetheless, throughout the 1920*s, Latin 
America was also trying to follow the European countries in re-establishing the gold 
standard and the international monetary system which had collapsed with First World 
War.
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Industrialisation (MST) and inflation during the postwar are discussed in Part II, 
Chapter 5» Section (c).
Ht-For an introduction into the subject, however indirect, see D. Joslin and F. 
Tamagna (15)©
Observance of the rules of the gold standard meant that certain problems 
never arose. A shortage of foreign reserves could hardly occur, and any inci­
pient price inflation could be stopped by a shortage of money before it could 
gather momentum. Among the virtues of the gold standard was that it achieved 
these ends almost automatically, and problems requiring political decision and 
administrative action were less acute; together with restricted import needs 
and expansive export markets. In one respect, though, most Latin American 
countries departed from the strict gold standard conventions: ' holdings of the 
currencies of industrial countries were treated as if they were gold. It was 
convenient to hold them and, since they were fully convertible into gold, this 
meant a departure from practices followed overseas.
Despite the moves towards financial independence, monetary systems were 
still hardly developed enough to give much scope for deliberate policy. Exchange 
controls and multiple rates were as yet tcuisad. In any case, the material basis 
for a more active and independent policy hardly existed in most countries, at 
least in the short run, if the lackof local capacity for producing manufactures 
is taken into account. Monetary expansion would have led quickly to an increase 
in imports and an unacceptable loss of foreign reserves. But the almost complete 
absence of conscious economic strategy proved a serious handicap in the years 
that followed. Administrations were not gaining in experience and political 
leaders thought that economic development was, broadly speaking, outside their 
control and therefore not their responsability.
The larger economies with time might have had to abandon the rules of the 
gold standard, important as its advantages were and even if fluctuations in 
foreign trade had heen avoided. These rules implied a great priority for bal­
ancing payments and domestic price stability. Income and employment could, grow 
and recessions could be avoided only if export markets continued to expand; 
which in last resort meant a dependence on the growth of advanced countries, a 
rate which might prove to slow for a region with low per capita income and a 
fast rate of population growth. However, the question was never put to the test. 
The depression which started in J.929 was so harsh that even advanced countries 
discarded the gold standard. The leading industrial countries abandoned converti­
bility into gold one after another and devaluated their currencies. The abandon­
ment of the gold standard was the necessary condition for anti-cyclical programs, 
such as public schemes.
The slump was particularly severe in Latin America. Public revenue depended 
largely on export taxes and investment from foreign sources was important. So 
that the decline in exports, which was much larger than in the industrial countrie 
meant a reduction in both.
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At the sane time, the foreign exchange shortage was aggravated by the slow flow 
of short-term capital, which in'some cases was turned into an out-flow. At the 
sane time Latin America found it particularly difficult to cut the necessary im­
ports. Governments revoked convertibility, not only into gold, but also into 
foreign currencies. Like manv other countries, industrial or primary nrodncer, 
thosein Latin America introduced import tariffs in an attempt to correct the de­
ficit in foreign payments and increased duties on imports. Many of them also de­
faulted on foreign debts, as a number of European countries were doing.
Apart from these steps, one group of countries took additional measures 
whereas the remainder did not, and there has been a clear distinction between 
these groups ever since. A distinction on which, from the monetary point of 
view, we base our abstraction. The additional measures can be summed up as auto­
nomous monetary expansion, autonomous in the sense that it was much greater than 
would have been justified by movements in reserves. Moreover, the monetary ex­
pansion - and inflation - occurred in those countries which had the largest in­
dustrial sectors - Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, and Mexico - and 
MST potentiality. These countries had the greates scope for action: they had 
industries which could supply at least some of the needs of the local consumer 
and absorb some of the unemployment. It must not be thought, however, that com­
pensatory action was in all cases deliberately chosen as an economic strategy 
or that exchange controls were imposed to stop the consequent loss of reserves. 
The crisis developed so quickly that administrations had to improvise. The ex­
pansion of credit was decided, on a few hours to save banks from closing budget 
deficits appeared because of falling revenues. Each further movement broke away 
from the conventional standards, monetary and budgetary and domestic and foreign 
stability wise. Backing for the currency fell; further devaluations occurred 
not o n l y  in terms of the gold but of the American dollar: and, more controls
were placed on purchases of foreign exchange.
1SOO
Gold Reserves of Latin America 
(millions of dollars)
 includes seven countries includes twelve countries
10
Note: For 1913-1939 data was only available for seven countries (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela). Five additional 
countries are included in the second curve covering 1929-39 (Colombia, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mexico).
Source (13)
Although there had been some diversification in the larger economies, as 
it was said, the Depression came to demonstrate how far this process would 
have to advance by reveling how much Latin America was dependant on import. 
Because of the shortage of foreign exchange the imports of Argentina, Brazil, 
and Mexico shrank by one half between 1929-32, and in Chile even more. The 
problem of maintaining the level of income, the standard of living, and employ­
ment was one of creating import substitution industries and public works. And, 
devaluation, and higher tariffs gave impetus to industrialisation and opened up 
new domestic markets. But, the serious obstacle was financing investment; 
foreign investment was small, private savings were on the decline, imports were 
expensive. Also, the labour force lacked skills, land owners were unwilling to 
modernise, there were few entrepreneurs. Thus, throughout the 1930fs: industrial­
isation increased the demand for domestic and foreign inputs, which because of 
devaluation were now dearer, as well as foodstuffs. Adequate infrastructure, 
like transport and energy, were greatly required. And, although industry grew 
in response to the protection stimuli, competition was imperfect and prices 
higher. The response in agriculture was even more inadequate and allowances 
for imports of capital goods and fuels had to be made. The result is that the 
demand for foreign exchange did not fall and the exchange rate was under cons­
tant pressure. By 1932 prices were rising in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico; Ar­
gentinian and Uruguayan took longer because exports could be diverted into the 
domestic market (see Table III). Also, Argentina had advanced further in her 
industrialisation and the substitution for imports involved a less radical de­
parture from previous patterns of production. Moreover, both countries had 
basic social capital, labour was less immobile, and fiscal and monetary policy 
were managed in a way to offset the effects of fluctuations in foreign trade.
The inflationary industrialisation experience in this group of countries, is 
cm interesting illustration of the relative significance of monetary and real 
factors. It is possible to attribute inflatinn to the easiness with which the 
authorities expanded the supply of money. If this monetary expansion had not 
occurred, prices and exchange rates would have changed little, as in Venezuela 
and the smaller Caribbean and Central American countries. But one must take 
account of the context of monetary policy. Faced with a catastrophic fall in 
exports, policies had to make choices between unpleasant alternatives. V/hen 
revenue fell off, for example, Governments were presented with a dilemma. They 
could make drastic cuts in expenditure and face social implications (at a time 
when unemployment was high) or they could resort to deficit finance. Similarly, 
monetary authorities had to decide whether to expand credit, despite the fall 
in reserves, or shut-up banks. On the other hand, they had whether to promote 
import substitution or to face stagnation. In several of our economies they
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chose rising prices and devaluation rather than falling income.and unemployment.
Of course, this is not to say that the strain on the balance of payments and 
price inflation would not have been less if policy had been carefully thought 
- something that judging from the chronic inflation Latin American policy has 
not been able to do yet.
Most of the remaining countries either refrained from an autonomous monetary 
and budgetary policy or from significant industrialisation. This is the case of 
Central America, the Caribbean, and Venezuela, which form the second group of 
countries (see Tables III and IV). For one thing in these countries urban pro­
letariats were relatively very small. While the depression meant severe hard­
ship, a great part of the population worked in subsistence sectors only remote­
ly affected by fluctuations in the commercial part of the economy. The banking 
systems were, moreover, largely in foreign hands and there was opposition to mea­
sures which might lead to devaluation of the currency. In any event, the scope 
for expansionist policies was quite limited in small economies which, although 
very dependant on exports, could hardly launch an industrialisation effort, e.i. 
Central America.
Venezuela falls into this group too. It possessed in petroleum an export
which has proved easy to market until quite recently and then only for a short
period and earnings of foreign exchange have climbed up very rapidly. Even
in the depression, the upward trend was halted rather than reversed. The need
for compensatory policy did not therefore rise in the 1930's and the Venezuelan*bolivar was so strong that it appreciated vis-A-vis the United States dollar .
Three countries belonging to this non-industrialised group, however, did 
attempt unorthodox financial policies and in two cases prices rose sharply dur­
ing the 1930's. Bolivia suffered from a severe decline in tin exports, which 
immediately unbalanced the budget, and on top of this came the Chaco war, fought 
in the midst of the depression. The consequence could only he an unmanageable 
demand for imports, leading to successive devaluations and internal price in­
creases (see again Table III and Table VT3). Paraguay, Bolivia's protagonist in 
the war, although it financed its military expenditure in more orthodox terms, 
also started to suffer one of the worst Latin American inflations. In Ecuador, 
also, monetary expansion led to steep price rises, -without alleviating internal 
conditions appreciably;, Structuralist and in size these countries belong with the 
Central America-Caribbean group, but precisely because they lacked the initial 
industrial potentiality of the more advanced countries they experienced particular­
ly violent bouts of inflation. Because of this they have been included in the
*The criteria followed by the Economic Commission for Latin America is similar
(17). It is this unmatched favourable situation in the external sector which
largely explains how Venezuela has been, able to avoid inflation. It has been:
possible, via. imports to bridge gaps and avoid bottlenecks to the extent few
other countries could hope for. Government receipts from the external sector have
heen^large, so that.expenditure could be expanded without the same pressure on the financial structure.
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study as a special sub-class which shall be included with the first group (see 
Tables III and IV).
Summarising, the countries of the region can be divided into two groups:
the first includes those ten economies that have followed unorthodox financial«policies, experienced chronic price inflation, and a series of devaluations.
Seven of these are today the most industrialised economies of the region; the 
other three, although much closer to the second group in structural character­
istics, also have suffered violent inflations. The second group is composed
*of Venezuela, Central America and the Caribbean economies ; those countries 
which after the depression maintained their parity with the US dollar - they 
are in fact now on a dollar standard - and continued to practice orthodox finan­
cial policies. These countries experienced only moderate price rises over the 
three past decades; they are mostly unindustrialised and relatively more de­
pendant on foreign trade; and their economic structure tended to be preserved 
by reciprocal trade agreements with the United States, which offered special 
marketing advantages in return for restricting protection towards local indus­
tries and trade from other countries.
This classification criteria is frequently present in works about the finan­
cial problems of Latin America. ECLA writes: ’’Excluding ... Venezuela, the
countries with relative price stability are the smaller countries where the ex­
port sector is predominant? where industry is considerably less important; and, 
in general, where the urban population is smaller. Thus the pressures associat­
ed with industrialisation and urbanisation have been less intense, and exports 
have expanded at a relatively favourable rate... Monetary policy... has follow­
ed orthodox lines and currencies have maintained their value in relation to the 
dollar (18)”. Professor Seers has also divided Latin American economies in sim­
ilar groups (19)• "All these countries - he explains refering to Venezuela,
Cuba, Ecuador, and the Central American Republics - have maintained from 1929-60 
a dollar exchange standard, with high dollar backing and little exchange control” 
Moreover, he goes on to say, that the growth rate has been connected to export 
performance; the import coefficient shows a gradual upward tendency; the 
government made only sparing use of protection; inflation appears to have been 
moderate during the last three decades ; and most members had in 1958 the 
same exchange rate vis-d-vis the USA dollar as in 1929• These countries were 
politically more able to face stagnation or a decline in domestic income, when 
exports stagnated or declined. Profits of foreign companies in the export trade 
absorbed a high proportion of export fluctuation; a big fraction of the labour 
force is in the subsistence sector, and the working clases have little political
*For the pre-war period Nicaragua is an exception because of its considerable 
inflation and after the 1958 revolution Cuba becomes a case all its own.
ifcrftATYfc for Ecuador.
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power•"However* there are also indications that political tensions can arise in 
primary-producing countries which achieve monetary stability by monetary restric­
tions and by neglecting industrialisation" (in Cuba there was stagnation follow­
ed by a revolution and in Venezuela, when the petroleum boom subsided for a period, 
there was unemployment, a rise in expenditure, devaluation despite big foreign 
loans, import controls, and higher tariffs, and rising prices). "Mexico and the 
rest of South America show a greater variety of experience. They have experienced 
higher rates of growth than in exports. They have all experienced moderate-to-fast 
inflation, which continued - or accelerated - when export markets weakened in the 
1950's. They have also had more incentive to stimulate growth, because of large 
working-urban classes which need employment; but these economies also enjoy great­
er physical possibilities for compensatory finance, having large manufacturing 
sectors already by the 1920's and possessing markets large enough to permit con­
siderable industrialisation" (this last statement, as it will be seen, is of course 
open to much debate}.
Resuming, in simple terms the difference between inflationary and semi-stable
*countries, with respect to the cost of living and in a historical context, may be 
seen in Table III. V/here data is available, inflation appears to be persistent and 
severe in the selected countries from 1930 to 1966. In the pre-war period this is 
true for all these countries, excepting Argentina and Uruguay where export product­
ion was diverted into the domestic market, something that was less possible in the 
rest of the countries. Mexico is also a partial exception, in so far as from the 
1960!s she has moved towards stability. On the other hand, in the semi-stable 
countries v/here data are available- Venezuela, Cuba, and Costa Rica - inflation was 
well under control in the pre and post-war periods. This is true for all semi­
stable countries in the post-war period. In both groups of countries, however, in­
flation accelerated during the II World War. Still, inflation was severer and per­
manent in the selected countries. The long run tendencies and the difference be­
tween the two groups may be further seen in Diagrams I and II (1920-1959) and Dia­
gram III (1958-1966). Moreover, they provide a comparison with stable advanced - 
countries, the United States and the United Kingdom.
C - Inflation and industrialisation
It is important to illustrate the relationship between the process of infla­
tion and industrialisation, which has been discussed in a historical context. 
Concentrating on the post-war period, Table IV has three simple indicators of the 
increasing importance of industrialisation in the inflationary countries, over and 
above what is happening in the semi-stable ones. First, it may be seen that manu­
facturing as a of GDP represents in all the inflationary countries a much higher 
figure than in the semi-stable ones. Moreover, the relative importance of indus­
try has been increasing rapidly in the latter. Second, urban population - which
if "It should be stressed, following Professor Mikesell, that not only are the price
represents to an important extent the industrial labour force - has been a signi­
ficantly greater percentage of the total in the inflationary countries, except in 
Venezuela and Cuba* And, third, in these countries the export coefficient is re­
latively smaller in all cases and has either tended to decline or stagnate, While 
in the semi-stable countries exports as a GDP are much more high in all the 
cases and have tended to increase their relative importance* This may be taken as 
an indirect indicator of the importance of the domestic sector - i*e* industrial- 
isation — as against the export sector, which as we shall see is composed main­
ly of primary products* The fact seems to be accompanied by inflation.
Further proof of the relation between inflation and the industrialisation pro­
cess can be seen in the following sample taken by ECLA, Of course, today most 
countries in Latin America have started some sort of industrialization; but the 
ones that have advanced mostly are the inflationary ones*
TABLE V
Manufacturing Sector (i960)
of Gross Value of Production)
C
Group 1
0 u n t r i e 
Group 2
s
Group 3
Food, beverages and tobacco 27.0 31.7 57.3
Textiles, footwear and clothing 15.0 19.0 17.0
Wood products 3.4 3.2 5.0
Leather 1.6 1.3 1.3
Paper and paper products 2.7 2.0 2.9
Printing and allied industries 2.2 2.4 1.9
Rubber and rubber products 1.9 1.9 0.8
Chemicals and petroleum products 14.3 13.8 6.8
Non-metallic products ^3.7 3.6 3.8
Metallurgy 25.0 13.6 3.8
Miscellaneous 3.2 4.6 1.6
Source: ECLA, The Process of Industrial Development in Latin America (20 )
The first group is formed by Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico and the second by 
Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay, all inflationary countries; and, the third by 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican 
Republic, all semi-stable countries. It is clear that the first two groups have
The relative decline in the importance of agriculture in these countries may be 
seen in Part II, Chapter 5» Section (A).
data less reliable and based on a smaller sample in Latin America than in indus­
trialised countries, but they are usually confined to market prices in the large 
. urban centres, say Buenos Aires, Mexico City or Santiago. Moreover, to the extent 
that they are dual economies, a percentage of the population and production es-
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advanced more in the industrialisation process, i.e. Metallurgy, chemicals and 
petroleum products. While the stable and small economies are still concentrat­
ed on the production of primer consumer goods,ie. food processing, beverages, 
tobacco products, textiles, etc.
The object of the classification has been firstly to start with a universe 
and describe the broad generalities of Latin America*s growth and inflation; and 
secondly to enable us to abstract from the semi-stable economies. The study shall 
concentrate therefore on the inflationary economies and on their parallel indus­
trialisation process; first in terms of the Monetarist-Structuralist controversy, 
and later on economic policy thought and on three case studies of stabilisation 
policies. Before going into the subject, however, it is convenient to give some 
further details on the degree of general instability in these ten countries.
CHAPTER 4
25.
The Extention of Price Instability 
(1946-1965)
To measure and to evaluate the degree of inflation that the selected Latin 
American economies have suffered, as it was said, it is convenient to start from 
its most noticeable roots during the Great Crisis and in the subsequent period 
that culminated with World War II (21). However, the scope of this work is limit­
ed to the two decades which form the postwar period; alibi to some extemporaneous 
comments on previous experiences.
It has been agreed, moreover, that generalisations are valid when refering 
to Latin America. ECLA states: , ‘Each country has experienced its own brand of 
inflation and has applied its own medicine, and only detailed individual studies 
can explain these differing experiences. Nevertheless, at a rather general level 
there are characteristics which have been common to most of these countries..•
That is, to explain why price increases have been so easily touched off and, once 
begun, why prices have tended to spiral and have proved so difficvilt to bring 
under control1 (22). But, even if this statement may be put into question, it 
is incontrovertible fact that the ten countries have suffered violent and chronic 
inflation. Nonetheless, the degree of price increases that constitutes ‘inflation* 
does not provide a simple case. It has been rightly argued, especially referring 
td the relation between inflation and growth, that a mere percentage, say 7fit can­
not be taken as a dividing line between price stability and instability. Any fig­
ure will always prove subjective and reduced to the specific national case. With 
reference to the controversy, the Brazilian economist Mario Simonsen writes: “One 
can be a structuralist at 5$ a year inflation rate and a monetarist when prices 
increase at 50^... there is a sharper difference between a 5?o and a 50fo a year 
price rise than between a 5fo year rise and stability* (23)» that difference be­
tween stability and absolute disequilibrium. Any chosen figure tends to vary from 
country to country - in the words of the Chilean economist Carlos Massard: ‘There 
is a question of magnitude. What rate of inflation can be accepted?..Chilean ex­
perience indicates that a rate of increase in prices of 10 to 15/S per year does 
not worry anybody* (24). But, again the above figure ma;/ only be say, 7?° for 
Mexico, Still, some economists specialised on the region tend to admit that any 
recurrent rise above 9fo constitutes serious instability. Professor Mikesell writes 
the following: *1 shall regard an annual rate of increase of less than 5^ in the
cost of living index as constituting relative stability for Latin America; a rate 
of increase of 5 to 10;^  as constituting moderate inflation; and any rate above 10fo  
per annum over a period of several years as indicating substantial inflation’ (25)0
For the purpose of this work the above criteria shall be adopted with an 
important qualification. The annual rate of inflation is really significant 
within the context of a national economy, as suggested by Mr. N. Warman; so 
that any comparisons between different countries have to be of a more qualitative 
nature* For example, if in country X prices have been increasing at 18# on aver­
age for several years and in the next they increase to 22# this may not consti­
tute a noticeable turn into a more severe inflation; while, if in country Y 
prices have been moving at 5# and suddenly the rate increases to 9#, this may 
be an indication of acute instability. Thus, this study will analise instability 
as measured in annual price changes within a country and comparisons between 
countries will be qualitative minded -
A* Domestic Indicators
Despite the differences in criteria, though, it is obvious that the ten 
Latin American countries, except for some temporal respites, present with various 
degrees severe inflationary processes (see again Table III and Diagrams I and II). 
The process can be traced back to the early 1930*s, when the data is available; 
during ii World Y/ar all of Latin America was highly inflationary; and, during 
our post-war period the tendency continued or accelerated, with some modifica­
tions only in the selected countries. During the last two decades inflation, as 
measures through the cost of living index, has accelerated in Brazil and Uruguay 
and proceeded at very high rates, except for short periods, in Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, and Peru (see table narabe^IIl). On the other hand, Bolivia and Para­
guay, the most inflationary countries in the pre-war period, have tended to re­
duce the rate of inflation. Something that becomes noticeably in the early 1960’s 
although the rate of inflation for the whole post-war period is more than con­
siderable for both countries (at least 30# per annum for Paraguay and more than 
40# for Bolivia). The two exceptions to the rule are Mexico and Ecuador. Mexico 
a tourism exporter, since the early 1960*s has moved towards a relative degree of 
price stability. For this reason, Mexico, considered a semi-industrialised eco- 
nomy, has been signaled out in the analysis. These differences, of course, have 
to be studied in terms of the causes of inflation and the policies applied; but 
for the time being, the contention is only to describe the magnitude of the gener­
al and obvious problem. Ecuador, on the other hand, is a rich exporter of bananas 
that has managed successfully to control its internal prices, although these have 
been sometimes above 5#* What interests us here is that by the 1960*s it has tend­
ed to become more inflationary and its experience with an expansive public sector.
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Where data are available, the general wholesale price index reflects the 
same tendencies (see Table VT). This index and its component sub-indices re­
fer to a representative list of commodities priced at the wholesale stage of 
distribution. They may also represent the prices charged by representative 
manufacturers or producers to wholesalers, the price charged by wholesalers to 
retailers, the prices paid by importers to producers, etc. In general these
prices tended to increase slightly less than consumer prices, although they
*were considerably higher in Argentina and Paraguay •
B*. * External Indicators
The magnitude of inflation reflected on price indices tells only one as­
pect of price problems. The financial and economic disequilibria it produces 
are also shorn in the external sector situation and its impact on the monetary 
system. A measure of inflation and of its consequences on the external and in­
ternal sectors, however, indirect, is given by the rate of exchange (See Table 
YIl). The impact of devaluation on the price level and on the balance of payments 
is a controversial subject of which something will be said later. But, it is 
also true, that it points out to the degree of price instability a country may 
suffer. The recurrency and sharpness of devaluations in Latin America give thus 
g good idea of the magnitude of the problem. It is significant to see how be­
tween 1929 and 1967 the rate of exchange of the cruzeiro has gone from 9 to 
2745 per dollar; of the Chilean peso from 8 to 600; of the Argentine peso from 
2 to 350; of the boliviano from 3 to 11S0; of the guarani from 4 to 126. All 
of our ten countries show recurrent devaluations during the post-war, as in gen­
eral the second group of countries have maintained something closer to exchange 
rate stability (See examples in Table VIl). By the early 1960*s, however, both 
Mexico and the non-industrialised economies - Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay - 
have maintained almost the same parity rate, a fact that corresponds to their 
relative price stability of the present.
It would appear that the rate of exchange instability - and the inflatio- 
nary problem it precludes - should be reflected on the international liquidity 
position of our economies * While this is true, several factors prevent a 
clear correlation between the process of inflation and the external financial 
position. Devaluations themselves place difficulties in evaluating, both in
For a superficial description of long-run tendencies in the international 
liquidity position of Latin America see the work of the Centro de Estudios 
Monetarios de America Latina (26) and ECLA (27).
27.
This is generally a consequence of internal movements in the terms of trade; 
i.e. from agriculture to industry.
Ge
ne
ra
l 
7/h
ole
 s
ale
 
Pr
ic
e 
In
de
x 
(1
95
8=
10
0)
i
LOoci
rH
Oci
03
CD
C5
oo
C l
CO
LO
Cl
o
LOo
CO o CO rH 1 1 o 1 03 1 03 I— rH
o V Cl o rH rH •H Cl O
t- Cl T*< 03 rH rH rH rH
rH
Ci o o L0 I 1 O t-r Cl Cl CO
rH t- r— oo rH rH o O Cl o
CO 03 CO rH rH rH tH r—< rH rH
rH
T—1 o o ID 1 I Cl 1 ^ fr TT1 rH o
CO Cl o 03 o o L0 O Cl o
c o CO rH rH rH rH rH rH rH
Cl CO o t o  1 O 1 t - CO CO t— Cl
CD CO lO rH 'S ' o 05 CO o Cl Cl03 rH rH rH rH rH rH rH
O o o O O  1 O 1 o O o o
o o o O o O o O o o o
rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH
rH O rH Cl ^  I 03 1 t - O CO o O
CD r- o o r- Ol C1 r- C l rH O
lOCl
rH
(M
LOo
rH
o
LOo
00
Cl
CO
LO
o
CO
03
C3
I t-03
LO LO 
03
CO
o
LO
LO
03
ID
CD
I I
I I
I I
Olt-
o
LO
L0"D1
I Cl Cl 
a  v*
I t- ^
Cl 03
I 1 f-
I I L0
a rD
CS ,— S. A xX •H •H >> rD c u cS
+3 rH cS o o D
- P C •H o £ D o > t o
C c 33 rH O D t o •H •H c3 cS
D u CS •H rH X r=3 r-t u
o u U c c U o O o CS
cd ■ < O o Pm t o CQ rj% Pm
t-
c*
i-ci
03Cl
»
g3xKJ
t>>
U■P
a3oCD
o
cs
-p
m
•H
o
m
co
03
Oo
Cl
Cl
CO 03 Cl t"
COo
COCl
Cl
00
00
u
o
o 03 ci
rH CS rH
O > CH rH C
N CS s
C m -p£ cs
o r-H C
> =3 CD a) 
So
ur
ce
: 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
Mo
ne
ta
ry
 
Fu
nd
, 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
St
at
is
ti
cs
b) 
Pr
ic
e 
of 
ho
me
 
and
 
im
po
rt
 
go
od
3.
O 9 M*H 3 M» p. ® MSO 0* •© cm cm
49 9* P* O 9cm O O M *-3 PM* 4 » M- 9* PO 3 © o © o
9 « H*a  o o M* CM P
H o P P M-»p *0 9 O'o 9 I-* a
cm 4 €+■ 9 © CM
© CM 4 O P
4 M* CM M* C*-
4 ® © a M»CM P a • a
D* eJ- • o CM• © P H*9 M- O
P «* ►3 VJ eO' 9* •o *a © PU< 4 4 ©© M*» © V
9 M*o* o * nP H* © pc*-49 4 a® P © p-
P © CM4  M* M O
« B O•• 49 9* PO P
4 9 ©O
4 CMP 4 9*cM P ©
• CM
• • nw m ©
9s ►* ©
e o 4
CM4 P9* M-»• m4  o  « <
©
h »  4  
B P *G M  o** ac- p 
cm 
•1 ® 
P w r*- O © *1 tt H*• o p
Bo
©5©9<♦*
k  a  o  o  w  >© 4  © © P* 4  4H 9 4  M- H* p <wH* <T5 p O l-* N ®
P
B © H* P 
ty h  tf 
sw. cr* h *  
P w o " D wj»
O'
33 O' 33
9 O 9© M-» PCM M* 4N «* P
P P 9M- 4
M* ©1
03
M 09
M  09
M 09
M* 0*
*o *d o ►© *v o  >o* 0 0 0 0 4 0o a  m  oo a p coO O O O N OoP H*P 4 P. O
OV9op.e
a o* 9 O O M  4 H- O <1 M» O 
9 O •
P9pu
49o»
oa
I Gt 09 tO M M H O O O M
M 09 ^  cn h
M  O  
09 tP
CH
CK
toU  M  A  to •*! -4 o
09 tO O  M  A  O  A
09 tO 
tO -4 tO tO O Cl
M C M  H 
10 Of 09 09 O iP
to M  CO a «a co • 01 Ol
M  M
M  00 M 10 • •o> Ol 00 CO
tO CO H* 09 • •01 CO GO
to to09 O
to
Ol
to
01
to
M* •
to o to09 Ol o 00 •4 CO O 09
to M O MM O M *  to 0909 • O  O O tO00 *P
„ toC9 tO A M  M
O 09 M» • to 09• 00 tO O  O
03 tO
0000
to
01
09a>
to
03 JM»
09 Cl o
oo9Pe+*
4<<*
O
944o
po
MO
to«o
o
o
0  ►A.01
oCl
o09o
o
09
09
OoCl
MOO
TADLE 
VI1 
*
Rate 
of 
Exchange*' 
(domestic 
currency 
per 
dolar)
23
domestic and foreign currencies, the foreign assets of an economy; many other 
factors influence the internal liquidity position as reflected in the balance 
of payments in a given moment (short-term fluctuations in the prices and volume 
of international trade, the weight of occasional foreign credits, sudden repa­
triations of foreign capital, accumulated repayments of foreign debt, etc).
Thus the international liquidity position of Latin America definitely reflects 
external desequilibrium, but not a simple correlation between devaluations, 
foreign assets and inflation, (See Part II, Chapter C, section (b)). At best, 
the figures show an erratic fluctuating tendency, in some cases of a downward 
nature (see Table VTIl), Abstracting from 1965, which was a good year for the 
ten countries, only Argentina shows a shapr downward tendency in her liquidity 
position, culminating with years of negative figures. The other very inflatio­
nary countries - Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia - only show violent ups and 
downs in their foreign assets. There is a group of countries - Mexico, Ecuador, 
Peru, Colombia, and Paraguay - which, although at a low level, have tended to 
improve their holdings of central banks's foreign assets. In contrast, however, 
the international liquidity of semi-stable countries like Venezuela and El Sal­
vador has moved much more noteceably.
Still, if the external desequilibrium position in itself and with relation 
to domestic inflation is not that clear, there is a further indicator which 
leaves no doubt about the relation: the coverage position of local currencies
with foreign assets, gold and dollars (See Table IX). The indicator shows the 
relationship between the internal monetary instability and the balance of pay­
ments position, and thus serves as an indirect measure of the degree of domestic 
monetary instability. Except for Peru , which has maintained a semistable ratio, 
all the other nine countries have suffered - or inflicted upon themselves? - a 
declining ratio between their money supply and their stock of foreign assets, 
the consequences of which have to be studied. Moreover, all these countries 
have a peak ratio in 1945 which declines with various speeds throughout the past 
two decades and which illustrates the internal monetary desequilibrium. The ex­
treme cases are those of Argentina and Brazil where the coverage becomes either 
negative or negligible. All the countries, including Peru, reached minimum ratios 
by the late 1950's or very early 1960*s and have remained there or only improved 
slightly. Hence the problem of financial instability and inflation extends to 
the entire period. The long-run tendency seems to be more stable, although the 
foreign-assets backing ratio is small, in those countries like Mexico and Ecuador 
where the inflationary processes have been reduced. The sane applies to Peru, 
which, nonetheless, has had recurrent inflation*
*Peru, however, is not an exception during its severe internal and external
desequilibrium of 1957-1959 (see case studies).
Source: 
International 
Monetary 
Statistics 
International 
Monetary 
Fund
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C,- The rate of inflation and growth
The above exercise has only proved that inflation in Latin America is more
*than considerable - although hyper-inflation has not prevailed , - and has des­
cribed to an extent the magnitude of the problem, with reference to price and 
financial indicators. The theoretical and pragmatic problem of Latin America 
is not really stated in these terms. The core of the matter lies in the inter­
connected problematics of growth and inflation. This is the origin of the Mone­
tarist-Structuralist controversy which will be analysed below. That there is a 
relationship, whether positive or negative, between the two phenomena is almost 
obvious. But its nature and complexities are such that no simple definition 
will do. One cannot establish at this stage of work any correlation because it 
would be common place and ineffectual. The explanation usually goes: Brazil
has had a high rate of growth and severe inflation; Peru*s growth is just as 
high but its inflation milder; while, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are stag­
nant and very inflationary; Mexico and Colombia have had mild growth and in­
flation, and so on. There seems to be, nevertheless, a guideline to approach 
the subject, 6n one extreme growth can be made a function of inflation or, on 
the other, inflation can be made a function of growth. In the frist case in­
flation is made an independent variable and the shortcomings on the growth pro­
cess are blamed on it - the influence of inflation on savings and investment, 
on international trade, on foreign capital and so on*- This approach would mere­
ly consider inflation a handicap, A good example of this technique is on G.S, 
Dorrance’s work (29)* The alternative, as one of the dependent factors of the 
growth variable, has also been tried. In this second case advances made in - 
the rate of growth are interpreted by the positive, neutral, or inevitable rate 
of inflation, among other factors. Such a technique would,then not refer to 
inflation as a clearly negative factor. An extreme example of it, is on several 
of the works of W. Baer and I. Kerstenetzki on the Brazilian case (^0). (There 
are, of course, many intermediate positions). Both of these types of studies, 
although highly quantitatively minded, arrive at opposite results. Moreover, 
implicitly value judgments tend to appear and policy recommendations - in terms 
of Objectives, measures, priorities, and compatibility — become obscure and an­
tagonistic, Here the nature of the problem is not only Latin AMerican but glo­
bal and close to the theoretical findings in advanced countries. The only les- 
son that can be obtained from these alternative approaches is that it will not 
do tlo start from the end - that is, trying to establish a correlation between 
growth and inflation as such —, but that its necessary to analyse from the *be-
Except, perhaps, in Bolivia during 1952-1957 (for an introduction into the sub­
ject, see C.H. Sondag (28),
30,
ginning* the causes of Latin American inflation and its cures in terms of certain
growth criteria A a simple observation of savings and investment - and work up-* *wards from this to a comprehensive integration of the phenomena « Presumably 
this is what the Monetarist-Structuralist controversy is about. Stated in these 
terms the problematic becomes of such a magnitude that it clearly lies outside 
the scope of this paper. One may, however, adopt this principle as a guideline 
when analysing the nature of inflation in Latin America, That trying to establish 
a simple relationship between the rates of inflation and growth may prove frustrat­
ing or, worse still, somewhat irrelevant may he seen in the following table:
TABLE X
Average annual Pates of Gorwth of GDP per capita and Prices
(1950-1965)
Country GDP per capita Banking Inflation Banking
Argentina 1,1 (8) 21.4 (7 )
Brazil 2,7 (2) 24,0 (9)
Chile 1.4 (6) 22,6 (8)
Colombia 2.0 (4) 8.4 (4)
Peru 2,4 (3) 7.8 (3)
Uruguay 0,5 (9) 17.4 (6)
Mexico 2.9 (1) 5.3 (2)
Bolivia Ool (10) 42.7 (10)
Paraguay 1.3 (7) 14.6 (5)
Ecuador 1.6 (5) 2.1 (1)
Sources Tables IV and XI
If one takes the last fifteen years (1950-1965) and estimates the average*rates of growth in per capita output and prices no clear comparative relationship 
can be established between growth and inflation in the ten countries. The rate 
of growth — or of stagnation - depends as what 'sustained* rate happens to be 
adopted to measure growth in output. The United Nations considers growth - not 
development - a sustained rise of 5o5fo in GNP per annum; something which in per 
capita terms would be close to 3f~ for Latin America, Except for Mexico and Brazil
The can only be taken as crude approximations of the long-run trends in. both 
variables,
*/ .  \(See footnote in the following page)
31
none of the countries reach the mark* They all, however, are inflationary in 
various degrees* Mexico (5*3$) and Ecuador (2.1$) come out with low rates of 
inflation for this period, but their annual variations in prices have been sev­
ere (See Table I, Part II).
Judging by the ranking, however, it appears that countries with mild growth 
(2.2$) have had milder rates of inflation (8$), i.e. Colombia and Peru; while 
countries with severe inflation (more than 15$) have been rather stagnant (less 
them 1.5$)t i*e. Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia. But the ex­
perience of Mexico and Brazil contradicts the conclusion, and these are precise­
ly the countries with the high rate of growth in which one is interested. Brazil 
has almost both the highes rates of growth and inflation; while Mexico has the 
highest rate of growth and a mild inflation.
If the two powtwar decades are now taken and divided into four periods 
(Table Xl) again no relationship appears. The disquieting experience is that 
both high and low rates of growth are accompanied by various degrees of inflation. 
There is, however, one important exception that may give a clue to the influence 
of inflation, if any, on the rate of growth. In Brazil, as the rate of inflation 
has gained momentum, the rate of growth in output has tended to fall.
Thus, on these simplistic trends, a guide line - not a conclusion - will be 
adopted: mild inflation seems to accompany mild growth in unstable L^tin-American
countries (Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador); while severe inflation seems to 
bring stagnation (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Paraguay).
(..from the preceeding page)
** *No doubt, writes R.F. Mikesell, a more penetrating analysis of the economies 
of individual countries would reveal more fully the operation of the basic mon­
etary factors such as the proximate causes of the increase in the supply of 
money and its velocity of circulation in relation to output. However, if we 
are to understand inflation in Latin America we must probe deeper into the 
fabtors which determine the flow of both money and goods and into those forces 
which operate more directly on prices and costs in imperfect markets1 (3l)«
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PART II
"A Confrontation of the Monetarist-Structuralist Controversy"
CHAPTER I
Introduction
The first problem encountered when studying the subject of inflation in Latin 
America is trying to define what is Monetarism* and ’structuralism*. A Defini­
tion will be attempted in this introduction; in the separate exposition and enir- 
pirical analysis of both doctrines in the following two chapters; and with res­
pect to their different policy views on the last part of the survey. The contro­
versy, however, is far from the clear cut case where both arguments would be sep­
arated into two different parts of a whole. In general terms, one could consider 
the Latin-American polemics as a corollary of the general controversy between de-
■Wrmand-pull and cost-push inflation • But, as it shall be seen, if such a criteria 
is adopted one is bound to find oneself dealing with a very ’peculiar* corollary.
Thus initially it is convenient to try to establish a guide-line on what is 
monetarism and what is structuralism; where the schools differ basically; where 
there might be agreement; and, to propose an analytical system for the survey.
It is assumed here, with respect to the system and guideline, that the contro­
versy is carried on two levels: first, theoretically on the causes or nature of
Latin-American inflation; and, second, on the policy recommendations to reduce 
and avoid - or live with - inflation. It is hoped that the approach will also 
clarify the iritial problem.
The background of the controversy - for theoretical purposes - is the chronic 
inflation of Latin-America which, starting in some countries during the 1950*s, which 
coincided with an acute external disequilibrium. The special focus - for policy 
purposes - 'has been the International Monetary Funds* (IMF) supported anti-in­
flationary programmes. These programmes -which are formed by orthodox policies 
based on credit and budgetary constraint^ exchange rate devaluation, and the eli­
mination of exchange and some price controls - intended to stop inflation, gave 
further way (along the 1950*s) to the question of whether stability would be achiev­
ed at the expense of economic growth. Thus it is tempting, but dangerous, to try
to base the distinction between the opponents in a simple correlation, whether
/ **\ positive or negative, between growth and inflation (as Dr. Simonsen does ).
For ray views on the subject see the background paper I wrote for this work. The 
section on the theory of inflation.-***It seems to me, writes the author-, that the simplest and also problably the 
best definition of the conflicting views lies in the expected sign of the corre­
lation between inflation and growth. Monetarists believe the correlation is a 
negative one; structuralists believe in a positive regression coefficient (l)* 
For Dr. Simonsen*s discussion of the Brazil case see the footnotes (2).
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It is the intention of this work to probe deeper into the distinction and, as it 
was said, into the possibility of a correlation. However, let us pick up the sub­
ject from here: V/hat are the differences, simplistically, between monetarists and
structuralists?
a) The complex relationship between growth and inflation in Latin America, 
Monetarists violently reject the idea that the rate of growth may be a positive 
function of inflation. Structuralists, may grant this with reservations, but 
are willing to be more permissive with certain types and rates of inflation.
The difference between both doctrines in this respect really appears in the 
context of economic policy measures, although structuralists are seldom as ex­
plicit as monetarits,
b) The historical nature or causes of inflation. Superficially, monetarits (this 
is where the term comes from) are advocates of demand-pull inflation, While, 
structuralists are a peculiar brand of ‘mixed inflation*;where either excess 
demand or cost-push may have the original blame, but where this tends to have 
a secondary importance. That is, where inflation - either measured in excess 
demand or in climbing costs - is a consequence of ‘autonomous factors (i,e, 
the external sector) and the structural characteristics of the economy (its 
underdeveloped nature)*
c) The inflationary spiral (perhaps the most important aspect in the policy nature 
of the controversy). For monetarists inflation starts and develops mainly as
a consequence of monetary and budgetary expenditure; and, price distortions 
and controls, with special reference to the foreign sector; but, also, through 
wage increases which may be autonomous. Thus the term', ‘monetarism1 has been 
stretched. Structuralists, on the other hand, see inflation developing as a 
consequence of supply bottlenecks which pari uas£u activate the propagating 
causes of inflation, with special emphasis to exchange rate devaluation.
d) The traditional unorthodox role of economic policy. Monetarists are inclined 
to see the policies followed by the monetary and fiscal authorities are res­
ponsible for inflation; while structuralists see authorities as ‘forced*
— yith reservations and qualifications* - by autonomous factors to follow 
unorthodox financial measures. Indeed the concept of compatible growth and 
equilibrium is the context of unorthodoxy.
e) The political bias. Grossly over-simplifying, monetarists tend to be part of 
the peculiar liberal tradition of Latin America (which today is ‘conservative1) 
and structuralists comprise all kinds of socialists (public-interventionists, 
to put it in Latin-American terms).
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Stated in these hold terras the distinction between the schools may ar>pear 
simple. However, let us go slightly into the literature to see that this is 
not so and to support the above guideline*
It should be clear that the debate from its start was one on the causes or 
nature of inflation. ‘Superficially, writes professorrGrunewald, it may be con­
sidered a corollary of the demand-pull versus cost-push discussion, although the 
structuralists and the cost-push arguments seem to have little in common* (p)*
This point i.s important because it limits the notion that structuralists are only
*concerned with supply-inflation, and not with demand pull . But from here on 
structuralists go on to discuss whether stability is only achieved at the expense 
of the underutilization of resources and with greater costs than those of the in­
flation it strives to cure.
Because of opinions like the above, monetarists -see for example, professors 
Bunton and Dorrance (6) - have seen in structuralists a negative permissive at­
titude towards inflation. For the above authors since in many underdeveloped 
countries (UDC) savings and public revenues are insufficient to finance a given 
rate growth, structuralista have tended to think that inflation is an easy method 
of expanding investment and hence to finance it through the loans of the central 
banks to private investors or to the government itself. Thus they blame structur­
alists for making inflation the instrument of policy rather than the control of 
inflation an object of policy. Furthermore, inflation is then a result of public 
policy aiming at higher investment than what is compatible with price stability, 
in the false hope of accelerating growth. Structuralists, as we shall see, re­
ject the accusations. For the moment, the general answer is that authorities are 
•forced* to be financially expansive. But, monetarists answer that it becomes 
clear that inflation is a consequence of a weak monetary system, particularly 
when there are strong wage pressures and distortions in the price system. Hence 
monetarists are stressing that increases in the supply of money and inflation are 
obviously4' related - the relationship being imperfect because of the velocity of 
circulation. No structuralists will deny such a fact. So monetarists then argue 
again that the supply of money has increased because of financial irresponsibility. 
This brings down the discussion to the *reasons* for the increase in the supply 
of money and again to the causes of inflation.
*The author later claims that in the controversy *there is hardly any ciuestion of 
the ability of monetary policy to achieve its price stability* (*i). The state­
ment seems unfair to structuralism because it assumes their ignorance of the 
theoretical work in advanced countries around the inelasticity of investment 
to changes in the interest rate, the difficulties of controlling the supply of 
money, and the limited scope of monetary policy. This would appear to bo one of 
their major arguments. It is possible, of course, that the professor is refer­
ring to only .‘shock* treatment, with which stability would be achieved at the 
expense of growth. For this view see professor Seers (5)«
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Structuralists have claimed from *a start* that it was doubtful that econ­
omic policies were the main cause of inflation. Inflation can stem, writes pro­
fessor G. Maynard, from external pressures whore the government has no direct 
control; in such a case the government may have to accept some inflation or 
forego some conditions for growth*. Sharp swings? in the prices of the exports 
of primary goods - produced inelasticities of demand or supply - introduce insta­
bility into monetary systems, particularly when both the supply of money and 
fiscal revenues are geared to foreign exchange earnings or credits. The fact 
may not only produce fluctuations in incomes and prices, but act as a chronic 
pressure towards inflation. Thus, it was claimed, UDC seek industrialisation 
and less dependence on exports. Imports, however, remain a feature of the sys­
tem. Moreover, necessary as this is, in the long run, industrialisation may fur­
ther create monetary instability (7 ).
•A proposition that could serve as a common denominator for monetarists, 
writes professor *T. Davis, would be: that secular inflation cannot persist with­
out secular increases in the supply of money (at rates in excess of the rate of 
increase in output and services ; and that inflation cannot be halted without 
limiting the rate of expansion of the supply of money (to correspond to the rate 
of growth of output)* (8). Structuralists interpret this as wrongly blaming in­
flation on the 'perfidy or incompetence* of central banks.
The unifying proposition for traditional structuralists would be that supply 
schedules in general (with emphasis on agricultura and infrastructure) and for­
eign exchange in particular (with emphasis on the adverse terms of trade), are 
substantially less elastic than those in developed countries. Monetarists agree 
that, considering the continous changes in the structure of demand, such inelas­
ticities may account for some inflation. But, monetarists - professor Mikesell, 
for example (9) - are willing to accept this explanation for a 5 to 7$ rate of 
inflation, but not for a persistent inflation of 10 - 40%> over the last thirty 
years. The argument isreduced to which come first: inelasticities of supply
(structuralism) or inflation (monetarists).
Some sistematization with respect to both schools has been achieved by Dr. 
de Oliveira Carapos, a well known monetarist (lO) . Monetarism, for the .author, 
is based on the following assumptions:
la) Inflation is caused by imprudent actions of the monetary and fiscal tu- 
thorities.
b) It has ceased and it is incompatible with development.
Being the author a staunch monetarist, his observations should not be taken 
at face value.
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c) It must "be stopped quickly - for its own sake and "before it degenerates 
into hyoerinflation - by reducing excess demand through monetary or fis­
cal policies - prudent or shockers - and with international credits*
d) Most of the supply inelasticities or bottlenecks are caused by price 
andexchange rate distortions generated by the inflationary process it­
self and through arbitrary public intervention*
Structuralists, for the author, assume what follows:
a) Inflation is a natural accompaniment of growth (something which, however, 
most structuralists reject)*
b) It cannot be reduced by monetary and fiscal policies without provoking 
unemployment or stagnation because of supply rigidities,
c) Inflation is a consequence of a weak foreign market and an inelastic 
food supply* The instability of export proceeds (or foreign exchange) 
generates an import-capacity bottleneck and makes it impossible for in­
flation to be stopped in the short-run*
d) The relative rigidity of the government budget means that the alternative 
to central hank credit would be a decrease in public investment,
e) The single remedy of monetary policy will be detrimental to tT,e growth 
of the economy,
f) One could also add that a costly and oligopolistical import substitution 
process and a regressive distribution of income are important autonomous 
sources of inflation.
Nevertheless, the author arrives at the conclusion that 'to a certain ex­
tent the views are less different than it might appear, the divergences being 
more of method and emphasis than of substance1 (ll). The statement might appear 
to be substantiated when one listens to the 'official structuralist1 position, 
that of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). In the 
words of Dr. Prebisch: 'ECLA does not believe that inflation is inevitable in
the economic development of Latin America. It rejects the theory that inflation 
is caused solely by the financial disorder and lack of monetary restraint of the 
Latin-American countries, because there are extremely powerful structural factors 
which lead to inflation and against which monetary policy is powerless. This is 
the first fact* The second is the critical position adopted towards certain 
measures aimed at monetary stabilisation. It is agreed that a supreme effort 
must he made to arrest inflation and achieve stability, but not at the expense 
of a decline in the rate of growth, of stagnation or of a slowing-dovm of its 
rate of development' (12).
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In another place Dr. Prebish writes that *••• there has been the belief that in­
flation is an unavoidable means of forced capital accumulation where voluntary 
savings is insufficient. One fact stands out: the stimulus of monetary expan­
sion has led to a high level of employment and thereby to an increase in income. 
It may happen that this effect, however, aopears in the initial phase of credit 
expansion and not in the subsequent inflation. As the process develops, the in­
crease in employment and real income has been less marked, and that of prices 
and concentration of income more so* (13)• However, it is the intention of this 
work to show that monetarism and structuralism in Latin America differ basically 
- both in economic philosophy and theory and less so in policy thinking -, al­
though there are some similarities which, nonetheless, it is dangerous to exag­
gerate •
Lastly, for this work the debate is more than a Latin-American version of 
the disjmte concerning the efficacy of monetary tools in stabilising the price 
level. It also involves a deep disagreement over the ability of the price mecha­
nism to bring about a socially acceptable rate of growth, as well as a distribu­
tion of income. There is also, as it was said, a great deal"of political bias. 
The fact is well summarised by D. Felix. *The structuralist dispute with the 
monetarits is thus carried on at three levels. There is a disagreement as to 
the causes of the inflation and of the efficacy of tightened credit, fiscal re­
trenchment and the elimination of direct controls in checking it. There is a 
closely related disagreement on economic development policy. Finally, there is 
a mistrust of the Rightist sponsorship of the stabilisation programs which stems 
from the fact that many of the structuralists are partisans of the Left (l4)f.
j
With reference to the initial guideline and. to the literature implicit in 
the above quotations, the next step is to summarise the main features of both 
sides of the controversy; assuming an ‘ideal monetarist* and an *ideal struc-
' Vv.,r ■ / ; . . .
turalist*. The outline will be based on three levels of distinction: the main
causes of inflation and its spiralling nature; the policy measures suggested; 
and the economic objectives implied. These last ones are listed in a deliberate 
order, although this is not the place to discuss priorities and compatibilities. 
The following outline, of course, does not pretend in any sense to be coranrehen- 
sive or subtle.I . V: ’ ,• . ■
1.— Monetarism
A. On the causes of inflation
1- The supply of money and quasi money
2- Budget deficits
5- Wage inflation (however structural one may consider it)
4- The perturbed price mechanism.
a)"Price controls, with emphasis on over-valued exchange rates
b) Distortions in savings ana investment
c) Disencouragement oi foreign investment
d) Distortions in international trade
e) Induced supply bottlenecks.
B. On the policy measures
1- Monetary policy
2- Fiscal policy (higher revenues and lower expenditure)
3- Incomes policy
4- Devaluation and a free exchange rate system
5- Abolition of domestic and external price controls
with reliance on the workings of the price system
6- Foreign investment and credits
C. On economic objectives
1- External equilibrium
2- Price stability
3- External and domestic liberalisation
4- Income redistribution and higher savings
5- Price signals and confidence in expectations which 
will result in higher domestic and foreign investment
6- Economic growth
y~ Public debt management and increased public services.
Structurali sm
A. On the causes of inflation
1- The foreign exchange bottleneck
2- The agricultural bottleneck
3- The infrastructure bottleneck
4- The regressive distribution of income and the low level
of savings
5- The implications of the import substitution process
6- The propagating causes of inflation (with emphasis on
devaluation and de-emphasis on wage escalation)
B. On the policy neasures
1- Devaluation, foreign credits, direct controls, import
substitution, export promotion, a common market, etc.
2- Land reform, economic and technical assitance, etc.
3- Increasing public investment and a fiscal reform
4- Incomes policy
5- A 'new'* monetary policy
C« On the economic objectives
* 1- Maximisation of the rate of growth
2- Higher employment
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3- Public debt management
4- Redistribution of income
5- External equilibrium
6- Price stability.
Sections A, for both doctrines, are described empirically with respect to 
the ten selected countries in the following two chapters. Sections B and C are 
restated in Part III, but with special reference to the stabilisation programmes 
of Argentina, Chile, and Peru.
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Chapter II 
The Monetarist Side of the Argument
Monetarism is far more than an emphasis on the monetary causes of inflation 
and on the need of restricting the supply of money and quasi-money, A stable 
price level and external equilibrium (although this subject is rather ambiguous) 
are considered necessary for growth. Through them savings are encouraged, ex­
ports vil! expand, foreign capital is attracted, domestic capital vn.ll stay at home, 
long-run investment will he greater, and so on. The general idea is to create an 
atmosphere where growth will take place spontaneously, as a result of private enter­
prise responding to profits. In such an ideal situation, an ideal monetarist would 
claim, the government would limit itself to keei)ing the budget balanced, avoiding
credit expansion, maintaining a steady exchange rate and giving the price system 
* • a chance to work . As far as economic theory and thought, during the XIX century
when the United Kingdom, the United States and Western Europe industrialised these
principles were broadly followed; the recovery of West Germany since the War also
adopted the same philosophy.
There is, of course, a respectable and elaborate body of theory to support 
this attitude, the classical school. To summarise very drastically the essential 
points of this doctrine, in the words of professor Seers (l6):
a) The working of the price system will ensure that resources will be 
automatically mobilised for the satisfaction of society's needs - 
Adam Smith's invisible hand, 
b) If these wants are not adequately expressed, it is nevertheless 
dangerous to tamper with this distribution because one might im­
pair incentives; and, in the view of some, reduce savings and
employment.
c) International free trade should allow each country to specialise 
in the lines of output where it enjoys comparative advantages, 
and all countries should benefit.
d) Economic policy is reduced to maintaining a stable currency, 
balancing budgets and, in later versions, by curving the ex­
pansion of bank credit, so that growth will take place spon­
taneously. **
* 'See, lor example, Mr. A. Alsogaray, former Economic Minister in Argentina (15); 
or the cited references Dr. Seers makes of the IMF's economic philosophy.
Before assessing the relevance of this doctrine to Latin America today, one 
should candidly ask oneself as it was done in the background paper mentioned, 
why it has ceased to be held widely, at least in this form, in the industrial­
ised countries. The reasons for its modifications and partial rejection abroad
may give some clues on the ways it should be modified or rejected in the Latin-
To achieve this ideal state, however, monetarists desire tighter credit con­
straints, cuts in public expenditure, partial wage freezes, devaluation and a 
liberalised external sector, and the repeal of various types of subsidies and 
direct controls* Halting inflation and abolishing controls and subsidies would, 
they believe, eliminate most of the imbalances and supply bottlenecks on which 
the structuralists lay such heavy stres?. Monetarists believe, moreover, that 
there is a potential in the private sector as well as a possibility of attract­
ing larger amounts of foreign capital* But to realise this potential Latin- 
America must undergo a painful but necessary anti-inflationary programme to 
clear the distortions and obstacles to growth induced by inflation * The mon­
etarist position, nevertheless, should not be taken to extremes* Mr* Felix 
writes that *this is not to say that monetarists want a free economy in the 
(complete) classical sense. They, too., presume protection against competing 
imports and ... infrastructure investment* (17)*
Having stated this doctrinal background, the next step is-to analyse the 
core of the monetarist argument: the causes of inflation and the subsequent po­
licy measures recommended. It is very difficult to try to divide and give prior­
ity to the different *causes of inflation* in the monetarist analysis. They form 
a whole, - reflected on the inflationary spiral - where they intermingle. How­
ever, artificially and following the general emnhasis of monetarists, they have 
been divided in the following order and under the following headings: the sup­
ply of money and quasi money, budget deficits, wage inflation, savings and in­
vestment, and distortions, price controls and indueed bottlenecks. Devaluation 
is treated somewhat apart because here monetarists and structuralists in Latin 
America tend to come more within reach of agreement. The second part of the mon­
etarist argument is, of course, the stabilisation policies. In this chapter, 
however, only marginal comments will be made on the subject; in the understanding 
that it is possible to dedicate an empirical chapter to three cases of stabilisa­
tion programmes in Latin America
A.- On the Causes of Inflation 
a )  The suoplv of money and ouasi-money
Without any doubt for monetarist a fundamental cause of Latin-American infla­
tion lies in the ‘irresponsible* expansion of the supply of money. Dr. de Oliveir?
*They implicitly believe that a stabilisation programme will first reduce the rate 
of inflation and later abolish it; something that is not necessarily true in prac
American case.
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writes: "a statistical effort in Latin America is necessary to determine the
possible correlation between the exrmnsion of the effective money supply, in­
dicating a passive behaviour of the monetary authorities, <the rate of price 
inflation and the rate of growth" (l8). For the author this would prove that
in the majority of the ten economies selected the expansion in the supply of
/ • *\ money has been of such a magnitude (20 to 30/; per annum ) as to outstrip any
realistic possibility of it grooving in relation to increases in the real dom­
estic product plus net im?>orts. At such a rate of monetary expansion any 
economy, underdeveloped or not and with or without supply bottlenecks, would 
not fail to have inflation. The proposition has been taken for the ten couun- 
tries chosen and, initially, the comparison between the annual changes in the 
supply of money and quasi-money and the annual changes in the cost of living 
has been established. Later on, unlagged and lagged comparisons are made.
Turning to the first Table, what simple comparisons may be established 
between the supply of money and money plus quasi-money and inflation?
1- It appears that it is not necessary for the supply of money to in­
crease at, say, more than 20c/o per annum to have strong inflation.
This is not true for all countries; i.e. Mexico, Peru and Ecuador,
2- But, what is evidence for the monetarist arguert, is that the most 
inflationary countries - Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay; and 
Bolivia and Paraguay during the 1950!s - have indeed the highest 
rates of monetary expansion. In fact, they tend to be over 20^ 
per annum, s Colombia is a border case, 1/hi1e the less inflationary 
countries - Peru, Mexico, and Ecuador - have milder rates of money 
creation,
i- Moreover, what also appears important for monetarists is that per* 
riods of strong inflation are also periods of a higher rate of ex­
pansion in money. Not much reliance, however, should be placed on 
this: while this is perfectly true for Brazil all along 1946-1965*
in Mexico the more stable years (l961-1965) were accompanied by 
higher monetary increases,
4- With exceptions, on the whole, the increases in money plus quasi­
money are stronger than those of money alone. In Brazil, however, 
when quasi-money is incorporated the rate of money expansion is 
moderated. This is a consequence of the expansion of Central Bank 
credit, especially to the government; something that constitutes 
evidence for monetarists (for a discussion on Brazil*s Central Eahk 
borrowing sao ECLA, 19)*
* _This not present in Peru, Mexico and Ecuador, and hardlv in Colombia. See
Table I.
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5- But, what is disquieting to find iron the monetarist angle, is that 
there is no simple relationship between increases in money and pri­
ces. The rate of expansion in the supply of money may he made to 
contract and still prices may increase very noticeably; also the 
rate of inflation may decrease substantially together with a sharp 
rise in money (for example, in Argentina and Chile). Thus a statis­
tical correlation may be helpful, as well as the establishment of 
time lags.
Let us then turn to Table II. Here linear correlation coefficients have 
been estimated for the ten countries. The monetary variables have been corre­
lated to prices in three ways: without lags (P); with a 'monetarist year-
lag,(f>«d) where increases in money are reflected in next year prices; and 
with a structuralist* year lag. (P-l) where semi-autonomous prices increases 
force the monetary authorities to be*permissive1 so that monetary increases 
coincide with last year*s prices.
14 Initially one was rather doubtful whether such a correlation would be of 
much use. Indeed this might be a *spurious* correlation since the two 
variables are obviously relatedj However, as it might be seen, the re­
sults were rather surprising and helpful to some extent in our contro­
versy. Moreover, they corroborate the above observations.
2— The first surprising fact is that there is no obvious correlation - a 
high correlation, say 0.7 or 0.8 - between money increases and price in­
creases; something which is clearly implied by monetarism. Different 
countries had very different experiences.
3— The monetarist argument, with qualifications that limit it as we shall
see below, only holds for the most inflationary countries. Its theory
*really seems to apply to Bolivia and Paraguay, the non-industrialised 
countries of the group. Here the correlations were high both for P. 
and P+l. It also applies in the cases of Brazil and Uruguay, but with 
the difference that here the P-l lag was also significant. Thus the 
evidence may appear inconclusive. One could claim nonetheless that the 
variables were 'so* related that they would be significant in all three 
cases. The fits of the equations were reasonably realistic.
4— But, this is as far as one can stretch the monetarist argument. The be­
wildering cases of Argentina ana Chile, both very inflationary countries,
That Bolivia's inflation was 'caused* by the Central Bank is something establish­
ed. However, it is superficial to reach the conclusion that it was a credit 
squeeze — stabilisation programme that halted inflation in the I960*s. It 
should be remembered that inflation in this case is a 'political* consequence of 
the 1952 Revolution (we shall turn briefly to the subject below). For an intro­
duction into Bolivia's inflation see Mr. C.H. Zondab and Mr. G.J. Eden, (20).
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still have to he explained. Their coefficient in the best of cases (p+l) 
cannot he taken to he significant (0.48). The constant terra in the 
equations moreover, indicates that other were the main factors behind infl£ 
tion. Thus it might he better to look for the causes of inflation with 
respect to the velocity of circulation, structural causes, or the role of 
public expenditure, wage increases and devaluation. This applied more so to 
the next group of countries,
5*- In the less inflationary countries -Colombia, Peru, Mexico and Ecuador-
there is no correlation between monetary increases and prices. Indeed, as 
it was pointed out, the correlation was negative in Mexico, Colombia and 
Ecuador in some cases. Only in Peru -in the case of p+1 with respect to 
M+QM/- did the coefficient reach 0.57* But, while these relations cast much 
doubt over what monetarists regard as obvious, it does not constitute proof 
for the structuralist argument: p-l had no significance in any case. This, 
again, indicates that a study of the rest inflationary variables is necessa 
ry.
The object of the above exercise has been to stress that evidence of the 
relation between the supply of money and the price level in Latin ■‘hnerica is 
rather scanty; and, not obvious as a monetarist will tend to have it. This is 
important because, presumably on such evidence, the monetary authorities of some 
of these countries, often under pressure from the IMF, have applied stabiliza­
tion programmes which may unduly rely on the scope of monetary policy alone.
The above correlations are in fact too simplistic (although they stem from
the also simplistic approach that monetarist have adopted towards the quantity
*theory when dealing with the region's inflation) • The relationship between the 
supply and the demand for money leads to the highly controversial subject of the 
income velocity of circulation. Monetarists, at least from the limited experi­
ence of this work, seem to have gone into the subject by simply assuming that 
velocity is nearly constant and hence monetary controls a fundamental instrument 
to check inflation. With structuralism the approach has been more complex, 
although not immune from superficiality. They grant that increases in the supply 
of money are a secondary factor that helps to propagate inflation. But they 
insist that there are "real causes" which force the monetary authorities to be 
permissive and, what is more, that the control of the supply of money -unless
* See, for example, the above quotations of Dr. de Oliveira and Mr. Alsogaray 
and the position of the I>iF discussed in Fart III, Chapter 2.
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draconian- will not by itself secure stability. Structuralists isay,, often 
quite implicitly, that the velocity function is very unstable. In the last 
resort, their implication is that inflation will go on despite a control of the 
supply of money, assuming that this is possible. Moreover, both monetarists and 
structuralists seem to leave the subject at this, and proceed to discuss other 
causes of inflation and policy measures. One cannot blame structuralists too 
much since they point out that their interest lies in their fundamental causes 
of inflation. (See the introduction to chapter 3)*
From the angle of this section, however, the core of the matter remains in
the behaviour of velocity -which, following the latest developments in monetary 
is . *theory, still a theoretical and empirical issue • Monetarists would be correct
in "moving on" and assuming that velocity is stable if the adoption of stabil­
ization programmes had led to price stability. But such programmes have been 
tried and inflation in the majority of cases continues. Structuralists, taking 
an extreme position, by implying that velocity perhaps has no upper limit seem 
to bring in the possibility of hyper-inflation into the pecture. ^ut, in a 
period of over twenty years characterized by sharp increases in both money and 
prices, the region has not found herself near that situation (perhaps with the 
exception of Bolivia). Can one then assume an upper limit to velocity -or a 
resistance to further increases?
This is clearly an important issue that merits some comment. The discussion, 
however, will take one beyond the controversy itself. In as much as the subject, 
at least in the present literature of the region both from monetarist and struc­
turalists, has been by-passed with marginal assumptions, usually theoretical and 
not exempt from value judgements, on income velocity. It is hopped nonetheless 
that this section will contribute a background for the understanding of the re­
gion's inflation. Because whatever assumption is adopted with respect to the 
demand for money as a flow will determine to a large extent the policy measures 
chosen. Moreover, it seems helpful to try to make this assumption an explicit 
and empirical one.
This partial digression will cover the following grounds (i) a theoretical 
statement on the monetary controversy; (ii) an empirical description of velocity; 
(iii) an analysis of the demand for money with reference to foreign assets and 
deposits in foreign currency, the effect of stabilization programmes, the struc 
ture of the rate of interest, and some indicators on the behaviour of the bond 
market and the stock exchange, plus comments on institutional arrangements.
* H. Johnson, Monetary theory and policy, Am. Econ. Rev., June, 1962.
48
(i) A Theoretical statement
Some structuralists hold that the controversy in advanced countries -and
hence a focus on the demand for money as a flow- is irrelevant to the region's 
*inflation.. In very crude terms, the theory postulates a certain interaction 
between demand-pull and cost-push in the context of supply bottlenecks, income 
growth, and the underdevelopment of the region; and, only secondarily, on the 
financial markte (see Chapter 3f the introduction). Special attention is given 
to establishing a relationship between the inflationary process and the external 
disequilibrium. At the present stage of this work, however, the proposition 
seems too extreme, in the sense that velocity also merits special attention.
That is, although for particular structural reasons the scope and efficiency of 
monetary policy could be challanged -as it is done in advanced countries- it 
role in contributiong towards stability and within general economic policy seems 
selfevident. The different particular monetary tools and their scope, however, 
are not selfevident.
If it is assumed that the supply of money is contracted by the authorities 
but that this given volume can be made to sustain a larger or a smaller volume 
of transactions, the demand for money becomes a highly unpredictable variable 
(from the angle of the income motive) and the concept of controling its supply 
is put into question. On the other hand, the constancy in the velocity fuction 
in the quantity theory rests on the assumption that expenditure is regulated by 
the desire to hold money balances equal to some proportion of income. Contempt 
rary monetary theory, as it was said, regard these assumptions as an empirical 
issue. This being so, the adoption of the controversy to the peculiar structural 
and financial characteristics of Latin America is, to say the least, a major 
undertaking outside the scope of this work. It is hoped, nontheless, that what 
follows may constitute an introduction into the subject.
The core of "the. life long controversy" is between a constant or a stable 
velocity function or a relatively elastic and unstable function. A traditional 
point of start for the quantity theory was the Fisher equation; and the Keynesian 
revolution which, on the other hand, left the theory discredited as tautological 
and offered a whole new apparatus of "iucome-expenditure".
* See, for example, J. Noyola, El desarrollo econdmico y  la inflacion en Mexico.
Investigacion Ecdndmica, Mexico city, March, 1956; and" D. Seers, Inflation and
growth: the heart of the controversy and Inflation and growth a summary of
experiences in Latin America, ojjs, cits.
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The controversy has grown rather sophisticated with time, and much empirical
*analysis has been contributed . Professor Friedman and what today is called the 
Chicago School has had an importaht£ebirth of fundamental consequences to econo­
mic policy* The Keynesian tradition has continued to develop and, what is just 
as important, different Neo-Keynesians have "taken-off" in different directions* 
With respect to the latter for the purpose of this exposition the following au­
thors illustrate the different currents: professor Kaldor and Mrs, Robinson, and 
professor Kahn; Sir John Hicks, and professors Wilson and Newlyn; and the 
Radcliffe Committee* Independent progress has developed around J, Tobin, J*S* 
Gurley and E*S, Shaw and the Yale School, Fashions change and at different times 
some of these doctrines have had prevalence over the others. In the early 1960's^ 
during the "Kennedy era", the Radcliffe report for example became of much 
consequence; but, by the late years of the decade persuasion has come from the 
Chicago School, The alternative influences spill-over to economic policy and 
the IMF and ultimately to Latin America*
Professor Friedman's "> rebirthhas tried to answer the challenge in redi­
fining the quantity theory as a theory of the demand for money -where velocity 
is determinant- and not as a theory of prices and output; and, made the essence
of the theory the existence of a stable functional relation between the quantity**of real balances demanded and a limited number of independent variables *
Friedman according to Patinkin, has really presented an elegant exposition of the
modern portfolio approach to the demand for money which can only be seen as a***continuation of the Keynesian theory of liquidity preference * Redefinition****has led Frieraan himself, and Cagan, Meiselman and Miss Schwartz , to the
empirical testing of a stable demand for money. The Keynesian response, of course,
*****has attempted to disprove the findings •
* H* Johnson, Ten years after Radcliffe, unpublised material from the LSE*
** M* Friedman, The optimum quantity of money, Aldine Publishing Co,, Chicago 
1969.
*** Professor Johnson also refers one to certain Neo-Keynesian interpretations 
where the emphasis is on liquid and illiquid assets and this is argued to 
be compatible with Friedman's "liquidity preference theory". Specifically 
he mentions the work of A, Leijonhufvud, Keynes and the classics, Inst, of 
Econ* Affairs, London, 1969#
**** M. Friedman and A.J* Schwartz, A monetary history of the USA, 1867-1960, 
Princeton Press, 1963; and, P.C* Cagan, Determinants and effects of chan­
ges in the stock of money, Columbia University Press, 19^5*
***** ^ summary of the "response" is found in Miss S.If, Edge's, The relative
stability of monetary velocity and the investment multiplier (Australian 
'Economic Papers,’ Dec, 196/)' which discusses the works of D.H, Hester, A. 
Ando and F. Modigliani, M, de Prano and T, Mayer,
Professor Johnson today explains that Friedman's borrowing from Keynes'
*port*olio-balance analysis presents a difference • The quantity theory introdu­
ces explicitly and emphasize expected changes in the price level as an element 
in the cost of holding money and other assets fixed as to both capital value and 
yield in monetary terms, whereas the General Theory starts with the assumption 
of an actual or. expected stable price level (there is nothing, however, from 
stopping the introduction of an ustable price level into the General Theory, as 
for example in the case of professor Tobin; or, for the matter, a certain sta­
bility in the demand for money), Keynes' assumption is said to be misleading 
because it encourages the interpretation of changes in the market interest rate 
on monetary assets as indicators of changes in the ease or tightness, without 
proper allowance for the effects on the relation between money and real rate of 
interest of changes in expected rates of inflation and deflation. This criti­
cism makes the essence of the differentiation between the monetarist and the 
alternative Keynesian approach to economic policy. The monetarist approach 
stresses the unreliability of money interest rate changes as economic indicators, 
owing to the influence on them of price expectations, and concentrating instead 
on changes in the money supply as a, variable, Friedman's quantity theory, con­
cludes professor Johnson, has the advantage of freeing it from the Keynesian 
criticism of assuming an automatic tendency towards full employment, by making 
it a theory of the demand for money without a commitment to an analysis of prices 
and employment. This amounts to a disadvantage since it leaves the theory with 
nothing to say about the relative impact of short-run variations on money, pri­
ces, and physical output.
Disbelief in any constancy in the velocity function is well represented by** ■» professors Kaldor and Kalin • ICaldor argues that there are no grounds for such
a suposition. He explains that in some countries the velocity is low and in o- 
theishigh, in some it is rising and in others it is falling, without any syste­
matic connection between such differences and movements in the degree of infla­
tionary pressure. Such movements for the author can only be explained by histo 
rical developments -institutional factors- and the varying incidence of the po­
licies pursued. Velocity only reflects a relationship and is not determined by 
factors independent of money or incomes. Thus a change in velocity is not an in 
dependent phenomenon hut a reflection of a restrictive policy. It is thus a mis 
take to assume that given the normal frequency of payments the maintenance of any
* H. Johnson, op. cit.
** H.F. Kahn and N. Kaldor, Committee on the workings of the monetary system, 
Vol. 3, HMSO, I960.
given flow of payments requires some definite quantity of money. For the author 
it is through changes in the rate of interest that changes occur in the demand 
of money.
Professor Kahn also says that, other things being equal, an increase in 
money means lower rates of interest, because it means that the banking system 
is taking larger quantities of securities off the market. It is the lower level 
of interest rates, not the increase in money, which creates a change. For secu­
ring control the rate of interest provides the means. Velocity should be regar­
ded as a passive though variable factor, since the quantity of money held idle 
is closely related to the level and structure of the rate of interest. Kahn thus 
believes that velocity is a bogus concept.
The discussion of the Radcliffe Report -and also of the Joint Economic 
Report of the FRS- on the liquidity of the economy as the key variable for mone­
tary analysis represents the most influential answer to the quantity theory.
The Radcliffe Comission concluded that the supply of money is only a part of a
wider structure of liquidity in the economy and that the whole liquidity position*is what is relevant to spending decisions . The decisions to spend are not only
*determined by deposits because there is the alternative of raising funds through 
the purchase and sale of financial assets as well as credits from non-financial 
intermediaries. Hence Radcliffe saw little reason to assume that velocity has 
any "upper limit". The report went on to recommend variations in the rate of 
interest to influence the selling and holding of liquid assets. The danger of 
establishing fluctuations in the rate of interest also made them sceptical about 
the scope of monetary policy in checking inflation, so that the subject then
i **moved to the virtues of fiscal policy .
Rirther unorthodox developments have also taken place around professor Tobin,y y ft
the Gurley-Shaw approach and the Yale School • For the group monetary theory 
is a theory of portfolio management by economic units. Its subject matter are 
stocks of assets and debts (including paper money) and their values and yields.
It can be distinguished from branches of economic theory which take the income 
statement as the accounting framework and flows income, savings, expenditure, 
and production as the subject matter. One of its major implications is the neces­
sity to regard the structure of interest rates, asset yield, and credit availab­
ilities rather than the quantity of money and the linkage between monetary and 
financial institutions on the one hand and the real economy on the other. The
48-3
*  Radcliffe Report, Committee on the workings of the bionetary system, HMSO, 1964.
** A more radical approach is that of I. Little, R. Nield, and A. Rose, Committee 
on the workings of the monetary system, op. cit.
* * *  Next page.
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distiction is between the financial sector and the real sector (or between 
stock £.nd flow analysis) rather than between the banking system and the rest of 
the economy (as the quantity theory will tend to have it) or between liquid and 
illiquid assets (as in the case of some Neo-Keynesians), The moral of the The^ o 
ry is that the control of both the banking system and non-financial intermedia­
ries may increase the effectiveness of monetary policy and, at the same time 
protect the interest- cost of public debt. The critical issue is whether the 
relationship (deduced from the maximizing behaviour of all economic sector) in 
the financial sector are stable enough to permit changes in the supply of money 
to be used to analize and predict changes in the real sector (output and prices) 
or whether a detailed understanding of the financial sector and the effects of 
monetary changes on the structure of interest rates, asset yields, and credit 
availabilities is a pre-requisite.
Not all Neo-Keynesians have been sceptical about a certain stability in the 
demand for money function. That is, if the transactions-precautionary and spe­
culative motives could be separated then the income motive would be a function of 
the level of income which, through liquidity controls, could contribute to the 
stabilization of the demand for money transactions, while the unstable specula­
tive motive would be a function of the rate of interest. Professor Newlyn, for 
example, writes that the demand for money is a function of the level of interest
rates and variations in the ratio of money to income should be associated with*changes in the interest rate • A specialized exchange economy necessarily in- 
volves the holding of a medium of exchange over time; and time must set some fi­
nite limit to the velocity of circulation and the more the interest rate is pre 
vented from rising by variations the lower the limit will be. Expenditure, on 
the other hand, requires that money is provided by someone and the less there is 
of it in relation to expenditure being attempted the greater the probability that 
it will not be available in the time and place required, Newlyn's concern for 
liquidity controls is a consequence of his commitment to a full employment and 
a public debt management constraints,
Thepossibility of encouraging a certain stability in the demand for money 
for transactions -as a consequence of Keynesian economics- has also been dealt
*** J, Tobin among other, Money, capital, and other stores of value, Am. Econ, 
Pjev, May, 1961; and G. Gurley and E.S, Shaw, Money in a theory of finance, 
Enthoven, Washington, I960.
* W,T, Newlyn, Theory of money, Clarendon Pres3, Oxford, 1962,
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by professor Wilson • For the author the real question is, more than to 0ssume 
an upper limit to velocity, a careful definition of liquidity. The important 
issue is the relationship between the level of expenditure (transactions) and 
the level of liquid assets desired; together with the question of how the de-
aire for liquidity will be affected by changes in the interest rate. It has
been rightly argued that marginal reductions in the supply of money will be 
off-set by increases in velocity. But for Wilson it is wrong to assume that
nothing can be achieved by controlling the volume of deposits. It can be ar­
gued that if deposits are liable to be used more actively so much the better 
reason for controlling the volume rigorously. The Radcliffe Report, however, 
vent on to argue that the control on the supply of money would drive borrowers 
to less liquid assets; that is, to the stock market and other-than-bank finan­
cial intermediaries. Professor Wilson has argued that liquidity has to be de­
fined more carefully; financial assets and deposits plus currency are not the 
same ting; the liquidity of the former is considerably less so that liquidity 
involves a cost. The inconvenience and cost would grow if deposits were cbse- 
ly controled. Of course, no one cannot put a numerical upper limit to ve­
locity but it is reasonable to suppose that the cost and inconvenience will tend 
to grow as velocity rises. If despite its greater cost, borrowers and lenders 
take to the long run and stock markets, here not all institutions will afford 
the cost of new floatings; but, if they can, capital issues controls may be in­
troduced. Moreover trade credit-whose importance is secondary -can also be con 
tained through hire-purchase controls, although they may have a once-and-for-all 
effect. With respect to stock exchange transactions with existing assets a li­
quidity control would imply a fall in share prices and, in the money market, a 
rise in interest rates, for example in demand deposits.
The purpose of the above comments has been to state a background for the 
discussion on "Latin America's velocity". For the moment, however, the in­
terest is mors on the causes of inflation rather than on its policy cures.
That is, in a Latin-american inflationary setting -where one is interested in the 
deman-pull and/or cost-push origin of the inflation and the inflationary spiral 
itself- what has been the behaviour of velocity? Grossly over-simplifying the - 
variable could behave in several wayss
1.— As the supply of money (defined rather rigorously) increases, velocity remains 
nearly constant and inflation proceeds. In such a case, other things being 
equ&l, and initially, inflation may be checked by global monetary measures
* T. Wilson, Inflation, Blackwell, Oxford, 1961.
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(the monetarist thesis).
2.- As the supply of money is raised velocity also increases -the extreme si­
tuation "being hyper-inflation. In such a case, other things being equalr 
a fall in the creation of money would result in a fall in velocity. The
:* implications of the assumption are, at least, twofold:
(a) A liquidity control would check inflation
(b) It might be necessary to assume an upper limit to velocity, however
hazy.
3*- A contraction in the supply of money -or a reduction in its rate of increa 
se- results in an increase in velocity. In such a case inflation may not 
be checked and prices may behave rather anarchically. The implications of 
the assumption are rather complex:
(a) It may be necessary to widen the definition of the supply of money and 
include quasi-coneys plus less liquid assets. Something which in turn 
would involve a careful definition of liquidity, as well as the intro­
duction of both orthodox and selective controls. In such a way that
rising velocity becomes inconvenient and costly and stability in the 
demand for money for transactions becomes increasingly desirable and, 
together with liquidity controls and interest rate variations, checks 
inflation. The question remains whether variations in the interest ra 
tes will not result in severe fluctuations which will defeat the stabi6 
lization effort.
0 0  A wider definition of liquidity may result in the impossibility of re­
ducing velocity as monetary controls are introduced. A cautious impli 
cation of the assumption would be that monetary policy alone is uncapa- 
ble of checking inflation. If the passivity in the response of the su­
pply of money were adopted, its control would then come from the varia­
tions in the interest rate approach. Still, the subject hqs moved on to 
fiscal policy, institutional changes (as in the case of structuralism) 
or the "inevitability of inflation".
4.- With respect to Latin America*s inflation, -the frequent inability to con­
tain it and the fact that it has not degenerated further into hyperinfla­
tion- another relationship may be assumed:
(a) In a first stage (which is inflationary) an increase in the supply of 
money leaves velocity nearly constant (the implicit monetarist position).
(b) In a second stage, when global monetary controls are introduced, a con­
traction or a reduction in the rate of increase- which nay be marginal—  
leads to a noticeable increase in velocity and inflation manages to con­
tinue (the implicit structuralist position).
* :: [/,-•' . / • * '  f ' 'V'S* ’ '* ■ • ‘ ' ' ' f  : ; . *
(c) In a third stage, when selective controls are introduced, a contraction 
should lead to a decline in velocity and inflation is reduced. If this 
does not occur several explanations may have to he ventured..
(<») The stage would be one where money and velocity are rising. Or, alter­
natively, that severer controls in the money market still result in
increases in velocity or else plunge the economy into a deflation unac­
ceptable from the political and social points of view. The capital mar­
ket may be relatively underdeveloped and incapable of influencing the 
deman for money. The importance of the "financial external sector" as a 
source of liquidity or illiquidity may be rather decissive.
(ii) An empirical description of the behaviour of income velocity of circulation
It has to be granted that from the previous simplistic exercise -monetarists 
have an initial case with the unindustrialized countries of the group, Bolivia 
and Paraguay but also with Brazil and Uruguay. The Bolivian case might have 
very well illustrated the thesis were it not for the lack of adequate statistics. 
It should be noted that, during our period of study, the 1952 revolution took 
place and proper data become nonexistent. Still, it is a well known fact that 
the almost hyper-inflation of the 1950*s in this country was "caused" by the 
central bank. Inflation started to gallop in 1952. By 1956 the government of 
president Paz Estenssoro adopted a severe stabilization programme with emphasis 
on monetary restraint and with the support of the United States government. 
Inflation, nontheless, continued to gallop until I960, but after that price in­
creases were greatly reduced. It was thus claimed -probably rightly so- that the 
policy was successful (see Table I again) .
Turning to Table A (and to the set of graphs) one is first reminded of prof­
essor Kaldor*s warning the experience has been for velocity to move in various 
directions without any apparent connection with the degree of inflationary pres­
sure. Moreover, the ratio of income to money plus quasi-money can extend from 
a floor of (1.7 in Argentina to a limit of 11.4 in Paraguay. The explanation of 
these regional differences imbedded in historical institutional arrangements- 
are still a subject to be developed in the context of inter-country conq>arative 
analysis. What is particularly puzzling is that it may not be claimed that the 
more developed financial systems have a lower ratio, and viceversa. Chile's
48-7
* For an introduction into the subject see again C. Zondag, op. cit. Structuralists, 
on the other hand, have claimed, that if inflation gave way it was because of 
the considerable recovery in agriculture and tin exports plus the large credits 
and aid from the United States that enabed Bolivia to avoid further devaluations 
and to cover public expenditure which in other circumstances would have let to 
huge public deficits. _Moreover, the democratic regime fell to Colonel Barrien- 
to's dictatorship which could further enhanse monetary restrain.
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financial markets are relatively scmhisticated and velocity is high, while Peru's 
are rather backward and velocity is much lower*
Certain patterns, however, may be distinguished in a setting where the 
experience has been one of sharp and continuous increases in money (turn back to 
Table I). In Brazil and Uruguay, as it was said, velocity has reinainded relat­
ively stable -and they are two of the most inflationary countries. Colombia 
presents fluctuating j>rice increases with a considerable fall in velocity. The 
rest of the countries have considerable increases in velocity, at le^st in the 
greater number of years during the period, with different degrees of inflationary 
pressure. But, resuming, if year to year comparisons are made, it is clear that 
velocity has been rather unstable for the group as a whole. A simplistic 
assumption could be adopted if it were true that the more severe the inflation 
the faster the increases in velocity. But this is not apparent. It is worth 
insisting that Brazil with the worst inflation has the most stable ratio, while • 
Mexico with a much milder inflation has had considerable rises in velocity* The 
core of the matter, moreover, could very well be one where in a setting -charact­
erized by rapddly depreciating money- velocity has not increased beyond rather 
tolerable bounds. These are the questions that have to be answered, Why has 
velocity been unstable and why, at the same time, fluctuating increases have 
been rather mild considering the trend in prices? The attempt to produce an 
answer really has to rest on the financial arrangements of these countries; the 
differences between the practices in the countries; and, the incidence of the 
policies pursued, where the final aim should be to distinguish between "nominal 
or theoretical" practices and the "real" determinants in the demand for money.
Before trying to understand some aspects of the behaviour of the money and 
capital markets, it is convenient to try to define more closely the nature of the 
instability in velocity and inflation. Having observed the instability in curren­
cy and demand deposits, three other indicators may be useful in this respect; 
the trend in time deposits, the importance of foreign assets and foreign currency 
deposits (FCD); and the likely effects of stabilization programmes.
When velocity is seen purely in terms of the trend in time deposits (quasi­
money as a Jo of GNP in Table A and the subsequent graphs) the increasing velocity
becomes more clear. In Argentina and Brazil, the most inflationary countries of*the group, the importance of time deposits has fallen most severely *
Chile and Uruguay are just as inflationary and yet time deposits have decreased
* In Paraguay, which is perhaps the most underdeveloped country of the group, 
time deposits have never had any importance.
less* The milder velocity is only apparent, since in.the former time deposits 
include FCD, while in the latter they do not. Thus in Chile and Uruguay 
increasing velocity is somewhat concealed or averted "by such deposits (more of 
this below). This assumption is also valid for the less inflationary countries 
(Colombia, Peru, Mexico and Ecuador) -inflation being milder the velocity in 
such deposits has been lower. Moreover, in the first three countries FCD have 
gained importance and contributed to disguise the velocity trend in money. The 
importance of Mexican time deposits is rather small considering the relative 
sophistication of the financial market. This is however due to the growing 
importance of public and private bonds whose development responds to various 
factors, but one being increasin price stability.
In Table B the comparison between velocity and FCD, as well as with the net #foreign asset position , has been made. Since in Argentina and Brazil official
FCD do not exist, it is not possible to judge their impact on velocity (an
answer would require research into the effect of the black market). Still, at
this stage one is left with a bewildering alternative: with similar inflationary
settings and external financial positions velocity has doubled in Argentina,
**while in Brazil the increase is relatively marginal ,
On the other hand, the increasing importance of FCD in Uruguay seems to 
explain some of the smaller increases in velocity. Also, FCD have grown pari 
passu with a fall in velocity in Colombia. And their importance is considerable 
in Mexico, Chile, and Peru. It is, however, hardly possible to establish a 
statistical relationship between the two variables, since the behaviour of FCD, 
besides inflation, is influenced by the varying controls of the authorities and, 
what is fundamental, by expectations about devaluation. In Mexico, for example, 
when devaluation was further feared during 1955-1958, FCD increased, velocity 
was high in demand deposits, and inflation considerable. When expectations chan­
ged for the better after I960, all three variable started to fall. Ecuador, with 
the mildest inflation and unfrequent devaluations, may illustrate why FCD have 
been so low (Ecuador, of course, is also a very poor country).
A general relationship seems to exist between net foreign assets and the 
inflationary process (turn again to Table B). In all cases the deterioration of 
external financial positions is associated with the persistance or acceleration 
of inflation. Ecuador, the country with the mildest inflation, is also the one 
with t^e best relative reserve of foreign assets. It is unfortunate that Peru
* It includes Central Banks* and Commercial Banks* foreign assets.
* *  A fundamental comparative study could be made here. The first explanation may 
lie with Brazil*s permissive monetary policies and Argentina*s contradictory 
monetary restrain^ see Fart III, Chapter 2 and case study).
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andMexico, intermediate cases, do not publish their net foreign asset position. 
However, it is a well known fact that, after periodic crises, their position has 
been remarkably superior to that of the others (the subject is descussed in 
Chapter 3» section b).
An interesting indicator that may explain increses in velocity may be the 
incidence of stabilization programmes on the demand of money (although the pro­
grammes may been reduced the supply of money only in marginal terms and
ineffective in reducing prices over the medium and long runs). In Tables A and 
B years when monetary controls and budgetary restrain were the main objective 
of economic policy have been underlined together with their corresj>ondieng vel­
ocity (see also the graphs). It is presumably by no coincidence that during 
those years of monetary restrain (although they might have been mild restrains 
and often frustrated ones) velocity increased very noticeably in Chile, Peru, 
Mexico, Ecuador Paraguay an only less so in Argentina (whose velocity has "just” 
kept on increasing). While on the other hand, in those countries -Brazil, Uru­
guay and Colombia- where monetary restraint was not (generalising) the official 
policy of authorities, either velocity remainded rather constant or it fell, a$ 
in Colombia. It ought to be clarified that Brazil "intended” two stabilization 
programmes: one in 1955-56 and a second which started late 1963* Put the first 
one was regarded as a fiasco, while the effects of the second and severer one 
cannot be judged within the period of this study .
With respect to the effects of the programmes on price increase the picture 
is rather disquieting. In the cases of Argentina and Chile inflation and veloc­
ity increased (although there was a brief respite in Chile from I960 to 19^3* 
when nontheless velocity was high). The situation is similar in Peru, although 
milder the trend in both variables (it should he noted that Peru was fortunate 
to have an export boom in 1960-1965, after its stabilization programme of 1958- 
1959) (see case studies). In Mexico, however, the turn was for the better.
During the years of stabilization (1955-58) -although the term as such was not 
used- there was a sharp increase in velocity, higher price increases, and FCD 
continued to rise. But after 1959 prices and velocity started to fall in tune.
This was accompanied by monetary increases, a high industrial rate of growth, and***an inflow of foreign capital .
* The selection of these years, more than on quantitative measures, has been 
based on the declarations of Governments on economic policy objectives (The 
subject is discussed in Part III, Chapter 2 and based on the case study 
readings recommended in the bibliography).
** See ECIiA, The revolution of ecororric policy in Brazil and Chile in Peon. Snrv. 
of. L.A, UN, NY, 1965T
*** Structuralists claim that this was not fundamentally a consequence of monetary 
controls, but of the long-run structural charges the econony had been under­
going in public investment, agriculture, industry, tourism and foreign 
investment.
(iii) Some determinants of the demand for money and financial assets.
Having established that velocixy has'been increasing in the region, the 
question remains why, in the face of continued monetary depreciation, velocity wa 
not indeed higher. Why was the demand for money in the form of transaction 
balances not further reduced by the different degrees of inflationary pressure?
To gain some knowledge of the subject it might be useful to distinguish two close 
connected stages:
1.- The institutional setting in which money markets have developed in these 
countries; accounting for the different degrees of financial evolution the 
different countries have reached by the early I960*s. That is, the peculiar 
arrangements that aim at the control of money through the liquidity and 
interest rate effects and the scope of regulating government bodies.
2*- The behaviour of money is further determined by the degree of development-or 
underdevelopment- of the bond market, the stock market, stock exchange 
transactions and the peculiar institutional arrangements in these markets.
The subject may be approached taking the following steps, and trying to 
describe them in the context of institutional arrangements:
A - Some further comments on the money market.
B - A description of the peculiarities of the bond market.
C - The stock exchange.
*D - The nominal structure of the rate of interes •
(A)
It is convenient to emphasise that the growth of demand and time deposits
in Latin America is a relatively recent historical development. It may be argued
that only after the Great Depression and during World War II did the financialy K
systems advance into the extensive use of more diversified means of payment • 
Different countries have arrived to the reliance on demand deposits, quasi-$oney 
and sophisticated banking services at different times throughout the century. Th 
is particularly interesting because even today these countries illustrate the 
different stages through which a Latin-american country develops its financial 
institutions. Grossly over-simplifying, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay had an ear
48-11
* The exercise abstracts from the implications of budget deficit financing and 
the debt management constrains. This is discussed separately in the next 
section and in Chapter 3» section D.
** An introduction into the subject is found in F. Tamagna, La banca central en 
America Latina, CEXA, Mexico City, 1963*
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start during the turn of the century, Mexico, Brazil and Colombia began their 
more elaborate developments during the 1930's (while Mexican institutions have 
developed faster during the past thirty years and reached a relatively superior 
stage by the 1960's );• Peru's financial diversification only started in the 1940's 
and still, remains relatively backward; while in Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay the 
financial markets are still very underdeveloped. It is worth pointing out the 
obvious, in the inflationary setting that was enhanced during the war, because it 
may help to explain why velocity remainded thereafter within tolerable hounds.
When prices started to increase there was not much effort to cut cash and deposit 
balances since these had always been traditionally low. The structural change, 
which took the form of income growth independently from foreign trade and increasing 
industrialization, presumably demanded growing transaction balances. On the other 
hand, capital markets were small and few the a^ets available as substitutes of 
money. There was a lack of experience to hedge against inflation. The structure 
of the rate of interest has been rather anarchical, and money dearer than what 
nominal interest rates indicate. Exchange controls and multiple exchange rate 
systems were widely used with the effect of making FCD illegal or cumbersome •
The inflationary process was very liJcely accompanied by a wage lag which retarded 
the response with which workets could dispose of cash balances (turn to section c^ ).
On the other hand, even today, despite the expansion and diversification of 
financial institutions and the structure of assets, financial markets are predo­
minantly debt markets rather than for stocks. And within the limited scope of the 
debt market, short-term transactions predominate. The predominance of the money 
market -as a characteristic of underdevelopment- is represented by commercial 
banks as the most important group in the financial structure. Through these banks 
together with the central bank, flows the major proportion of total financial 
resources:
*"Mexico writes D. Shelton, has now played the game of growtlunanship in banking 
for longer (meaning 1948-1963) than most UDC, and she has played it with 
considerable skill. Her techniques, successes, and failures deserve a wider 
audience" (pag.114) in Public policy and private enterprise in Mexico, Ed. P. 
Vernon, Harvard Press, Mass. 19o4. Also see R. S. Brothers and L. Solis 
Mexican financial development, Austin, 1966.
** The Monetary Commission for Latin America (CEMLA) comments that though deposits 
in foreign exchange are permited in some countries, they are closely controled 
by the central banks in Los mercados de capitales en America Latina, CEMLA, 
Mexico City, 1966 (pag 18j.
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Relative Importance of Commercial an Central 
Banks within the Banking Systems, 1963 ($)•
Country Ratio between commercial 
Bank's resources and total
Ratio between central bank 
resources and total.
Total
Argentina 
Brazil^
54.6 32.2 89.8
43.2 -
Chile 40.9 40.0 80.9
Colombia 38.3 37.1 75.4
Peru 61.0 24.4 85.5
Uruguay 39.6 52.9 92.5
Mexico 30.0 23.7 33.7
Bolivia 13.6 81.7 95.3
Ecuador 30.5 37.2 61.7
Paraguay 37.5 47.8 85.3
Source: CEMLA, op. cit. (a) it does not include the Bank of Brazil.
The absorption of financial resources within these banks is quite predominant 
(with the exception of Mexico). In commercial banks the main source of funds is 
represented by demand deposits. Such deposits do not bear interest, except for 
negligible margins in Brazil and Peru (see Table C). Less important are time 
deposits which on any event have been eroded by inflation as it was said. Time 
deposits are considered very liquid: a substantial part fo time and savings depo­
sits can be had by the depositors almost when desired. The interest rate paid va­
ries considerably within the countries, without this meaning that inflationary 
countries pay higher rates. In fact, considering the rates of inflation the 
interest is ridiculous. This is with the exception of Mexico and Feru which pay 
attractive rates, some of which are in dollars (see Table C again).
Most commercial banks operate very closely to the money market. Although on 
occasions, as in Mexico and Colombia, they operate with long-term bonds (usually 
forced by the monetary authorities). Hence the system, at least in theory, has 
a nixed character operating in both the money and capital markets. Participation 
in iong-run paper would enhance liquidity controls. However, their main function 
is granting short-term credits. The following table shows the proportion of long­
term credits in the total.
Mexico has a higher participation in the capital market, but in the rest of
the countries the total is very small. The nominal structure of the rate of
interest again does not vary very much between these countries, despite the
different degrees of inflation. There is also a tendency for higher interest rates
48-14
for short-term credits. The main determinant, however is the fact that commercial 
banks are compelled to purchase certain quantities of long-term public debt 
(more of. this below).
Long-term Investment as a $ of Total 
Credits in Commercial Banks, 1963#
Average rate
Country % of inflation
Arentina 9.0 21.4
Brazil 1.1 24.0
Chile 7.2 22.6
Colombia 2.2 8.4
Peru 2.0 7.8
Uruguay 5.0 17.4
Mexico 29.0 5.3
Ecuador i • 53.0a 2.1
Paraguay 0.2 14.6
Source: CEMiA, op. cit. and Table C. (a) time deposits as such.
The object of these comments is simply to emphasise the importance of the 
money market and the unimportance of the capital market in Latin America. To a 
large extent it is the former market that determines the trends in velocity 
through the policy measures adopted. Moreover, a qualified definition of liquid­
ity, particularly in an underdeveloped setting, would point out to the major 
importance of demand deposits and short-term credits (except for Mexico). One 
can expect that borrowers and lenders have a lesser recourse to the capital 
market than in other countries. Hence the traditional liquidity effects may be 
of fundamental consequences for velocity. The fact remains that stabilization 
measures appear to increase velocity in one way and, paradoxically, deter "at 
the same time" unlimited increases. The reasons why liquid balances have been 
maintained to some extent must lie, at least partially, on the monetary measures 
taken by the authorities: the traditional liquidity ratio, the wide range of re­
serve requirements and special deposits, the composition of reserves in the 
asset structure of banks and financial institutions, Bank rate and differentiated 
real rates of interest, the degree of liquidity other-than deposits financial 
assets may not possess, and so on. To explain the relevance of these measures 
it is necessary to see how the bond market has behaved, what has been the influ­
ence of the stock exchange, and the effect of the rate of interest.
(B)
Through the growth and diversification of fiuancial institutions Latin Ame­
rica has hoped to create a higher rate of savings that would flow into investment.
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Despite the efforts, the capital markets in the majority of these countries are 
relatively underdeveloped, something which explains their modest contribution made 
to investment. The number of and variety of financial instruments is reduced and 
their circulation hardly diversified, as it will be seen below. Operations in the 
long-term market are small and simplistic; and when they take place is partially 
in response to compulsory measures taken by the monetary authorities. Operations 
in the stock exchange are a very small fraction of total transactions in the market 
and limited to few stocks.
Central Banks in the region are entitled to intervene in the capital market,
but the use of open market operations has scarcely any importance. However, Centra]
Banks do absorb a good proportion of government paper, as well as place it
through liquidity controls in commercial banks, which in turn represents a very
high proportion of total circulation (see Table D). The practice has been also
for Central Banks to frequently guarantee, explicit or implicitly, the re-purchase
of public assets and, on occassions, the banking of private assets. Specifically,
the Central Bank -or special "coramisions' created for the purpose- has intervened
in the bond market so as to prevent excessive fluctuations in prices and to support
liquidity. Not all Central Banks publish specifications about the range and scope
of their powers -the following comments may, however illustrate their intervention*in the capital market •
1.- The Banco Central in Argentina has as part of its theoretical role the channe­
ling of financial assets into the long-run market and production investment.
Its main tool is the Fondo de liegulacion which seeks to support the liquidity 
of government paper and its price stability.
2.- The Banco Central in Chile may take recourse to open market operations to 
regulate the monetary system. It has the role of selling and buying public 
securities with direct or indirect state guarantee. It may also buy securities 
when there is a contraction in the supply of money or when there happens to be 
soother deflationary signs. But, in practice, its intervention in the capital 
market has been very limited.
3*- The Banco de la Republics in Colombia may buy or rediscount short and long­
term paper, both public and private. It places such securities by compulsion 
in the commercial bank system. It may also intervene in open market operations 
with financial assets but so far it has not done so. Credit, besides liquidity 
controls, is managed also through Bank Bate and differentiated interest rates.
* See, C2MLA, op. cit. (pags 142-150).
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4.- The intervention of the Banco de Mexico in the capital market has as its main 
objective the role of "influencing the orderly growth of such a market and 
the channeling of‘savings towards productive investment". The market, however 
is still characterized by a weak stock exchange and a somewhat anarchic 
structure of the rate of interest, which is not very sensitive to monetary 
policy. It absorbs public debt in moderate amoudts, as a means to encourage 
infrastructure investment and to maintain an adequate level in the liquidity 
it creates partially, as well as with other means of payment. The degree of 
liquidity, from the quantitative point of view, is regulated through special 
deposits and portfolio composition both in commercial and investment banks. 
From the qualitative point of view, the banking system is controled through 
the policy of limiting rediscount and the compulsory investment in certain 
assets and credits. Its main tools are compulsory deposits, which are said
to be a combination of orthodox liquidity ratios, open market operations and 
rediscount. The bank uses direct measures to limit raises in the rates of 
interest, so as to channel cheap money into long-run investment. For example 
time deposits, in commercial and investment banks, has upper limits for int­
erest rate. It has also forced private banks into investing in stock for
over two years, and a portfolio which implies a channeling of 70fo of savings
into production and 30$> into trade. Such a variety of controls has contrib­
uted to the flow of speculative funds into Financial Societies. On this
second type of financial institution the Central Bank, through a securities 
comniision, has tried to channel the resources of Financieras away from the 
money market.
5.- The Central Banks in Peru, Paraguay and Uruguay limit their intervention to 
the absorption and backing of public debt. Uruguay, however, has undergone 
a banking reform in 1964 which introduces special deposits and portfolio 
guidelines.
6.- CEMLA quotes the Central Bank in Ecuador as saying that in this country the 
institution does not intervene in the capital market because there is no org­
anize market to channel savings into productive investment.
The important aspect to distinguish, according to CEMLA, is that bonds
represent the main instrument to attract savings; and that those floated by the
*government represent a major part of total circulation • Even within these assets 
their small importance as compared with total economic activity may be seen in 
Table D. It is very relevant to note that over 60^ c of public bonds are floated 
by the public sector (except in Mexico). Private floatings of bonds only has 
importance in Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile.
* See, CEMLA, op. cit. ‘(pag 11).
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The holding of bonds is also very concentrated in the public sector in the
*most inflationary countries -Argentina, Chile and Uruguay #
Private purchase of bonds, on the contrary, are much higher in Mexico,
Colombia and Peru. The fact that private banks appear to take them up readily 
in Mexico and Colombia is a result of compulsory measures of the authorities. 
Nontheless, individuals and non-banking enterprises, purchase them readily in 
Colombia, Uruguay, Mexico, Ecuador and, particularly so, in Peru. This may be a 
consequence of the more attra^ive interest rates these countries offer, some of 
which are dollar bonds (see Table C). Considering the rates of inflation, this 
is specially true in Mexico, Peru and Colombia (and all three countries have 
contained increases in velocity)# Uhile in Argentina, where the private sector 
hardly purchases bonds,velocity has kept on increasing . In Argentina, Uruguay and 
Ecuador the public sector absorbs 82$, 56$ and 57$ respectively. The hanking 
system is predominant in the rest of the countries (with the exception of Peru).
The extreme case is Chile where 96$ of total bond circulation is absorbed by the 
Central and private banks. The proportion is also considerable in Colombia (60$) 
and in Mexico (45$); although in the latter the. central hank and public Banks only 
account for 5$« Peru's private sector acceptance of bonds must be explained by 
their relatively high rates of interest (see Table C again). The general charac­
teristics in the bond market are a reflection of the Central Bank's policy of 
guaranteeing public and certain other bonds, of absorption of public debt and 
liquidity ratios.
The interest rate is usually very variable ranging from 2 to 10$. On average 
the rates, despite the inflationary pressures, are between 4 and 6$ and sometines 
below the interest paid on time deposits. Such interest rates in Latin America 
are, however, only nominal. Numerous practices alter the rate, although it is 
true that where they form part of compulsory purchases they are placed at par value. 
Some devises that explain their relative acceptance in the private sector are the
u v Wi
following s
* There was no available data for Brazil; but, according to Dr. Simonsen, the 
placing of public debt in the public banks is enormous in this country, op. cit. 
(pag 36). In 1963 the ratio of the money supply to total loans to the 
government sector was 44$#
** It is unfortunate that comparable data was not available for Brazil because here 
huge increases in public debt x re r e compatible with stable velocity (prices, ox 
course, have been getting more and more out of hand),
*** Although it should be insisted that, judging by the predominant holdings of the 
government sector, their voluntary acceptance is quite limited.
**o—xo
1#- In Argentina, for example, there is a Fondo de Regulacidn for public and
private assets which mainly supports the value of government liabilities. A1 
some public bonds, like "national bonds", which pay interest betwee 2.5 and 
10$ have a guarantee of re-purchase in five days. Public bonds have also bee: 
used as part of the salary payments to the civil service.
2.— In Brazil they have been used as part payment of income tax (on occasions up 
to 15$ of the total).
3*- In Mexico a striking aspect is that almost every government liability, public 
bank bonds, and some private sector assets have been given for extended perio< 
of time perfect liquidity. Government bonds have been supported at par for 
nearly two decades. The situation persists because of total assurance that 
the Banco de Mexico will support the market in the face of any substantial 
liquidation. The whole structure usually resembles a "call money" market 
within out regard to the technical maturity of the instruments employed.
4.- In Chile they sell at below par and are readjusted in value according to the 
price of gold.
5*- In Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Ecuador, governments bonds are also denomi 
nated in dollars. These floatings especially in Chile and Peru have competed 
very favourably in the market. In Peru for this reason -together v/ith the fat 
that institutional investors pay very attractive rates of interest, some of 
whose bonds are in dollars- the private sector has been attracted to the markt
What is important to clarify is that perhaps some of these practices explain 
why velocity has not gone beyond certain bonds.
Although the importance of public investment banks and private financial 
sector bonds, with respect to total economic activity, is still more reduced it is 
nsefull to make a few comments about the prevalent practices. In simple terms 
these floatings include those that originate in government investment banks and 
other public institutions, private investment banks, Latin-american Financieras 
(institutional investors), insurance companies, and private enterprises, whose 
importance is negligible.
In Latin America the financial sector most likely to participate in the long- 
run market is the one compossed by a great variety of public banks . The imports
*  The great majority of bonds, writes CEMLA, is usually denominated in domestic 
currency, and*large parts of the floatings denominated in dollars has had the 
object to consolidate foreign debt (Mexico is an exception since she has manage 
to place government bonds in foreing markets). The funds collected are said to 
be destined to cover both current and capital expenditure, with emphasis on 
infrastructure investment. CEMLA, however, is rather sceptical and estimates 
that in the inflationary countries -especifically Argentina, Brazil and Chile- 
their main purpose has been to mett previous public debt (Chapter 3> section ja)
** To have a complete picture of total government bond transactions it is necessar 
to include besides the state banks all those public bodies which participate in 
(see overleaf).
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of these bonds, appears to be considerable only in Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay (see 
Table again)* On average the term of such bonds is over ten years* The inter­
est rates vary considerably from one country to another, but their average of 5 - 7$ 
is moderately low (although an occasions, they include readjustment mechanisms). 
Paradoxically nominal interest rates seem to be higher in less inflationary 
countries. Frequently, as with the rest of government bonds, they are placed 
among the banking system as part of their liquidity ratios or portfolio composition; 
although a certain proportion is bought freely by the private sector (specially in 
Mexico and Peru). The fact that they include re-purchase guarantee plus the 
backing of a government body makes them rather liquid. It is not usual for their 
value to be supported at par and assurance is given that, on the face of instab­
ility, official support is granted. In must cases they are placed at value, excer/t 
in Argentina, Colombia and Chile where they are placed below par.
In principle their function is to supply credits for agriculture, industry, 
and foreign trade. Their origin comes from the reluctance of banks to grant long­
term credits, as well as invest in infrastructure. Their funds come from govern­
ment capital grants, special funds, credits from the Central Bank, foreign credits 
bond floatings, and occasionally time dei^osits, Time deposits pay ridiculous rates 
of interest considering the inflation, although they are attractive in Mexico and 
Peru (see Table c). Their main attraction, however, is a "participation in profits1' 
In Mexico, for example, the Nacional T’inanciera (the governments investment bank), 
has bonds, both in peso and dollar denomination, with a 4.5 to 10$ interest and a 
5 participation in profits.
Their transactions include the financing of both the money and capital markets 
extending credits or investing in stocks. In Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, 
and Uruguay they tend to concentrate on government debt. But, in Mexico, Colombia 
and Chile they also invest in private bonds. Investment in shares is only important 
in Mexico and this is mostly in enterprises where there is government participation. 
Their main function seems to he a growing tendency to finance popular housing 
(Chile, Uruguay and Mexico). Public expenditure financing is important in all 
cases, Statistics about the proportion of funds destined to long-term investment 
are difficult to obtain in a consolidated form, "different banks have followed diff­
erent policies". C K jLA estimates that these fluctuate from a negligible amount to 
, . *9^$ m  one of the Mexican state banks •
IN ThE Market, like the Social Security Ints, Land Reform Inst., Housing Inst., 
and so on,
* See CEMLA, op. cit. (pags. 117-119).
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The group composed by private investment hanks -adn other non-hanking
institutions which have been developing rapidly during the last-decade- should
*traditionally operate in the long-run market • They are known, however, to work 
also in the short-term market, something which makes them difficult to be dist­
inguished from commercial hanks. Their funds usually come from bond issues and 
time and savings deposits. . Their clients are usually private enterprises and 
individuals. The functions, besides the granting of credits, include the pur­
chase of both private and public bonds. Their credits are usually for construc­
tion and trade, although successful efforts have been made to channel them towards 
the financing of industry, and less so in agriculture (the trends in the countries 
differ considerably).
Their bond issues are not unimportant, especially in the long-run market 
(return to Tables C and D). Contrary to public banks their circulation is rather 
diversified ranging from the Central Bank and private financial institutions to 
private investors. The non banking private sector take them up readily in Colom­
bia, Peru, Uruguay, Mexico and Ecuador. Although their time deposits are handled 
in much the same way as those of commercial hanks, their interest rates are 
slightly higher. Despite the sustained inflation this type of deposits have ten­
ded to grow. Again this is explained by the value readjustments. In Argentina 
-not withstanding their usual rates of 18 to 24$- they are readjusted in terms 
of the cost-of-living index. While in Chile, they are revalued according to chan­
ges in the index of wages and salaries. In Colombia Mortgage Banks (which have 
access to Bank Rate) float bonds with a 7$ interest rate and are mainly sold to 
commercial hanks, insurance companies and private enterprises. In Chile Invest­
ment Banks float bonds, some denominated in dollars, and claim to grant credits 
for productive purposes. In Mexico they float bonds at interest rates which 
range from 4 to 10$ with a predominance of 8$ rates. Their main function is to 
intermediate between saviours and investment.
1.- In Argentina these hanks operate mainly with long-term paper (from 5 to 15 
years) and pay interest rates from 7 to 15$* tut they absorb much government 
debt to cover budget deficits. Financial Corporations, on the contrary, grant 
short term credits destined to consumer goods, although monetary authorities 
have been trying to gear their funds towards the medium and long-term markets.
2.<- Brazilian institutional investors work exclusively with short-term credit, 
and grant a right to profits.
3.- Colombian Mortgage Banks are very diversified in their operations. They grani 
long and short term credits (with moderate interest rates of 8 to 12$) and huj 
assets, mainly government and public bonds. Financial Corporations work with 
short-term paper (l to 5 years with interest rates from 8 to 12$), but also
* They include Mortgage Banks, Savings Banks, Financial Societies, and Mortgage 
Tian#t^ .npnts of Commercial Banks.
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operate in the stock exchange and grant credits to industry.
4.- In Chile Investment Banks occassionaly work in the money market, hut concentrate 
on long-run credits (more than 10 years with interest rates of 7$, which include 
cost-of living adjustment).
5*- In Mexico investment banks have a mixed character. They invest in both private 
and public long-term bonds, grant industrial credits (starting from 5 years), 
but also operate substantially in the money market.
In general, their credits and bonds extend from 3 to 35 years, predominating 
those for 10 years. The greater proportion of funds goes into construction and 
housing; and to a lesser extent to government bonds, trade credit, and hyre-purchase 
Mexico has a high proportion of investment in industry.
A major change in the structure of the financial institutions in the region has
been the growth of private Financieras companies, which are not hanks although there
is a trend to include them within Banking Legislation. Though their quantitative
importance is small and unspecified, they have been extending in Brazil, Colombia,
Mexico and Chile. They are considered useful as an instrument of financial intermed
iation and as a hedge against inflation and interference from the Central Bank.
Their specific function is the purchase and sale of assets -operating as stock *companies • They usually invest in stock from productive, financial and commercial 
enterprises. Only a small fraction of their resources is placed on the bond market. 
Their funds come from the issue of their own stocks.
The interesting thing to note, is that while these institutions were practicall; 
non-existant by the end of the war- when the commercial banking system was the main 
and in cases the only private financial institutions- they have grown ever sinca. 
Their growth has usually merged with an important commercial and investment hank 
group in response to the liquidity controls impossed. For a time, the versatility 
and usefulness as outlets for the closely regulated funds of the commercial and less 
so investment banks permited them to gain importance. These are the institutions 
which accept time deposits, sell certificates of deposits, and market long-term 
credit and stocks. They have tended to group together so as to reduce competition 
from the public sector and enhance profits. This should not be taken as a. monop­
olistic trend, since "financial groups" tend to compete with each-other. However, 
by the early 1960's monetary authorities have been devising measures to control 
their operations.
*In Brazil they invest in industrial enterprises (food and steel find insurance}; in 
Argentina in live-stock and commerdial firms; in Colombia in chemicals and bever­
ages; in Mexico in commerce and industry; while in Chile they have been relatively 
unsuccessful because of competition of governments bonds denominated in dollars.
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Another important group is formed by the private insurance companies*
Their importance in absorbing savings has kept on increasing, although far from 
the importance the£ have in other regions, A certain share of their fund goes 
into the capital market, mainly through the purchase of public and private bonds 
and long-term credit* Funds come from insurance policies and very frequently 
from investment in real state (Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Mexico)* Apart 
from their explicit functions, they invest in building, real state, and housing 
for leasehold* Only recently have they purchased bonds, as a result of conq>- 
ulsory measures, in Argentina, Mexico and Peru* It is not known what proportion 
of their fund is invested in the long-term market, but it is claimed th$t it 
mustly goes to trade, and industry* Long-term credits are granted to the govern­
ment and banking system, and short-term credits for hire-purchase.
Lastly, with respect to private enterprises, according to CEMLA, it is well
known that Latin-american firms hardly issue bonds* Their investment is usually
financed through undistributed profits or credits from the banking system.
Although statistics are very scanty and unreliable, CEMLA, estimates that in Chile
Mexico and Peru fctich circulation may reach at the very most 20^ of total bond
issues* The interest rates paid are somewhat higher than for other bonds, and in
the case of the above countires they are sometines denominated in dollars* They
are usually placed in the private sector, although occassionally some public banks
have taken them up* I'heir backing is usually given by an important financial
*institution and, as in Chile and Mexico, on occasions by a public bank
The over-all modest development of the capital market — together with the 
erosion caused by chronic inflation, but in the context of powerful and divers­
ified liquidity controls- explains to some extent the check on the instability 
in velocity. It was said that a qualified definition of liquidity in the region 
(perhaps with the exception of Mexico) points out the large importance of the 
money market in determining the trend in velocity, other things being equal* 
Resuming what are the institutional characteristics in the capital market with 
reference to velocity?
1,- The great proportion of government paper is placed within the public sector
itself, as well as in private commercial banks. In the remainder Central Banks
and special commissions have the power to intervine in the capital market, but
it is clear that their power has to be exercised mainly in the money market
(again perhps with the exception of Mexico).
2*- The bond market, despite the degree of deficit financing in the public sector**has moderate floatings as compared vith total economic activity * Moreover, 
a very large part of both issues and holdings is kept within the public sector.
* CEMLA op. cit. pags 62-65*
** The apparent paradox is studied in Chapter 3» section d.
7
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The potential source of inflationary pressure is then closer to the "budget- 
deficit-cause-of-inflation" rather than to excess liquidity available to the 
private sector (especially so in Argentina and Chile), And, it is by no coin­
cidence that in the less inflationary countries (Mexico, Colombia, Peru and 
Ecuador) private holdings of bond issues were relatively much larger -and these 
countries have contained increases in velocity# Cther factors that check 
excessive velocity in the market are real rates of bond interest which may he 
much higher than what statistics indicate; bonds may have considerable liquid­
ity, in the form of re-purchase guarantee and assurance of support from the 
Central Bank; and, they may form part of the compulsory liquidity ratios of 
commercial hanks and institutional investors,
3*-The quantitative importance of bond market transactions of private investment 
banks, Latin-american financieras, public investment banks, insurance companies 
and private enterprises is indeed very relative; although less so in the less 
inflationary countries (Mexico, Feru and Colombia) which sometimes pay attrac­
tive rates of interest and a right to profits. This again, either way, ensures 
a check on velocity.
4.-It should he stressed that although in theory private investment banks, and some 
public banks too, oxight to work in the capital market, it is known that a good 
proportion of their resources is channeled through the money market (especially 
in Brazil and Colombia).
5*-The development of Financieras precludes a hedge against inflation, a right to 
profits instead of interest and an encouragement to hold financial assets (more 
of this below). Whether this carries greater liquidity in the capital market 
depends on the steps monetary authorities take to include these institutions 
within banking legislation and controls (as in Mexico and Argentina).
(C)
CEMLA writes that statistics on the stock markets are scarce; hut that, on
the other hand, the general characteristic of the markets are similar in the re- #gion . In fact, as a consequence of the particular methods through which enter­
prises finance investment, the importance of shares in the stock market is very low. 
The persistent trend has been for shapes to be kept within the ’’family unit”. Thus 
the "quantitative" importance of registration and transactions in the stock exchan- 
ges is almost negligible. Still, if their quantitative importance is small, such 
transactions may serve as qualitative indicators of trends in financial activity.
Out of the ten inflationary countries considered in the study, seven have 
stock exchanges -four in Argentina, twenty two in Brazil, two in Chile and Colombia, 
one in Peru and Uruguay and three in Mexico. The main bulk of transactions, 
however, is concentrated in the capital cities; except in Brazil where Sao Paolo is 
also important. The small importance of stocks as transaction instruments of 
the stock exchange m a y  be illustrated by the ratio between stocks registered and
* Idem* pag. 16.
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stock transacted (Table E). Except for Argentina, in the rest of these countries 
the percentage of transactions was very low; something which reflects the concen­
tration of assets within the enterprise. The indicator, however, is a very crude 
one since it does not include transactions outside the stock exchange. CEMLA 
estimates that outside transactions can he as high as 90$ of the total in Bogota, 
but as low as 20$ in Lima and 13$ in Mexico City.
The types of assets and their terms differ considerably in the various 
exchanges. But in general, transactions are characterized by long-term paper and 
shares; although the Rio de Janeiro exchange works mostly short-term assets.
Concentrating on the transactions performed for the small period when 
comparable data was available, what has been the contribution of stock exchange 
transactions to liquidity? (see Table F). If the transactions are divided simply 
between bonds and shares two opposite trends are evident. The evolution of 
transactions has to be interpreted in terms of Table G. It becomes clear that in 
most inflationary countries -Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay- the main hulk 
of transactions has naturally been in shares; while in the least inflationary 
countires Mexico and Peru -transactions are concentrated in bonds. In fact,
Mexico City*s exchange appears to be purely a debt market. It is interesting that 
Colombia, which "stands in the middle" with respect to the rate of inflation, also 
divides its transactions equally between stocks and bonds. Thus from Table G, it 
may be seen that in the first group of countries stocks are what count, while in 
the second bonds are the indicator and in Colombia the total of both types of 
transactions.
Taking the series at market prices it would appear that, even after two 
decades of chronic inflation, the stock exchange in the region are buoyant (with 
the exception of Montevideo). If, however, the value of transactions is deflated
with the cost-of-living index the picture is rather different. In the inflationary
* . countries -Argentina, Chile , Colombia and Uruguay- the "liquid funds" forcoraing
from transactions have either stagnated or declined sharply. It may he claimed the
* The long-run contraction of Chilean stock exchange transactions and bond issues 
may be seen in the following series (giillions of 1964 escudos) (S. Undurraga, 
Economic development issues, Frager, London, 1967» pags, 129-30:
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
S 147 120 118 259 279 378 152 119 106 110 67 56 71 107 100 91
B 58 57 55 46 46 15 9 28 8 7 7 13 10 4 2 1
Ratio Between Securities Registered and Securities Transacted
1963
. TABLE E
Stock Exchange %  of Securities Transacted
___Argentina 
Brazil
Colombia '
Uruguay 
Mexico
Sourcei Los mercados de capitales en America Latina CEMLA MEX. 1966
TABLE P
Index Series for the Growth in Value of Stock Exchange Transactions
(1959-1963)
CountryAear 1959 .1960 1961 1962 1963 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
(at market prices)_____________(at constant prices)
Argentina
Stocks 100 235 257 250 489 100 86 83 63 100
Bonn's 10° 264 296 193 695 100 97 96 49 142
Total 100 239 262 243 614 100 88 85 62 125
Brazil
Stocks 100 184 323 924 2779 100 99 126 236 406
Bonds 100 157 140 302 469 100 85 55 77 69
Total 100 176 266 731 2059 100 95 104 187 301
Chile /1Stocks 100 64 60 97 211 100 41 36 51 77
Bonds 100 97 182 181 104 100 63 109 95 38
Total lOo 67 68 103 203 100 43 412 54 74
Colombia /
Stocks 100 88 81 106 131 100 79 67 88 80
Bonds 100 134 129 143 177 100 120 107 115 108
Total 100 104 99 120 147 100 94 82 97 90
Peru
Stocks 100 149 163 161 128 100 122 124 117 86
•Bonds 100 528 729 741 430 100 432 556 536 291
Total 100 247 308 310 206 loo 202 235 224 139
Uruguay
Stocks 100 97 122 92 74 100 50 51 . 35 23
Bonds 100 161 121 66 56 100 83 51 25 18
Total 100 106 122 89 71 100 55 51 33 22
Mexico
Stocks 100 139 • 117 98 190 100 136 108 89 171
Bonds loo 88 186 469 612 100 81 170 42 6 551
Total loo 89 184 460 600 100 82 169 417 541
74
5
26
56
18
Sourcei See Table E
TABLE G
Distribution of Transactions in 
{%)
the Stock Exchange, 1959- 1963
Country 1959 1960
i
1961 1962 1963 1959-63
Argentina
Stocks 88 87 86 92 84 86
Bonds 12 13 14 8 16 14
Brazil
Stocks
S
69 72 84 87 93 89
Bonds 31 28 16 13 7 11
Chile
Stocks 93 90 82 88 96 92
Bonds 7 10 18 12 4 8
Colombia
Stocks 64 54 53 57 57 57
Bonds 36 46 47 43 43 43
Peru
Stocks 74 45 39 39 46 44
Bonds 26 55 61 61 54 56
Uruguay
Stocks 86 79 87 90 89 86
Bonds 14 21 13 lO 11 14
Mexico
Stocks 3 4 2 0.5 1 1
Bonds 97 96 98 99.5 99 99
Source: See Table E
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frustrated borrowers and lenders in the money market could not look forward for 
much liAuidity in the stock exchange. This nay be a factor which deterred further 
increases .in velocity. On the other hand, in the less inflationary countries, 
stock exchange transactions did grow considerably and may have contributed to 
liquidity. The puzzling case is that of Brazil because stock exchange transactions 
grew four times in real terms in only five years. Moreover, such an increase was 
compatible with a rather constant velocity and monetary permissiveness (the fact 
may be explained by the growth of Financieras and their dear money practices, as 
we shall see below).
As far as share price changes as compared with price changes and stabilization 
periods the following pattern may be observed (Table H). The fluctuations in share 
prices have been considerable without any apparent relation to price increases.
One would have assumed that the more the inflation the higher the prices for shares.
What can be said is that during periods of stabilization objectives -those years1 >
underlined- the prices of shares fell indicating two alternative things. An attempt 
to obtain liquid assets or simply a low level of activity. They, however, had 
little impact on prices, since these continued to increase. The only exception is 
Mexico, but here share tansactions are quite negligible and cannot be taken as an 
indicator.
In general, it is safe to assume that financial transactions in the stock 
exchange are rather unimportant with respect to the rate of inflation but that 
their sruall importance is creating liquidity may also be one of the factors that 
impedes further increases in velocity (except in Brazil).
(D)
From an eclectic angle it would apjiear that continuous increases in the
supply of money, together with extremely low nominal rates of interest end chronic
inflation, would result in a highly unstable velocity function. In fact, the
regioris experience has been one of increasing velocity, nominally low interest
*rates, and a negative Bank Bate . But, it is also a fact, as it has been repeatedly 
said, that velocity has remainded within rather moderate bonds considering these 
increases in money and cheap rates of interest. But, could it not also be true 
that institutionalized practices have in fact raised real rates of interest in 
such a proportion as to ascertain a certain stability in the demand for money?
Throughout Latin -America it is recognized that a maze of legally fixed
interest rates and officially supported assets puts extreme limits to the usefulness
£of much of the interest-rate published material arm variety of subterfuges produces 
a considerable difference between apparent rates and actual rates paid. In the 
context of regi'onal comparisons one has to be careful not to generalize too much:
* Brazil still appears to manage a rather stable velocity with negative bank rate 
and norainal rates of interest and increasing inflation.
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what is determinant here is the rate of price increases which varies a lot
between the countries of the study.. Hence the gap between nominal and real rates
of interest should be wider in, say, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay; Chile being a
spacial case in this sense; less so in Colombia and Peru; much less so in Mexico;
*and perhaps not at all in Ecuador •
The question is that with chronic inflation financial institutions have 
adapted themselves to the setting-with various degrees of sucess in the money 
market and less so in long-term paper and credit. The markets have developed very 
complicated devices to avoid the legal restrictions deviced for non-inflationary 
economies. Indeed, the powers of the monetary authorities have gone over bank rate 
into the right to practice differentiated rates of interest, placed ceilings on the 
rates, extend to different assets and financial institutions, and so on. The 
structure of the interest rate in these countries is much higher than the one 
prevalent in advanced countries; but judging by the rate of inflation, they are still 
ridiculously inadequate (see Table C again) .
Thus the result has been to find legal loopholes or legal formulas which
replace the words "loan" and "interest", as well as a variety of value readjustment
mechanisms. With the rate of inflation being unpredictable, the result has been to
solve some of the problems in the short-term market, while the long-term market has
***presumably been deprived from a certain amount of funds • How has then the gap 
between no?ninal and real rates of interest increased during inflationary periods?
1.- As it was illustrated a variety of fixed-incorae securities are placed below 
value; perfected liquidity is granted on occassions; whether, implicit or 
explicit re-purchase guarantee is offered; official backing is granted by the 
public banks or a main private financial institution.
2.- Escalator clauses are practiced in accordance with the cost-of-living index, 
the wages and salaries index, or the price of gold. In some countries like 
Brazil or Mexico, this is not legally practiced; but in other it is possible to 
do so -Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. The solution, of course, even if legal, 
is not satisfactory because the unpredictability of inflation implies the 
danger of a readjustment lag.
* A fascinating -not to say overwhelming- empirical research could be comparative 
studies on the interest rate, starting with an inflationary setting which led 
to an "immeasurable" setting of interest rates,an official world of nominal 
rates and the ineffectiveness of bank rate policy and finishing with the rec- 
omenSation of a viable interest rate policy that would check inflation.
** Average rates of price increases hardly indicate the magnitude of the divergence 
in many years prices have increased beyond 25^ and up to l l k f c in Argentina.
*** This is not the place to discuss the distorture effects of inflation on savings 
and investment (for a discussion on the subject turn to section d below).
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3.- The natural consequence has been, as it was said, for time deposits to 
decreased at an alarming rate (see Table A).. The move, only in some countries 
-Chile, Peru, Mexico and Uruguay- has been for PCD to increase.
4.- Banks, of course, grant credits on the last resort since they pay even lower 
interest rates to their depositors.
5#— Frequent devices to increase nominal rates of interest have been: out-right
charges of interest without registration in the hooks; high banking fees for
"services"; a sophisticated device has been to tye a loan to a time deposits
*until the debt is paid off •
6*- Trade credits can be enormously high. In Mexico, the least inflationary of the 
countries, small business often pay 30$, and consumer loan as much as 36$ per 
annum . i
7«- The creation of associated financieras to an important commercial or investmeni 
bank implies the granting of rights to "profits" instead of interest payments 
or the creation of bills of exchange (letras de cambio) instead of loans • In 
• Merest rates then can be as high as 30-40$. Deposits and loans then take the 
form of participation and interest rates the name of profits*
8*— Experts estimate that real rates of interest have been climbing consistently 
with inflation, although in unpredictable fashions •
* The borrower takes out a loan much larger than what he wants and desposits 
part of this money in the bank. Since the interest rate paid on such depositE 
is far less than the rate charged for credits, the effective rate is far above 
that appearing on the contract. Such deposits are, of course, subject to 
liquidity ration resulting in liquidity control and deater money. Suppose the 
an individual wishes to obtain a loan of a 1,000 pesos. The bank lends 2,000 
pesos at 10$ a year and requires the borrower to deposit half of the amount ii 
a time deposit at 2$ per year. The effective rate of interest in this case 
comes to 18$*
** See D. Shelton, op. cit. (pag 135)*
*** The second system is even more ingenious. The borrowers exchange promissory 
notes for bills of exchange drawn by him and accepted by the financiera. The 
due dates of the bills of exchange are escalated in such a way that before th€ 
due date of each an equivalent amount of promissory notes bought by the borr­
ower becomes due. Thus the finance company assures the payments of the bills 
it has accepted through the previous falling due of bills received by it* Up 
to then, the borrower simply exchange promissory rates for bills of exchange. 
However, since the bills of exchange are considered as securities it is 
possible to sell them at a discount in the capital market (hence the growth o i  
these transactions in the stock exchange, i.e.Brazil). Thus the borrower keei 
the money he requires, (in practice the company then resells the securities 
from the borrower to the public)* For the purchaser of the security, interesi 
is replaced by the discount. In this way a one year* security is resold for 
74$ of its nominal value (that is with a 26$ discount) and assures the purchaf 
an implicit interest of 26/?4 or 35$ annum. The borrower, who exchanged 
his promissory notes for bills of exchange, indireclty pays this implicit 
interest rate, plus taxes and commissions.
**** CEBLA, op. cit.
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9*- The effect has been for long-term credits (productive credits as they are 
called in Latin America) to fall on the shoulders of public hanks and other 
government agencies (which have recourse to rather dear foreign loans, some 
of which are made occassionally in the domestic currency). The interest rate 
charged by these agencies *is extremely low in view of the inflation.
Obviously for the borrowers this constitutes a gift, hut as with all gifts 
they are scarce.
If the nominal structure of the rate of interest is taken at face value, 
the picture is one of very cheap money (see Table C again). Y/hat appears part­
icularly bewildering, leaving bank rate aside for a moment, is that the most 
inflationary country (Brazil) had the lowest nominal rates of interest and mild 
er fluctuations in velocity. While, the least unstable ones (Mexico, Peru and 
Ecuador) has higher and more realistic rates of interest and sharper movements 
in velocity. The rest of the countries (Argentina, Colombia and Uruguay) 
present little difference in their nominal rate of interest structure (Chile, 
however, has higher interest rates). It is interesting to note again that most 
of the countries maintained FCD and different bonds denominated in dollars; while 
Argentina does not and she has the highest increases in velocity (Brazil, however, 
is an exception).
It can be concluded that the least inflationary couutres -Mexico, Peru and 
Ecuador- followed more realistic interest rates -on occassions higher than the 
rates of more inflationary countries- and were rewarded with a lower rate of 
inflation. In fact, Ecuador has the most realistic record (but this is an unfor­
tunate example since this country is one of the poorest in the region).
Turning to the trends in nominal Bank Ilate policy, velocity, and price what 
do official statistics indicate? (Table j). In Argentina Bank Ilate has been kept 
at "floor level" for at least over a decade and this too has coincided with sharp 
increases in velocity. Brazil*s Bank Rate has also been at floor levels, but with 
a rather constant velocity. And in both cases the divergence between Bank Bate 
and price increases is enormous. Thus, considering the very relative usefulness 
of the indicator, the trends may be purely "coincidential". The relationship, 
however, seems to be more pertinent in Chile, Colombia and Peru. In the latter
two cases there has been a mild trend in Bank Rate increases together with a
certain decrease in velocity -inflation has also been milder. And in Chile, after 
1958 there was a sharp change towards dearer money, so that increases in bank rate 
seem to move pari passu with a fall in velocity. The response in prices, however 
and except for 1961, has been minimal. Mexico presents a case of a fixed Bank rate 
floor for at least IS years together with various changes in velocity and prices
(see Table A). So that, for the reasons stated along the exposition, one should be
very sceptical about the possibility of establishing a relationship between a nomi­
nal variable and velocity. The official opinion in Latin America has been that
Changes in Bank Rate, Velocity and Prices, 
1948 - 1965
TABLE J
Country Period BR P ^
Argentina 1955-1958 5.0 1.95 20.7
1959 4.5 2.8 114.0
j 1960-1962 5.0 3.3 26.3
1963-1965 4.5 3.8 25.5
Brazil 1948-1957 6.0 3.0 16.5
1958-1964 8.0 3.3 46.7
1965 18.0 3.2 61.0
Chile 1948-1956 4.5 7.5 35.9
1957-1958 6.0 10.9 26.0
1959-1960 16.6 8.5 25.5
1961 15.9 7.7 8.0
1962-1964 14.3 > 6.6 35.0
1965 15.3 6.1 28.0
ColoQibia 1950-1957 4.0 5.9 8.0
1958-1963 5.0 5.1 5.8
1963-1965 8.0 4.9 17.7
Peru 1948-1958 6«,0 4.6 10.3
1951-1965 9.5 4.5 9.1
Mexico 1948-1965 4.5 - -
Source: See Tables A and IMF, IFS
a) Average for the period
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true open market operations are negligible and rediscount policy rarely decisive.
It mast be remembered, however, that something must explain the deterrent 
factors that have kept velocity within tolerable bonds. That is, taking the 
monetary policy measures one by one their effect may appear negligible, but if 
all liquidity and portfolio controls are added-up, together with the growing gap 
between real and nominal interest rates, the measures may go a long way in 
explaining the phenomenon (turn to Part III, Chapter l).
What remains disquieting, of course, is that in the majority of cases, prices 
have continued to increase despite monetary policy. This brings the argument back 
to the controversy,- to the structural causes of inflation (turn to Chapter 3)> and 
to the scope of monetary policy. It is generally recognized that draconian mone­
tary restrain may reduce the rate of inflation in Latin America for some time, but 
only with ^irreparable” damage to the rate of growth and public investment, 
furthermore structuralist claim that because of the structural causes of inflation 
and the historical economic characteristics of the region a growth priority is sine
quanon, in the sense that stabilization programmes will not succed without such a *primer objective •
Resuming, monetarists assume demand inflation, control of the supply of money 
and predictable velocity. It is necessary to determine how monetary authorities 
may or may not control the supply of money and the financial sector whether in the 
light of monetary considerations (the liquidity effects) or as a result of fiscal 
requirements (interest rate effect). (Something which also brings us in the next 
section to the second monetarist cause of inflation, budget deficit financing). 
Still, these appear rather weak assumptions to structuralist, who are interested 
in cost-push inflation and structural imperfections, Aside from these causes of 
inflation, this does not mean that the supply and demand for money are not behind 
the inflation -although for structuralist their role is only a propagating one-
it means that their role is partial and has to be further assessed with necessary
empirical case studies and with reference to the imperfection of the money and 
capital markets in the region. In our view this has been done insufficiently by 
both sides of the argument, so that the object of this disgression has been to
make the fact explicit.
The second thing that monetarists assume is that, because of the rates of 
growth in money and the predictable velocity, inflation can be cured with monetary 
policy. Let us state the position in the words of professor Lutz when he talks 
about Latin America (24). He specifies that in the case of demand pull inflation
* This is a controversial subject discussed in Fart III.
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the immediate cause of inflation is the over expansion of credit either to the 
private sector or to the government. If it is the latter, one can claim, the 
obvious method is to balance the budget. It should be remembered that if the 
monetary authorities worked within the constraint of a given debt management 
policy, monetary tools may not control inflation. For the author "it goes 
without saying that if inflation results from excessive credit expansion to the 
private sector, a restrictive monetary policy is the proper method to deal with 
it" (professor Lutz refers one to the Italian example in the post war). Dr. Kaldor 
does not agree with the Italian example. He writes: "but there are other examples. 
I would remind professor Lutz that... Dr. Salazar's monetary stabilization was 
followed by 30 years of hard currency, stable prices and a completely stagnating 
economy" (25). Mr. A. Kafka also disagrees: "the great concentration of banking 
and financial institutions in Latin America plus the very close relations of these 
institutions with the also heavily concentrated industrial sector (brings forth 
that...)., the net effect of credit restriction is an increase in the concentration 
of industry which, I think, is one of the key propagating factors.•• You won't find 
that a severe credit restriction in the private sector will cause prices to fall, 
even though stocks are sold. Of course, in general, the result of this is to 
favour fiscal policy because of the bad effects of monetary policy" (26).
What is.peculiar is that monetarists do not seem to have applied to Latin 
America -but opposed- the limitations of monetary policy found in advanced countrie 
Experience such as the one described in the theoretical statement above appears to 
be rather neglected. While, on the other hand, structuralists have not gone into 
the subject in empirical terms.
However, a second part of the monetarist argument is -as professor Lutz says- 
the role of budget deficits and borrowing from the central bank in the inflationary 
process.
b ) Budget Deficits
It is recognised that the constraint created by public debt management may well 
lie behind an expansion of the supply of money. This is especially true in Latin 
America where unemployment or under-employment is relatively high;
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where infrastructure services constitute a bottleneck; and, where the size of 
the money and capital markets may make the voluntary purchase of government 
paper difficult. Through this bridge - an expansion of expenditure and credit - 
public deficits may contribute substantially to the inflationary process.
This demand rull inflation can better spiral if wages and other costs tend to 
increase together with the presence of structural bottlenecks. But, in theory 
- and here Mr* W. T, Newlyn is particularly helpful (27) - it is also said that
the fact should not he exxagerated; i,e, given an unduly weight,
•It is my impression, writes professor Karberger, tha.t the basic force which 
has created the inflationary pressure in Latin American countries has been a chron­
ic budget deficit* (28) (See Table III), But it is important to realise that bud­
get deficits do not invariably produce inflation. Economic gro:.*th is the princi­
pal reason that budgetary deficits can be maintained ccntinously without neces­
sarily producing inflation. Having this in mind, let us turn to the monetarist 
exposition of how budget deficits are a cause of inflation: following professor
Harberger closely (29), The money supply in the hands of the public and the gov­
ernment may be conceived as representing the liabilities of the banking system as 
a whole. Any increase in the money supply will have as its counterpart some in­
crease in the assets of banks, and an increase in bank assets can represent either 
private obligations or public sector obligations, or both. Assume a situation iri 
which the assets of the banking system consist initially of half public and half 
private obligations, and in which these proportions are maintained throughout the 
process of monetary expansion. If the sigpply of mooey expands ad the rate of of> 
per annum, half of this expansion would he accounted for hv increases in hank 
holdings of government obligations. On this account only, monetarists would jus­
tify a government deficit which each year was 2.5k of the money supply.
Monetarists claim that the amount of deficit that can he justified for UDC 
is less than for advanced countries. In advanced countries the money supply often 
amounts to 33^ or of a year's national income, so that a government deficit 
of 2 .5 f s of the money supply would amount to 0.85 of 1.0^ of 1,25f  of the annual
income. In UDC, on the other hand, the supply of money typically amounts to
something between 20fr to \ 0 f of a year's national income. Here a deficit of 2.5k
of the supply of money would only amount to between 0.25 k of l.ofo or 0.5^ of 1.Op
of a year's national income (See Table III, where in GIT? terms the fo of public 
deficit is quite larger for all countries).
See again the paper cited (pags 11 to 14).
What this moans is that authorities can control the supply of money, desnite an 
increase in public debt, if Bard: Hate is increased to a penalty rate, of course, 
the Government incurs in higher debt costs.
The fact that the money s u p p ly  amounts to such a small fraction of annual 
national income in most UDC, argue monetarists, operates to produce a particular 
tendency to inflation. Suppose and AC in which the s u p p ly  of money amounts to 
50$ of a year's national income. If this country has a deficit of 2$ of a year's 
national income and if it i3 financed by the sale of bonds to the banking system, 
the resulting increase in the money supply may range between 4$ and, say, 8$.
(The 4$ figure pssunes that the government divided its sales of bonds between the 
central bank and the commercial banks in such a way that the government absorbed 
the full increase in the supply of money) (the 8$ figure assumes that the govern­
ment sold the bulk of its bonds to the central bank, and that there was a secon­
dary expansion of money on the basis of the reserves thus created).
Suppose; on the other hand, an UDC in which the money supply amounts to 
only 10$ of the year's national income and the public deficit is equal to 2$ of 
it. On the same assumptions, the resulting increase in the supply of money would 
range instead between 20$ and 40$, The same deficit, expressed in relative terms 
can produce inflation to a greater extent in an UDC, On this reasoning monetar­
ists explain why inflation has been so much more a serious problem in UDC than in 
AC, It is thus believed unlikely that any country can avoid a substantial rate 
of inflation if its government has a chronic large deficit of which a substantial 
part is financed by the sale of bonds to the central bank. This has been the re­
cord in many Latin American countries. Moreover, monetarists recommend that sta­
bilisation programmes should include a serious attack on the problem of chronic 
and substantial budget deficits. But, of course, this amounts to recognizing 
that purely monetary measures will not be sufficient as long as large public de­
ficits persist. It is also evident that structuralists cannot deny the validity 
of this reasoning.
Structuralists are going to admit that budget deficits may reflect the 
existence of a propagating or induced cause of inflation. But, again, they will 
be interested in the causes that 'forced* authorities to incur in such permissive 
ness, which will even involve the mismanagement of public monetary accounts with 
the central bank and the public. They are going to argue that the government is 
pressed by high unemoloynent, infrastructure bottlenecks and particularly a shori 
age of foreign exchange that may push the economy into a chronic deflation. How­
ever, what interests us here, simplistically, is the relation between budget def-*icits and the rate of inflation. Turn again to Table III.
*The limitations of using budget deficits as an indicator of public behaviour arc 
discussed in Chapter III, Section D.
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lo- It is surprising not to fi^ wl at the general level of inter-country compari—  
sons, any clear relation between “imd-get deficits (measures as a percentage 
of GRvP) and annual price increases.
More so, different countries uresent different tendencies. It is only in 
Brazil - and perhaps in. Argentina — where the Monetarists* argument of large 
Bridget deficits coinciding with higher prices seems to he present. But 
Mexico and Chile present exactly the opposite tendency: larger budget def-
icits are accompanied by a fall in the rate of price increasesJ And in 
Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador there is no regular pattern,
3#- Still, two important facts stand out in the monetarist argument. First,
countries with large budget deficits (Brazil and Argentina) have higher in­
flation; and vice versa (Mexico and Colombia), But, Chile is an excertion 
in the former case, and Ecuador in the latter, Second, in years of particul 
arly high inflation rates, with er'ception, large budget deficits coincide 
(except in Chile and Mexico),
The next step is to establish a simple statistical correlation between the 
two variables (Table III):
1,- The correlations appear to support the above inconclussiveness. That is, 
one cannot generalise in Latin America about the relationship between in­
flation and. budget deficits. Thus one should not ,iump to the conclusion
. that budgetary restraint is obvious when aiming at stabilisation,
2,— Initially, monetarists seem to have a case again with Brazil, The coeffi­
cient (0,7^) 1 agged. for the monetarist assumption (P+l) is relevant and 
the fit of the equation •good1. However, if one looks at the series it 
will appear that HD and P started to climb in 1955. ECTjA writes that this 
coincides with the coffee crisis, ‘The maior factor in destroying the bal­
ance in the public sector was the coffee crisis, and the payments made in 
the process of the stockpiling programme•.• The funds paid out in the pro­
cess of maintaining this programme was large and with the peak coffee crop 
of 1959, amounted nearly to y }  of GDP* (pO). Structuralists are going to 
interpret this as evidence of an external sector crisis which resulted in 
further inflation and forced the government into an increasing defitic,
While tMs ‘original cause* of increases in FD and ? is true, there is also 
evidence that the management of fiscal accounts leaves much to be disired. 
Outright borrower." from the Central Bank has been high, much of it has been
spent in consumption, and infrastructure bottlenecks have not been reduced
to a significant *v>iut, These uoints are also discussed in ECLA*s "The 
evolution of economic -policy in Brazil ( 195** - 19^3 ) (pi)•
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3*~ Monetarists also have weak correlations in Argentina (0.6) Colombia (0.55)> 
and Peru (0.5). However, Argentina's equation fit is very poor and mislead­
ing* As we shall see in the case studies of Argentina (which has a shrink­
ing public sector) and Peru, the stabilisation programmes which were able to 
reduce the rate of inflation for a short periori coincided with expansions in 
BD* This is, of course, short-term analysis; different from the long run 
generalisations one is making here.
4.- As expected negative correlations were found in Chile (-0.87) and Mexico 
(-0.56). The Mexican case may be interpreted as evidence for structuralists 
as public investment and growth increased, domestic bottlenecks and infla­
tionary pressures were reduced over the long-run. But, this is not so for 
Chile; chronic inflation has persisted. As it will be seen in the Chilean 
case study BD have coincided with stabilisation programmes, something that 
to a certain extent is explained by increasing recourse to foreign credits.
5.— In the least inflationary of the countries - Ecuador - there is no correla­
tion; despite that BD have tended to be high from I960 to 1965. It is un­
fortunate that complete information for Bolivia is not available. However, 
it would appear surprising that when the rate of inflation was greatly re­
duced (1959-1965) BD*s continued to be extremely high. Its non-inf1ationarj 
impact is largely explained, according to Mr. Zondag, by direct United State 
aid.
6.- Two simplistic conclusions are the following: there is insufficient evident 
that budgetary deficits are an •original* cause of inflation nor are they 
sufficiently related in a statistical sense to prices; and, a reduction of 
public expenditure, and, hence public investment, can be rejected as part 
of a stabilisation programme. This point will be extended below.
Structuralists argue that BD*s as such are not enough proof of a correlation wit! 
inflation. They think that it is necessary to establish the relation between 
public expenditure and both the rates of inflation and growth. For them part of 
what happens to the rate of inflation depends on what happens to public expendi­
ture, i.e. public investment. The distribution of expenditure in current, trans­
fer payments, capital, ar.d national debt expenditures should be compared with 
both the rates onf inflation and growth. Moreover, structuralism is interested 
in what happens to revenue; what ore the causes for its fluctuations; how does 
it compare to expenditure; and howT budget deficits arise? This they find neces­
sary to understand the relationship between fiscal policy and inflation. Structiu 
alists take the sice in the controversy of expanding public investment to reduce
inflationary pressure, although they are interested in finding ‘better1 wavs to*place government bonds in the money and canital markets* • The controversy is
53.
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taken up a "a in under structural ism (Gapter 3, section d).
The next point monetarists usually consider, no longer dealing exclusively 
■with demand pull, is the role of wage and salary increases in Latin-American in­
flation. Here the term monetarism has to he stretched, because monetarists are 
willing to consider wage push - mainly from the side of the sunply of labour - as 
an autonomous cause of inflation.
c) Wage Inflation
In advanced countries wage push has come to play an important role in the 
post-war inflationary spiral. This is said to he a situation of cost push where 
demand pull is very present; plus, of course, other factors like mark-up pric­
ing. Moreover, it is more frequently claimed that a sound policy should include 
an important chapter dedicated to *incoraes*. But, here the subject is highly 
controversial. Structuralists believe that, in any case, the final aim of 
a wages policy lies in what becomes of productivity1, growth endeavours and, 
mainly, an expansive public investment, as compared with an orthodox contraction 
of it.
Turning to Latin-America in the light of monetarist analysis, it should 
be stressed that monetarist? although interested in demand null, consider wage 
inflation as an autonomous source , One should remember, however, that Latin 
American countries present different structural characteristics from advanced 
countries in.this respect. One has to keep in raind different levels uf unemploy­
ment in the economic sectors, as well as smaller emphasis on full-employment ob­
jectives; a different, concentrated, pattern of income distribution; relative 
weakness in trade union organisation^ mark-up pricing backed on the size of 
the marketJ the protection and oligopolistical price distortions that may bo a 
consequence of HST; and, the fact, that such iraperfectness might render price
■X' Xincreases through wage escalation even if there is a deflationary policy . This
54.
For a brief discussion on the subject see the background paper mentioned 
(pags. 65 to 68 and 138-9).
■V V V-A  A  A  0 vThis is the noint, for example, raised by Sir Roy Harrod (33) and by professor 
• Earberger in Chile, Hr. Diaz Alejandro in Argentina, and Dr. Simonsen in Brazil, 
as it will be later seen.
■X-'K-Ti-jC-This point was suggested by Hr. N. Harman.
(Fromoverleafj
* .The Mexican experience may be helpful to understand the policy thought (see for
example D. Shelton and R. Vernon (32).
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will be explained in our case studies.
Monetarists in Latin America thus consent that an autonomous rise in wages 
can cause a rise in the general price level even if the money supply is held con­
stant. If the nonev supply is indeed held constant in the face of rising wages 
it is likely that the level of output will be reduced and unemployment increased, 
This under the assumption that the level of activity falls to the level of costs 
that permits stable prices. Theoretically wages would be forced down and togeth* 
with increases in productivity some other full employment at a different wage 
level would be achieved. It is said that this painful process has not always 
taken place in Latin America because monetary authorities have expanded the sup­
ply of money to permit the economy to move towards full employment, in the face 
of a higher levol of wages.
An autonomous rise in wages (above the justified by productivity rises) 
should he easy to identify in a setting of stable prices preceeding the wage 
rise. But where the process goes from here is a difficult matter to determine. 
If workers are willing to see - or are forced into - the apparent wage rise part­
ly or wholly eroded by subsequent price increases, then there is no reason to 
expect a spiral. If workers, on the other hand, bargain and receive a second 
rise to compensate the price increase, then a second round of price increases 
will be initiated. This is a case of wage inflation (presumably with full em­
ployment). In fact, where the setting is one of chronic inflation it is very
likely that a spiral is in motion. However, it has been very difficult to det-
**ermine whether the role of wages, in theory, has been autnonous or induced.
In general terms it is belihvdby monetarists that autonomous wage increas­
es were present in A-rgentina, There real urban wages were raised to unrealistic 
levels during the Peron era, and where strong trade unions remained after the 
general's fall. The process is said to be the following:
a) Wages increased autonomously (during the 1940's) above productivity 
rises.
b) Prices, employment, and output increased.
c) A wage spiral was set on.
d) After Peron*s fall there were stronger deflationary efforts, but the 
reduction in activity did not bring wages down in the proportion need­
ed to achieve stability.
This point was suggested by Mr. N. V/aman.
One is inclined to think that short-term analysis is very necessary. That is, 
to take a country, a specific period, and 'break* the spiral at some point to 
see That the behaviour of prices and wages has been like. Obviously much de­
pends on the qualit3r of the statistical information.
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The possibility is also present in Chile and Brazil, dne to the escalation 
in minimum wages. But, it is less probable because trade unions are weak* in 
these countries. It is also said to exist in Colombia; hut here it seems to 
arise from wage-drift or the demand for certain types of labour. Cn any case, 
structuralists will argue that in the long run one cannot ernhasiso this factor
because in the lant decade the share of wages in national incone fell quite per- 
*centiblv.
Summarising the controversv:
1- Monetarists will tend to argue that autonomous wage increases to some 
estent preceedcd price increases (our P+l assimintion) • in the spiral.
2- Structuralists will saj,r that price increases induced wage escalation 
which resulted in further price raises (our P-l assumption). Structur­
alists, base their argument on a regressive distribution of income; 
on monopolistical mark-ups; and, in the emphasis on bottlenecks where 
cost-push leads (although not wages!) and demand-null follows.
Let us then return to the general case and explore it in terms of some em­
pirical evidence. Initially, the only indicator found is the trend in nominal 
wages in manufacturing (Table V ). V/e shall assume that the series reflect to 
some extent minimum wage escalation and transmit1 their effects to the labour 
sector itself:
1- At first glance, there appears to' be a close relationship between
wages and ''rices, without a lag and especially in inter-country compar­
isons. Indeed, the higher the rate of inflation the higher the wage 
increases. One nay even attempt to arrange the countries in that order 
- from the more inflationary to the least so in the period 19^°~1965 - 
Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico and Ecuador. However, 
as encouraging as this looks for monetarism, no clear !year-to-year* 
rclationshiu is obvious.
2— Thus correlation coefficients were estimated for the two variables 
- unlagged, lagged for the monetarist assumption (p+l), and for the 
structuralist assumption, P+l (See Table Yl).
3— The first surprising fact is the monetarist argument is not really 
reflected in the correlation coefficient, except for a v e r y  brief 
period in Brazil (l96”-6p). In Peru and Argentina the coefficients 
are too low (0.5 and Q.b respecttively) and, in any case are higher 
with the two alternative assumptions.
4- It is also surprising that in Brazil's long inflation - at least for 
a decade — there was no significant correlation between wages and
* '/ \These noinis will be dealt with in Chanter 5. section (e) and Part TTT. Cl. .coo. a.
Sources: 
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and prices. There is further evidence of this in Table VTII where real 
wages — measured with the real minimum wage index for .Guanabara, which 
is regarded as the most appropriate index in that country - are seen to 
la" sharpl3r behind the cost of living index. Thus so far it would 
seem that monetarists are correct when they assume that Brazil*s infla­
tion has been caused by demand—pull, reflected in the supply of money 
and budget deficits. Still, it is necessary to preoerlytses the weight 
of the structuralist argument in terms of structural bottlenecks,
5-In Chile and Peru, on the other hand, the structuralist argument is 
present. The correlations are very high, so that wages seem to adjust 
with a year lag to the inflationary spiral. Something which may he 
taken to represent induced wage inflation,
6-For Argentina, Colombia and Ecuador the significant coefficients are 
found in the unlagged assumption. Something which may he taken as the 
significant for wage inflation, hut indeterminate in terms of the con­
troversy, Argentina*s equation fit, however, ir rather poor and mis­
leading, since the constant is high and negative. As it will be seen 
in the case study, the leading propagating factor of inflation has 
been exchange rate devaluation, with wage increases trailing behind,
7-In Mexico, the least inflationary of the countries, there is no correla­
tion between nominal wages and prices. Evidence that autonomous wage 
inflation is not present may be seen in Table VII and in Mr. A. J3uira*s 
analysis (3*0*
TABIjE VII
a)• Mexico: wages, labour costs, and prices, 1940-1965
Year Cost of living Money, Peal Wages Index of Index of labour 
1954 = 100 wages 1940= 100 productivity costs0
1940 21,3 1.52 100 100 100
1945 45.2 1.90 59.2
1950 75.3 3.35 62.3 118 57
1955 116.0 6.34 76.7
I960 154.2 9.89 « 89.5 , 148 6l
1965 169.1 16.00 132.0 159 83
*The rcgressiveness of income distribution is discussed in Chapter III 
section e.
In fact, professor Earberger shows that the direct effects of wage in­
crease on the price level were relatively small in Argentina and Chile 
- a l6 f s increase in wages causing the price level to rise by less than 
1.3/3 for both countries (33 a).
*38.
Year Cost of Living 
1945 = 100
Average
earnings
Real
earnings labour costs
Index of
c
1945
1950
1955
I960
100
16?
257
342
49.9
81.1
126.9
197.1
100
123
100
91
100
73
70
75
a) Source: A. Buxra, op. cit. (pags. 59 and 60)
t>) Pesos per day
c) Costs per unit of output
'Real v/nges in i960 were well below what they were in 1940, although they were 
higher than in 1950. This, continues the author, is not surprising in view of the 
abundance of labour and the weakness of the trade unions. On the other hand, a 
steady rise in productivity as real wages declined has dramatically reduced labour 
costs ^er unit of output below the 1940 level. This means that entrepreneurs 
were able to absorb very substantial increases in wage rates without an increase 
in labour costs per unit of output. Real wages in manufacturing fell below the 
1945 levels during the postwar years and rose towards their 1945 levels only in 
1955 and later... In any event, the result of lower, or at best, constant real 
wages and increased productivity was a substantial (25?0 reduction in labour costs 
per unit of output. A long period of rising output per man coupled with falling 
or at best constant real wages, points to a redistribution of income. The Mexican 
industrial worker, by accepting a declining or at best static real wage, seems to 
have contributed heavily to the financing of the process of investment. It may 
well he said that autonomous wage increases over and above increases iii producti­
vity have not taken place. Consequently labour cost-push must he rejected as an 
explanation of rising prices in Mexico.
8-Although it may be dangerous to generalise on the Mexican and Brazilian experien 
ces, it may be claimed that the monetarist argument does not appear to be present 
in Latin America. Following structuralism, it nay be said that in the spirals the 
most likely thing is that wage adjustments followed price increases. There is in­
direct evidence of this in the income distribution argument presented bTr structur­
alists.
.59
Brazil: Real Average Minimum Wage for Guanabara and Prices
(1958 = 100)
TABLE VIII
Year blWages
(1964 prices)
Wage
Index
Cost of 
living
1952
1953 
195*±
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961 
1962 
1963
1963
1964
1965
31,800
27.900
35.600
37.000
37.6 
41.5
36.3
41.7 
3^.8
40.7 
38.1
35.4
35.4
32.5 
29.9
88
77
98
102
104
114 
100
115 
96 
112
105 
98 
98 
90 
82
35
42
50
60
73
87
100
137
185
236-
390
684
684
1270
2050
a) Source: Estimated from M.H. Simonsen (op. cit.) pag. 41
b) Thousands of cruzeiros, monthly average.
Before going into frequent devaluation as a source of inflation in Latin 
America, which shall be treated somewhat apart because here monetarists and 
structuralists tend to come closer, it is convenient to see a few of the monetar­
ist ideas around the subject of savings and investment. One could rhetorically 
claim that for monetarists the relation between inflation and savings may produce 
a "savings-bottlcneck11 canse-of-inflation.
d) The Likely Effects of Inflation on Savings and Investment
Monetarists believe that inflation has negative effects on savings and 
investment, while structuralists are more o^en to finding positive effects on 
the growth of savings and its channeling to productive investment in an infla­
tionary situation. Monetarists like A. Harberger, F.R. Mikesell, G. Dorrance, 
professor Lutz and C.' Schwartz, writing ahout Latin America, tend to agree and
60o
emphasise the fol loving negative aspects .which hr in" forth their hirh priority of 
stabilisation. Indeed, the greatest effort of monetarists seems to concentrate 
on this field.
In general, the dangers of inflation in a very resumed manner arc: the pos­
sibility o f hyper-inflation, its underirable effects on savings, the misallocation
of resources, its consequences on the inflow of foreign capital and on the balance 
# *of payments, and the reduction of the standard of living of the majorities,, Thus 
it is claimed that inflation nay have adverse effects on voluntary savings, while 
its ability to force savings is limited or non-existing. Community savings are 
reduced, a significant part may be exported, and some are diverted from caoital 
markets. Since inflations are erratic., the failure to anticipate and the disparity 
of pace blurs policy decisions and inhibits or mischnrmels investment. This for 
monetarists can have many consequences. It i/ill mean that fewer growth innovations 
will take place. The real rate of interest may become negative and a sufficiently 
accurate cost accountancy becomes impossible, making a rational investment policy 
difficult. It leads to inproductivo forms of investment: accumulation of inven­
tories and other short-term investment, gold and foreign securities, real estate 
and housing for the wealthy, cuts in export investments, etc. Relative price chang­
es which are necessary to overcome bottlenecks result ineffective for resource al­
location in an inflationary environment, where every enterprise secras profitable, 
where nobody is threatened by losses, and where the degree of uncertainty is so 
great that shifting resources does not seem worthwhile. Lastly, some monetarists 
claim that inflation affects negatively income distribution. That is, it raises 
social costs quite out of proportion to the favourable effects it might have on 
capital accumulation. Forced savings, if they occur, result from a .change in in­
come distribution in favour of profit income, a largo part of which will be invest- 
*•* **-* ed. On to this it is added the discouragement of foreign capital and pressures
on this balance of payments*
It must not be overlooked, however, that balance of payment problems may arise . 
quite independently from domestic inflation. A shift from consumption to invest­
ment tends to raise the demand for imports no matter what happens to the level of 
income, since in UDC the import content of investment goods exceeds that of con­
sumer goods; and fluctuations in foreign trade prices may inject inflation into 
the economy.
**There is an apparent contradiction here: if forced savings occur through infla­
tion total savings would ne raised. Monetarists, however, emphasize sinplistic- 
ally that this is unlikely, in such a way that total savings are reduced, ,,/s
( Continued overleaf )
Overleaf
Theoretically, monetarists form part of the neo-Keynesian theory around the
determination of the liqtiidyty preference and the rate of interest, as -well as*on the field of expectations* Let us remember here only the major aspects of 
the subject in terns of Latin-American monetarism.
As it has been seen the monetary system operates on the assumption that m oney  
serves as a satisfactory medicm of exchange, numeraire, standard for debt repay­
ment, and store of value. If prices are stable or only rising slightly money 
will be accepted for all these purposes. But if prices rise steeply, individuals 
and firms will cease to hold money for the latter two of these purposes. More­
over, if prices are not expected to remain stable, the economic adjustment would 
be different from a situation in which price stability is expected. The problem 
is, of course, that the degree of price change required to influence expectations 
is not only indeterminate in anyr particular case, but will depend on price behav­
iour in previous years, it will differ from country to country, and between 
countries with similar monetary experiences.
Inflation has thus two effects on the desire for liquidity, whiEh depend on 
the speculative and precautionary motives. Inflation increases the value of ef­
fective liquidity, thereby rising the community*s desire for it, hut it makes the 
most generally accepted store of liquidity money and financial assets denominated 
in money-unacceptable sources of protection. This desire for liquidity and weak­
ening of the usefulness of the traditional store of liquidity will exert their 
greatest influence cn the types of investment undertaken during periods of infla­
tion; but, it is claimed, will also work to reduce the total flow of resources 
available for investment. If inflation proceeded at a uniform pace, it might hav< 
little effect on the liquidity preference. In practice, the rate of inflation 
is unpredictable and its variations are likely to become more pronounced as the 
average rate inflation increases. With the future uncertain, the probability of 
unpredictable investment opportunities arising, or difficulties occurring, is in­
creased, Hence-the desire to hold liquid assets for speculative and precautionary 
purposes is strengthened. However, during an inflation money and financial assets
~ ~ —  — - — ~ fry
(from overleaf The point would he that through inflation the structure of sav­
ings and investment are negatively affected in terms of long-term production in­
vestment, and perhaps reduced. This will he discussed below.
^ y
The inflow of foreign savings and investment will firstly depend on the pro­
tection of legislation adopted by the recipient country in terms of profit rem- 
nittances. But, it is also true that chronic inflation vill induce such a pro­
tection which would curtail foreign investment. This vill be discussed below,
*See the background paper mentioned (nags. 15 to 26 and 52 to 39)*
l/e shall abstract from the transactions motive because, in a setting of chronic 
inflation, it may be unwarranted to generalise. One can only say that involun­
tary holdings of financial assets would have to increase in an inflationary 
spiral.
6 1.
denominated in money cannot be depended on as stores of liquidity, since they de­
cline in real value as prices rise* In these conditions, attempts vill he made 
to acquire assets whose value is expected xo rise in the interval before the in­
vestment opportunity of other occasion for disbursement arises. This flight into 
non monetary assets is the source of • tunny of the distortions which accomoany an 
inflation and is a partial cause of the decrease in the flow of resources to in­
vestment, according to orthodox theory.
With those general comments and introduction the next sten is to go in with 
some detail into our inflationary Latin-American economies in the light of monet­
arism. The exposition relies heavily on Mr, G, Dorrance (35) and includes the 
following headings: domestic saving, excluding governmentj foreign carital;
■ifinventory investment; housing; business fixed assets,
(i) Domestic Savings, A considerable part of the community*s savings, 
writes Mr * Dorranee, taxes the form of the accumulation of finan­
cial assets. In most UDC, money forms the major mart of the com­
munity^ financial assets. Even in DC, financial assets denominate 
ed in money (money itself, time deposits, bonds, etc.) absorb a 
large part of total savings. The willingness of individuals and 
firms to hold an expanded quantity of money or financial claims 
is supposed to depend on their expectations regarding the future 
price levels. If prices are expected to rise markedly holders of 
money will try to limit any increase in the money value of their 
holdings, or may evon attempt to dispose of them. Historically, 
the ratio of money to income in all but the wealthiest countries 
has tended to rise, and what monetarists claim is that in the in­
flationary countries this ratio has declined. For Latin-America 
the point would be that those countries with the severest infla­
tion, the volume of savings accumulated in the form of money and 
quasi—money has been quite small, whereas in the less inflationary 
countries these accumulations have been substantial• It is thus 
convenient to examine the proposition in terms of the selected 
Latin-Anerican economies (See Table IX).
Where data was available, the changes in the ratio of money to in­
come reveals that in all countries, except for Colombia, the ratio 
has declined (as compared with DC where it has increased). More­
over, the decline was higher in the most inflationary countries, 
Argentina and Chile. The simpler comparison of the value in terms 
of constant prices, of the increase in money and quasi-money presents
Pressure on the balance of payments arising from inflation will bo dealt with 
the subject of devaluation in a later part of the cahpter and the influence of ••
a) 
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a more controversial issue. First, it is true that in the countries Trith the hi"'1 
est rates of inflation — Argentina, Uracil, and T‘ir,‘,"u.av— , the volume of scvinrrs 
accnrr.ilateu in the form of money and quasi—mo?iev has heen suite small — in Ar"er'~ 
tine, it has o.oclinodj and sec^ 'v", 5r? the leas inflationary* countries — Colombia, 
Per?t, and Mexico and Ecuador — f'cso ecc"mu.le tie^s ’-'•'>ve "been Tr,^'re s,',hst'>’^"?'io.l.
Rut, thirdly, the exceptions render t ie co?'? arisen inconclusive. Chile, with one 
of the highest rotes of inflation, has the highest accumulation! (parayuay and 
3olivia have considerable increases in money and quasi—money holdings after their 
sharp falls in their rates of inflation). Fourth, it should he remembered that 
this comparison is limited to changes in the value of these holdings. It does 
not take account of any changes in the roal value of transactions which these 
holdings are required to finance. Fifth, savin" in the form of monev accumula­
tion is only one part of saviuy through th e acquisition of financial claims j and, 
a larqe ■*’'*»rt of money f'ccmmlotion is invfunta.ry, Nonetheless Mr. Dorrauce is 
riqht in claiming that severe Inflation seems to reduce a ootential source of in­
vestment (with the exception of Chile).
However, other holdings of financial assets are voluntary. These are likely 
to rise less (or fall more) than those of mo^ey if nrices are emected to rise.
Lot us then try t o  illustrate this monot^ri'st arqnment with the cases of Argentina
and Brazil (See Table X). For the monetarist argument to hold true - inflation
reduces uu a s i—mon e v and the hoi din" of other financial assets — '~,oxityr holdings 
would have had to increase more rauidly than the rest. This is onlv ■^ artialln'- 
tr’G for Argentina because more" holdings in current n-rices increased 9 times 
and oua si-money fl*? times. ~owevor, it is ver,r true that the ~*ri vote holdinns of 
nuhlic debt have remained sta^uanat. Moreover, in real terms (defla.tiu." orices 
with the cost of livinq index where 195«t=10ol the monetarist argument holds: 
between 1959 and 19^5 t^ere wa.s a decline in the value of money holdings and in 
other financial assets. In Brazil the situation is more clear. Hidings of 
money between 1959 and 19*^ 5 rose lie times (in real ter,*,s, deflating wit7! the 
pri.ee index, there was a dr on in value) while holdings of "ua s i—money oul'*r rose 
It times (in real ter^s there 'TTas a sharn decline^. Although the holdi.ms of 
"cverr.mcrt sec,ir5.t5.es and life insurance h.a.s increased considerahlv at current 
^rices durin^ 1950—64, in real terms inflation has eroded t7?eir va.lue t o  a nega­
tive f inure. In yen oral terns, monetarists thus claim that force'’ so.vinqs arc 
usually offset by the r’ccline in value.
It 5.s true that th 5.s arnumerh savs nothin" mere than that one element of
savin" rill he re^ 'eo''7. '•’"at, sa'rrs ’•***. Dorronce, it is "r -j-r*+o^ -r- ele—^ut a.c—
cesihle to uonT?v,ep-ert''r omerr, ?xc?.allv in UI)C. Individuals who foreqo monev 
savings will divert so*"e cf their sa.Tr5’r>"s to ot 'er fom^s. "^ewev^ 'r, ^i^ce co"— 
sunrtion is also an alternative 5.f more'" is umtractivo it is hound to he asso­
ciated wi th a decline in total savi.rr's•
-* . a /r,”.”inflation on income distribution has been left for a different chanter, (Chanter ill. Section e;. •
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With respect to personal savings, the effect of inflation will denend on 
what happens to wages, salaries, and ncnsions, and how the distrihntion of in­
come is changed• For monetarists, however, forced savings are unlikely and de­
trimental to growth. As it has "been said in reference to ■'rapes and the ten 
La tin-Ane rican economies (see the previous section), the effect of chronic in­
flation may reduce real earnings.
In the early stages of a mild inflation, the belief that prices will not 
rise too much may well lead wage earners to accept nearly constant wages, and 
pension plans with fixed money payments. In such a case, there might- he a shift 
in income distribution from the low-incone groups to the wealthier profit receiv­
ing sector. *fhat happens to savings depends on t'^ e propensity to save of the lat­
ter. If the high-income Latir-Anerican sector has a high nronensity savings 
should increase, but if luxury consumption and the demonstration effect are ram­
pant the opposite is true. Also, inflation would tend to misallocate investment.
Once wage earners realise that their real value is lively to or has declined, 
they m i l  nress for higher wages or for adjustments which will ensure the mainten­
ance of the real value of their earnings. At the same tine, employers, with ris­
ing money profits, will be wi ling to compete for workers by paying higher wages. 
Similarly, pressure will bo exerted for the adoption of escalator clauses in wane 
and pension contracts, whether in terns of the cost of living, the level of min­
imum wages, or some similar escalating provision. This nrocoss will result in a 
shift in income distribution from the wealthy to the 1ow-incone sector. However, 
the empirical evidence oi the previous section ^oihts to the opposite. See also 
chapter III, section (e).
■x-With respect to business savings, monetarits claim that strong inflation 
will bring forth two specific pressures encouraging business to distribute, rath­
er than to reinvest, current earnings. The higher desire for liquidity which pre­
sumably results from inflation will discourage long-term investment and hence en­
courage the distribution of profits. And second, in their search for liquidity 
and profitable investment, investors are likely to shift from domestic to foreign 
investment. If this happens, share-holdcrs will press managers to distribute pro­
fits, so that the proceeds may be transferred abroad.
Comparative statistics of company practices are almost non-existant. How­
ever, indirect prrof for Mr, Dorrance may be looked for on the activities of ccr- 
ooutions controlled by US residents in Latin-American countries:
•*
See again Mr. Dorrance (37)«
65.
F o r e i g n  Companies Controlled by US Residents: Percent of Earnings
Retained (1957-1960)
COUNTRIES AVERAGE PRICE EARNINGS
INCREASE RETAINED
Argentina h i 46
Brazil 31 52
Chile 24 14
Colombia 7 58
Peru 9 16
Mexico 5 22
Source: Survey of Current Business
With this evidence, one can only conclude that, for these countries 
and for this short period, the monetarist argument dees not hold. Because the 
countries with the highest inflation, excluding Chile, retained the largest per­
centage of earnings; and, the countries ■with the mildest inflation, excluding
*Colombia, retained a very small part of earnings•
In an inflationary economy foreign financial assets serve to protect 
liquidity. Insofar as the expectation of price increases, as a concomitant, an 
expectation of exchange depreciation, domestic claims vill he expected to decline 
in real value, -whereas foreign claims vill not. Consequently, it may he expected 
inflation will lead to an increase in the desire to hold foreign assets, and that 
savings vill he diverted from the purchase of domestic assets to the purchase of 
foreign assets. Again, this vill depend on the existence - and effectiveness - c 
an exchange rate control.
Statistics on the purchase of foreign assets by residents of countrie 
experiencing inflation are not available. However, it is possible to illustrate 
this monetarist argument with a partial case for Mexico, remembering that Mexican 
inflation is relatively very mild (see table Xl), The yearly relation between 
sham nrice increases and large purchases of short-term foreign assets in Mexico 
seems to be very close.
The explanation of the opposite reaction, suggests Mr, Vfarman, nay simply lie 
in that it is not merely inflation but profit remittance legislation which con­
trols the distribution and export of profits. Hence Mr, Dorrance's proposition 
is inadequate, lie shall return to the subject below.
TABLE XT 66.
Inflation and Met Purchases of Short-Term Foreign Assets
For Mexico, 1951-65
Year Annual Change 
in Frices
Purchases of Foreign 
Assets (Millions US Bis)
1951 15 9
1952 -5 21
1955 6 2
195^ 16 44
1955 4 l to ui
1956 6 -15
1957 12 17
1958 2 27
1959 6 -9
I960 1 ~ k
1961 1 12
1962 1 -1
1965 5 6
1964 4 8
1965 4 -12
Source: Balance of Fayments Yearbooks, IMF.
Foreign Carital. In addition to the reduction of domestic savings, 
monetarists argue that inflation will reduce the inflow of foreimn canital 
A major part of private international capital transfers arises from equity 
investment- by non residents. * This flow is largely in the form of direct 
investment, which can go either to traditional staple-exnorting activities 
or into new industrial fields - whore a hold on the national market is 
important. The first type of these investments is largely in function of 
its expected return, the second less so. Now, inflation may he expected 
to raise the money return on investment. If the exchange rote could be 
expected to depreciate at the same rate that ■orices increase inflation 
would have a neutral effect cn foreign envest^ent. However, as it will be 
seen belovf, the exchange depreciation is likely to be more severe than the
point is also presented by professor Mikesell (59).
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67.
increase in prices. Hence, the net return to foreign investors in inflationary 
countries may "be expected to deteriorate. Therefore, the flow of equity capital 
m il probably diminish.
One of the effects of inflation is a deterioration of the foreign balance 
and this will induce the government tc taJ.ce protective action. One of these ac­
tions may be the restriction of the repatriation of profits. At the first sight 
of inflation then, nonresident investors will fear restrictions of this kind and 
vill refrain from investing. This is apparent in the following figures for United 
States investment in some of our countries:
Average Increases in Value of U. S. Private Direct Investment (percent)
Countries Average Annual Increase Chances in Value
in Prices (1943-65) 1950 - 1961
Argentina 21.4 78
Brazil 24.0 55
Chile 22.6 34
Colombia 8.4 120
Peru 7.8 ' 201
Uruguay 17.4 -11
Mexico 5.5 98
Source: Survey of Current Business
It may be seen that in the countries with the highes rate of inflation the in­
crease in value of foreign US direct investment was lower and negative in TJrucuay, 
and vice versa. The execution of Argentina may be accounted for by the fact that 
in 1959—60 there was a sharp increase in foreign investment (mainly in the newly 
opened sector of petroleum to foreign investment, as nart of the stabilisation 
programme. However if ve now turn to total movements in fcreimi urivate capit­
al, the conclusion no longer holds (See Table XIl).* However, in order to follow 
monetarism, assume the following: the higher the rate of inflation the likelier
the external imbalance and the devaluation of the exchange rate, the more the ex­
ternal controls to foreign investmentand the lesser the private investment. This 
negative relationship between higher prices and foreign urivate capital is simply 
not rrcsent in the inflationary countries, with some exceptions.
1.— At first glance no year to year or trend relationship can he seen. Thus 
the fact that inflation may accelerate is not reflected in a reduction
in these capital movements. All one con say is that private capital move­
ments have fluctuated enormously hut with no apparent relation to prices.
In some countries - Argentina, Brazil and Peru - private capital tended 
to increase up to some point in the late 1950*s, and after that it declin­
ed. In others — Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, and Paraguay - it has simply 
had erratic fluctuations.
2.- It should he noted that in Argentina and Chile private foreign capital 
increased as a result of the stabilisation programmes; 1959-60 and 1956- 
57 end 1961-62, respectively. But, in two of these cases these were per­
iods of severe *open inflation* (See Part III. Chapter 2, sections b and C)
3.- Nonetheless, linear regression analyses was tried and, as expected, the 
coefficients were mostly negligible. There were, however, some weak corre­
lations in Chile, Mexico, ParagrwTg, and Ecuador. In Chile and Paraguay 
coefficients of - 0.5 and - 0.6 would indicate that the higher the annual 
change in prices the lower the foreign private investment. In Mexico 
(-0.4) it appears also that as inflation became milder private capital was 
attracted; and the sane applies to Ecuador (-0.55). However, it is more 
likely that these last two relations are •accidental* since Mexico and 
Ecuador are the least inflationary countries of the group and have no ex­
change rate controls.
4.- Thus a fair over-all conclusion is that strong inflation does not seem to 
be an important factor in determining the inflow of foreign private capital 
One may best look for the reasons in its behaviour in the exchange rate pol 
icy and the foreign investment legislation of each country. In fact, one 
should try to correlate periods of frequent devaluation with an outflow of 
capital.
5.- One last point should be mentioned. The exercise may also be taken to dis­
prove the alternative assumption-*- an inflationary setting with its promis< 
of rapid profits (provided remittances are flexible) does not seem to at­
tract foreign private capital.
Aside from private capital and the distribution of dividends of foreign 
companies - and following Hr. Dorrance -, the monetarist analysis suggests that 
inflation is likely to produce forces which diminish the conventional resources 
and effectiveness of investment. Thus they claim that savings in money, quasi- 
money and other financial assets are likelier to be lower than under stable nonet 
arv conditions and that the investment criteria will be distorted to the detrimen
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of growth* Let vs examine superficially what ray harden to investment decisions 
according to monetarism.
(iii) jfoventory investment
If money and financial assets denoriinated in noney, writes Mr. Dorrance, 
cease to protect liquidity other sources of protection will be looked for. The 
accumulation of inventories is one way of holding assets whose real value is like­
ly to be maintained in the face of rising prices. Thus monetarists expect infla­
tion to encourage the accumulation of inventories and to ston the nnrchase of fin­
ancial assets — which would have implied some long-run investment. In addition 
to the illiquidity attached to long-term fixed investment, there is the element 
of uncertainty. And in an environment of unstable prices and rising costs, the 
long restation period of investment renders an indeterminate cost. Because of 
these fwo factors, once an inflationary spiral is on, a marked diversion of in­
vestment towards inventory investment nay be expected. In the latter stages of 
prolonged inflation, the ratio of inventory investment to fixed investment may 
be expected to he somewhat higher than it was in an initial stage, but it should 
be less than in the early stapes of inflation.
Let us explore the proposition, according to the available information ( 
(See Table XIIl). Comparing the stock of inventory investment as a fo of gross in­
vestment with the flow represented by changes in nrices, some rather peculiar ev­
idence appears to be present. It is true that in Brazil Colombia, and Peru, 
chronic inflation is associated with a tendency to increase inventory accumulation 
from 1951-55 to 1964-5. Moreover in the least inflationary countries of the group 
- Mexico and Ecuador - the opposite is true. In Mexico as the rate of inflation 
fell new inventory investment tended to decrease. And with Ecuador*s mild infla­
tion the proportion of inventories has tended to remain constant. But, what ap­
pears bewildering is that the percentage of inventories should be larger in these 
countries with mild inflation as compared with the mere inflationary ones. A 
further contradiction is present in Argentina and Chile. In neither of those two 
countries is there a relation between prices and inventory investment. In Argen­
tina - during the decade for which there was relevant information - all that one 
can say is that in years of economic crisis (1959-60 and 1964) inventories were 
formed; but this boars no apparent relation to the inflationary spiral. In 
Chile the relation, if any, is even more enbigous: years of fast inflation ap­
pear to be accompanied by a depletion of inventories, and vice-versa. Perhaps 
this contradictory experience suggest that * other fnc fcOFS * - whether economical,
This should not be taken as a final conclusion, especially in terms of emmirical 
evidence where the issue is quite controversial. Eor examnle, Dr. J0 Tcrrent 
- in his recent unpublished thesis - found strong evidence ox an inverse ... / ••
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technological or as a consequence of policy measures — are more determinants in the
*formation 01 new inventories than inflation as such.
However, so as to he ahle to compare statistically the two variables as flows, 
the next step is to try to establish a correlation between the monetary value of 
accumulation of stocks and the rate of inflation (with lagged and unlagged assumpt­
ions), That is, as inflation advances there is a greater accumulation of invento­
ries, In Table XIV one can see t:iat the value of stocks at market '■'rices has tend­
ed to increase ve3n^  much - except in Argentina where it has fluctuated sharply — as 
a result of inflation. One would have expected that — because of the speculative 
and transactions motivies and the implicit price increase in stocks in an inflation­
ary setting — the correlation between such a formation and the inflationarv pace 
would have been high. As it was said, linear regression was applied, but the coef­
ficients were negligible in all cases, ..'except for Brazil and perhans Colombia,
The results for these countries were the following:
Brazil: P: r=0.83; y^ =21.5+0.18?;
P-l: r=0.S6; y=17.6+0.15x
Colombia: P: r=0.44; y=4.6+0,Olx
P-l: 5=0,59; y=5.4+0.01x
Resuming, with the above evidence it is impossible to generalise - let alone 
affirm - that inventories have followed price movements in our countries, except 
for Brazil, The exercise thus suggests that a thorough investigation of the struc­
ture of savings and investment is necessary before one can ascertain the long-run
•Jf-A*impact of inflation on the composition of investment in Latin-America,
(iv) Housing
Apart from inventory investment, it is suggested that an inflationary econ­
omy is characterised by excessive investment in luxury housing - form 01 long-term 
investment that also depends on the propensity to save of the high income groups. 
Inflation is c?rnected to encourage the demand for houses, either for occupation 
or for rent. In an inflationary economy .governments can be expected to control 
money rents. Hence the returns are prevented to rise in step with the increase 
in the level of prices. The outcome may be that savers buy boirses for themselves, 
and stop investing in rental property.
7°.
•+Stated in these terms this would be a new field of study.
■JHfMr. N. Varm.an suggests that one test could be to relate the changes in total in­
ventories, as part of aggregate supply, with movements-in wholesale prices and 
corrections in- accounts for depreciation and devaluation. This would recurs a 
highly sophisticated information and exercise.
correlation between inflation and private investment in Colombia (1955-54); 
but the opposite for Brazil during the 10p0*s (59). The Brazilian example, how­
ever, has gone sour in the 19o0's (See Chapter III, e).
Data on the distribution of expenditure between housing and other foms of 
investment are scarce, and data on housing investment for owner occupancy are al­
most nonexistent® However, an indirect measure on the effect of inflation on the 
demand for building materials may be illustrative (see Table XV). This seems to 
be consistent with the monetarist argument that inflation leads to a rise in the 
relativa demand for buildings, as distinct from other forms of investment - with 
the exception of Paraguay®
TABLE XV
Comparison of the General Wholesale Pricb Index and Prices of Building
Materials
(19599 where 1953=100)
COUNTRY WHOLESALE
PRICES
BUILDING MATERIAL 
PRICES
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Peru
Mexico
Paraguav
305
1053
187
181
143
297
354
1086
203
187
161
193
Source: A,S. Shaalan, Inoact of Inflation on the composition of
private domestic inflation, Staff Papers VOL® IX (1963), 
pags. 259.
Another indirect measure could be the relation between the rate of inflation 
and the over-all construction rate ( See Table XIV). However, except for Argen­
tina where as inflation proceeded construction advanced, there appears no rela­
tion^ Indeed, the opposite may be true for Brazil and Uruguay: the rate of in­
flation has increased, while the construction rate has diminished even to a nega­
tive rate.
(v) Business Fixed Assets
The pressure exerted by inflation on the allocation of investment varie: 
according to the different types of fixed assets. Some activities (such as rail-
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road transnort) require long-lived equipment, while others (such as road trans­
port) require much shorter-lived equipment. Some of these investments then in­
volve long-term commitments and will be influenced by expectations. If invest­
ors belive that the future prospectives will be similar to those of the present, 
or if they can reasonably expect that changes will be foreceable, they can have 
a firm basis for their decisions. Technological factors will then be the primary 
determinants of both short and long-term investment. But if investors expect rap­
id changes in basic economic relations, they will be hesitant to invest for the 
long-run. If capital investments may be amortised quickly, an investor has more 
opportunities to revise his decisions. The expectation of rising prices will 
therefore bias investors towards fixed assets with relatively short-lived lives. 
For these reasons, monetarists feel that inflation may be accompanied by the dis­
couragement of long-term industrial investment and social investment, and b3r the
*flow of resources where returns are obtained more quickly.
On these arguments - and on the scanty and 'somewhat contradictory evidence 
collected here -, monetarists claim that inflation is likely to produce forces 
which divert savings to an excessive accumulation of inventories and luxury hous­
ing, rather than to productive long-term investment and popular housing. Of the 
productive investment actually made, a bias will develop towards short-term pro­
jects, while resources may he diverted from low-cost production, basic necessitie;■x-and investment goods to the production of consumer goods, particularly luxuries,
e) Economic Distortions, Price Controls and Induced Bottlenecks.
The field where monetarists and structuralists most clearly clash, both 
in theory and in policy making, is that one which refers to the working of the 
price system. Inflation for monetarist is also •caused* by the economic distor­
tions which appear on the price mechanism when price controls and some other 
kinds of government intervention are instituted. This intervention then creates 
bottlenecks which become inflation induced bottlenecks. They thus believe that 
the way-out of inflation implies a set of equilibrium prices which would remove 
bottlenecks. Structuralists do not agree: they believe that bottlenecks them­
selves are a major cause of inflation - and not vice versa — and that public in­
tervention in prices is a necessary instrument of growth. The controversy, of 
course, has fundamental implications with regard to the objective of price stabi­
lity and its implementation.
These arguments are related to the influence on inflation of price distortions 
and controls, foreiui-sector controls, and inflation induced bottlenecks which 
shall he discussed in the next section. Also see my paper (pags. 32-42, 97-111) 
on the rate of interest.
The subject of savings, investment and. inflation is taken up again in the con­
text of import substitution industrialisation (Chapter 3> Section d) and the 
case study work (part III, Chapter 2).
Monetarists are enviously aw.ro of the existence of suynly rigidities in 
Latin America. These, as we have repeatedly said, are considered by then as a 
consequence rather than a cause of inflation. They claim that they are distor­
tions either created by price expectations built up during the long inflation 
and by supply inelasticites which were the result of distortions in the struc­
ture of relative prices due to controls. The first type, as it has been seen 
above, refers to inflated inventories, fixed asset investment, foreign capital 
reductions, luxury construction, etc. The second type, of which something will 
be said here, refers to price controls - underpriced public services, control 
of agricultural prices, an overvalued, exchange rate and. industrial protection.
That is, an inadequate capacity to import, power and. transport bottlenecks, and 
a poor rate of agricultural output are recognised, as in the structuralist anal­
ysis, as key points; with the basic difference that they are treated as infla­
tion induced.
The relative profitability of investment in any activity is a function of 
the prices of final output rendered possible by the investment, compared with 
the prices of other final outputs which could be achieved by alternative invest­
ment. Now, governments frequently attempt to restrain inflation by imposing con­
trols on the prices of basic commodities and community services. Under these 
circumstances, the general rise in other prices is equivalent to a relative fall 
in the prices of the basic necessities or services. If price controls are not 
accompanied by subsidies to the produces of these goods and services, investment 
in their production will become relatively unprofitable and m i l  be discouraged. 
Consequently, monetarists claim, if the consumer is protected from inflation, the 
result may be a diversion of investment, so that in the end he is deprived of po­
tential supplies of basic necessities and public services. This distorting effect 
of inflation may be seen in the public utilities field. Many public utilities 
are monopolies and their price is subject to control. This control is likely to 
create a lag in the rise of public utility prices behind other prices. Moreover, 
such control is used to restrain further increases in the cost of living. Hence, 
inflation may lead to a diversion of investment from public utilities.
Moreover, inflation brings forth other kinds of public intervention. The in­
crease in imports calls for the protection of reserves, which nay involve active 
encouragement of import— substituting activity and exchange restrictions. Import 
substitution usually involves the protection of domestic production from foreign 
competition. This protection may be given by administrative restrictions, tariffs, 
or excessive currency depreciation. Structuralism, sustains that import substitu­
tion will accelerate growth. Monetarism, claims that it will lead, to the encourage— 
ment of activit:' which, in the absence of protection, would remain improduciive 
with respect to foreign competition.
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Let us now turn to seme points of the controversy itself, around the monet- 
arist position. A £ood example of this are- the comments of Dr. de Oliveira Cam­
pos (40). Dr. de Oliveira questions the proposition that supply inelasticities, 
instititutional rigidities and the import capacity bottlenecks are the active 
forces and monetary expansion a residual. He argues that some countries managed 
to control inflation despite bottlenecks. ‘There is no intrinsec reason why
bottlenecks and inelasticities should be greater in Brazil and Argentina, than*in Mexico and Ecuador*. Structuralists assume that such inelasticities are in­
herent to the growth process in Latin America and autonomous causes of inflation. 
The theory is mainly a development of ECLA*s experience around the Chilean infla­
tion - one of the repressed kind, accompanied by price and exchange rate distor­
tions. These economic distortions are said to discourage investment - in food­
stuffs, power and transports, and exports - and create bottlenecks. However, 
monetarists agree that once these bottlenecks have been created they play an in­
dependent causal role. How are then bottlenecks generated according to the authoi
a) Excess demand arising from the pressures in the foreign sector (wartime 
export surpluses not offset by unspent export taxes or imports) led to 
price inflation.
b) Attempts to control inflation were not done through curving excess demand, 
but by controlling key prices - foodstuffs, transport, energy, interest 
rates.
c) Private savings and investment were discouraged and, after a lag, were 
substituted by public investment deficit-financed.
d) Inflation was aggravated, once bottlenecks arose. Thus bottlenecks were 
originally inflation induced, although later they fed inflation.
In the case of transport and electricity bottlenecks, utility rates were 
frozen (i.e. Argentina and Brazil) and the results were a reduction in investment 
or desinvestment and bottlenecks.
Althoiigh we shall not try to answer here the monetarist position according to 
structuralism (this forms the core of the next chapter) it is worth mentioning 
that the author has chosen the wrong examples. Mexico and Ecuador are the most 
stable countries of the grouo nresumably because their supply bottlenecks have 
not been reduced not because they were inexistent, Ecuador*s import capacity 
bottleneck was greatly reduced by a booming banana market and thus external and 
domestic imbalances have been less present. Mexico presents a more complex case. 
It has a long tradition of public intervention into the price S3/stem that has re­
sulted in tine with lesser -price instability. A look into her balance of trade 
ouestions the assumption that there is not an imgort capacity bottleneck; a1thou; 
tourism end foreign-capital have helped. Mexico's agricultural reform and indee< 
subsidies and price controls have resulted in an expansion of supply and milder 
inflation; which the opposite is true in Argentina and Brazil. Indeed, general­
ising as Dr. de Oliveira does, it would appear that Mexico and Ecuador illnsirat< 
the structuralist thesis, as we shall see*, 
see next page.
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In the case ox price controls or* the food su^nly, first with respect of dom­
estic consumption, the subsidisation of domnd aggravated the price pressure; 
there was a reduction of relative profitability and thus of investment, in rela­
tion to industry and imports; and there was a diversion to iinproductive use of 
land, With respect to agricultural 2*roduction for exports, there was repressed 
inflation through overvalued exchange rates and the manipulation of prices by • 
governnent export monopolies which tax the export sector in order to subsidise 
industry.
Turning now to the import capacity bottleneck, the author considers it a 
consequence of inflation:
a) There are subsidised rates for the rigid imports that are held to be 
important cost-of-living items - fuel, -wheat, machinery, equipment.
But, wasteful consumption is encouraged, investment demand is fover 
estimated1 Ip/- an artificial reduction of the cost to t:*c firm;
b) and, subsidised import rates go together with 'negged rates for 
certain exports which thus become subject to heavy taxation; this 
results in a disincentive to the expansion and diversification of 
exports.
Thus the capacity to import bottleneck is an induced bottleneck for the 
author, arising from deliberate policies that combined internal inflation with 
external overvaluation, and aimed at financing import substitution through im­
port taxes, rather than by general taxation, or from lack of foresight in build­
ing up reserves in boom periods Dr, de Oliveira quotes Brasil, Argentina, as’
countries who- have biased their growth in an anti-export direction; and Mexico
■x-and Venezuela, as countries which have done the opposite.
Selecting Argentina as an example of unorthodox protectionism is not quite 
relevant, Argentina during 1959-62 abolished to a great extent import controls 
and export taxes, devalued and kept a more or less free exchange rate market; 
and abolished the majority of domestic price controls. Nonetheless the import 
capacity bottleneck, agricultural inelasticities, and infrastructure works were 
enhanced rather than reduced (see Part III, section b).
These again are very debatable examples, Venezuela exports petroleum, Mexico*s 
foreign -protection should not be underestimated (See for examnl e, 3. Izquierdo (42) )
-JHf . .(from previous page) This is a very unqualified charge. ECLA has five case studies 
on the external disequilibrium of Latin America and its autonomous bottlenecks 
— for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia (42),
Still, the author arrives at the conclusion that once supplies inelastici­
ties have been created th rou gh  inflation they exert a derived causal role.
Moreover, they make the fight against inflation more difficult in a manner where 
•stabilisation programmes raav have to create open inflation (prices in the control­
led sectors being allowed to rise in order to correct previous bottleneck-creating 
distortions)1* Kis programme against inflation would include monetary and fiscal 
policies, reorientation of public and private investment, as well as foreign aid. 
Factors which wore present in the Argentinian programme and which culminated in 
the 1962 crisis, and in more inflation.
Unfortunatel3r Dr. de Oliveira does not offer any empirical evidence in his 
arguments, something surprising considering he starts out by emphasising the need 
for. empirical research.
Structuralists obviously do not agree that bottlenecks have been a result of 
•inflation. They, as we shall see, defend wholeheartedly the opposite. Their thesi! 
which shall be explored in the next chapter is both an exercise an economic history 
and on economic policy (see also Part I, Chapter 2). With respect to autonomous 
bottlenecks as a source of inflation let us only repeat here that they arose in 
the historical context with the fall in the demand for Latin American exports, a 
reduction in foreign-exchange, and the move towards MST industrialisation as the 
main source to maintain the level of income and employment (This is the main body 
of the ECLA-Prebisch theory). The above three factors implied a highly public in­
terventionist policy in industry, agriculture, foreign trade, and public works. 
Controls were thus widely adopted with the intention of maintaining the rate of 
growth in the face of an unfavourable external sector and domestid supply rigidi­
ties* The policies followed were probably plagued with mistakes, structuralists 
grant* In fact, they concede that with time the overvalued exchange rates, xmder- 
priced public services and agricultural prices, as well as the industrial protect-; 
ion, became burdensome.* But the basic policy was correct in terms of maintaining 
the level of income end inducing an imposed structural change that would reduce 
the external vulnerability of an economy* The fact that a structural change *had 
to be made* and that bottlenecks existed as such resulted in inflation. Structur­
alists i/ill say that if such a structural policy had not been adopted as monetar­
ists seem to want it and even granting a reasonable export demand for the regionfs 
nrodncts - the result would have been stagnation, decline, or at best widely cyclic 
al fluctuations in income; and price stability. Presumably rrowfh wag driven
* .See on this moint Mr. D. Felix (43)*
**One could claim that in 1930 the balance of payments stability was not sacrificed 
by Latin America herself but by the advanced countries.
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*•oriorit^ and stability sacrificed end the setting oi '**5? industrial!nation in — 
sti.tu.ted. But if. wo s cue, accordin'1" fc structure?.!,stswhich started to func­
tion with Inch of oifblic worhs, shortage of foodstuffs for the domestic market 
and. low foreim exchange reserves.
*
The control in cyclical fluctuations and increasing government controls and 
suhsidies in advanced countries should make this clear.
1
B. On Devaluation
It was stated previously that when exchange rate devaluation is considered 
as a fundamental cause of inflation, monetarists and structuralists tend to come • 
closer to an agreement. Devaluation as a source of inflation has not always 
been a feature of monetarism. However, when one speaks of ’contemporary monetar^* 
ism* - by this we mean professors Karberger and Dorrance,.. from whom we have been 
quoting, and, for the matter, the neoTieynesian tradition, including Sir Rod Harrod 
when he speaks of Latin-American inflation - this is so. Devaluation as such may . 
be considered somewhat neutral as far as the controversy, but not so in its tras- 
cendental role as a cause of inflation. The importance of devaluation obviously 
determines in a good measure price stability and, it is also claimed, its influenc' 
is extended to external equilibrium, the growth of output (the absorption effect) 
and the distribution of income.
From 1948 to 1965 the relationship between the rate of inflation and the fre­
quency and amount of devaluations is obvious (see table XV). Ecuador, the country 
with the lowest rate of inflation (2.5^) is also the country with relative exchange 
rate stability. The countries with the slowest rate of inflation for these period; 
- Mexico, Per”., and Colombia - have the least frequent and massive devaluations, 
whereas the opposite is true for those with the highest rate of inflation - Brazil, 
Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. Bolivia and Paraguay, however, have suffered mas­
sive devaluations in a decade or so and afterwards have achieved exchange rate sta­
bility and have moved towards domestic stability.
But, if monetarists and structuralists agree that ;devaluation is behind in­
flation here the agreement stops. As soon as one goes into exchange rate policy 
the conflicting opinions appear. An extreme monetarist position would hold that., 
•any attempt to maintain any kind of price for a considerable length of time at a 
level which does not equate supply and demand is bound to cause distortions in the 
economy and to produce misallocation of economic resources* (44). R. Sammons, a 
monetarist, writes: *The exchange rate is a price and should be permitted - per­
haps with some official interference - to serve the function of a price. It is a 
very special kind of a price; there are very strong arguments for holding it 
steady as long as possible. But, like any other price, if it is held for a long 
oeriod, at a level which does not equate demand with sunnly, it is hound to create 
problems*. Policy wise there are three alternatives for a Laiin-American country 
undergoing inflationary uressures, in the context of monetarism:
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1.- It may hold an exchange rate as long as possible and then, when finally 
forced to make a devaluation, make it a big one. This, for monetarists, 
creates a host of problems. For speculators it provides a way for capi­
tal flight and a large profit when the adjustment is made and the caoital 
returned. It can rake the wage-spiral worse. It tends to leave the cur­
rency overvalued, something that may subsidise imports against domestic 
production.
2.— A second alternative is *tlie adjustable peg system1, where the exchange 
rate is changed in small amounts frequently and has official support. 
Latin-Amcrican countries, particularly, have sought a compromise in the 
way of a fixed rate for commodity trade transactions and a free-merket 
rate for capital transactions. Monetarists say that the system presents 
the problem that when there are two or several prices, this creates un­
certainty about what its real value is. ,fJ?o protect exchange reserves 
from the erosion induced by inflation, writes professor Dorrance, many 
countries have resorted to exchange restrictions... (they) have been 
based on multiple exchange rates which provide minimum exchange depre­
ciation for certain basic export products... The favourable rates provid­
ed for the import of essential commodities serve to discourage domestic 
production and encourage activities,(usually the production of nonessen­
tial goods) which are given the greatest-decree of protection* (45).
This monetarist argument, incidentally, is ^art of the economic distor­
tions discussed in t'-^e previous sector.
3»— A free exchange rate, which is what a monetarist would support
a) Devaluations and the price level
This would then be a subject of controversy. Paradoxically, monetarists, 
who are so eager to institute price stabilisation programmes, through the logic 
of this arguments arrive at the conclusion that devaluations are inflationary 
and, at the same time, that they are inescapable. Structuralists, on the other 
hand, consider devaluation as only one chapter in the ’foreign sector* pressures 
that result in inflation. On these assumptions the following analysis shall 
take up the monetarist argument - to be developed later according to structural­
ist thought. (See Part III, Chapter I, sections a and c).
t
80,
The specialised literature on the subject in Latin America is as massive 
as the devaluation of the region as a whole. The main bulk of work has develop­
ed around the Chilean school ox thought which has held for a long time that de­
valuation can be expected to have very serious consequences on.the level or nrices 
This includes authors like 0, Sunkel, A. Pinto, L. Grunwald, F. Herrera, and J, 
Ahumada. In Argentina, besides Hr, Prebisch, two important authors are A. Ferrer 
and C. Diaz Alejandro, For Mexico one can mention J. Noyola, H, Flores de la 
Pena, A.. Navarrete, P. Ortiz Mena, and U.L. Urqnidi (46). It j.s out of the scope 
of this paner, however, to mo into all of these materials; one can only nope 
here to illustrate the main guide lines of the monetarist argument.
A good example of the monetarist position with respect to the effects of a 
devaluation on the general level of prices can be resumed in nroiessor Harberger's 
words: (47)
• 1,- They can be very powerful for massive devaluations.
2.- IThen very powerful, the effects are hard to offset by fiscal and 
monetary constrairts,
3.- The effect^ are more manageable with small devaluations.1
Professor Harborger for a long time tended to minimise the nossibility of 
devaluation having serious consequences on the price level. Ke modified his 
views lately based on the Argentina experience. In Argentina during 19o2 the 
internal price level rose by 35/<r, while the money supply only increased 15^» It 
was thus difficult to explain the rise in the ^rice level on the basis of changes 
in the supply of money. On the other hand, a substantial devaluation (pOg) had 
occurred earlier in that year. "Based on this fact he has constructed a theore­
tical model on how devaluation can affect the price level.
He assumes a country that cannot influence world prices of either its ex­
ports (X) or imports (l-l). This means that as a consequence of devaluation the 
internal prices of X and N will go up in the same percentage as the exchange rate. 
Thus if account, for lOg of national income, a rise in the exchange rate of pOf* 
would produce from this source a rise of 5f* in t'ne price level. If a  accounted 
for 8g of GX?, a devaluation of pOg would raise the price level by 4fr.
Suppose now, professor Karberger suggests, that M-type goods are produced 
domestically and that X-type goods are consumed within the country. If M-type 
goods amount to 10k of national income and X-tvne goods amount to er-, the tricesvJ 4 , - - ^ 1 7 -
o f  these goods rdll also be governed by movements in the exchange rate in much 
the same way as trices of X and M. If new the attomrt to measure the effect of 
a 50fr devaluation is made on the price level of internal goods, 26f: is directly 
affected (lOg of Mf 10,k of M-type goods, and 6g of X-type goods consumed at hone).
Xf we only look at the price level of goods produced at home, 24k of the total 
will be affected directly (8g of X, 6f; of X-type goods, and 10fr of 1-5-type goods). 
As the direct consequence of a devaluation of pOf^ , the general price level of the 
goods consumed and invested at home would rise by 13f:» while the price level of 
goods produced at hone would rise by only 12*2,
If there is a substantial substitution of domestic goods for international 
goods, there might result a substantial substitution induced rise in the price 
of the former, which may increase the rise in prices attributable to devaluation. 
Obviously, if the supply of domestic goods is perfectly elastic, no rise in price 
will occur; the loss elastic the supply of goods, the greater will he the effecf 
of devaluation.
There is also the classic possibility that devaluation may have an effect 
on the level of output of the economy. If there are, at the time of devaluation, 
significant amounts of unemployed resources within the economy, there will be 
significant possibilities for expanding output. The international goods sector- 
assuming that there is foreign demand with respect to X - will have inducement 
to employ additional resources as a consequence of the rise in the price level.
If the econony is initially fully employed, there can be no significant ex­
pansion in output as a result of devaluation. In this case the incentive to ex- 
pand output would tend to produce an excess demand for factors of production, 
which would lead to price increases. It is also likely that prices ’'•'ill rise 
more if wages are rising. But, says the professor, a model that demonstrates 
the uossibilitv of substantial price increases even when wages are constant is 
more interesting than a model in which devaluation would have an important effecl 
on prices via wages.
With these assumptions the author constructs an econometric model in which
*the impact of devaluation, with the help of determinant parameters , on prices 
is measured. The results he finds are quite striking: the perdeniage rise in
the general index associated with a 5Of: devaluation would be between 30p and 30,kj
The next question to ask is what can can policy do to limit the price level 
effects of devaluation. It is worth recognising that not all rises in internal 
prices are *badf. JSxcept in the cases where the elasticity of supply is zero,
■m-Price elasticity of demand for domestic goods; its income elasticity; income 
elasticity of demand for international goods; marginal propensity to hoard; pri< 
elasticity of supply of home goods; price elasticity of supply of international 
.goods; oercontage .share of international goods production in total output; and, 
international goods consumption and investment as a of total output.
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rises in prices are associated "with rises in output. However, if the economy is 
•working near full—omnlovment, the increases in ixooduction would he reflected, in 
increased wanes end profits and in still greater price rises. If this is so, a 
possible remedy is to hold dovm the rise in demand via taxes. Professor T'arber- 
ger thus incorporates taxes into his nodel and arrives at the conclusion that in 
the face of a 50$ devaluation taxes would have to be raised from IP to 27$ of
national product to maintain constant the level of prices. Alternatively, this
means that 10$ of national income would have to he raised in order to offset 
the effects of a 50;’ devaluation ,711st on the price level of home poods,
fIt appears that Latin—American countries, writes the professor, are proba­
bly poinp to have to po on livinp with 1inf1ation ay -1 devaluations, for I cannot 
imapine any country in Latin America which would be able, lot alone willinp, to 
accompany a 50$ devaluation with, a tax increase to 10 or 20;*- of the national in­
come (48(*« Tryinp alternatives to fiscal policy - monetary constraints - would 
lead to similar frustrations because the impulse of a major devaluation to the
domestic price level is simply too stronp to be countered by measures that are
less than heroic.
If this discussion has any hopeful conclusion, it is that the effects of 
small devaluations on the price level are easier to cope with than effects of 
larpe devaluations. Policy can cepe with a 5$ devaluation (implyinp, say, a 
2Of? price rise if not offset, and an extra tax of If’ of national income if off­
set) much more easily than it can handle a 50$ devaluation (implyinp, say, a 25$ 
price rise not offset and an extra tax of 10$ of national income if offset). An 
argument that suppests the wisdom of this course is that in resource allocation, 
it is relative prices that count, A uolicy which attempted to keep the relative 
price of fcreipn exchange stable in the face of an internal price inflation 
would be wiser, from t>e point of view of resource allocation, than a policy 
which tended to keep the nominal rates of ewchanpe constant for loop oeriods of 
tine, and which was periodically forced by the cumulative rise of internal nrices 
to take the step of massive devaluation. But will devaluation really have time 
to re-allocate resources? There does not seem to he much agreement, even befc/een 
monetarists. Professor Hikesell puts it a.s follows: In Latin—American countries,
which have experienced lonp inflation, Ithe real exchange rate* as measured by 
the ratio of the nominal exchange rate to the index of internal prices tends to 
decline rapidly following a devaluation. In other words, the rise in internal 
prices tends to cancel the initial effect of the devaluation in brinpinn internal 
prices into line with external prices. This continues until another adj 
in the nominal rate wholly or parti el ly restores the real exc:,anpe raise to its 
former position,. Thus periodic cxchanpe rate adjustments may not serve to ad-
just internal trices and costs to external ^rices for a period long enough to 
effect the direction of production and investment and to move the economy toward 
equilibrium1 •
b) Devaluation and growth
The effects of devaluation on the price level are only a part of a much wide 
field. The modem theory of devaluation is concerned with the effects of devalue 
tion both on relative prices and on real income and expenditure (the *absorption 
effect). We shall follow closely in this the work of Mr. A. Diaz Alejandro (49)
Devaluation theory has advanced by dropping some of its early assumptions, 
for example the constancy of income itself. Such development provides a simple 
way of dividing the effects of devaluation on the balance of trade into (l) the 
initial effect, associated with the effects on relative prices; and (2) the 
reversal effect, associated mainly with real changes in income. With respect to 
the initial effect, before 19?0, writes Mr, Diaz, the effect of devaluation on 
the balance of trade was reduced to the definition of price elasticities of ag­
gregate supply of exports and aggregate demand for imports. By assuming perfect
ly elastic supplies and a balanced trade before devaluation, the formula is thai
of the classical condition that a devaluation will improve the balance of trade 
if the sura of the elasticities of the demand for M and X has an absolute value
of more than one. Modern theory claims that elasticity optimism ensures onlsr a
successful first effect (with respect to the balance of trade, not inflation) 
and not a successful devaluation; besides ignoring the income change induced hj 
a first •successful* effect. Moreover, the key to a successful devaluation in 
the long-run (that is, the reallocation of resources between the foreign' and dor 
estic sector) is neglected by the use of only two goods, importables and export­
ables. This has led to an exxaggerated emphasis on the importance of demand 
elasticities for X and M, in the sense that it neglected to explore the condi­
tions in the domestic economy given rise to such elasticities. However, the 
classical condition for a future exchange stability may be used as a fairly ac­
curate first approximation to the criteria for a successful first effect of a 
devaluation. In the understanding that it has also assumed constant output and 
employment. Modern theory, again, drops these assumptions.
With respect to the reversal (and total) effect of devaluation, one way to 
handly the impact on the domestic economy, as iu was said, is to assume that any 
increase (or decrease) in total domestic expenditure is offset by fiscal and 
monetary measures. In such a case there would be no reversal effects, aid the 
total effect w orld  be equal to the initial effect. The point is that there will
be repercu.s si ons and these will tend to cancel out, the initial effect, whether 
positive or negative. Total expenditure does change after the f1rut effect as 
the result itself in the change of the balance of trade and.' a nossible shift 
in the money-car-und i ture schedule due to chan~o s in foreign trade, a.t a start,
A successful devaluation null thus raise both domestic prices and income. Such 
an increase will reduce part of the initial effect, by stimulating expenditure 
on imports and exports and by tending to increase the domestic nrice level; 
but the new thesis is that the reversal factors can never change the direction 
(favourable or unfavourable) of the initial effect of the devaluation, assuming 
no offsetting official policies. The models dealing with reversal effects also 
assume perfectly elastic supplies. Two further assumptions are required hero 
to satisfy a favourable devaluation effect. If only the reversal effect is con­
sidered, one has to assume full employment where devaluation works only if dom­
estic absorption is decreased relative to domestic oitnut; and, if total effects 
are considered, it is necessary to work with positive marginal propensities to 
save o
It has bee^ seen that a devaluation will raise the domestic nricos of M,
X, M-type goods, and X-type goods, not only relative to other prices but also 
in absolute terms. Indeed, this is the fundamental mechanism that starts off 
the effect of devaluation. Thus professor Harberger1s theoretical orice index, 
that includes bcth IInd X and other goods, shows a. sharp increase. This was, 
of course, under the assumption of no changes in foreign trade policy.
Still, the problem is that of resource allocation once devaluation occurs. 
Diaz1s analysis of devaluation eryhe.sises again the short-run impact of deva­
luation but also includes the income redistribution arising from it. This em­
phasis, ho clarifies, should not be taken as an attempt to diminish the import­
ance of resource allocation for the long-run success of devaluation. Income re­
distribution as a consequence of devaluation is based on the idea that devalua­
tion by changing relative prices would create a different pattern of output, 
thereby affecting the returns on the factors of production. Under such an as­
sumption the income redistribution will be characterised not only as a real-in- 
come transfer frcra tbe sector of the economy producing home goods to the sectors 
producing ?.nT'ortables and exportables, but also as a real income transfer from 
7/age earners to the non-7/age earners of the import-substituting and export in­
dustries. J. Spraos has studied this with the main interest of a devaluation 
induced shift in income distribution (a T-Tage lay) that rp^ * lead, to a new source 
of instability in the foreign—exchange market (?0).
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The wain point of interest in the modem theory then is to exolain the 
paradox of a devaluation that sucoeds in imoreviug the "balance of trade, hiv 
which nay "be accompanied by a fall in the real output of the economy, Mr. I 
distinguishes two stages of the impact of devaluation on the balance of tree 
the initial effect, whose size and sign will he mainly determined by the or] 
elasticities of the demand for importables and exportables; and the-reverse 
effect, vhich always works agaiost the first effect mainly through the inc.or 
mechanism, and vhich tends to offset the original impact of the devaluation 
onthe balance of trade. This is of course, part of the traditional theory 
which suggests that if the first effect is successful in improving the balar 
of trade vill also result in an .increase of output by stimulating the produ< 
ion of exportables and importables. On the other hand, a devaluation yield] 
a negative initial effect vill cause domestic output to decrease. But the £ 
guraent is that empirical evidence points out the opposite. Tn Argentina de­
valuations may improve the balance of trade in the short run, hut are generf
ly accompanied by a fall in the total level of output. Thus decreases in oi
*may result direct^ from devaluation.
The first step towards solving the paradox, is to remember that a deva­
luation by raising the level or prices, may cause some redistribution of in­
come among different social groups (something similar to vhat inflation may 
do). For f ' Q  author the redistribution effect helps to resolve the problem 
of on improving balance of trade and a decrease in output (depending on the 
propensity to consume of high-income groups). Moreover/ it is likely that 1 
redistribution effect vill have a quicker impact.than the initial price effe 
Even elasticity optimists do not ex-ect price elasticities to be very high 
in the short run and rely on such devices as short-term capital movements 
to fill the gap between the time a devaluation takes place end the time vher 
the balance of trade responds favourably to a change in relative prices. The 
second step is to assume a wage lag. The third is to consider three goods, 
avoiding the simplification of classical theory; home goods and importables 
and exportables (foreign goods he calls then).
The author then constructs a system of equations and arrives in the she 
run at the conclusion that the balance of trade will improve hut that output 
vill fall. The clue is to obtain the short-run impact of devaluation on to1 
money wages and profits. Me says that in the likely case of a. fall in ontuv 
after a devaluation, total real wages, as well as the real wage rate, vill c
* ;Assuming neutral monetarTr and. fiscal uolicies; altbouy* not necessarily ii 
monetary constraints are assumed to reduce investment violently and if pub3 
expenditure is rednced*
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Absolute meno~r nrofits vill increase in tee vorsi"n "oodr’ i■nd11^ -r-^r^ •'••all >^5
profits per unit of outuut, Bui, nrcfits in the production of. domestic poods 
vill fall as output decreases. The change in real profits vill depend on the 
expenditure pattern of non-Trane earners. The rate of nr of its, hovever, vould 
only by coincidence he compatible vith either full employment or balance of 
trade equilibrium. It is clear, hovever, that the profit share in the national 
income vill necessarily improve after ^evaluation.
The over—all price livel vill ho raised according to the importance of 
importables and exportables in the economy, hut the elasticity of the price 
level vith respect to changes in the exchange rate vill he less than one. It 
is such a price increase that yields the cut in real vaqc rates and the increase 
in the profit rate of the export and import-substitution industries, setting off 
the income redintribution effect. As income is redistributed in favour of the 
non-vage sector, the balance of trade vill improve in the short mm; and the 
.greater the simultaneous drop in domestic output, the more it vill improve.
The contraction of real vape rates leadinq to the fall of output vill result in 
a fall of demand far* both X and M. An immediate increase in X is possible — if 
foreiqn demand is elastic - even thou ph the total output cf X is frozen in the 
* short run. Thus the process of price inflation coupled vith real income defla­
tion, which has been described, has a number of similarities vith the theory of 
inflation in a closed, economy.
If the devaluation takes place under conditions of less than full e m p l o y ­
ment, real vaye rates may repair? part or all of their losses in the Ion" run 
when the output of export and inmort-substitution industries expand. Cn the 
other hand, if there.is no full emp!overrent together with a deficit in the balance 
of trade, part of the short—run fall vill be maintained in the lonp run, and when 
there is a reallocation ox resources and increases in output are achieved near 
full employment vould appear.
Apart from this, it is veil known that a devaluation has a stimulating effect 
on both X and ?! competing activities. The existence cf intermediate products 
requires a distinction between an ir*“ortahle (a final pood' and a.n li—com'oetinp 
activity- (value a.dde*1 that may.- represent a small nronorti'vi of the value of the 
final pood). Yet, in many semi-industrialised countries, the existing non-manu- 
facturinp sector penerally takes a dim viev of exchanpe-rate devaluation and 
fears such. a nolic^T as it nipht fear tipht monetar'* nolle'*, This suppests that 
at least mart of the manufacturing sector falls in a cate "or* mere ner.rlv to do**!— 
estic production t''on of the M—conpctinp iUdus t m r«
Two situations may arise: one where the conditions under which the effect
of devaluation provides encouragement to the X and manufacturing sectors; and, 
another in which devaluation is harmful to the existing firms in the manufactur­
ing sector* In the first case the manufacturing sector could he called import- 
competing, while in the latter it map he considered as domestic industry* A de­
valuation will he painful to the existing manufacturing sector, as it will not 
he ahle to reduce imports without reducing output. Under these circumstances, 
existing firms will tend to oppose further devaluation, unless they.can he assur­
ed- that it will not increase the price of their inputs. The hest of all possible 
worlds for firms produ.cing domestic goods is one of prohibiting duties or res­
trictions against imports of domestically produced goods, coupled with an over-* 
valued exchange rate, and other types of subsidies for the import of yaw mater­
ials. Such a situation would slow down the growth of the more advanced branches 
of domestic manufacturing. In summary, it is claimed that great care should he 
taken when trying to subsidise the manufacturing sector and subdivide manufactur­
ers into domestic industries and import-competing industries. - A given product 
may include value added in home as well as in import-competing industries, be­
sides having components directly imported. However, these subjects of income 
redistribution and import-suostitution, brought about by devaluation and similar 
to these caused by inflation, will he taken up again in the survey of structural­
ism*
^Returning to the subject, the conclusion is that by reducing the level of 
absorption by more than the drop in outuut, the redistribution effect will play 
an important part in improving in the short-run the balance of trade. *In con­
trast to the traditional theory, which states that absorption and output Trill 
move in the same direction as the balance of trade, Mr. Diaz suggests that in 
the short run the balance of trade improves pari passu with a fall in output.
The exercise has then been on how devaluation is not only an important cause of 
inflation, but a cause in the short-run of a possible drop in output. Moreover, 
monetarists, although they give a primer priority to price stability, seem to 
condemn Latin America to inflationary devaluations, whether massive or timid.
88.
C. On Stabilisation Programmes and Some Conclusions
Only a few comments will bo made bore on stabilisation policies and their 
objectives in the way of a resumnd of tbc monetarist position. Part III will 
deal with specifically the most irmortsnt stabilisation programmes.
The kev to understand monetarism lies in the working of the price mechanism 
and in the ideology of spontaneous growth. Thus the thesis that inflation *>».<? 
perturbed the .system - with respect to price expectations, external equilibrium, 
and the growth of output - requires an interventionistr stabilisation programme.
In general terms such a programme includes a tight monetary policy; cuts in 
nublic expenditure and increased taxes; wage freezes and "the encouragement of 
savings; small but frequent devaluations and a free exchange rate system; the 
repeal of various types of direct controls and subsidies, i/ith special reference 
to the external sector; foreign credits, and so on, Moneta.rists claim that these 
measures would stop inflation, at least in the medium-run.. Moreover, the policies 
recommended are a result of the monetarist analysis on the causes of inflation.
Does this follow from the experience of this work? It is convenient to sum­
marise the above exercise:
1— The arhitra.rv expansion, of the siur'lTr of monev and nun si money. It was 
surprising to find that t^ere is no obvious trend correlation between 
price changes and these variables, except in some of the most inflation­
ary countries. If monetarists have a case they have it with the non-in­
dustrial ised economies of Bolivia and Paraguay, and in Brazil and Uruguay.
In the rest of the countries, whether very inflationary or less so, the 
correlations are net significant. Pol louring structuralist thought and 
granting that the expansion of more~r is a "propagating cause of inflation, 
two things should be emphasised. The causes why authorities were forced 
to be expansive nave to be investigated. And, despite this fact, not 
much reliance can be placed on the scope of monetary policy although its 
*role* may bo obvious. It was pointed out that the theoretical field is con­
troversial; in such a way that any stabilisation programme should be 
overcautious before reljring heavily on the possibility and effectiveness 
of controlling the supply of money. Experience in Latin America, as well 
as in advanced countries, rearires of studies on the control of money, on 
its velocit" of circulation, or. the role of other financial intermediaries, 
on the responsiveness of investment and consumption to monetary tools. 
Moreover, monetarism irmlies an. over emphasis on demand inflation in 
terms of the majority of the inflationary countries.
S9.
The arbitrary expansion of 'Vblic expenditure. Since midget deficits 
have expanded the supply of money there has heeu the danger of creating 
demand inflation. But the empirical evidence makes it impossible to 
generalise on the relation between budget deficits and price changes. 
Initially, monetarists have a case with Brazil, and perhaps with Boli­
via and Paraguay. There are also weak correlations in Argentina, Colom­
bia and Peru. But, Argentina presents a shrinking public sector. And, 
the correlations are negative in Mexico and Chile, There is thus insuf­
ficient evidence that budget deficits are an autonomous cause of infla­
tion nor are they sufficiently related to prices in a statistical sense. 
The structuralist argument is taken on from here: it is necessary to
establish a relationship between the composition of public expenditure 
and the behaviour of public revenue with both the growth of output and 
prices. Other things being equal, over the long run a cut in public 
investment in an UT)C may result in inflation.
Autonomous increases in wages. Cn the assumption of both demand and 
cost inflation, has there been wage inflation? It is very likely, of 
course, that wage increases as such form part of the spiral. Superfi­
cially, the more inflationary countries have higher wage increases; 
but this is as far as the monetarist argument can he taken. Moreover, 
except for Brazil and Mexico where there is no correlation, there is 
some evidence that wages have followed prices, and not vice versa.
There is also evidence that real wages have lagged badly behind the 
cost of living in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. These and the income 
distribution argument which form the structuralist thesis on wage in­
flation will be discussed again. The simplistic conclusion for the 
time being is that autonomous wage increases and prices do not appear 
to be correlated in a statistical sense.
The negative effects of inflation on savings and investment. Monetar­
ists claim that inflation will distort the structure of savings, reduce 
its volume, anti missallocate investment. Moreover, it is doubtful whether 
savings trill be forced. In a general sense in Latin America inflation 
has probably reduced the ratio of money to income; savings in the form 
of money and quasi money ray decline; the value of financial assets
denominated in money is eroded and its de-nanc! falls; increases in con-!
sumption may he induced, and there is a probable regressive distribution 
of income. What remains to be answered is how inflation alters the struc­
ture of savings and what happens to profits and their redistribution or 
reinvestment. If t'-ere are no exchange controls - or if they are weakly 
enforced - domestic savings will likely be invested in foreign financial
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<c;a-fc«5# Qr> t‘’6 other hand, fr'T'ij r"~' rrivnto Capital COOS not Seem tc 
novo in accordance "to uric? chanfres; ot^ .oi* ‘thin."? ocual , its movements 
apnear rather erratic. Inflation a—poars to have increased inventory 
investment in Frazil, while growing stability has reduced stocks to a 
lower percentage in Mexico. Snt on the rest of the countries no corre­
lation was fonnd. It is likely that luxury housing construction will 
increase, although an increase in construction as such is not apparent 
•with rising prices. The theoretical idea is that a bias will develop 
towards short—tern investment and durable consumer industries, while 
investment wi11 be diverted from long—run nrojecis in general.
5.- Induced supply bottlenecks, A crucial element in the controversy is 
the working of the price system. Monetarists maintain in theory that 
supply bottlenecks are mostly a consequence and not a cause of infla­
tion - created by the distortions in nrice expectations during the long 
inflation and through tve intervention of the public sector in the 
structure of prices, that ranges from international trade to public 
works, as well as in agriculture, industry, and services. However,
no empirical evidence is really offered. The argument shall he taken 
up from here in terras of the structuralist thesis: the trends in ex­
ternal trade and the underdeveloped nature of Latin America constitute 
bottlenecks which result in inflation, when growth is attempted.
6.— Devaluation of the exchange rate. The fact that frequent and massive 
devaluations are closely related to the inflationary sniral is recog­
nised by both sides of the controversy. For monetarists, on the one 
hand, the overvaluation of the exchange rate, the bias against export 
trade, and the permissiveness with foreign exchange culminate, eventual­
ly with inflationary devaluations. For structuralists, on the other, 
devaluation is only part of the foreign exchange bottleneck which re­
sults mainly from the contradictor” relationship between unfavourable 
exports markets and growing import requirements. The monetarist analysis 
proposed massive devaluations (implicitly), a free exchange rate market, 
and nerhaps frequent but small devaluations as a means of achieving ex­
ternal equilibrium and price stability. Paradoxically, this will have
an initial huge inflationary impact and will leave the economy nrono to 
inflation. Furthermore external equilibrium may be achieved at the ex- 
nense of the rate of growbh and of the domestic market and. with ■*'•«reces­
sive effects on the distribution of income.
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Aside from the chovo conclusions, the monetarist analysis of these causes oj 
inflation entails the necessity of stabilisation nrogrammos and the emhasis on 
the objective of general equilibriuru Bat, such a conclnsion, also opens-up 
the controversial field of the relation between inflation and mrowth and the 
problem of tb.e implementation of stabililisation measures, in time and degree#
Structuralists claim that, erven though inflation may be undesirable and 
perhaps avoidable, the cure by means of.a stabilisation programme may be worse 
than the inflation. Monetarists answer that, if their analysis of inflation 
is correct, an inflationary economy must be one where growth is proceeding less 
rapidly than it would if the economy were stable,
t/ith respect to the growth inflation problem, monetarists do not hold that 
stabilisation will result in an immediate increase in output. They say that
ftthere might bo a temporary decline in. the demand for physical investment and 
consumption. Some investment nay have to be abandoned. Stabilisation may 
bring a reduction in the growth of uneconomic industries created by inflation 
and protection, leading to a decline in investment and in the production of 
capital goods. It might be thought that if inflation is a situation of excess 
demand, a reduction of demand night do no more than eliminate the excess, • But 
the situation which develops in an inflation is that the supply of goods and 
services includes types of commodities and services for which demand will exist 
only as long as inflation continues. Tire reduction of demand, through stabili­
sation, and its reple.cement by expenditure appropriate to stable conditions, in­
volves a corresponding readjustment in supply. Much will depend on what assump­
tions are made with respect to the propensity to save, the redistribution of in­
come, and re-aallocation of investment brought about by the policies. Assuming 
that all "oes well, monetarists add that the change ta’-es time. The flow of re­
sources created by inflation is said to be not only in excess of, but also par­
tially inappropriate to, the flow of demand in stable conditions. Thus the sev­
erity of the consequent adjustment problems and the time required to solve them, 
will depend, in part at least, on the degree to which the economic system has 
been distorted. This degree of distortion, monetarists agree, will in turn deperi 
largely on the duration which is being brought to an end. When inflation has bee 
rampant for decades as in Argentina, Brazil and Chile the problem is more serious 
and lengthier, than in the less inflationary countries, say Colombia and Per-.
Incidentally, Sir Bov uarrod comments: 1 the greatest crime to which the free
world is prone is to reduce demand below the growth potential of the economy 
in order to combat wage-priee spiraling* (pi)*
Hence, re some of toe forms it takes, monetarism is a rati"nolisailon of 
the need of the deflation, the priority of equilibria, and 'the return* to tee 
nr?ce mechanism.
. Nonetheless, monetarists stress that if deflation policies presumably ac­
companied by open inflation - are effective there should soon be an end to them, 
•It should be emphasised - writes Mr. dorranee, for example - that the depres­
sive influences ... are temporary, rather than fundamental. After a relatively 
short neriod, t^oy should eva^ort-e.• • ihe period of uncertainty most uass, and 
a new set of expectations should enable investors to make plans for future capit­
al creation, with a consequent rise in their demand for resources... The general 
flight from real assets to financial assets, which is o^o of the healthy signs 
of stabilisation even t^opgh it nay exert oppress in ~ effects on investment, 
should also be temporary. After a period of adjustment, individual economic 
units may be expected to desire additions to their stocks of both physical and 
financial assets. At the same time, the capital flight resulting iron inflation 
should stop (52)*.
With respect to the timing of a stabilisation policy - wlrther it should be 
a shocker or a cautious one - by the 19-0’s most monetarists - professor Lutz,
Mr. Dorrar.ce, Dr. Simonson, and Mr, Also— 'ar ay, etc. - are in favour of ffirm 
action*. It is generally argued that drastic changes - in money, public ex­
penditure, wages, domestic controls, and the foreign sector and distribution of 
income - must be made in the community * s’ expectations if stabilisation is to 
work. Because if the community sees only timid changes in economic policy, 
they will be under very few effective pressures to change their views. That 
is, once inflation has been established, individuals will expect oricos to n-0 
on rising; and, even if they believe that inflation has been halted, they will 
not expect stability to .ensue immediately. They will also ho conscious of the 
fact that the plan may fail. Therefore, even if money and financial assets 
should begin to appear more attractive, now purchases or holdings will be slow 
in the fear that the2r might again decline in value* By contrast, holding on to 
financial assets not denominated in. monetary terms will still offer protection. 
This would appear to indicate that the attempts to slow down inflation will 
take a long time to be effective. That is, the restrictive monetary, fiscal 
and wages policies may reduce excess demand, but the inflation induced distor­
tions are likely to persist, row firm authorities have to bo in order to halter 
expectations'is quite ap academical problem*
However, in practice, the timing of stabilisation, policies, according to 
Hr. Felix (f3)> may appear secondar,r when it is considered that both t'rr>es, 
fir’'* and cautious, have been tried rather unsuccessful-”'. The fact, of course, 
is. part of the. controversy itself. It will ho discussed in empirical terms in 
Part III, Chapter 2.
Nonetheless, let us end tMs section and open the survey, of structuralisir* 
with a quotation that reflects the mood of the opposite side of the rolemics. 
Considering the recent cxT'/irienco of stabilisation 'r,nor”rormes, writes T)r. cuji— 
kel, I cannot understand how anyone could recommend with enthusiasm the hitter 
medicine of stabilisation. The recent experience shows that stabilisation 
policies are doomed to failure (54)*.
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Chapter 3
STTd'JC 01 R  AbTS> I
Ao Pyelimiuartr-Words
What is structuralism in itself and as so^ethinq different# from monete.rin? 
This is the question that shall he attempted, in this chapter and vith reference 
to I«atin America1s inf1ationnry process. The survey of this school of thought 
is again carried out, as with the monetarist analysis, on two levels: the theo­
retical can.ses of inflation and the policy measures arising from, the study.
Such a division is arbitrary in so far as here the diagnosis and the eyre of in­
flation appear mixed in a rather comnlex fashion.
Two questions should ho understood from a start to "better study the la tin 
American stmctnralist-monetarist controversy. The first refers to the theor­
etical nature of inflation or its causes. And the second refers to the policy 
problems of achieving monetary stability, equilibrium and growth of output — in 
ner capita terms and with a corresponding redistribution of incone. Further­
more, structuralists present their argument in terms of the short-run — the im­
mediate, secondary ^r oronngating causes of inflation, their cyclical nature 
and the cyclical character of the policy measures aimed, at correctin'1, the in­
flationary process - and. in terms of the long—run structural causes of inflation 
and the structural character of the mol icy measures required to amm.emd. them, 
the "Structuralist Reform"• The present chanter will concentrate on the 1 struc­
tural causes of inflation*. The latter part will deal again wit*’ the propagat** 
ing and cyclical causes, in terms, of policy measures.
With resuoct to the nature of hat in—America * s inflation, it is a mistake %
to regard, structuralism as an exercise on TVorel,Tr cost inflation. One mev focus
this analysis as based cn. the historical chanr’cs of the structure of demand and
*cpiTvni-v- ■?^  T.n'hnAj^er-’ . Ch^n^es in r.’in ‘3tim,ct"'v'e demand caused ’->v
a rapidly growing ponnlation, the process of urhanisation (accelerated, by the 
"roi-rfch of indnstrTr), the increase in per carita cc"?’1^ri”>tior' due to a. rising 
income, changes in tastes, the demonstration effect, and, mainly, by the social • 
pressures of the working class and the civil service. Different income elasti­
cities will create big changes in the demand composition. And those changes put 
■oressure on th© structure cf rroducticnj "bottlenecks omern‘o —or not — defend— 
in#r Qrt r\ —e^  ativo e"* nsticities" of sunml^ ir» "f.he various sectors of m  ocr'vi°—rr•
*QflO #>1 +1, n T>,-{-►»<■% #3 •■</-* + -? r\~y t V-« ir,t 1 #1+,'? Oi~> i C; +*,#> — <"> i T^T  ^f A
uroduood hTr the Great Crisis ^Chapters 5 and 3^o
Inelasticity of supply, writes professor Grunwald, 'means that the supply 
of goods and services does not expand - and its composition does not adjust 
- fastly - to meet a rising demand and to a change in the pattern of demand 
without serious price pressures* a). Ilere, of course, the problem of 'the 
cause* of inflation appears* But, coming hack to the 'nature of inflation* 
(demand pull and/or cost push), this simple statement may show that Latin- 
American inflation, within the structuralist analysis, may he seen as a demand- 
pull situation* Because if such changes in the structure of demand bring forth 
an expansion of money and budget deficits, wage and profit increases, and suc­
cessive devaluation, an inflationary spiral is set on* This is what monetarists 
roughly concentrate on* But, one still has to answer the role of supply rigi­
dities; and this is where the structuralist emphasis on cost push starts, but 
not necessarily in detriment of a demand propagating inflation I
For a typical structuralist inflation in Latin America is caused by pro­
pagating factors - the ones undertaken in the previous monetarist survey - 
and "by; the structural factors; the basic ones so they claim* If this is so, 
on a theoretical level, monetarist analysis may be a chapter within structural- 
ism* Moreover, the analysis of supply inelasticities opens up a new field of 
causes of inflation, where the emphasis is on cost push. liThat does one mean 
by this in terms of the controversy?
Structuralists claim that the basic supply inelasticities and causes of 
inflation are to be found in the foreign sector, in the agricultural sector,
In the process of the import-substitution industrialisation, and in infra­
structure or public services* These are branded with the name of structural 
factor, both in terms of production and trade end institutional arrangements*
The collapse of export earning after 1929 is signaled out as the fundamental 
*factor* The purchasing-power-of-exports bottleneck, state strructuralists, 
imposed an import substitution process brought forth by the decline in the 
capacity to import* Looking at this from a different angle, the fact may be 
termed *an import capacity bottleneck** Both factors, imports and exports, 
are reflected in a decline in foreign exchange reserves which call for foreign 
loans and result in huge amortisation repayments, which, paradoxically, may re­
duce further foreign exchange* There is then an overall foreign exchange 
bottleneck* Import substitution, thus induced, creates by itself a host of 
domestic industrialisation problems* Changes in internal demand are met by 
supply inelasticities and institutional problems which result in higher costs
The decline is measured either in terms of per capita export earnings, purchas­
ing power of exports (deflating current export values by an import price index) 
or exports as a ratio of GDP* In some countries the decrease has also been in 
absolute terms* Or a steade increase in exports may have occurred, it is cla­
rified, but still the purchasing power of exports has declined in recent years*
and prices. Three further domestic bottlenecks are stressed by structuralists: 
a weak industrial sector, both in production and demand terms; inelastic or 
falling agricultural output; and infrastructure incapacities, mainly in energy 
and communications. On top of this comes the inequality of income distribution 
which, according to structuralists, plays a role in this concept of inelastici­
ty. The structural or bottleneck causes - together with demand pull, of course - 
have initiated the vicious inflationary spiral Latin America has experienced.
The •basic* or structural factors writes professor Grunwald, are the causal 
forces of inflation. The propagating factors may also be important once infla­
tion is under way, but gearing policy towards them, according to this view, 
will not eliminate inflationary pressures because the fundamental maladjustments 
will persist.•• In other words, structural factors are closely related to the 
state of DD of the economy (2). The non-structural factors, as it wTas said, 
are referred to as 'propagating factors*. Propagating factors are those that 
feed back on and aggravate the inflation. They arise from the capacity of the 
various sectors of the economy to defend their real income. Included in this 
category are the expansion of money, the wage and salary adjustments, public 
deficit spending, and recurring devaluations. Structuralists claim that policy 
only considers these causes of inflation. Such a policy only aims at the re­
duction for demand and its character is only cyclical; not structural. But, 
here, one is already on the second policy making level of the controversy.
Policy-wise the controversy is carried out in terms of a 'structuralist 
Befora' versus orthodox anti-cyclical stabilisation policies (monetary, fiscal, 
incomes and foreign exchange policies). The disagreement in broad terms ap­
pears to be on the question of priorities between a growth or development ob­
jective and external and internal equilibrium. Structuralists recognise the 
need for price stability but subject to the primer objective of growth. This 
is why, with serious modifications, the monetarist stabilisation policies 
might be considered a chapter — abusing the use of the word — within a structur­
alist reform* If this is true, it is wrong to consider that structuralists 
— because of their analysis on the causes of inflation - regard inflation as 
inevitable.
But if there are theoretical differences between monetarists and structur­
alists with respect to the causes of inflation and practical differences in 
policy making, there is still a further fundamental disagreement. Monetarists 
rely, as it has been said, on the working of the price mechanism to achieve
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Is this priority feasible? This is one of the main questions structuralists 
would have to answer. The subject is discussed on Part III, ’Chapter I.
general equilibrium; and what is more, growth of output. Structuralists, on 
the other hand, implicitly or explicitly, alter the assumptions of a general 
equilibrium model and place the intervention of the State as the mechanism which 
shall first produce growth and development and, then, price stability. Has 
this fact made them irreconcilable? Let ns set the nature of the controversy 
in its simplest fora: the causes of inflation, the policy implications and
growth versus stability dilemmas, and the phylosophical nature of the conflict.
What this means is abstracting from all but the central factors that fora 
the controversy. Suppose that to understand the structural position all one 
needs to know is the behaviour of exports (as a cause of inflation) and the 
makings of a structural change (as a policy) that would solve the problem.
And, suppose that to understand the monetarist position all one nees to know 
is the behaviour of money (as a cause of inflation) and the implementation of 
monetary policy that would solve the problem of inflation.
It is common knowledge, writes Dr. Prebisch, that economic growth in Latin 
America is closely dependant on the course of exports. The rate of growth of 
exports sets an upper limit to the rate of growth, while continous fluctuacions 
in this first rate contribute to serious internal instability. When there is 
a cyclical expansion of exports, income expands and this calls for a volume of 
imports paid for by exports. Bat when exports fall with a down-swing, imports 
cannot be maintained and, as a result, neither can the former level of income. 
Under an orthodox system of monetary stability, the external and internal des- 
equilibrium thus produced leads to a contraction of economic activity, while 
the balance tends to be restored at a lower income level. But, if the level of 
income is maintained inflationary forces arise; that is, if they were not al­
ready at work. This may lead to an expansion of credit and, while it impedes 
the downward trend in income, it also impedes the readjustment of imports and, 
consequently, the restoration of the equilibrium (3). Hence the initial ab­
straction has to he complemented with the cyclical nature of inflation and the 
use of anti-cyclical measures.
Desequilibriu? continues the author, is one of the factors that make it
difficult to apply an anti-cyclical policy that does not compromise monetary
stability. Hence the solution lies not in counteracting the effects of the
contraction of exports and income, but in ‘preventing them by means of effect-*ive structural changes*♦ One has then to add to the abstraction the use of 
a structural reform. The purpose of this change is tiro-fold: to allow the
rate of growth to exceed the limit imposed by exports; and, at the same time,
What are, of course, effective structural changes?
to keep internal activity operating at the highest level of employment without 
being affected by export fluctuations. Structural rather than cyclical measures 
should be applied in order to overcome the external vulnerability, although 
some anti-cyclical measures are helpful as a complement to the structural solu­
tion, the author .concludes (4). The situation is one of inflation, caused by 
a.structural factor - and not the supply of money - and which* calls for- struc­
tural remedies —  inflationary ones?
Professor Grunwald puts the structuralist case in a straightforward way 
(3). The structuralist school is not concerned with the problem of stability 
or growth. The essence of the argument is whether price stability can be at­
tained only through economic growth, and not viceversa. The basic factors of 
inflation are structural in nature. Financial factors are important only as 
forces propagating inflation, not originating it. Monetary policy only attacks 
symptoms but does not cure then. The idea of putting the monetary house in or­
der first before economic development policies (structural changes) are intro­
duced is rejected. Because the structural causes that bring pressure on monet­
ary authorities seem to make the expansion of money inevitable. Even when mon­
etary policy has successfully diminished total demand, the underlying inflation­
ary pressures will persist. (The declining power of exports). In the best of 
cases stability will be attained at the cost of economic growth. So far, the 
theoretical evidence coincides with our assumption.
Mr. Felix's summary conclusions are similar: 'First, the structuralists
do not regard inflation as a viable long-run solution to Latin America's growth 
problems. Rather it is viewed as a manifestation of a deformed economy. Sec­
ond, they concede that an IMF stabilisation programme may reduce some of the 
deformities in the economy - the secondary malfunctions. But what the program­
mes do not remedy are more basic imbalances which retard economic ■. growth. They 
thus introduce a degree of greater efficiency at the cost of reduced employment 
and stagnating output, a socially untenable solution (5). In another article 
the same author quotes empirical evidence on the subject: 'The failure of sta­
bilisation programmes strengthens the view that the major rigidities (supply in­
elasticities) are not as described by monetarists, and were causes rather than 
results of inflation ... the unfavourable trends in world primary product mark­
ets' (6).
The structural causes of inflation and the monetary policy versus structur­
al change approach intermingle further in Dr. Prehisch's exposition. He writes 
that 'the general mistake persists of considering inflation a purely monetary 
phenomenon to be combated as such. Inflation cannot be explained as something 
divorced from the economic and social maladjustment of these countries. Nor 
can serious thought he given *to an autonomous anti-inflationary policy, as if 
only monetary considerations were involved. It must be an integral part of
development policy. Economic development calls for a constant change in the 
form of production, in the economic and social structure, and in the patterns 
of income distribution. Failure to make these changes - or to adopt them only 
partially - leads to the maladjustments which release the powerful forces of 
Latin-America inflation. This should not he taken to mean that inflation is 
inevitable. To avoid inflation, however, there must he a far-sighted policy 
of economic and social development, in other words an essentially new approach. 
This is not a merely technical problem: it is essentially a political one (7)..
The main object of structuralism is, of course, to demonstrate that there
is a solution to the problem of monetary stabilisation that is a different one
to that recommended by the monetarist school. Dr. Prebisch rightly indicates
*that the orthodox position ignores the phenomena of economic development (8). 
Whether a Latin American country is enjoying a boom or suffering a slump in its 
exports, whether it is growing at a rapid rate or not developing at all, the 
formula is the same: iflation must he combated by a credit restriction, and
other monetary instruments. But does this mean that orthodox monetary policy 
is indifferent to a country's economic development? Does it set up monetary 
stability as primary objective, for the sake of which such development must be 
curbed or smothered? This would he an injust assumption. The problem seems to 
be the implicit negation of the need for a development policy - changes in the 
patterns of production and income distribution. The mistake is a consequence 
of the belief that growth is a spontaneous phenomenon in Latin America: once
monetary stability is assured and the economy free of state intervention, the 
free interaction of its forces will bring about maximum efficiency in the utili­
sation of the factors of production. The orthodox application of anti-inflation­
ary policy generally implies economic contraction, it is the indispensable sacri- 
fice whereby to earn the remission of our economic sins and the grace of foreign 
private capital. All this is much to be regreted, continues the author: monet­
ary policy should not be expected to yield results which it cannot produce alone.
It is impossible to combat inflation or prevent it by purely monetary measures, 
they must he a part of an economic development policy which insures structural 
equilibrium. This means, mainly, a transformation of the structure of production 
and the conposition of exports and imports. These changes cannot result from the 
spontaneous interaction of economic forces. The main objective of monetary policy 
is to stabilise the external equilibrium of the econony; not, however, its struc­
tural equilibrium. Structural equilibrium is not a matter for monetary policy.
*One has only to remember that professor A. Harberger says: 'I have chosen to con­
centrate a y  remarks on the problem of inflation, not because I believe it is more
important than the problem of growth, hut simply because I believe that the tech­
nical apparatus with which economists work enables us to say substantially more
about inflation than about growth. (9)»
Yfliat is first needed is a tax policy planned to provide incentives to invest­
ment and measures to promote capital formation; something v/liich will give 
monetary authorities a base from which to operate against the inflationary 
expansion of credit* Nevertheless, this concerns only one aspect of infla­
tion* Not all inflation originates in credit: the inflation of costs must
be also considered:
Unfortunately, the structuralist position and the controversy itself are 
not as simple as that of the abstraction assumed. There are more structural 
causes of inflation which interact in a complicated manner. Nor all structur­
alists agree with these top priorities and policy conclusions. Y/ithin the 
broad field so far described, there are different types of structuralists.
On one extreme there are those who consider that the structural changes are 
of such a magnitude, that they would surely be incompatible with initial price 
stability. These may be identified with those that demand revolutionary sur­
gery. On the other hand, some consider that Latin America may have to learn 
to live with controlled inflation —  and make the best of it. These may be 
closely associated with some studies of the Brazilian case. However, the clas­
sic structuralist analysis is still that which worries about the structural 
nature of the inflationary process, the priorities between internal and exter­
nal equilibrium and growth, and the resulting policy measures. This is the
one that has been developed around the Economic Comission of Latin America,
*where Dr. Prebisch is the main figure, and the Chilean School.
Before closing this general introduction into the subject of structur­
alism, and going into the empirical study of the causes of inflation, however, 
it should be interesting to stress that our main main concern here is to etate 
how the causes interact. It would thus be convenient to describe the mechan-I
ics of the structuralist inflationary model (a). Something should also be said 
about the Latin American countries where it may be applicable (b), and, lastly, 
some concluding remarks(c).
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In this respect, Mr. Felix writes: "A useful division is between structural­
ists who would work within the social establishment to reform it and those to 
whom a socialist revolution is essential. Major revolutions are rarely compa­
tible with price level stability until the institution goumdwork has been 
drastically relaid (l0). Y/ith the first group - in theory - reconciliation 
with the monetarists is more possible. Tentatively, this would imply a sec­
ondary role for monetary policy; a fundamental tax reform; an incomes policy 
that would create a growth understanding between workers and entrepreneurs; an 
overall agrarian reorganisation; . a new export policy; increased state inter­
vention in the form of public investment and infrastructure work; a yet un- 
inteligible industrial reorganisation, and other far-fetched measures of which 
something shall be said later.
a) The mechanics of the structuralist inflationary model*
The setting for the structuralist inflationary model is that of a X>atin- 
American country undergoing industrialisation. Y/hile -it is true that the 
mechanics of inflation may start in many ways, it will show for structural­
ists certain predictable symptoms: a strained foreign balance and particular
supply bottlenecks*
Suppose that a rise in exports slows down or stops* And suppose that*such a Latin-Anerican country has a growth priority. If growth is to con­
tinue! this must mean an acceleration of the rate of import substitution! i.e. 
industrialisation* But industrialisation will also produce structural in­
flation* With the rapid expansion of some industries! imports of capital goods 
and raw. materials %/ill not fall* Imports of consumer goods will tend to be 
reduced9 although foodstuffs not necessarily. The expansion of some indus­
tries will have a direct impact on the price level because9 at least initial­
ly, domestic produced goods are surely more expensive* Hence there will be 
protective measures; the market conditions may be monopolistic; the output
y y y
small because of the rise of the domestic market , and the technology rel­
atively wasted* In practice, relative industrial prices did not fall much 
after new industries had gained a foothold* Not only were domestic markets 
small, but once imports had been replaced, further growth depended mainly on 
the growth of income and its distri bution* But though income rose, agricul­
tural stagnation (the second bottleneck) and the highly inequal distribution 
of urban income retarded the formation of mass markets* Signle-firm or oli­
gopolistic industries and undersized plants became a permanent part of the 
Latin-American industrial structure* The monopolistic market structures, 
however, enabled increases in industrial costs to be passed on in higher prices
What is of crucial importance then is that the demand for imported inputs 
is increasing and that industrial costs are higher* To attract workers higher 
wages will be offered and this will raise costs and eventually the already 
rising price level* Also, industrial expansion will require more public ser­
vices (electricity and transport, the third bottleneck) and a higher demand
Hr. Felix interpreting Latin-American inflation in the structuralist histori­
cal and political approach, says: "A high rate of economic growth became (late 
1930's) a sine qua non for reconciling the competing income demands of the 
various social classes", (ll)
** 1 Industrialisation, writes the above author, %/as enthusiastically selected as
the chief means of achie%ring a viable rate of gro%/th, for it promised better 
enq>loyment for the urban workers and %/hite collar and professional classes and 
reduced social tensions and relief from threats of agrarian reform (12).
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It is said that Brazil and Mexico, for example, are exceptions* It is true the 
Jhey are potential exceptions, a structuralist %/ould argue, in so far as incou
for food will appear* Public investment is retarded because of-low tax rev­
enues, tax concessions to encourage industrial investment and competing *social 
demands* on the budget. But budget deficits appear as a consequence of the 
general expansion, and money creation is also taking place.
Thus import substitution changes the consumption functions throughout the 
economy. This requires a flexible domestic market in a setting where the mark­
ets for labour and capital are imperfect* This will mean rising prices. More­
over, to the extent that the transformation is inadequate, the pressure of de­
mand for imports will not be relieved. Then the exchange rate will be devalued 
which will also raise costs further. Once this has happened —  decline in ex­
ports, import-substitution industrialisation, a high import demand, agricultur­
al and infrastructure bottlenecks, and devaluation —  the setting is perfect 
for spiralling inflation.
Once price increases affect the standard of living, there will be attempts 
to raise wages and other forms of income* The propagating inflationary factors 
gain momentum* With time savings are discouraged and capital is moved away 
from long term investment. So that inflationary bottlenecks further increase.
Excess demand will have appeared because of these supply lags. (Agricul­
ture, steel, fuels, electricity, etc.). For example, in agriculture, where 
either prices rise or the imports of food increase. These will stimulate the 
pressures on wage increases, together with the effects of urbanisation on con­
sumption. One has to remember that two important problems coincide with Latin- 
America* s inflation. The sharp drop in death rates has given Latin America in
the past two decades the highest population growth rate in the world, and the*increased inefficiency of latifundia and minifundia. Similarly, a budget def­
icit may grow because of an expansion in expenditure and lags of revenue. Sim­
ilarly, demand may rise because of the expansion of monetary policy causing 
private investment to outrun private savings. Rising prices discourage exports 
while imports are stimulated, thus inducing a devaluation. Wage increases may 
be greater than productivity increases. This at once results in rising prices 
specially if the industry is monopolistical*
In any of these ways a structural price inflation can grow, and develop 
cumulative features.
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(from previous page) .. redistribution enlarges the market.
*Even if it were possible to transform agriculture rapidly, writes Mr. Felix, 
it is unlikely that agriculture would have maintained its role as major em­
ployer, many of the innovations would have been labour saving. Nevertheless,* 
a rapid rate of transformation would have at least meant cheap food for the 
cities and a growing rural market for urban products. Instead, the worst en­
sued. A rapid rate of agricultural modernisation proved too much for the ex- 
tate owners. Output expansion was slow, food prices pressed upward and agri-
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In summary, what are the basic features of the model? There is a chronic 
shortage of foreign exchange. There is also a chronic upward pressure on im­
port and food prices. These respectively, raise domestic costs and set off 
wage demands, culminating in a devaluation and in a general rise of the cost- 
price level, with oligopoly pricing in industiy and trade facilitating the 
upward price movment. On this setting propagating inflationary pressures 
intermingle. Because the government operating budget tends to be inflexible 
in real terms, and because revenue comes largely from indirect taxes and from 
foreign trade sources, the rise in prices generates fiscal deficits which are 
met by central bank borrowing. Similarly, the higher cost-price level indu­
ces the banking system to provide additional private credit. While tight 
money would thus prevent the cost-price rise, with import and agricultural 
prices rising autonomously, a fall in industrial prices and wages would be 
required. Since both are sticky downward a substantial drop in output and 
employment would be needed to force them down. Moreover, the relative rigi- 
ditios of the government budget mean that the alternative to central hank 
credit would be primarily a reduction in public investment. Since political 
pressures, already highly at work increase in Latin American countries when 
per capita output stagnates or falls and urban unemployment rises, efforts 
to maintain tight money fails both as policy medicine and in the political 
setting. Still, what this means is that price stability - somewhat aside 
from the problem of growth - could succeed, given the present conditions in 
Latin America, only if external circumstances were favourable, as during a 
sustained export boom, and if the supply of foodstuffs proved elastic. Sim­
ilarly, tight money might be maintained by a strong dictatorship which is 
able to reduce the expression of social discontent.
(b) To what countries does it apply?
The above sections have been generalising freely about Latin America 
as if it were a whole case for the structuralist analysis. It is convenient 
to try to specify to which Latin-American economies the model applies. Some­
thing fundamental has already been said about the subject in the Introduction
It was said that in principle the structuralist model -would apply to 
all of Latin America inasmuch as these countries undergo industrialisation 
and a structural change in demand. In practice this is not so: not all
Latin America had undergone sustained industrialisation nor have all countries 
relatively speaking, suffered chronic inflation in the post-war period*
We thus abstracted from the ‘stable* countries: Venezuela, the Central
American Republics, the Caribbean countries and the ex-colonies - or colonies
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*• till - of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands ana the United States.
The nain reasons why these nations did not suffer spiralling inflation have 
been superficially stated (sec Part I Chapter 3)# Professor Seers has a good 
introduction into the qualifications of the structuralist model (it). This 
study differs somewhat from the Professor’s approach.
One is thus left with the countries that have suffered chronic inflation 
in a good part of the post-war period. They are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Co 
lonibia, Peru, and Uruguay. Bolivia and Paraguay, soraevhat together; and 
Mexico and Ecuador, one which has moved towards stability and the other which 
has tended to move away from it. But this does not mean that the structural­
ist model applies to the lot. Important qualifications have to be made in all 
cases, qualifications that may greatly invalidate the applicability of the 
model (Structuralists, of course, claim that their analysis is generally ap- 
plicable). This is then one of the main interests of this survey.
Ecuador is the border case between relative price stability and infla­
tion, and used as a relevant point of reference in this respect. One can 
hardly make a case for Equatorian industrialisation. Yet, the export sector 
is fundamental for the equilibrium of its economy; specifically the banana 
market through which Ecuador has been able to maintain its rate of growth. 
Stating the case in these terms, however, would place Ecuador closer to the 
countries from which the study abstracts. Nevertheless, a structuralist case 
is made out of it if one stresses the relation between the export sector and 
price stability, in a setting of semi-unorthodox policies that have included 
devaluation. It is worth remembering that the countries abstracted from 
have maintained exchange rate stability.
Bolivia and Paraguay clearly present a peculiar case and a controversial 
one, at least in terns of the structuralist model. Again one cannot speak of 
industrialisation or of important changes in the structure of demand, but of 
the opposite. Social pressures have not had expression in Paraguay; and in
The assumptions, however, should not he taken to extremes. In theory it is 
conceivable that one of these countries industrialises without necessarily 
falling into spiralling inflation. Suppose, for example, that Central Ameri­
ca as a whole, undergoes consistent import siVbstitution and that its young 
common market, by the grace of international conditions, succeeds in elimi­
nating the inflationary tendencies of the process. Op take Cuba too. She 
was stable and stagnant and the devolution brought such economic and insti­
tution changes that the structuralist model is rendered obsolete.
E-KIt should be remembered in simple terms that evidence points out that the 
monetarist model seems to be more present in Brasil and Uruguay and Bolivia 
and Paraguay, abstracting from the structuralist argument.
Bolivia , if they have, they may have heen abortive* Bat both have suffered 
the worst cases of spiralling inflation during 1950*s and there are clear 
signs that unorthodox monetary and fiscal policies played a leading role 
(the propagating factors). If this were statistically based, a better case 
could be made for the monetarist argument. Still, there remains the structur­
alist point of a possible determinant relationship between the behaviour of 
exports and rate of inflation. Would both models apply then? One is clear­
ly back in the controversy itself.
The structuralist model fits better into the experience of Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay, and less so with Chile. Important qualifi­
cations have to be made, however, in all of these cases. This historical rel­
evance of the export sector can be stressed in all of them, although Peru' has 
had a more satisfactory experience. Import-substitution industrialisation, 
financed with the export proceeds of a few primary products is also a fact 
together with monopolistical practices and a small market. Except for Peru, 
where it is also more difficult to speak of a forced import-substitution 
effott. Nonetheless it may be possible to identify a serious overall foreign 
exchange bottleneck in the lot. It is also not difficult to observe infra­
structure bottlenecks, though it remains to be seen whether they are infla­
tion induced or autonomous. With respect to the agricultural sector - the 
inelasticity of supply and the handicap of institutional arrangements - the ' 
case may be seen through, the persistent imports or the decline in exports or 
the rising price level of such commodities. Structuralists would have to 
prove that this is a fact. It was once fashionable to argue, evenby structur­
alists, that the assumption was generally true, except for Argentina. *In 
regard to agriculture, writes professor Grunwald, it is absurd to talk about 
a bottleneck in Argentina, exports of food products can be varied and may be 
decreased to augment domestic supply* (15)* A later empirical study of Mr.
Diaz Alejandro, a non-structuralist, proves that indeed the Argentinian agri­
cultural supply has been inelastic (l6). With respect to structural changes 
in demand, it could be said that there has only been a small acceleration of 
population growth in Argentina and Uruguay in the past two decades; although 
urbanisation has proceeded fastly. On the other hand, it might be claimed 
that the relative growth of the urban sector and hence the pressure of social 
problems, has not been so great in Peru and Colombia as in the rest. The 
problem of assessing the social pressures on the public budget, say, are
Bolivia*s near hyper-inflation of 1952—53/ as it "was said with reference 
to bibliography, should be studied in the context of the 1952 Devolution, 
and the 1964 coup d*£tat.
*
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outside the competence of this study. One can, however, gather an idea of 
it through the behaviour of wages and salaries and trade-unionism. It is . 
said thattrade union pressureis weak in Latin America. But, again, this is 
a relative subject. Its power was obvious in Peron's Argentina, but seems 
to have declined in the last ten years. Alternatively, it was claimed that 
Chile*s trade unions are ineffective; something that may have changed in 
the last years. But here one is already dealing with propagating factors 
of inflation. And it is true that all of these countries have used non-or- 
thodox monetary and fiscal policies, wage increases, devaluations and semi­
fixed exchange rates and so on. In conclusion, the relevance of the exper­
ience of these countries and of the importance of the controversy in itself 
is rather obvious.
The case of Mexico, however, may bo taken to be peculiar. Beca'ase it 
may he used to sustain both the structuralist and the monetarist sides of 
the argument, as well as the negation of both. Mexico has experience con­
siderable inflation in the post-war period, except that in the last five 
years almost completa stability has been attained. Structuralists would 
claim that this has happened as a consequence of structural changes, ac­
companied by an inflationary period. They would speak of a social revolution 
an agrarian reform, an expanding supply of foodstuffs, a reduction of the 
foreign exchange bottleneck, the placing of manufacturers in the internation­
al market, persistent public investment in infrastructure and industry and 
so forth. Nevertheless, monetarists could argue that price stability is
within reach because prudent monetary and fiscal policies have been follov- *ed and, in the case of Mexico, a good argument can be made of it. But 
there is, to complicate matters even more, the possibility of a third expla­
nation. Other structuralists could argue that Mexico's price stability is- 
only apparent. It would be difficult to argue that social pressures have 
not changed the structure of demand or that there has not been an agrarian 
reform. But the elasticity of agricultural supply could perhaps be used as 
an argument. Here, of course, the crucial factor is income redistribution. 
Furthermore, it could be claimed that there is a foreign exchange bottle­
neck hidden by a clever financial policy. Tourism helps a lot, but does not 
stop the country from increasing its degree of foreign indebtedness and a 
tight, schedule of repayments (it remains to be proven that this is so).
Still, indebtedness, may arise, among other things, and in structuralist 
terms, because Mexico's primary exports have suffered the same tendencies 
as those of the rest of Latin America; because the exports of manufactures
This by itself could open a new approach different from both structuralist 
and monetarist analysis, because it would seem that price stability, structur­
al p.!ia.nfrpc! and frrowhh could be attained sinultaneouslv. Balanced Growth models
is yet insignificant, and because import substitution industrialisation is 
similar to that of the Southern countries. With respect to the raole of public 
investment, there is no doubt that Mexico has a highly interventionist state. 
What is less clear is whether intervention, starting from the 1920*s has in­
creased or decreased, most likely it has undergone ups and downs.
The above generalisations, the majority of which lie outside the scope 
of this work, have been made only to stress the case for including the ten 
countries in the analysis and to show the ambitious implications of the 
structuralist model.
C) Sons additional remarks
The trouble with the word structure is that it may contain ideological 
implications which are not the same in all cases. That is, the work implies 
different shadbs of economic philosophy. It would be too simple to identify 
structuralism with the intervention of the state in the economic mechanism 
and as a challenge to the workings of the classical price mechanism. This, 
however, would not be entirely true because many of the main exponents of 
the school do not adopt exclusively either one of the postures. One can rhe­
torically claim that different structuralists move along a scale that goes 
from less to more public invenventionin economic life; where more or less 
•use* is made of the free price mechanism^ or where the system itself may 
be totally abandoned in the search of a ’planned* economic system. The field, 
however, is not one of our competence.
One of the origins of the word is in Marxian (Economics. Where the term 
structure is used to define the main economic determinants of a given economic 
system - the ownership of the means of production and the means of production 
themselves - and the term suprastructure, to define the non-economic institu­
tions of a given economic system. The more leftist Latin American structur­
alists use the word in these terms plus to refer to all the factors that act 
as impediments to growth. From their analysis they draw the conclusion of a 
social revolution - a structural change. They are thus not interested on short 
term price stability or growth, but in an absoluto socio—economical change that 
within the process, does not seek immediatley either of the objectives. Once 
the change had occurred, they would presumably take up the problem of growth 
and stability.
More conservative structuralists are not concerned with social revolu­
tion and their use of the term derives from different sources. W ith them 
one may speak of the structure of demand and of the structure of production 
in an economic system that, up to a point, abstracts from social and poli­
tical determinants. With respect to the structure of production, we refer, 
for example, to Professor Leontief with his emphasis on ’structural* rela­
tions between industries and changes in industrial output and the composi­
tion of factors of production. With respect to the structure of demand, 
one may refer to T. Veblen and professors Dussenbery and Nurkse. Here, of 
course, besides economic behaviour of individuals and social groups, insti­
tutional determinants - like population growth and the distribution of in­
come - are accounted for.
But, within this nse of the word structure, it is possible to circums­
cribe a 'bit further its definitiion. It is used to refer to the composition 
of GNP, according to the economic sectors that form it. Hence the structure 
of CcNP is formed by the agricultural sector, the industrial sector, the ex­
ternal sector, and the services and trade sector. Structural changes are 
then those that occur within these sectors and within one sector in respect 
to the others; but, nonetheless, within the general field of the structures 
of demand and production and social and political institutions. Structural 
causes of inflation and structural obstacles to growth would be those deriv­
ed from the behaviour of the economical sectors and the market. A structur­
alist reform would be one that changes the existing behaviour or composition 
of the sectors and of the market.
There is a further fashionable use of the term in this resx>ect. It is 
used to differentiate the concept of economic development as something dif­
ferent from the growth of output. ECLA, among others, says that economic dev­
elopment besides including a non-cyclical growth of output in per capita tern; 
includes a structural change. By a structural change they mostly emphasise 
a change in income distribution pattersn, but it is not difficult to extend 
the meaning to changes in the economic sectors and in the market.
For the purpose of this work, - not wanting to de-empliasise the ideo­
logical and * input-output * validity of the term - structure is simple used 
to refer to the composition of aggregate demand and supply. A structural 
change is not only reflected in the growth of both variables and in the size 
of the market; but, what is more’important, in their composition. On the
demand side, the changes in the distribution of income and in the composition<
of consumption and savings are structural. On the side cf supply, the term 
applies to changes in the composition of factor of production and to the
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changes in the weight of the different sectors of the economy. Over-all, a 
structural change implies a sustained (non-cyclical) rate of per capita out 
put hut with progressive income distribution corollaries. Lastly, the term 
may be extended to those institutional changes that not only alter the beha­
viour of economic variables but result in a certain economic policy. A 
structural economic policy, as the word indicates, is au induced and 'new* 
policy that substitutes the economic status quo, whether the full price sys­
tem or another 'brand' of public intervention.
Having made this introduction into the subject of structuralism, the 
next step is to go into the subject in the above terms. The chapter then 
will deal with the cumulative cause of inflation. As it was seen in the 
mechanics of the model all factors interact in a highly complex fashion. 
However, for analytical purposes, they have been divided into five main 
groups: the agricultural bottleneck; the foreign exchange argument; import
substitution industrialisation; infrastructure bottlenecks and public in--fvestment and finance; and, the distribution of income. On the last part of 
this work we shall insist on the propagating causes of inflation, according 
to the policy measures implicit in structuralism.
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B. The Cumulative Causes of Inflation
a) The Agricultural Bottleneck
It is convenient to start the study of the cumulative and structural 
causes of inflation, with the factor of an agricultural inelasticity of sup­
ply.. The reason for beginning with this factor is simply one of order; in­
flation in a closed economy. However, it is worth noting that different 
structuralists emphasise the role of agriculture in the inflationary process 
with different degrees of relative causability with respect to other structur­
al origins of inflation. This exercise shall first follow the authors who 
give agricultural inelasticity a leading role. Later, an appraisal of the 
argument %/ill be made in such a %/ay as to integrate its relative role in the 
structuralist model.
The argument of the role of agriculture in the Latin-American inflation­
ary process may really be an extension of the theories of balanced groi/th 
versus unbalanced growth in UDC (for a bibliography on the subject see the 
footnotes (17)* Balanced gro%/th theories were defended in their time by 
professors Dusenberry and Nurkse; unbalanced gro%/th became popular through 
professors Hirschman and Streetcn, a good confrontation of the arguments is 
that of Mr. Lipton; and, a historical and empirical analysis of Japan, %/hich 
became of much consequence, is that of Messrs. Okhawa and Bosowsky. Although 
the subject lies outside the scope of this paper, it is necessary to say a 
few inttroductory remarks %/ith resx>ect to inflation. The ideal situation 
would be one -where agriculture and industrialisation in the closed economy 
advanced hand in hand; or, where in the historical sense, industrialisation 
has been preceeded by an agricultural revolution. In the real %/orld of UDC, 
ho%/ever, there are strong arguments that point out tkat the industrial sector 
may push ahead of agriculture; or that the agricultural sector may then shoot 
ahead of industry, and so on.
What is interesting here is not only the elasticity of output, hut the 
different elasticities of the commodities that compose such output. The gen­
eral argument is that the elasticity of the agricultural supply places a con­
straint on overall economic gro%/th. The argument proposes two alternatives. 
First, there should exist prior agricultural elasticity; %/hich usually re­
quires an increase labour productivity on the land, so that labour may be
*shifted into industry. Second, if there is ’excess labour* in agriculture, 
both agriculture and industry may proceed together. But, %/hatever the case,
This is, of course, a controversial subject.
if it so happens that the demand for foodstuffs cannot he satisfied and the 
market for manufactured goods is limited, then price stability is endangered. 
The argument can present the following developments. ‘Excessive* industrial­
isation in the early stages of growth can lead to inflation depending on 
what happens with agriculture and aggregate demand. With industrialisation 
the high income elasticity of food in UDC and the larger the proportionate 
increase in the supply of manufactures, the more likely prices of food will 
rise relatively to others. Several determinants have to be accounted for.
In Latin America there should be a greater sensitivity of agricultural prices 
to demand. A lot depends on what happens in the labour market and in the 
income distribution. If wages are sensitive they will rise with little lag. 
Costs of production in industry may thus rise. In any case, it may happen 
that if the relationship between real income growth, food supply elasticity, 
income elasticity, and industrial response is compatible and favourable then 
there is a chance for price stabilityi Presumably this is what has not hap­
pened in our Latin-American economies.
*The factor that will determine whether inflation gets out of hand, 
writes professor Maynard, is the price of food. *If food prices start to 
rise... then money wages in industry can hardly be kept stable. Once they 
begin to rise then inflation of industrial prices takes more the form of 
cost inflation than a demand inflation. •• the developing of manufacturing 
mnst not take too great a precedence over agriculture, for if the latter 
lags it will be difficult to prevent food prices from rising. The income 
elasticity of demand is the crucial factor which determines the appropriate 
growth rates of agriculture and industry. There is little doubt that food 
prices have played a key role in the severe inflations of Latin America* (18). 
This may be taken as an example of structural inflation, with emphasis on 
the agricultural bottleneck and 'excessive* industrialisation.
Suppose then that inflation in Latin America has been caused by an in­
elasticity of the supply of food and raw materials; among other structural 
factors. Suppose further that agriculture has not been able to respond to 
demand because of two things. The structure of demand has changed 'explosive­
ly* following the highest population growth in the world and the process of 
sustained urbanisation throughout the post-war period (See Table IV, Part I). 
On the supply side institutional and economical factors create such an in­
elasticity. The land tenure system, with latifundia and minifundia, has been 
inefficient and the structure of services - such as agricultural extension 
work, irrigation, transport and comaunicatitns, mechanisation and so on - 
has been rigid. Moreover, the regressive distribution of income will affect 
'negatively* the structures of demand and supply, and their growth (Turn to 
section e).
Population growth and urbanisation will then have a strong effect on 
agriculture and the production of the sector will have to grow very fast even 
though the income elasticity for food may be low. Assume, correctly, that 
the population grows at 3$ and that the proportion of urban to rural popula­
tion rises from 50$ to 51$. There are 5$ more to be fed in the citi&s* Even 
if the income elasticity of food is only 0.6 and per capita income increases 
only by 2$, it means that agricultural output will have to grow by about 6.2$. 
This, for Latin-America, let alone any other region, is quite an unfulfilled 
order. (See Table II)•
The proposition that Latin America's supply of food and raw materials 
has not been elastic enough and has created inflation, raises a host of in­
terconnections with the other structural and propagating causes of inflation.
A clue factor is industrial productivity. If this would increase presumably 
prices would fall. It is more likely, however, that wages will increase, 
among other things because of higher prices for food. 1/ages have then, an 
induced role. Dr. Prebisch stresses other spiraling possibilities. There 
are also important factors which contribute to inflation. The slower rate 
of increase in agricultural productivity, the antiquated land tenure system, 
and the cost of import substitution* (19)• Y/ith respect to agriculture, 1ST 
may raise costs because of higher prices for machinery, fertililisers, and 
other inputs. The point is that if agricultural productivity does not rise 
- or rises less than - higher wages will result and will he reflected on costs 
and prices. 'The existence of an anti-economic structure of land-ownership 
writes Dr. Sunkel, constitutes a strong obstacle to the introduction of mod­
ern technology and the full use of agricultural resources (20)'. This reduces 
productivity, agricultural production and a vital link in the process of growth. 
Moreover, not only through higher import substitution prices is agricultural 
inflation connected with the external sector. In the case of the export of 
foods, the inelasticity may lead to a fall in exports, therefore putting pres­
sure on the balance of payments. 'In Argentina and Uruguay there has also been 
a lagging agricultural supply, writes ECLA, but since foodstuffs are the majnr 
exports the shortage for domestic consumption is not so obvious* (21). In 
other countries, the increased demand for food may be supplemented through 
imports (this has been the situation, in different periods, in Chile, Colombia 
and Peru. But this reduces the possibility of necessary capital goods and 
raw material imports. In such a situation, again, the gap will be filled by 
price increases, since the demand for such goods is inelastic. There is an 
additional factor that the effort to stimulate exports by granting more favour-
*It will be seen however, that in Argentina and Uruguay not only the supply of 
primary exports was inelastic but the domestic supply of food tool**Incidentally, ECLA claims that Brazil and Mexico(where there has been -agrarian 
reform) have had a more elastic agricultural production. This means nothing 
here since one has the highest rate of inflation and the other one of the low-
o e f  f f t r  f h e  n o r i  rl  .
able prices raises domestic food prices, further contributing to inflation. 
Lastly, the argument can be interpreted in terms of income distribution.
•This (rising food prices) would mean a fall in the real income of the ur­
ban wage earners, says Sunkel, since food takes a large part of their bud­
gets, and would also cause a fall in theri demand for manufactures, since 
it would mean a regressive shift in nincome distribution. Whether the urban 
workers obtain wage increases or not, an unbalancing factor is introduced and 
it will either start an inflationary process, lead to balance of payments 
difficulties, or, by limiting the size of the market for manufactures, con 
tribute to the stagnation of industry and the growth process* (22).
From here the next step is to insist on a theoretical model of infla­
tion in a closed Latin-American economy (i) (The model %/ill be based on 
Professors Maynard*s analysis (23); and the second, to produce some empiri­
cal evidence).
(i) An inflationary model
The author's idea is that 'excessive' emphasis on industrialisation tof
the neglect of agriculture, tends to produce pressure on the level of prices, 
quite apart from excess demand; so that is the latter is removed prices may 
none the less continue to rise. It is true that one should not expect bal­
anced growth. In this respect the crucial factor is the income elasticity 
for the demand for food, -which does not remain constant through gro%/th; it 
declines with gro%vth. But, given the level of real income, there will exist
an 'appropriate' relationship bet%/een the gro%/th of agriculture and the rate£-of gro-wth of industry which %/ill leave the internal terms cf trade unchanged • 
If however, the gro%/th of industry is 'higher* than is 'appropriate' for 
agriculture, then the internal terms of trade %/ill favour the latter, and 
there are reasons to expect a rise in prices.
1*- Suppose then that there are only t%/o sectors in a Latin-American country: 
agriculture and industry. Second, that capital goods are not bought by 
consumers and that their demand does not depend on current real income. 
Thirds, food and consumer goods do depend on real income. If total output 
is compesed of 70$ of food, 20$ of manufactured goods, and 10$ of capital 
goods, while agricultural output remains constant, what happens to prices?
2.- If the rise in the output of manufactures takes the form of only capital
goods, its output will increase by say 60$. But, then real income also in­
creases, so that there will he excess demand for food end manufactures. The 
prices of which %/ill tend to rise. If the income elasticity of demand for 
food is less than unity, manufacture prices -will tend to rise relatively to 
food prices.
'# 1Allowing the rate of agricultural growth to determine the over-all rate of 
growth, in other words.
Alternatively, if the increase in industry is divided between capital goods 
and manufactures - and if the marginal savings ratio is 0.1 - then the in­
come elasticity of demand for food would have to be below a half to cause 
the terms of trade to move in favour of industry. The higher the income 
elasticity of the demand for food and the larger the proportionate increase 
in the supply of manufactures, the more likely agricultural prices will rise 
relatively to other. If part of the increase in the output of industry takes 
the form of consumer goods, there would not be a general excess of supply. 
Nonetheless, there would be excess demand for food; it follows that the 
general price level will not remain constant.
The factor likely to produce a rise in the price level when there is excess 
demand for food and excess sujjply of manufactures, is the greater sensitivi­
ty of agricultural prices to demand and the income distribution pattern. Pri­
ces in agriculture will increase more rapidly than a corresponding - theore­
tical - fall in manufacture prices. In the short run prices increase and 
agriculture switches demand from industry, where a low elasticity of substi­
tution of food for manufactured goods implies a rise in the price of food.
As we have said a lot depends on what happens in the labour market. If
money wages begin to rise vith a little lag, further pressure is put on
agricultural prices. Moreover, costs in industry are affected (this in the
long run depends on productivity and on the MST process). Inflation may be
tempered if the rise in industrial output stems from a rise in productivity,
*since there is a bigger chance industrial goods prices will fall. But if 
money wages respond very quickly to prices, the effects of productivity will 
be partially off-set and manufacture prices will not fall. The behaviour of 
food prices is determinant.
A major assumption of the model is that the food output remains constant 
when industrial goods increase. This is circumstancial, however, because 
the important thing is that the food supply per capita does not increase 
at a rate appropriate to the increase in real income per capita. If, on 
the other hand, the relationship between real income growth, the structure 
of the supply of food and its income elasticity is more appropriate then 
there is a greater chance of price stability. If there is little or no up 
ward pressure on food prices owing to a satisfactory growth in agriculture, 
then the price level may even fall.
This may prove to be wishful thinking in Latin America due to the institution­
al setting of industrialisation or the external sector.
*
7#- The model is not unreasonable in a Lat in-American country where food is still
the largest item in total spending# In a free consumer market if the internal
terms of trade move against agriculture, food prices will rise relatively to
other prices, and if this involves an absolute rise in food prices then gen-
*eral inflation will result#
Professor Maynard gives Argentina and Chile as examples of his model# In Ar­
gentina, from the 1930's to the early 1950*s disposable gross income per capita 
rose by about 21$, whereas available food supply per capita declined by 7$# And, 
despite policy to promote agricultural production (1952-55) and the fact that 
the agricultural prices rose 20$ more than manufactures (investment inducement 
in agriculture) inflation was intensified# The government could not prevent * 
money wages from rising with prices nor could it change the behaviour of agri­
cultural entrepreneurs# In Chile, after the war, the food supply per capita 
also rose very little and the concentration of income raised the elasticity of 
demand of food of the lor/-income groups with resulting price increases and a 
low demand for manufactures#
In both countries, writes the author, price instability was complicated by 
the export sector, which made the pursue of stable monetaiy and fiscal policies 
highly difficult# There is also no doubt that government .control over spending 
and over the supply of money would have proved too lax for price stability#
But the point remains: even if there had been no fluctuation in the terms of
trade, even if monetaiy and fiscal policies had been a model of rectitude, 
there would have been a pressure on prices arising from a too rapid rate of 
growth of industry against agriculture#
Professor Maynard thinks thus that the model may be applied to the whole of 
Latin America# 'At least two studies by ECLA (24) have demonstraded how agri­
cultural production has failed to keep pace with population growth and other 
production since pre-war years# In 1 9 5 5 t t o *  example, the per capita production 
of food in the region as a whole was about 6$ lower than the pre-war figure#
It is estimated that whereas real income per capita had risen by about 45$ from 
the 1930's to the 1950's, food increases per capita had risen only by 8$# If 
an estimate of 0#6 is accepted for income elasticity of demand for food, then 
the available food supplies did not rise sufficiently to match a rise in demand
V "Prom here one could go into public intervention, institutional reforms and price 
controls specifically.
One does not have to agree with this point# If exports were expanding securely 
surely the import of food could check agricultural inflation and allow for in­
dustrialisation. The Argentinian and Chilean cases are studied in Part III, 
Chapter II#
which (at unchanged relative prices of food and manufactures) would have been 
bought about by the rise in real income. It is significant that the post-war 
agricultural performance in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Bolivia, 
Uruguay, and, to a lesser extent Brazil, has been poor while inflation has 
been high. However, one is here going already into empirical matter. Before 
doing this, a few concluding remarks on professor Maynard's model are useful 
as far as structuralism is concerned.
In conclusion, if the analysis is correct, the inelastic food supply 
and demand imbalance would not bo eliminated unless either the growth in 
per capita income is held to a rate compatible with the growth of the food 
supply or the vage-salary classes accept a slower growth of wages than the 
real per capita income growth of other social groups. The model has been 
criticises mainly for two reasons: the use of a closed economy model in
Latin America (tfliich obscures the fact that industrialisation may not be 
'excessive') and the need to push the rate of growth beyond that of agricul­
ture when productivity increases and price stability are related.
Professor Seers writes: *my criticism is in reference to his (profes-
eor Maynard's) comment on 'excessive' industrialisation.1' His theoretical 
model shows that in a closed economy there will be an upward pressure on 
food priceshif industrial output grows much faster than agricultural output, 
but a close-oconomy model has little significance for Latin America. The 
main criticism one can make of Latin-Anerican industrialisation is not that 
it is excessive, but that it is unbalanced*. (25) Lagging output of major 
products has been an inducement to inflation (fuels, steel, chemicals) and
there are infrastructural bottlenecks. Hence there is no excessive indus-\
trialisation and the industrial sector has contributed by itself to infla­
tion. This has happened through import-substitution industrialisation, 
where the fundamental role of the external sector is introduced.
For structuralists growth - and growth that brings price stability - 
depends on productivity rises: productivity rises are more likely in in­
dustry due mainly to contemporary foreign trade trends, technology and other 
factors. 'The enormous benefits that derive from increased productivity, 
says J)r. Prebisch, have not yet reached the perifery in a measure comparable 
to that obtained by developed countries... hence the manifest discrepancies 
between their respective abilities to accumulate capital, since the margin 
of savings depends primarily on increases in productivity. Thus there ex­
ists an obvious disequilibrium, a fact which destroys the basic premise un­
derlying the scheme of the international division of labour. Hence the sig­
nificance of industrialisation not as an end in itself, but as the principal
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means at the disposal of those countries of obtaining a share of the benefits 
of technical progress (26) *
Besoming, it is very likely that agricultural inelasticities are behind 
the inflationary process as a *more or less* autonomous cost force* Although 
changes in the structure of demand and institutional factors have to be ac­
counted for)* But its role has to be weighed in terms of the other main 
structural causes of inflation. That is, it is not realistic to abstract 
from the external sector or to consider simply that industrialisation has been 
•excessive* (the subject will be discussed in section C)* MST industrialisa­
tion has been imposed on Latin America through the trends in its primary ex­
ports; technological implications; employment commitments, that include the 
absorption of rural labour discarded by the technological growth in agriculture 
and the rate of population growth, and so on* In such a way that the rate of 
growth in agriculture should not be left to determine the growth of real in 
come, least stagnation and unemployment may ensue. To take the extreme case: 
an extremist structuralist would argue for some countries an industrial spe­
cialisation and the import of foodstuffs* Still, the ideal structural situa­
tion would be to have an expanding external sector which would allow for a 
flexible and growing import structure. On the assumption of changes in de­
mand and income elasticity and modernisation of agriculture, a relative de­
cline in the agricultural sector would be compatible with a higher agricul­
tural output, industrialisation, increasing urban employment, a larger dom­
estic market for manufactures, and price stability from the factor of primary 
products prices.
u  i) Some empirical evidence
With the above precautions, however, the next step is to examine empiric­
ally the possible relationship between prices and the agricultural sector. 
Moreover it is very useful to begingthe exercise with the evidence that profes­
sor llaynard, in a posterior work of his (27)» offers in what for the present 
work is a ‘historical setting* of the argument.
It should not be expected, writes the author, that food output per capita 
should rise in the same proportion as real income per capita; but if follow­
ing ECLA, an estimate of 0.6 for the income elasticity of demand for food is 
accepted as reasonable (28), it is evident that available food supply in Latin 
America as a whole, dit not rise sufficiently to match the rise in demand (1939- 
1951)»at unchanged relative prices of food and other goods, brought about by
<*Turn to section C.
<"the rise in real income. It is estimated that whereas income per capita in
the area was about 45$ higher than in the pre-war, food supply per capita
was only about 8$ higher. In other words, to avoid undue pressure on food
prices relative to other prices, the income elasticity of demand would have
had to be less than 0,2 It is clear that a large change in relative prices
was required to produce balance in the demand and supply of food , and this
could hardly be achieved, if at all, except in the context of prices increases;
hence it is not surprising that food prices may have led the way in the chron-*in inflation of many Latin American countries.
Real Income and Food Supply in Pre- and Post-War (Per capita terms)
±a\j0
C o u n t r y  Available food Supply Disposable Gross Income
1954/8 1949/51 1954/8 1949/51
Argentina 100 97 100 135
Brazil 100 105 100 15i50
Chile 100 113 100 122
Colombia 100 134 100 135
Mexico 100 113 100 177
Source: Unittd Nationas, The Selective expansion of L.A, Agriculture
Looking at individual countries, it is clear that in all cases, except 
Colombia, the required income elasticity of demand to avoid pressure on food 
prices, would have had to have been lower than in fact was likely to he in 
the cases of these countries. The relationship between food supplies and in­
come growth is obviously very unbalanced, Colombia’s position seems satis­
factory except that the most substantial contribution to an increased food 
supply came from imports. This, means that food supply was presumably not only 
precarious, but that agriculture played an indirect part in inflation, Mexico 
presents a peculiar situation. Although the relation between income and food 
is unfavourable, here post-war development may he more pertinent than pre and 
post-war comparison. The rise in food supplies seems to have taken place since
Even assuming official price controls, which judging by food price indices 
were on any event weakly enforced.
the 1950's* The opposite is true for Chile: the supply of food contracted
only after the war. If this hypothesis is true, it would explain the grow­
ing price stability of Mexico and the growing inflation in the other coun­
tries.
Similar information did not exist for the rest of our countries. However, 
professor Maynard says that the almost hyper-inflations of Paraguay and Bolivia 
were largely connected with the shortage of food. Bolivia, indeed, provides a 
striking illustration between inflation and backward agricultural development, 
but in the context of a political and edonomical revolution (29).
If ve now turn to more recent data, the agricultural supply inelasticity
of Latin America seems to have grown in the majority of cases more acute (See
Table I). For the period 1953-1965» agricultural and food production in per *capita terms declined in Argentina and Chile and stagnated in Colombia and 
Peru. On the other hand, they apparently grew very mildly in Uruguay and Pa­
raguay and grew noticeably in Brazil and Mexico. Thus in the first four coun­
tries agricultural output lagged very badly behind the growth of real product. 
The fact undoubtedly contributed to the inflation. Mexico can also be inter­
preted in structuralist terms, since both agriculture and real product have 
grown fastly - and more in unison - and the rate of inflation has decreased. 
However, the 'apparent' exception of Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay all very 
inflationary countries, have to be explained. Despite Brazil's spiralling in­
flation, agriculture and total output have grown and, what is more, at similar 
rates. One should not imply from this, at least here, that inflation has help­
ed growth. The indices include coffee for the external market; so that if 
these figures could be substracted the growth of agricultural production for 
the domestic market (which is the relevant one in the possible relation be­
tween prices and an agricultural bottleneck) perhaps would not be favourable. 
The Uruguayan trend is not significant because both agriculture and total out­
put have fluctuated violently and much depends on the years chosen (See Table 
III). In Paraguay the case seems to be one of hardly any growth, a lagging 
agricultural sector, and a chronic inflation, that nonetheless has lost mom- 
entum.
On the whole, these observations appear to be confirmed with the general 
figures for the 1950-1965 period in Table II. The rate of growth of the agri­
cultural sector has behaved very poorly in all countries and it has lagged 
behind the rates of growth of the non-agricultural sector and GNP. The ex­
ceptions are only Mexico and Brazil• Thus, on these very general grounds, it 
may be claimed that structuralists are right when they claim that there is an 
agricultural bottleneck; which has probably played an autonomous role in the 
Region's inflation. Mexico is no exception. As the agricultural output 
See footnote in following page.
increased, inflation grew milder, Brazil, with the reservations we now 
turn to "below, does not seem to fit into the assumption; unless one wants 
to claim that inflation either helped.or remained neutral in the face of
■X-X-agricultural growth.
The question remains of how to get ‘closer1 to establishing a relation­
ship "between the rate of inflation and the agricultural supply? Perhaps a 
better indicator is that of the relation between annual changes in private 
consumption and real changes in food and agricultural production per annum 
(See Table 3)# Again, the most inflationary countries - in this case, Ar­
gentina, Chile, and Uruguay - have the highest monetary consumption rates, 
accompanied by fluctuation and slow rates of growth in agricultural product­
ion, On the other hand, the less inflationary countries - Colombia, Peru and 
particularly ao in Mexico - have more moderate increases in private consump­
tion and higher rates of agricultural growth. Brazil continues to be a rela­
tive exception. Although its rate of ‘inflationary' consumption is high 
(32$), its rates of food production (4.5$) and total agricultural output 
(3*7$) are also relatively high. Still, if coffee and cotton production 
could be substracted perhaps the rates of food and agricultural production 
would not be so favourable.
Aside from this, the discrepancy between a very high rate of growth of 
consumption and a slow and fluctuating rate of agricultural output is very 
significant. This may he taken as indirect evidence of pressure on prices 
through the agricultural sector. Hence the structuralist argument would be 
two£fold: there is a discrepancy between the growth of consumption and the
growth of agricultural output and the discrepancy is more conspicous in the 
more inflationary countries. The fact should be reflected on food prices. 
Take Chile and Mexico, consumption grew on average "by 32$ and 13$ and food 
production by 2$ and 5«8$ respectively; while in the first the rate of in­
flation was 22,6$ and on the latter 5*3$ (1948-1965),
A statistical test of the structuralist agricultural argument ought to 
be based on the agricultural and food production for the domestic market-per 
capita terms are useful to stress the structural change brought about by the 
rapid growth of population- and on the relevant price indices. Data on the 
agricultural and food production for the domestic market (that is, the one 
net of primary exports) was not found except for Mexico. The importance of 
agricultural exports in the structure of Latin America's agriculture is, of 
course, very considerable. In fact, this is a serious limitation of the 
tests that follow: The establishment of a relationship between movements in
y   —  (from preceding page)
The limitations in the use of these indices with respect to inflation are 
discussed below.
** See next page.
agriculture and food and prices, cannot "be direct and only in terms of the 
domestic market.
An indirect test of the structuralist argument would mean working with 
total agricultural and food production. A guide-line to the limitation may
be stated in these terms: The greater the importance of the production of
agricultural commodities for export in a given country the lesser the reliance 
in the text between agricultural inelasticity and inflation. The majority of 
the nine Latin-American countries used to test the structuralist argument are 
important exporters of agricultural products (See Table IV). But some to a 
lesser extent than others. On the one extreme is Chile and Bolivia and on 
the other Ecuador; passing through, in the following order, Mexico, Peru,
Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil and Colombia. That is, the possible re­
lation will be more relevant for Chile because Chile hardly exports agricul­
tural commodities and hence most of its agricultural production is for the 
domestic market and hence the possibility more difect of a relation between 
agricultural inelasticity and prices, consumption, and income. On the other 
hand, the test will be very indirect for Ecuador because the almost totality 
of its exports comprises agricultural commodities. The rest of the countries
are in intermediate positions: Mexico and Peru closer to Chile and Argentina
Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil, and Colombia closer to Ecuador. This is then the 
limitation and the indirectness of the test. Despite the limitation the test 
will be carried out for an obvious reason: total agricultural and food pro­
duction is related to the domestic demand, although not in the net manner that 
the exclusion of exports would provide. Moreover, when one is working with 
production figures, imports of food are excluded.
Still a simple direct indicator of food supply inelasticity reflected on 
prices is the comparison between annual changes in consumer prices for food 
and the cost of living. The higher the former the more likely the probability 
of agricultural cost-push. If we turn to Table V, in fact no generalisation 
can be made between the inflationary countries.
However, there is evidence that food prices have increased more sharply
than the cost of living in at least Chile, Peru, Uruguay, and Paraguay. This 
could be taken as evidence of the greater relative weight agricultural infla­
tion has had in the inflationary process. Furthermore, this would emphasise 
the existence of an agricultural bottleneck.
123*
(From page 122)
#*Remembering the evidence in the monetarist chapter, it appears as far that 
Brazil - and perhaps Uruguay too - are cases of demand inflation.
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Structure of Exports by Principal Commodities 
(l959~1965 averages)
TABLE IV
a)
Country and Commodity %> of total X Country and Commodity Jo of total X
Chile 
Copper 
Nitrate 
Iron Ore 
Other
Bolivia
Tin
Silver
Lead
Other
Mexico
Lead
Zinc
Copper
Petroleum
Cotton
Coffee
Other
Peru
Lead
Copper
Iron
Petroleum
Cotton
Sugar
Other
Argentina
Corn and wheat 
Meat and hides 
Wool 
Other
66.3 
6.0 
8.9 
18|8
61.4
4.8
5.6 
28.2
3.9 
2.1
3.7
3.5
19.8 
8.1
58.9
7.9
15.9
6.5 
3.3
17.7
11.5 
37.2
21.6  
22.4
13.0
43.0
Paraguay
Meat and hides
Tanning extracts
Wood
Cotton
Other
Uruguay
Wool
Meat and hides
Wheat
Other
Brazil
Coffee
Cotton
Cacao
Other
Colombia
Coffee
Petroleum
Bananas
Other
Ecuador
Bananas
Coffee
Cacao
Bice
Other
33.8
9.1
16.8
5.7
34.6
54.9 
26.2
1 .0
17.9
54.2 
6.3
5.1 
34.4
71.7
15.8 
2.9 
9.6
61.2
12.9 
13.1
1 .8  
11.0
) Source: OEA, America in Cifras 1963, Washington B.C. 1965
/
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In Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico the situation is not clear one way or 
the other. That is, alternatively, there is no evidence that food prices 
have lagged behind the cost of living. Colombia is an exception. Professor 
L. Currie has found that prices of agricultural products for domestic con­
sumption have lagged behind other prices. Government prices controls along 
with inflation have played a role in keeping farm prices relatively low in 
Colombia (30). In the other three countries, although food price increases 
have been very significant, the internal terms of trade between agriculture 
and the other sectors have suffered various changes. This is evidence of 
changing government policies and price controls, not of agricultural elasti­
city. Nonetheless, from the previous data, it is true that Argentina's agri­
cultural production has grown inelastic while prices have clearly tended to 
increase; the opposite is truefor Mexico. Brazilian inflation, on the other 
hand, cannot be interpreted in structural terms with over simplistic evidence.
Returning to the purpose of this work, however, the simplest test for 
the structuralist argument would be the establishment of a relationship be­
tween the changes for food production in per capita terms - to stress the 
change in demand - and the movements in consumer food prices. The test could 
also be extended to the production of agricultural raw materials and the rel­
evant wholesale price index. We shall concentrate on the first relation, 
with the limitation that food production here includes exports (See Table Vi)
It is true that annual percentage changes in food production per capita, 
except in Mexico and Ecuador, have been rather poor in all the countries.
One may as well speak of a tendency towards yearly decreases in Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, Uruguay and Paraguay? and of a very slow rate of- food pro­
duction in Brazil and Peru. It is also true that the most inflationary - 
countries in terms of the cost of living have also had the highest annual in­
creases in food prices. Whereas the less inflationary ones - Ecuador, Mexico, 
Peru, and Colombia - have had more moderate increases in food prices. Thus 
three things stand out: food production per capita has been poor; price in­
creases in food have been higbf and there is a logical distribution, on 
both counts, between lesser and more inflationary countries with the excep­
tion of Brazil.
But paradoxically, it is very difficult to establish a year to year 
relationship between food prices and food production. The structuralist 
argument should be one where the annual changes in food production are re­
lated to the rate of inflation, both in terms of the cost of living and con­
sumer prices. It %/as thought unlikely that a statistical correlation %/ould 
through further light, however this %/as tried under the following assumptions:
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1*- Correlations were estimated for per capita' food production and the 
changes in the cost of living and food consumer prices*
2.- The correlations were in unlagged terms; lagged to the reflected in 
next year's prices (P+l) and in two years time (p+2).
The results should have been a high correlation coefficient that reflect­
ed, namely, decreases in food production accompanied by higher prices. As it 
may he seen below, there was really no statistical correlation between the 
two variables:
Food Correlation Coefficients for Per Capita Food Production and 
Food Prices (Fp) and the Cost of Living (p), for 1947 - 1965.
C o u n t r y FP FP+1 P P+l
Argentina -0.3 nil -0.3 nil
Brazil nil nil nil nil
Chile -0.2 0.3 nil 0.4
Colombia -0.2 nil nil nil
Peru 0.47 0.5 0.4 0.5
Uruguay nil nil nil nil
Mexico F 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.5
FDM
Paraguay^
Ecuador
nil nil -0.4 0.4
nil nil nil nil
nil 0.6 0.2 0.4
a) 1952-1964, b) 1957-1964
It is surprising to see, however that in those cases - Ecuador, 
Mexico and Peru - where the coefficient had some significance (0.4 to
0.6) it was of the wrong sign. That is, it would appear that a higher pro­
duction was accompanied by higher prices. This cannot be blamed on favour­
able international prices for foodstuffs because the indices are for the dom­
estic economy. Moreover it is worth to notice that these three countries 
have the mildest rate of inflation of the group and better rates of food out­
put. Would this mean that a milder inflation stimulates agricuotural pro­
duction? From this general data, however, nothing should be concluded.
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As it was said the main limitation of the ahove comparisons seems to he
not having the agricultural production figures for the domestic market, These
are, however, available for Mexico, Thus the structuralist argument appears
to be present: as agricultural production for the domestic market expanded
- and expanded at high rates that even exceeded those for export from 19^4-*1959 - both food prices and the cost of living in.general fell noticeably,
Mexico: Agricultural Indices, Bates of Growth, and Prices Changes
1945-65 (1950=100)
P e r i o d  Crop Production for g pp p Crop Production 
Domestic Consumption for Export
1945-49 86.1 mm 8 53.0
1950-54 110.3 4.9 13 7 . 110.9 14.7
1955-59 159.9 7.4 7.6 8 160.3 7.3
1960-64 206.7 ’ 5.3 1.6 2.4 189.1 3.3
1965 250.2 21.0 5 4 222.7 3.3
Source: Economic Survey of Latin America, UN, N. Y., 1966 (pag. 185).
In synthesis what may be concluded from this exercise? Does the struc­
turalist argument of agricultural bottleneck and inflation hold? On general 
grounds it appears that structuralists have indeed a good case when they 
speak of a lagging or stagnating agricultural sector and spiralling cost 
inflation. The distribution of lesser and more inflationary countries with 
respecto to agricultural inflation, moreover, was significant. That is, ex- 
'> cept for Erazil where a more detailed study of the structure of agriculture 
production is a sine qua non.
In fact, the main limitation of this study is a reflection of the general* 
ities implied by the controversy itself. It is true that structuralists have 
a case, but it is of such a general nature that, with the aid of simple tests 
it is very difficult to establish the relationship between lags in agriculture! 
production and the rate of inflation. This cannot be blamed on price controls
A statistical correlation was tried between production for the domestic 
market and the price chan, es, but the results were not significant (see 
Table in previous page).
*
either, because consumer prices for food have been spiralling in most cases*
It seems that, aside from the general argument, fundamental questions in the 
controversy require an answer. How does the agricultural bottleneck affect 
prices? How has the structural change in demand and the changes in income 
distribution affected the agricultural sector? hliat has the impact of IIST 
industrialisation and international trade been on agricultural prices?
Before those and other more specific ^questions - both statistical and theore­
tical - have been answered anti-inflationary policies for agriculture will 
remain obscure and insecure. One may, of course, claim that structuralists 
are correct in their argument, but that the nature of their argument, for
the time being, does not lend itself to its corroboration of to the establish-
*ment of anti-inflationary agricultural measures.
Thus the 1empirical 'observations made by this study should only be taken 
as a generality. There seems to be much scope first for individual studies 
and later for compatible inter-regional comparisons on the subject of agri­
cultural bottlenecks, and inflation. An agenda for research could perhaps 
comprise the following steps:
a) A disaggregation of the agricultural supply structure.
b) The analysis of the cost of living index in terms of the 
relative weights of food and raw materials.
c) The composition of adequate, food and raw material consumer 
indices that include considerations for:
(1) Changes in the structure of aggregate demand
(2) Considerations in terms of income distribution groups 
- or changes in the demand elasticity for primary pro­
ducts -
(3) Corrections for official price controls, international 
primary commodity prices, and import prices for food 
and raw materials.
(d) The establishment of dependence and relationship of the agri­
cultural sector with the behaviour of the industrial market.
127,
However, something will be said on the .subject in Part III, Chapter 2.*
b) The Foreign Exchange Argument
Most structuralists concentrate their argument on the structural causes 
of inflation, the external desequilibrium and the limitations of foreig ex­
change* What, in very crude terms, does this mean? Structuralism emphasises 
that the behaviour of primary exports (with value and quantum implications 
and short and long run tendencies, taken tpgether or separately) have caused 
price instability, plus a host of related problems* Secondly, the argument 
extends to the behaviour of imports and industry. The 1 initial* relative 
decline in exports brings forth the need for industrialisation based on im­
ports: which in itself - this need for imports - is limited by the behaviour
of exports* Thirdly, the argument is further extended to the general balance 
of payments deficit, and the need for foreign capital which results in foreign 
indebtedness* The over-all argument is then a foreign exchange bottleneck
- resulting from three sources: declining or slow growing exports receipts,
*rising or essential imports, and rising debt repayments.
.Thus the behaviour in exports and foreign exchange in general result in 
a structural cause of inflation* But, what refers to the induced need for 
import-substitution industrialisation and the induced behaviour of imports 
is more of an inflationary policy measure than an original cause of inflation. 
Hence, in the analysis of the structural causes of inflation below, this 
section shall concentrate on the first and third parts of the argument. The 
following section (c) will deal specifically with the policy of iraport-sub- 
sitution as a structural cause of inflation and external desequilibrium.
Stated in these terms (see also the introduction to this chapter) the 
argument is the main chapter in the controversy. But, it is also a •finan­
cial* extension of the centre and periphery theory - the international trade*protectionism defended in Latin America mainly by ECLA and Dr. Prebisch.
It is hard to say which comes -:first — structuralism or centre and periphery - 
or which relies more on the other. Chronologically, while in the late 1940*s 
structuralist theories were being discussed in Mexico City , much work was 
being done in Santiago and Buenos Aires on a *new international trade theoryt 
for Latin America* While these two theories - which developed intro contro­
versies - are really one, this work purely for analytical purposes will ab­
stract from the international trade controversy as it is mainly concerned 
with inflation. The main issue at stake here is the argument on the dete­
rioration of the external terms of trade (DTT); something which in a strict 
sense is not necessary to stress the existence of a foreign exchange bottle­
neck nor its possible inflationary impact (see again the discussion on deva­
luation)*
MXFor a Besumd and an introduction into the theory see Dr. Prebisch (l)
One of its main exponents was Mr. J. Noyola (2).
The subject is divided into four parts: (i) the behaviour of exports
and the import repercussions; (ii) some empirical evidence; (iii) foreign 
indebtedness; and (iv) some final remarks.
(i) The behaviour of exports and the import repercussions.
The structural cause of inflation one has in hand may be stated in a 
question. How does the grot/th of income at a more rapid rate than the ex­
port performance release inflationary forces that upset monetary stability 
and place a limit on the rate of growth of a Latin-American economy? If
there is to be stability the rate of growth of exports, the demand for imports,
*and the growth of income must he compatible. Dr. Prebisch'puts it in the fol­
lowing terms (3)*
If primary exports grow at 2$ per capita, per capita income can he raised 
at the same rate only if the demand for imports also increases at 2$. (if the 
income elasticity is one) But, if imports expand at a higher rate, it will 
not be possible for income to rise spontaneously at the same rate as exports. 
Say that imports expand by 1.50 forkeach 1$ in the increase in per capita in­
come, then the latter cannot rise hy as much as 2;’, since in that case the 
demand for imports would go up by 3$ and exceed the rate of growth of exports. 
If growth is to be accompanied by external balance, the annual growth of per 
capita income must not exceed 1.33 since this only rate will result in a 2$ 
growth of imports, the same rate as for exports. It follows that if the rate 
of growth of per capita income is to rise at more than 1.33& import-sbbsti- 
tution is- essential. An annual per capita import-substitution rate of 1$ is 
required if income is to grow by 2$. A 3$ rise in per capita income would 
require an expansion of 4.5/<> in import demand, of which 2.5 would have to be 
met by domestic production in order to maintain growth and equilibrium. The 
rate of growth of exports, clarifies the author, is lower then the one of the 
example, and in some cases exports have declined. Hence the great proportion 
which import substitution has to assume (the process, of course, has inflaticn- 
ary consequences of its own).
Mr. Felix puts it in the following way (4): (there is a) ‘tendency for
the Latin-American demand for imports to outran the demand for Latin-Anerican 
exports. This need not, of course, hold for each individual country.•• Ke- 
strincting ourselves, however, to aggregative relations between Latin America 
and its trading partners, the United States and industrial Europe, the argu­
ment runs as follows* the income elasticity of demand for Latin Americafs
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In a strict sense one cannot generalise about inflationary Latin-American 
economies; however, for some evidence on the incompatibility of the trends 
in these variables turn to Tables
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ports, which consists overwhelmingly of raw materials and specialised food! 
staffs, is less than unity. That is, the demand for these products rises 
less than the rise of real gross national product in the United States and 
other industrial regions. On the other hand, Latin America's demand for 
the exports of its trading partners is greater than unity. This is parti­
cularly true of the demand for capital goods, since the indigenous capital 
goods industry is inadequately small.•• Thus, with no deliberate interfer­
ence with the technological and behavioural forces determining these demand 
relationship, Latin-American countries would be unable to maintain a rate 
of growth of per capita income equal to that of the advanced countries even 
were they to sustain equivalent savings-to-income ratios, without incurring 
repeated balance-of-payments crises and devaluations... Given the social ne­
cessity of a high growth rate, the coice reduces itself to the means of meet­
ing the chronic foreign exchange shortage: to whether incur repeated open
devaluations or slow its frequency by exchange and import controls. Both 
alternatives are inherently inflationary'.
It is generally agreed that demand and supply elasticities with respect
to primary production tend to be rather low. It is also true that prices
of primary products are normally determined by international markets rather
than by individual producers. So that discrepancies between\orld demand and
supply tend to produce sharp movements in prices rather than in output; and
the export receipts and TT of primary producing countries therefore suffer *from instability. The rate of world demand may vary in such a way that 
producers of primary products will be induced to vary their output in re­
sponse to demand and that such a response may prove excessive bringing about 
a later imbalance in the opposite direction.
However, concentrating on the short run, assume that there is a favour­
able ■world demand for primary products and, therefore, in the export prices 
of primary products. It is reasonable to assume that the net TT (export 
prices divided by import prices) of the primary products will also move 
favourably, since generally the elasticity of supply of manufactured goods 
is higher (this, of course, depends on what sort of wage hyp $ the sis of s made).
*The theory in the long run imdos an unfavourable trend where there is a 
growing divergence between the receipts of primary-product export countries 
and those that export manufacturers obtain; plus productivity and employ­
ment consequences that take disadvantageous forms for the first and advan­
tageous for the latter.
But, for the primary producing country this will mean that real income is ris­
ing faster than real output, while this may take the form of higher consump­
tion (at least for a grow ox the population), there is an opportunity for 
higher real savings and investment; higher real income can yield higher 
real investment rather than higher real consumption. The second consequence 
is that the capacity to import will expand. The fact may he vital, if in­
vestment in primary-producing countries depends on the capacity to buy capit­
al goods abroad. The foreign exchange earned abroad, of course, need not be 
invested; it can be consumed or '.used to purchase foreign assets*
Whether the opportunity to invest will be taken depends on what happens 
to income and prices in the domestic economy. If the exchange rate is kept 
stable, export profits and income receive the initial benefit. The effects, 
however, can spread to other sectors. The government itself is likely to be­
nefit through higher tax revenues coming from the export sector. Some of this 
income is likely to be spent on domestic industries, setting-off multiplier 
effects, which may raise the inducement to invest in sectors of the econocy 
other than exports. The situation may well become inflationary if the rise 
in export prices and income is substantial. Y/ages may rise when profits and 
demand are rising, and the cost of production will too. So at the same time, 
it is unlikely that imports can raise sufficiently to satisfy all the increas­
es in money incomes and demand, while in the short run at least, the elastici­
ty of supply will be normally low. But, provided that wages do not rise at 
a much faster rate than prices, some real capital accumulation will take place, 
The beneficial effects of a rise in export prices and improvement in the TT
can, therefox'e, be as follows: real income is caused to rise faster thani
real output, while at the sane time the growth of the latter is promoted by 
a rise in the capacity to save and to import, and in inducement to invest.
And to the extent that faster growth takes place, it will be accompetnied by 
rising prices. According to structuralism, presumably, this is what did not 
happen in Latin America; but, paradoxically enough, nether for monetarists, 
as we have seen.
These favourable effects tend to be quickly dissipated if the rise in 
export prices is purely a temporary boom, to be followed by a precipitate 
slump; or, wTorse still, when there is persistent downward trend. Unfortunate­
ly* short run instability of export prices seems to be the fate of many 
primary producing countries. The economy barely has time to adjust itself
The reference is strictly to the external income terms of trade. Tlovrevcr, 
for a wider discussion on the subject see The income terms of trade and 
developed and developing countries by T.Wilson, IZ.P. Sinha and J.H. Castree 
in The Econ. Journal, 1964.
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to a rise in export receipts and income when the subsequent collapse forces 
re-adjustment. Perhaps the greatest difficulty arises from the fact that 
inflation becomes more difficult to control when export receipts and income 
fluctuate. It might be thought, hovever, that i/hen export prices fall in­
flation would be automatically checked, and perhaps prices in general might 
even fall. Often this is not the case, and at least three factors can be 
relied on to increase inflation rather than check it:
1.- DTT bring about a check on the growth of real income; indeed, real in­
come is likely to fall in absolute terms if the export sector has a very 
high weight on the economy or if imports are indispensable. If real income 
does fall, it transforms a rise in wages, profits, and prices - which when 
export prices were rising served to foment capital accumulation - into a 
vicious spiral vith all sectors fighting to maintain their relative share
of income. Thus the likely-hood.of checking inflation is less.
2.- A fall in export prices often causes public deficits to rise, something 
which may lead to credit creation and to further inflationary pressures.
3.- A balance of payments crisis is often precipitated, since there may be 
many difficulties to cut imports. If accumulated reserves are not enough, 
exchange depreciation follows. Import prices now rise while the fall in ex­
port income (in domestic currency) may be somewhat checked. But in any case 
the cost of living i/ill have climbed more.
It follows that fluctuations in primary product prices are a source of 
monetary instability, and stability would be more likely if they vere elimi­
nated. Unfortunately, however, fluctuations cannot be got fid of by the 
action on the part of primary countries alone: the industrial countries,
who are the buyers of primary products, also play a part. Agreement between 
buyers and sellers of primary products is not always easy to reach, for 
whereas the latter are interested in obtaining a long term rise in primary
product prices, the former would clearly prefer a long term fall. Hence*agreements have frequently broken up . The common place statement that 
follows is: UDC see the way out in the reduction of their dependence on
primary product exports, and in the overall diversification of their econo­
mies. But, industnalisation, which is taken as the solution to the problem 
may in itself create further price instability.
•KHere, of course, one can take up the literature that goes from the Havana 
Conference to the New Delhi one, passing through the GATT programme, the 
Geneva Conference, the Kennedy Hound, and the commodity trade agreements.
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It is thus important to concentrate on what may he called a cyclical 
decline, -where exports in value either decline, stagnate, or grow very slow­
ly* With a decline in exports, however measured, over-all demand falls ini­
tially, investment is discouraged employment in export activities may he re­
duced, and there will he depressive effects on over-all employment, income 
and imports* The Government suffers from the same dpressive effects and 
the effort to maintain its expenditure and investment through deficit fin­
ancing may lead to inflation. These effects tend to relieve the contraction 
of the economy and to give private investment encouragement with recourse to 
credit expansion* However, if the impact of a contraction in exports on in­
come is attached in this way, the decline in imports is prevented and the 
external dosequilibrium is intensified* The continuation of such a policy 
makes monetary depreciation and inflation invevitable. This argument may 
appear to he close to monetarist: granted that a decline in exports starts
an imbalance that is attacked with budget deficits and credit expansion and 
inflation would ensue* Structuralists, however argue that the cure is not 
an anti-cjrclical policy . - budget and money retrenchment - hut a •structural' 
change* This is, of course, an import-substitution policy of different theo­
retical implications however inflationary it may in itself he - to which we 
shall turn to later*
In order to understand the magnitude of the external desequilibrium and 
inflation, it is important to see how the growth in exports (X) entails an 
increase in imports (ll) as part of the cyclical movement. Allow us to fol­
low Dr* Prehisch in this phenomenon (5):
j The Export and Import Cycle
When there is no inflationary pressure (a ), curve M always drops below 
curve X; but, while during the upward swing, this lag indicates a surplus 
of X over M; during the downward swing the opposite occurs. There is no in­
flationary pressnre because foreign currency was accumulated in the -.upswing 
to cover-up the coming gap. Reserves will not be completely exhausted if X 
stop declining at a level higher than their starting point (c). But there 
will be inflationary pressure when M tends to increase with greater spped 
than X and approach or even exceed X during the upward swing (B)l If ex­
penditure in M is covered by bank credit (ll) this will bring an external 
desequilibrium and an inflation somewhat proportionate to the magnitude of 
M over X.
With credit expansion - or perhaps without it - M %/ill fail to decline
•sufficiently* and external equilibrium %/ill be equivalent to the amount of
the drop in X. Desequilibrium leads to monetary devaluation which in turn
may restrict M and promote X in the short-run. In fact, devaluation leads
to further price increases and, as we have seen, to a redistribution of in-
*come in favour of high income groups.
But what interests us here is that a Latin American country is faced 
%/ith the dilemma of choosing bet%/een monetary stability, %/hich requires dom­
estic activity to fall %mtil over-all income has been reduced to a level com­
patible %/ith exports; or an inflationary economy, through credit, budget dei 
icits, %/age and profit rises, and devaluations; or some peculiar import- 
substitution policy that makes growth compatible %/ith stability. *The solu­
tion to the problem, says Dr. Prebisch, calls for structural changes that 
%/ill allo%/ the economy to grow beyond the limit imposed by exports and to 
prevent, rather, than correct, the internal consequences of the fluctuations 
of exports (7)'*
Such redistribution, %/rites Dr. Prebisch, reduces the demand of the masses 
and boosts that of the high income groups. Apart from the social effects, 
this %/ould not have an adverse effect on the total volume of internal demam 
if the investment coefficients of demand of the masses and the high-income 
groups were the same. But in practice they are not; the coefficient of th 
latter is usually higher. As the demand of imports of the high income grou 
tends to remain at the same level or even rise, depending on the intensity 
of inflation, the effect is reflected on the rest of imports. The fall in t 
consumption of the masses has depressive effects on the internal activity az
(footnotes continues on follo%/ing page)
In terns ox the controversy it si important simply to recognise that 
structuralists and monetarists - once a stand on the behaviour of exports 
is made —  agree to the fact that credit expansion and "budget spending set­
off inflation spiralling. Structuralists, hovever, do not "believe that or­
thodox policies vill "bring stability and growth; and monetarists do.
Before going into the problem of statistical evidence for the foreign 
exchange bottleneck, it is convenient to summarise these somewhat dismember­
ed comments. Professor Seers offers a small model that gathers the whole of 
the structuralist argument (8).
The symbols used are the folloving:
Y = GDP G = Purchases of manufactured
I = Per capita product consumer goods
X 1- Total exports plus net capital inflows ^ Per c°pii-a product
X = Total exports T ’= lfininum tolcrable GDP
M = Total imports m = faction of G imported
t = timeP = Population
The author first assumes there is a steady rise in Y. This i/ill produce 
structural changes in demand because income-elasticities of demand differ 
greatly between different commodities. (The population is growing fastly.
The demonstration effect, urbanisation, consumer credit facilities, and 
changes in tastes.) Also income distribution i/ill become more regressive 
because a large proportion of the population is unskilled and under-employed, 
and because the fiscal system is also regressive. Also, the manufacturing 
sector grows relatively faster than GDP. If this is so G can be expected to 
grow faster than income:
dG x dY / ,1+dt 7 dt
If m is kept constant, total M of finished goods are mC. It follows
that
dY
Idt 7 dt
(footnote continues from previous page)
*...thereby facilitates the regressive adjustment of imports. As a result 
inflationary redistribution of income produces two opposite effects. By 
expanding investment it leads to maintain economic activity at a level high­
er than is justified by X. At the same tine, however, the incentive that 
the relavant imports offer to the forces favoured by redistribution tends 
to limit the scope of the process. It is therefore-not strange that infla­
tion nay be accompanied by inadequate use of production capacity or may re-  ^
suit in aslow rate of growth, if no direct measures are taken to modify (over,
The inequality is likely to be considerate because manufactures are like­
ly-to amount to a significant proportion of M. The model also implies that 
domestic production of manufactured goods rises faster than GDP, so that the 
imports of intermediate and capital goods increase faster than GDP. But, 
since M consists of mostly manufactures and there is no reason to expect that 
other types of imports grow more slowly than GDP, total M will grow faster 
than GDP:
dM j dY
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dt 7 dt
If trade is initially balanced, X equals M, national product will grow 
more slowly than X:
dY j dX
dt * dt
This is the condition for structural equilibrium. Y/hatever the adequate 
rate of growth it depends on X performance. If X grows fast enough the pat­
tern of demand can be accomodated through M. But what is the adequate rate 
of growth? It depends mostly on the rate of growth of population and on the 
rising expectations. The latter can be defined as dl*/dt: the minimum long- 
run rate of growth of per capita output compatible with lack of social upheav­
al (poverty and unemployment for the author).
If I* P = Y* is the minimum GDP tolerable, then:
dY* = dP + dl*
dt dt dt
But the condition for sodial equilibrium is that:
dY ( dY*
dt dt
sSo that the condition for full equilibrium, coonomical
and social, is:
dx ) dP + V dl1
dt dt dt
Suppose then that the rate of X growth declines or slows down, thus the 
rate of economic growth will fall, and in the long run ceases to be political­
ly tolerable.
There is a variation to the above formula if m declines. .If the pro­
portion of manufactures which is imported falls, then the following is pos­
sible:
dW / dY ^ dY \ dX— TV—  I -rr- SO that ~r ■ ■ 1 —dt ' dt dt 7 dt
* (from previous two pages)
the composition of imports (8). But one is here already dealing with 
imp ort-substitution•
137
Under what conditions can such a fall occur? If m is currently 'very 
high*the domestic product should "be able to grow more rapidly than M, for 
a time. But, for technical reasons, there is a lower limit to m set by the 
requirements of various manufacturing processes. The actual market in any 
country for any product will he determined by the size of the population, 
the level of per capita income, and the degree of income distribution.
These three variables therefore set minimum values to m, at which further 
industrialisation becomes very costly. This is, of course, the process and 
the cost of import-substitution industrialisation. To continue with profes­
sor Seer's model it is thus necessary to go superficially into the subject.
What happens then to industrialisation when it is forced beyond the 
trend permitted by X? As m falls, dl/dt and therefore dY'/dt continue to 
rise, because of the mentioned changes in the structure of demand. This pat­
tern of demand causes the 'gap* to widen.
dG \ dY
dt J dt
The problem becomes more severe in two ways. First, the immediate ef­
fect of accelerated industrialisation is to raise M, mainly capital goods.
The initial savings of M through the fall in m is not as big as it seems 
because there will be new induced demands for imports of raw materials, in­
termediate products and spare parts. Second, import-substitution is a con- 
tinous process. Eacli year a start is made on new industries, involving fresh 
requirements of imports of capital goods; and progress in substitution makes 
entering necessary into types of production which are more and more capital 
intensive. Infrastructural requirements will also raise the requirements of 
capital goods.
To the simple model now has to be added the inflationary pressure inher­
ent to it. That is, the process of import-substitution is one of the struc­
tural causes of inflation. In these circumstances periodic devaluation is 
likely, since import and exchange controls are unlikely to be effective. 
Because a large proportion of the labour force is unskilled, the capital 
market is imperfectly competitive, and the supply of enterprise is inelastic, 
there will be difficulties in obtaining factors of production and factor 
costs per unit of output 't/ill bo high; together with monopolistic practices, 
protection and sc on. So that import substitutes are almost certain to be 
more expensive than the goods they replace. Through pressures in wages, 
the rise in costs will be general. Once the price rise gets under way, 
there will be the familiar cumulative tendencies.
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It is true that some expansion in the supply of money, writes the structur­
alist author, is a necessary condition for the process to go very far (although 
one must expect some elasticity in velocity)* A restrictive monetary policy 
would, hoy/ever, only permit the necessary rate of growth to he combined with 
price stability if the prices rises i/ere offset by price falls in other sectors* 
Since the upward pressures are strong this is very unlikely* The consequence 
of a strict monetary policy would be to keep Y linked to X; that is, price 
stability at the cost of almost complete dependence on exports.
The working of the model - to give the over-all vision of the argument -
may be substantially modified by a rising inflow of foreign capital* Provided 
that this is growing faster than profit remittance, it enables M to groY/ faster 
than X and changes the equilibrium condition to:
dX* ) dP = dl*
dt dt dt
where X 1 refers to X plus net capital inflows. Conversely, a change from an 
inflow to an outflow of capital or rising remittances of profits inhere foreign 
capital investment is constant aggravates the desequilibrium and inflation.
With this model in mind - v/hich up to a point abstracts from the domestic
*causes of inflation - allow us to turn to the empirical evidence *
(ii) Some empirical evidence and statistical indicators (1946- 1963)*
Going into the statistical test of the foreign exchange bottleneck argu­
ment is no simple matter, Because, at the very least, structuralists have 
in mind mixed economic indicators Y/ith reference to several economic problems. 
The argument very simplistically extends to the following interrelated economic 
problems: the behaviour of the foreign sector, price fluctuations, internal
and external instability, and economic growth* For the purposes of this paper 
the foreign sector problems may be in themselves subdivided into export beha­
viour, import repercussions, and foreign capital* It is important to under­
stand this in Y/hat follows* That is, one may start to work with the export 
sector and interpret its several parts with respect to external price fluctua­
tions, domestic inflation, balance of payments desequilibrium and the growth 
of oidput or income. The structuralist argument, of course, implies that there 
is a definite and overall relationship between the external sector and the set 
of problems, presumably identified by statisticalindicators and relationships* 
This is then the object of the present section*
ECLA, since the early 1950*s has had case studies of external desequilibrium 
based on the above principles; see particularly the studies for Mexico, 
Brazil, and Argentina (9)*
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Moreover, it seems convenient to set the structuralist argument in its 
historical context. Because if one takes simply the economic indicators with­
out considering the historical trend of Latin-Amer i can economies, much of the 
moaning in the structuralist model may he lost and hence the possibilities of 
interpreting dminish. Allow us then to briefly go over some well-known mater­
ial, and add at the end our conclusions,
/ \ *(■*■/ Historical Setting
It was said in the introduction (Chapters 2 and 3) that the structuralist 
model - in so far as price instability and the foreign sector - starts to oper­
ate with the Great Crisis, the depression that followed and the post-war period. 
It is claimed, however, that the period that goes from the world's recuperation 
in the mid 1950's to the Korean T»vrar boom in the early 1950's somewhat obscures 
the structural imbalances . the Latin-Ainerican countries were suffering.
That is, when the world pulled out of the depression Latin America's exports 
rose and price inflationin the majority of cases slowed down to a halt (see 
Part i). Concentrating on our countries, this halt was very short lived: by
the late 1930's and, more so, throughout the war period inflation proceeded 
steadily in all cases. Again the war is an exceptional period,
**Despite the rise of exports during the War, imports lagged behind. The 
Latin-American economy was inflationary (a more manageable inflation is assum­
ed) in a different sense from that of the 1929-1965 trend. Commodities from 
Europe were difficult to obtain, but they could be replaced by imports from 
the United States until Pearl Harbour, Thereafter, the conversion of industry 
to a war economy in the United States and Britain, the shortage of shipping, 
the submarine warfare in the Atlantic and the Caribbean severely limited non­
war supplies to and from the United States. The expansion of export income 
in Latin America was therefore much bigger than the rise in imports, A rise 
in foreign reserves induced an expansion of credit and public financing which 
stimulated investment and raised total demand considerably. Assumed then that 
one is on the ascending phase of the cycle. Moreover, internal activity was 
not only stimulated by an export surplus but by a greater liquidity in the 
banking system due to an inflow of wartime foreign capital. The result was, 
of course, a sharp increase in prices and growth. Certainly, measures were 
taken to limit the supply of money; but their success was very relative judg­
ing from the inflation of the period.
The comments that y o I I o w  are mostly based on ECLA's El desequilibrio extsrno 
en el desarrollo oconomico de America Latina and in the articles of professor 
Seers and Dr. Stmkel (see the footnotes’]*]!
-x-The cost of the limited imports of Latin America rose, although not remarka­
bly because of price controls in the United States.
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Import-substitution industrialisation proceeded at a greater speed al­
though the reason now was not a shortage of export revenues. Yet the diffi­
culty to obtain imports reflected itself obviously on the demand for capital 
and intermediate goods, and other commodities. Capacity was usually stretched 
to a limit and infrastructural bottlenecks stretched the system. The war also 
revealed weakness in other sectors: in Mexico and Peru it was food, in Brazil
fuels and steel, in Argentina energy. A favourable feature was the expansion . 
of inter Latin-American trade, specially for the more industrialised Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico*
In synthesis, here the origin of inflation - and growthJ ? wat that imr- 
ports were being reduced while exports increased. Serious bottlenecks appear­
ed on the way, say in agriculture and infrastructure. This had to lead to an
expansion of credit and income. The orthodox policies adopted were not very
*efficient, more than theoretically mistaken . But if it is true that fiscal 
and monetary policies could check excess demand and reduce inflation, it is 
more unlikely that they could have solved supply problems.
The years following the armistice, like the 1920*s, were prosperous in 
the majority of cases. Reserves were high and exports kept increasing. How­
ever, now all types of imports started to rise rapidly; so that the cyclical 
structuralist model starts to work. Liquidity and demand were buoyant, and the 
price movement was generally upwards. Although price structures were quite 
distorted by the end of the war (exchange rate overvaluation, price controls, 
certain shortages, etc.). Orthodox monetary policies were used in some of 
the countries to equilibrate the balance of payments and to keep prices under 
control. Increases in import prices, however, were transmitted throughout 
the whole economy. Also, since export prices and export quantum were expand­
ing, there were instances where the supply of money could expand sufficiently 
to accomodate demand. This was a case of imported inflation which kept prices 
going up until 1948, when the acceleration of price increases in the United 
States diminished. The common factor in these countries was foreign exchange 
stability in the immediate post-war years.
In the countries which were following less orthodox policies - i.e. Ar­
gentina, Chile, Brazil - developments were different. The exchange position 
at the end of the war was somewhat illusory since part of the reserves were 
made up of private capital which was quickly repatriated, and the rise in 
world prices reduced these reserves. Nonetheless, for some years the foreign 
balance did not appear in a dangerous state. This impression allowed the sup- 
plyof money, Budget deficits and imports to rise, while the possibilities of
*One should remember the lack of experience of public administration in those 
days when the emphasis was on laissez-faire.
expanding and diversifying exports, were not widely explored. The most clear 
example of this is Argentina* Price and wage policies after 1945 had the ef­
fect of raising the purchasing power of wages in terms of traditional export 
products* Heal wages rose in Argentina by 50J$ between 1945 and 1947, while 
export prices were prevented to follow the trend of world prices* Argentina, 
therefore, never quite recovered her markets for agric\iltural products, spe­
cially grains* Imports, on the other hand, rose and there was a decline in 
foreign reserves from 1,700 million dollars in 1946 to 700 million at the 
end of 1947* The increases in wages were higher than those in productivity, 
so that costs of productionrose. Public investment, although heavy and lead­
ing to budget deficits, did not out infrastructure bottlenecks* lienee prices 
averaged over 20fo per annum in 1945-50*
Some countries did much better. Because their exports expanded more 
quickly and they made better use of the opportunity. Investment was high in 
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay and while GDP rose by about 5-6Jo, price 
rises were moderate, 5^11$. Iu these cases imports could be attained and in­
ternal supply problems were eased. Still, in retrospect, it seems that the 
region failed to profit fully by the opportunity of an export boom in 1945-50*
Structuralists claim that with the stagnation of exports in the 1950’s
the real supply and demand imbalances of most of the Latin-Anerican economies
were revealed; in such a way that the model starts to operate in its down*ward cyclical trend. These strains, still, were late in ‘making themselves 
felt. The Korean war and the recovery of Uest Germany help to explain it.
But, by 1951* prices of primary products were on the fall again. Broadly\speaking, there was no further sustained rise in commodity prices after 1951* 
And, although the upward trend in import prices slowed down reflecting price 
stabilisation overseas, it did not stop. From this moment, it is argued, the 
DTT for Latin America was strongly felt. Thus the purchasing power of exports 
fell, inducing further inflation and eventually checking the rate of growth. 
The inflow of foreign capital, still, would have stimulated groirth, just as 
an outflow would depress it.
Assume next that generalisations around the ten inflationary economies 
are valid. The following should be taken as structural assumptions, that 
will be later explored empirically in this section:
This point was discussed in the introduction, see also Dr. S. Sunkel (i0). 
Prices of non ferrous metals, sugar, and coffee continued to rise until 1954.
*
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1.- There was a shop decline in exports - more in value than in quantum - 
after the Korean Boom, say in 1953* Pricew continued to increase but 
at a higher rate. Nonetheless, income growth was pushed ahead by the 
authorities. By this time MST industrialisation was a deliberate policy; 
accompanied by a tight import structure plus a protectionist apparatus 
developed throughout 1930-50. Thus imports of intermediate products'and 
some capital goods and foodstuffs were 'essential* and'had'to be increas­
ed or maintained. In terms of export receipts these imports could not 
be afforded.
2.- The immediate next stage was a running down of foreign reserves. This 
was accompanied by either devaluation or unrealistic exchange rates or . 
controls. There was also a movement towards a contraction of huge foreign 
credits and stand-by allowances. These were destined to have a major imr- 
pact on the composition of the balance of payments and on the future of 
imports. Still, this was a temporary way of financing them. But, in
all cases, the decline in exports and the import demand was reflected on 
a growing deficit on current account.
3*- From the domestic point of view, the propagating factors of inflation, 
induced by the external sector, start to operate fully. The supply of 
money, budget deficits, mark-up pricing, and wages increase sharply and 
prices are pushed up further. There is a flight of domestic capital, 
and in some cases, foreign private investment becomes cautious. An im­
portant contradiction may start to operate. On the one hand, inflation 
may be discouraging savings and investment, and, on the other, it is a 
consequence of the policy measures adopted to stimulate supply for the 
. domestic market and maintain the rate of income growth.
4.- Despite the above (specifically I-IST) increases in income fail to result
•in a real rate of grwoth. The agricultural, industrial and infrastructur­
al sectors, despite the protection and incentives, tend to remain rather 
inelastic. At some point the balance of payments position grows so acute 
that imports cannot be increased or they even fall. Foreign loans cannot 
be repaid or, if they are met, the capacity to import is reduced in net 
terms.
A PALL
5.- There is thus eventually inflation, accompanied by deflftti-en in invest­
ment and real consumption (this may be a consequence of anti-inflationary 
policy making), './ages lag belling other incomes and there is a regressive 
distribution of income. Still, the deflation threatens industry, land­
owners and services, a competition for the stagnating shares of income
is enhanced.
6.- The authorities try different 'crash policies' that may alternatively 
extend from severe stabilisation efforts to unorthodox reforms, but 
fail to contain the rate ox inflation and the decline of growth in a 
cyclical sense.
7.- Political tensions mount up and contending urban workers, the civil 
service and liigh-income groups may drive the system to a coup d'etat; 
where the likelihood of a successful military take-over increases,
8.- This structuralist argument, from the angk of this work, seems to apply 
best to Argentina. In this country the decline in export valuo and the 
foreign exchange crisis appeared as early as 1948. From that year the 
structural and propagating causes of inflation operated in a severe - 
fashion. External desequilibrium grew more severe; inflation became 
almost permanent= and the rate of growth fluctuated in adownward trend. 
The authorities tried unsuccessfully from 1952 to 1963 various and con­
flicting policies either to stabilise the ooonor^ y or to maintain the rate 
of growth. The outcome of the period, besides the external and internal 
instability and the economic stagnation was the-military take-over of 
1964 (see the case study). Uruguay'^ case is also very close. Although 
here structuralists have to be cautious when they speak of MST industrial­
isation in the context of a small econonjy. Moreover, the short-term 
fluctuations in income, and the external sector are so violent that the 
trend analysis is difficult. Still, by the early 1960's Uruguay had a 
stagnating economy and external sector, galloping inflation, a chronic 
balance of payments disequilibrium, and mounting political tensions
(1966-69).
9.- In Brazil and Colombia, the foreign exchange crisis was not felt until 
1954. Moreover, despite the downward trend in exports and the difficul­
ties of reducing imports, the real rate of growth continued to increase.
In fact, Brazil was taken as an example of a high rate of growth compa­
tible with inflation and external disequilibrium; and, in the view of
•some, stimulated by the former. But, by the late 1950's it was clear 
that the propagating causes of inflation were behaving violently and 
out of control; perbps as a consequence of the policies to maintain 
the growth in income regardless of the external imbalance. The situation 
• in Colombia, although much milder, was not really different. In both 
countries MST advanced enormously, but came to stand-still. V/hether 
inflation itself, the policies followed, or the external sector are to 
blame is a controversial issue. On any event, the military take-over 
in Brazil in 1964 turned towards stabilisation, and the rate of growth 
continued to decline
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10.- Peru’s external disequilibrium has been less dramatic. However, of all 
these countries, Peru was the first to experience it in the immediate 
post-war period. In 1946-49 a stabilisation programme was carried out, 
which nonetheless culminated by 1950 with an ’early* military dictator­
ship. Throughout 1950-65 the export and import have been relatively 
very favourable, and there was high growth accompanied by mild infla­
tion. Bat, there were also a serious external crisis in 1957-59 and 
minor ones in 1962 and 1966 in which the structuralist model then ope­
rates in the downward phase of the cycle (see case study).
11.- Contrary to ’conventional structuralism, from the experience of this 
work and in relative terms, the Chilean case doew not fit very well into 
the foreign sector structuralist model. This is not to say that Chile 
has not had structural bottlenecks; some evidence of this was seen in 
the last section and, moreover, the test of the monetarist assumptions 
was not convincing. It is obvious that Chile has had a severe and chron­
ic inflation - where structural and propagating factors have been at 
work - a slack rate of growth,, a chronic balance of payments deficit 
and frequent devaluations. But, allowing for sharp fluctuations, the 
trend in export receipts and in imports has been relatively favourable. 
In such a way that the external disequilibrium should have been milder 
than it iB fact was, and hence growth faster and inflation milder (at 
least in the simplification of the structuralist model). In other
words MST has been less present in Chile, but nonetheless it has ad­
vanced, and, vith some export revenue and large foreign credits, its 
presence should have led to a faster rate of growth in income. In
very simple terms it may he unwarranted to blame the trend in exports 
for inflation and slow growth. It is convenient to look into the trend 
in imports, and its structure; into the behaviour of industry and agri­
culture, into the propagating factors; as well as into the different 
stabilisation measures that have been tried unsuccessfully. It would 
thus seem, that if structuralists have a case in Chile, they have it 
more in terms of the domestic sector and the policies adopted towards 
the *whole* of the external sector, rather than in export trends partic­
ularly. Another distinction in Chile is the persistence of the demo­
cratic institutions of the system (see also the case study).
12.- Mexico and Ecuador, vith a mild inflation, stand at extreme points in 
the structuralist model in terms of the forced industrialisation. Yet 
both can be interpreted in structural terms vith respect to their ex­
ternal desequilibrium. In Mexico, the external imbalance was also felt 
early: there was a uecline in exports, devaluation, a fall in the rate 
of growth, and price increases first in 1948-49 and later in 1953-55*
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Moreover, for the greater part of 1945-1959 one may apply the structuralist 
model with emphasis on the doimward phase of the cycles. However, from some 
point in the late 1950's to 1965 the external and domestic situation "became 
much more favourable: in general terms, export and import trends have "been
more stable and have grown noticeably, inflation was almost abolished, and 
the rate of growth was high. In the situation MST was more easy to accomplish; 
the propagating factors could be controlled with prudent measures; and, at 
the same time structuralists would emphasise, there was scope for reforms in 
the domestic structurt. Still, some would emphasise that external equili­
brium has been precarious — judging by the chronic deficit on current account. 
Mexico has relied heavily on tourism, border transactions, and foreign cre­
dits, which with a cyclical upswing have been repaid more easily. Still, the 
growing divergence between export receipts and import needs, plus a heavy 
foreign debt repayment schedule, is a matter of concern. Moreover, the peace­
ful political set-up has shown signs of strain in the late I960*s. Ecuador 
in the period of this work, has had a booming banana market and has not at­
tempted serious MSI. But, at the points where there has been strain in the 
external equilibrium, devaluation and other propagating factors, although 
very moderately, have been at work.
13.- Bolivia and Paraguay, as it has been said, are not really cases of MST, but 
nonetheless they have experienced severe inflation. In fact, Paraguay's 
severe inflation and slow growth in the 1950's was accompanied by a fall in 
exports, external desequilibrium, devaluation and the rest of the immediate 
causes of inflation. When inflation was greatly reduced in the 1960's the 
external sector recovered. It should also be remembered the persistence of 
a strong dictatorship. In a sense, Bolivia was the Paraguayan opposite.
The almost hyper-inflation and fall in growth diu’ing the 1950's was accompan 
ied by a socialist revolution. The period, nonetheless, is characterised 
among other things, by an acute external disequilibrium where exports toppled 
down and imports soared-up. The over-all picture was one of galloping in­
flation j acute external disequilibrium, and negative growth.
How much these generalisation on the structuralist model fits into some em­
pirical evidence is the next point.
As it has been said for structuralists the most important common feature of
the Latin-American countries is the very great dependence of their growth and eco-■x-nomic stability on external economic events. This is not so much due to exports
External events which are sometimes beyond their influence, although the relevance 
of domestic problems and policies should by no means be underestimated3
being a high porportion of GNP (see Table i). Rather, it is due to the fact 
that export production is concentrated on a very few primary products (see 
Table II, previous section). Colombia derives about 15$ of GNP from exports 
and about 66$ of it from coffee alone. Brazil derives a much smaller propor­
tion of GDP from coffee (about 5?)* but nonetheless coffee comprises over 50$ 
of the value of its exports. The eoonony in Chile is based very substantially 
on the production of copper, not so much because copper production is a high 
percentage of GDP or even because copper sales form 50$ of total exports, but 
mainly because a substantial part of government revenue is derived from the 
source. While in Boliviathe value of the export sector is higher and tin pro­
duction alone accounts for more than 60$ of the exports. The exports of Ar­
gentina, Peru, Uruguay and Mexico are more diversified. Even so, over 90$ 
of Argentina's exports stem from the agricultural and livestock sector; the 
figure is similar for Uruguay; Mexico derives more than 60$ of its exports 
from agriculture and mining; and, Peru, although more diversified, derives 
the almost totality of its exports from agriculture, mining and fishery.
When a country's economy is geared so heavily to the production and ex­
port of one or very few primary products, then its long-term rate of economic 
growth and its short-term monetary stability depends rather crucially on world 
demand for these products. As it was said, a country may be fortunate in en­
joying a long run expansion in world demand for its major export products, so 
that prices show a persistent tendency to rise. Real income would then rise 
faster than real output and the country could increase its capital formation. 
Besides, through export production and revenues, investment in industry could 
also be induced through multiplier effects. Moreover, provided the volume of 
exports does not fall as prices rise, the capacity to import would increase; 
and this would obviously facilitate investment. The fact may well start a 
mild inflation throughout the econony, but one that, since real income is 
growing, may be kept under control. Structuralists, on the other hand, say 
that amore serious form of monetary instability is introduced into the economy 
if export prices fluctuate or show a persistent downward trend. Moreover, 
and mainly depending on what happens to imports and industrialisation, infla­
tion may be accompanied by economic stagnation or growth, somewhat independ­
ently from the mere behaviour of exports. Thus the question for an ideal 
structuralist is whether the rate of growth, the rate of inflation, the move­
ment in export values (and the TT), the behaviour of imports, and import- 
substitution industrialisation are significantly related. The main problem 
here is that short-term policies - devaluation and measures with respect to 
imports and capital movements - will alter the trends in the external bottle­
neck.
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TABLE I
Exports as a percentage of GNP, 1950-1965.
Country 1950 1953 1958 i960 1965
Argentina 9 7 9 11 9
Brazil 12 8 7 7 9/a
Chile 11 9 10 12 13
Colombia 14 15 19 15 *3
Peru 16 19 20 24
a00T-f
Uruguay 18 8*) 12 14 13a
Mexico 17 14 12 11 10
Ecuador 20 19 19 18 17
Bolivia 18 l6b) 16 16 21
Paraguay 16 12 15 IS 21*
Source: Statistical yearbook, United Nations, New York*
a) 1968, b) 1955
(2) ivk^ tv'- Fluctuations in Exports and Imports.
The first thing to see. is what has been the tendency of exports and 
imports, with respect to the alleged price fluctuations. It should be dis­
tinguished, however, that structuralists are more interested in the long-I
run trend. Because it may very well be possible that a country with sharp 
secular fluctuations in exports shows greater instability that one whare ex­
ports are increasing secularly, although fluctuating widely in the short-run. 
The Monetary Commission for Latin America (CEMLA) has calculated three coef­
ficients both for imports and exports that measure instability in the foreign 
trade sector for the period 1948-1963 (see Table i d .
The instability coefficient (i) shows the fluctuations of exports and 
imports in the long run; the higher it is the more the instability. The 
coefficient of growth (b ) shows the growth of exports and imports in time; 
the closer it' is to zero - or to negative - the higher the stagnation of ex­
ports and imports. The coefficient of correlation (R) measures the relation­
ship between esports and imports and time. The comparison between the three 
coefficients, following the structuralist argument would enable one to measure 
the instability in the foreign trade sector as an indication of the instability 
in oincome and prices.
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Following these indicators (for 1948-1965), the countries selected may 
be divided into two groups: those where the external trends, in exports and
in imports were relatively favourable; and those whose external sector be­
haved very distfavourably. It was interesting to see that this simple divi­
sion proved relevant as the argument was developed and different indicators 
used.
In the first group - Mexico, Chile, Peru, and Ecuador - the three coeffi­
cients showed better tendencies. The best case is the one of Mexico. The 
instability coefficients for both experts and imports were very low; the 
growth in exports and imports was the best for the group, although the lat­
ter grew at almost the double t an the former; and the correlation with 
time was almost perfect (0.9). The country moreover had a very fast growth 
and mild inflation* Structuralists will thus argue with reason that the 
better the trend and the stability of exports and imports the higher the 
rate of growth and domestic stability. Peru and Chile also have consider­
able growth in imports and exports and high time correlations, although the 
coefficient of instability was higher. In Peru, structuralists will say, 
that the gro^fth in the external variables and its instability was reflected 
in a high rate of growth in income, but in a mild inflation. Chile, however, 
appears to be an exception. From here onwards it will be seen that, des­
pite growth in the external sector, allowing for considerable instability, 
inflation was very high and growth very poor. In Ecuador the rates of 
growth in exports and specially in imports were low; and instability high 
in imports. In this situation there was mild growth and inflation.
In the second group - Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, Bolivia and
Paraguay - the behaviour of the external variables was poor. The instability
coefficients were high in all cases, except in Colombia (0.05) and Paraguay
(0.09). But this was because exports stagnated (l.O and 0.0 respectively).
Thus in the rest either exports fell - Brazil, Uruguay and Bolivia - or
increased very slightly - Argentina. Moreover, the correlation with time
*was not present, thus indicating fluctuations in time.
Uhat can be easily concluded from these coefficients is that in the second 
group all countries were very inflationary (perhaps with the exception of 
Colombia) while in the first all had much milder inflations (the exception 
of Chile, however, is very conspicuous). With respect to the rate of growth 
the problem is more complex.
For 1964-65 the picture for the countries selected remains the same with 
very small modifications. There is a slight improvement in Brazil's ex­
ports and a good improvement in Paraguay's exports and imports. Imports 
in Argentina and Brazil, on the other hand, have declined steeply. In 
the first group the tendencies have remained favourable (see Table III).
It is true that in the first group, all countries had rather good ratew of 
output growth, "but Chile is an exception. In the second, growth in GNP was 
low in Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia, but average in Colombia 
and high in Brazil. For simple purposes one could say that the structuralist 
argument of an external bottleneck and low groirfch and high inflation is pre­
sent, but that Colombia is a border case and Brazil and Chile exceptions. The 
problem, as we shall see below, is more complex.
Having established that high instability or poor performance in the ex­
ternal sector way lead to a rapid rate of inflation, the problem is how to 
establish a meaningful relationship between both variables. That is, what 
is the statistical relation between the external bottleneck, if any, and the 
rate of inflation?.
For the purpose of arriving at statistical indicators of the relation 
between trends in the external sector and domestic prices implicit in the 
structuralist theory, it is convenient to assume what follows:
Over the long run there is a decline, stagnation or slow growth in exports 
(One that is incompatible with structural equilibrium, following Dr. Prebisch 
and professor Seers). It follows that income will grow faster than exports, 
for a time (with respect to general instability much will depend on alternative 
policies that encourage growth or stability).
*This leads to liST industrialisation. In other words, income will grow faster 
than exports in t e form of MST. This is reflected in the structure and trends 
of imports. MST will mean that relatively fewer consumer dufables and non­
durables are imported and more intermediate and capital goods - or foodstuffs 
if that is the case - will be purchased from abroad. Hence imports become a 
function of income. As the process advanced and simple substitution is ac­
complished, imports purchases vill become a derived demand of investment.
Thus income depends on industrialisation and industrialisation on imports.
The result may be a rigid import schedule in terms of income growth. The 
process may present two initial stages:
a) Imports increase fastly; so that there is an external imbalance re­
flected first on current account and later on capital account. This 
will presumably result in the growth of income and in domestic in­
stability. But, up to a point and since income is growing, inflation 
nay be easier to handle.
Ina formal sense this section abstracts from the MST process. Its theoretical 
and empirical consequences are examined in the following section (c).
b) The external disequilibrium may eventually bring a reduction in imports.
This reduction will not only halt income growth but since the incompati­
bility or gap between exports and income has been evidenced - may result in 
further inflation and the persistence of the external disequilibrium reflect­
ed in both components of the balance of payments.
V/ithin the context of the initial disequilibrium, at a later stage export 
may recover - increase - and imports may be reduced and the growth in in­
come decline or stagnate, but the persistence of a 'gap1 still reflects it­
self in an external imbalance. When this stage is reached a decline in the 
trend of income growth will be accompanied by a more serious inflationary 
spiral.
The main problem in this analysis is that the trends in exports, imports, 
income, industrialisation, inflation, and external disequilibrium will be 
affected by short-term policy measiires. These policies may not have the 
same objectives and furthermore they may change the direction of the pro­
cess in the short-term, although our implication here is that the long-run 
trend persists. That is, the results in external disequilibrium and infla­
tion as reflected in the external sector variables will be modified by ex­
change rate measures; the protective or liberalised policies adopted to­
wards exports, imports and foreign exchange; the encouragement or halting 
of MST; and the monetary, fiscal, and incomes' policies followed. For ex­
ample, at some point, the external disequilibrium will be met by devaluation 
and an inflow of foreign loans and stand-by credits and restrictive domestic 
policies. Thus imports and income growth will be reduced; exports may in­
crease, but still remain below an initial lead; and, the rate of inflation 
may be reduced. But, for structuralists, this is unlikely or, on any event, 
short-lived; it may well happen that inflation is not contained, the growth 
in income stagnates, and the external bottleneck persists. Kence what one 
wants to substantiate is whether the long-run trends in unbalanced external 
variables - despite the short-term measures - are significantly related to 
domestic prices,
*It is important to see whether this is a self-defeating exercise. Not only 
alternative short-run measures stand in the way, but lags are bound to be 
very present and their impact difficult to account for. In very simplistic 
terms - how long does it take for an external imbalance, however measured, 
to result in a rise in prices? Also in simple terms and in the relevant
The short-comings in these 'heroic* simplifications will be met in a modest 
way in the case studies, which account for short-term variations and policies
cases three assumptions %/ill be tried: an unlagged relation (P), a lagged
relation of one year (P+l), and a further one for two years (+2).
The indicators that will be used, under the above assumptions, are the fol­
lowing!
a) the comparison of the trends in exports, imports, GNP, and 
prices*
Considerations about the quantum in rxports and imports*
c) The relationship between the capacity to import (CM) total
imports of goods and servies (KGS), and prices (p).
d) The significance of a chronic deficit on current account (b)*
e) The over—all deficit of the balance of payments as seen on 
capital account (B)*
(3) GDP, Exports, Imports, and the Cost of Living (See Tables III and IV)«
In the simple comparison between these four variables one should be 
able to find some evidence of the structuralist argument on a foreign ex­
change bottleneck, external disequilibrium, and inflation. The conditions
for equilibrium in the model %/ere that exports grow faster than income or$-
that imports lag behind income gro%/th. There %/ould be price disequilibrium, 
on the other hand, if t%/o other trends are prevalent. First, if exports lag 
behind income and if imports gro%/ for a time much faster than exports and 
are later forced do%m together %/ith income. This would not only create a 
chronic tendency towards an external imbalance but a kind of domestic infla­
tion particularly difficult to contain. Second, %/hen exports tend to in­
crease moderatly and especially %/hen the rate of gro%/th of income is main­
tained high, imports may rise very much and produce a general imbalance. In - 
flation in this case, ho%/ever, should be easier to contain although the ex­
ternal imbalance may be chronic.
Stated in these terms the structuralist argument is generally present in 
the inflationary economies, although not in an obvious %/ay. Naturally each 
country, for multiple reasons, has had its peculiarities. Moreover, as it 
%/as said, short-run policies alter the simple trend one %/ould have expected • 
Still, the nezt step is to go into the argument. The co%mtries are divided, 
as it %/as done initially, into those %/ith the worse trends in rhe external 
sector and prices - although, Bolivia and Paraguay %/ill be signaled out as 
cases %/here MST is very %/eak - and those %/ith relatively more favourable
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The general case of the relatively stable Latin-American economies (See
Part I, Chapter 3)*-*An important determinant would be the 'degree1 of MST a country experiences 
(income) plus the effects of the follo%/ing main policies: exchange rate
rate measures, (devaluation), contraction or prepayment of foreign debts
(continued in following page)
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trends - although here Chile will have to he placed in a special category - 
But with respect to 6he external sector - and other things "being equal - 
the first group is formed by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, and Bo­
livia and Paraguay; and, the second, "by Mexico, Peru, Ecuador and Chile:
1.- In Argentina -exports declined from a peal-: in 1948 to a stagnant level in 
1954-61, and thereafter recovered mildly although the initial point was 
not reached (see Table III again). Moreover, the peak was lower to that 
of the war years, and this in its turn lower to the pre-1930 level. Im­
ports also had their peal: in 1948 but, unlike exports, they fluctuated 
sharply downward reaching a minimum in 1963-65; their fluctuations being 
a result of short-term measures, Thus the period that goes from 1948 to 
1965 is one where there is an export bottleneck, accompanied by chronic in­
flation and increasing shortage of imports. The disequilibria between ex - 
ports, imports and growth of output is btter seen on Table IV> It nay be 
seen that in the majority of years percentual changes in exports lagged 
behind the growth in income; and that imports either came crashing down 
or increased outstripping exports. Inflation thus became a permanent fea­
ture of the system.
The cases of Brazil and Colombia are rather similar, the former being 
a milder version of the latter. Exports and imports increased until some 
point in the mid~1950fs decreased very substantially, and in 1965 they were 
veil below their point of decline. Inports tended to decrease more sharply 
in Brazil because of the scope MST could continued to assume in such a large 
economy. Prices, moreover, increased sharply in Brazil after the decline in 
exports and tended to maintain on average the same rate in Colombia. Since 
both were growing economies during the period, the gap between exports and 
output becomes very noticeably from 1953 onwards. From 1953 relative changes 
in exports except in one or two years, fell behind increases in output; while 
changes in imports tended to be negative.
Uruguay’s animal fluctuations have been so bewildering that they obs­
cure the disequilibrium. Moreover, the downward trends in exports and im­
ports, take place in the context of s stagnant economy. In fact, exports 
and imports increased sharply until at least 1934, and afterwards fluctuated 
downward. Inflation has been a permanent feature of the system, but it can 
be seen that it accelerated fastly from 1957 on, precisely when the rate of 
growth in GD? declined. Annual changes in the other three variables show the 
instability they suffered.
..(the capacity to import) liberalisation or protectionism of external trade 
(tariffs and controls); and fiscal measures (taxes on imports and exports). 
This will become obvious in what follows.
In Bolivia and Paraguay the acute inflation of the 1950*s was also accompan­
ied by a decline in exports. But since in these countries MST is very modest 
- and hence export performance determines income growth substantially - im­
ports could be more easily reduced in such a way as to affect consumption. 
Price stability would be more feasible the moment exports increased again 
and provided imports were cut substantially. In Bolivia exports and imports 
increased until the 1952 revolution and inflation was more moderate. But 
after 1952 and at least until 1963 (when they started to recuperate) there 
was a sharp fall in exports and galloping inflation. Since imports did not 
decline the external disequilibrium was enhanced and in this sense Bolivia 
was ’living beyond her means*. From 1958 onwards, when exports started to 
recover and imports were reduced, inflation was greatly reduced and income 
growth since it does not depend vitally on imports, was fast. This should not 
be taken to mean that other factors - ile. foreign free aid and domestic mea­
sures - did not also contribute to stabilisation. The Paraguayan casa is less 
clear, although not different, since the trends in the variables have not 
been so sharp. Still, exports probably increased until 1951 and thereafter 
fell and stagnated until 1961; imports, on the other hand, continued to in­
crease until 1961 and fell thereafter, It is by no coincidence that infla­
tion was severe throughout the 1959* s and was put under dontroj. in 1961. 
Moreover, annual changes in exports lagged behind output- despite the fact 
that income was stagnant during the period - and imports increased sharply 
in some years.
In Peru, Mexico, and Ecuador, the trends in the variables have been more 
favourable and inflation much more mild than in the former group. Still, 
there are significant features that should be noticed.In Peru, exports and 
imports have expanded at very considerable rates from 1949 to 1965* Still, 
they have suffered setbacks in 1952-53 and 1958059, and were stagnant before 
1949• These periods experienced a faster rate of inflation on average. How­
ever, the tendency in the majority of years has been for exports to increase 
faster than a fast rate of growth in GDPf and increases in imports have 
been large. Thus, the inflation was not only more moderate hut more sus­
ceptible of control Its persistence, allowing for the cyclical variations 
in the variables, may be taken as evidence that domestic inflation was per­
haps relatively more important. In Mexico the external trends have been 
less favourable, but still favourable if the period is taken as a whole. 
Moreover inflation has been greatly reduced and income has grown fastly from 
I960 onwards. It may be questioned, however, if this is a result of exports? 
Exports were stagnant in 1947-49 and again in 1952-54 and 1957-59 and there­
after rose very substantially. In simple terms the periocb of stagnation
were much more inflationary and 1960-65 was a period of stability. Im­
ports, on the other hand, were rather stagnant until 1955 and thereafter 
the trend was clearly upwards, although fluctuations were sharp. Some­
thing that may be a consequence of the enforced MS!T and of the scope of 
the process can assume in Mexico. Still, the trend in export groirfcli has 
been "barely above the growth of GDP. In fact, in some years it has fallen 
behind and in many yearly variations output outstrips exports. Nonetheless, 
there was a movement towards price stability and thus the idea that other 
factors than exports (although their over-all trend is favourable) conti- 
huted to stability. Ecuador, the country with the mildest inflation in the 
group, experienced very fast growth in exports until 1957 and thereafter a 
milder growth. Thus imports f'dlowed closely the pattern set by export, per­
haps with a year lag. But, it should he noticed that in 1965-1964, when ex­
ports stagnated and imports increased sharply, prices also increased.
Chile appears to he a very peculiar case. Because in terms of the simple 
structuralist argument, inflation should have been milder and growth faster 
than they were. In fact, Chile had a stagnant economy and severe chronic 
inflation. From 1947 to 1965> however, exports increased 100$ and imports 
80$. Thus, over the long run and comparing to the rest of the countries, 
the export bottleneck is not present. But what is true, is that in cyclical 
terms Chile*s exports - and more so its imports - have suffered frequent and 
serious set-backs (in 1949-50, 1955-59, 1957-195S and 196l). Thus over the 
short-run a better argument could "be made for instability in the external 
sector. Still, over the whole period and 'so far* it would appear that re­
latively speaking inflation as induded by the export trend should have been 
much milder, especially when the low rate of income growth is considered. '
In at least half of the years in the period exports increased faster than in­
come.
(4) The quantum of exports (OX) and imports (0M)
The structuralist argument implies that the decline and instability in 
the value of exports is not necessarily connected with the supply volume of 
exports, hut with fluctuations in prices and demand. In fact, the volume of 
exports may increase but since there may he a deterioration of the terns of 
trade (l)TT), where the prices for imports behave more favourably than those 
of exports of primary products, this may he accompanied by a fall in export 
value. ECLA's estimates indicate a BTT in all of the countries studied, ex­
cept for Chile and Bolivia which are the main mineral exporters of the gro’j.p. 
However this does not tell truck since both countries with fast inflation 
-i.e. Argentina and Brazil - and countries with a mild one - i.e. Mexico and 
Ecuador - had BIT. Moreover, Chile's external terms of trade have improved 
and inflation persisted.
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External Terms of Trade
(1950=100)
Country 1950-52 1954-56 1960-62 1963 1964
Argentina 94 75 81 87 92
Brazil 97 98 73 69 78
Chile 108 118 111 111 112
Colombia 93 100 72 67 77
Peru 109 100 72 77 79
Uruguay 99 88 84 84 88
Mexico 109 90 77 86 90
Bolivia 118 114 130 168 181
Ecuador 95 94 74 67 67
Paraguay 115 118 75 77 86
Source: Economic Survey of Latin .America, 1965* N.Y.
It is convenient to examine QX considering the terms of trade, and also 
QM with respect to domestic prices (See Table V). The countries are again 
divided into those with less favourable trends in the external variables and 
those with more favourable trends*
1.- In Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, allowing for yearly fluctuations, QX
has tended to expand^ presumably to compensate for the fall in value of ex­
ports. In Uruguay, however, QX fell by 28$ between 1953 and 1965, but in­
creased by 20$ if 1948 and 1965 are taken as reference. In Bolivia, on the 
contrary, QX fell pari passu with the improvement in the TT; and, nonetheless 
the economy moved from acute instability to relative stability by 1961. Para­
guay's stagnant export value vas accompanied by an 81$ increase in QX from 
1948 to 1965. In the countries with more favourable trends in export value 
and a milder inflation - Mexico, Peru and Ecuador - which also had BIT, QX 
expanded rather considerably. On the other hand, Chile with improving terms 
of trade had to expand QX only in moderate terms. Thus it would appear that 
all countries, except for Bolivia and Chile, had to make supply efforts to 
meet stagnant external markets and to compensate for the existence-o# the 
danger of an inflationary export bottlenecks.
2*- The quantum of imports has fluctuated widely, presumably as a result of dom­
estic policies. Still, in the inflationary countries with a stagnant export 
trade QM has either tended to stagnate - as in Brazil from 1954 and in Ar­
gentina from 1951 - or fallen sharply - as in Colombia and Uruguay. On the 
whole, in the countries with expanding exports - Chile, Peru, Mexico and
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Ecuador - it has been more possible to expand QM.
• - It waz felt that a simple test of the relation between inflation and the
trends in exports and imports would be to correlate annual changes in
*prices, lagged in various forms, with annual changes in QM • That is, in 
black and white, if unfavourable external trends eventually force down im­
ports this could be associated with the inflationary spiral (following 
.the initial assumptions). So that over the .long run the higher the falls 
in QM the higher the price increases, since MST could not advance without 
serious strains and consumption was affected. Correlations for the whole 
of this section were tried in unlagged terms (p), lagged for one year (P+l) 
and lagged for two years (P+2). None of the results were really signifi­
cant and the fits of the equations were poor (see table Vi). Weak correla­
tions - between-0.4 and-0.5 - were obtained in Argentina, (p ), Brazil (p),
Chile (P+l), Uruguay (P+l and P+2), and Ecuador (P+2). In Mexico a higher 
correlation (0.6) was obtained, but it was of the wrong sign. It should 
thus be concluded that if a statistical relation between these two variables 
is to be established, short-term analysis of both the variables and the rel­
evant policy measures should be undertaken.
(5) The Capacity to Import (CM) and Total Imports of Goods and Services (MGS)
It should he clarified that, so far, the above exercises do not really 
disprove or prove the foreign-exchange "bottleneck argument, althought they 
may throw some light on the behaviour of important factors. Firstly, struc­
turalists are not only speaking of the behaviour of exports and imports as 
such, but of the total capacity to import and tht eotal purchases of imports
It should be advanced that linear correlation between domestic prices and 
several external variables was found to be an inadequate statistical measure 
ment (See Table Vi). In the majority of cases the correlations were minimal, 
frequently of the 'wrong sign', the fits of the equations poor, and the sig­
nificance low. By the look of the trends it was equally felt that non­
linear equations may also lead to poor results. The main reason for this 
is not the invalidity of thestructuralist argument but the fact that 
trends cannot be corrented for changes in short-term measures. That is 
the percentual changes do not only reflect changes in exports and imports 
trends c,I2ne but the impact of devaluation, deflationary measures, tariffs 
and controls, and import and export taxes which may actually compensate for 
changes in the former.
Correlation Coefficients ‘between the Cost of Living (p) and the 
Quantum of Imports (QM), the Capacity to Import (Crl), Total Im­
ports of Goods and Services (MGS), and the Balance on Current
Account (B) 1947-65 (a)
TABLE VI
Country P P+l P+2
Argentina QM 
CM 
MGS 
B
-0.4
-0.2
-0.2
y=30-0.5x
-0.2
+0*3
-0.2
Brazil QM
CM
MGS
B
-0.5
-0.3
-0.3
y=34-0.5x -0.3 -0 .2 
-0.3
•
Chile QM
CM
MGS
B
-0.2
+0.5 y=48+0.11x
-0.5
-0.4
-0.5
■ :
y =^35.8-0.9x
ys=36.4-0.5* 
y*36.9-0.7x
-0.2
-0.3
-0.3
-0.5 y*=13-0.12x
Colombia QM
CM
MGS
B
+0.2
+0.2
-0.2
-0.2
—0.4
-0.3
y*=10-0.2x
-0.2
-0.5 ys=7.6-0.05x
Peru QM
CM
MGS
B
-0.2
-0.3
-0.3
-0.2
-0.3
+0.2 +0.2
Uruguay QM
CM
MGS
B
+0.2 -0.4
-0.2
+0.3
ys=33-0.3* -0.4
-0.2
-0.3
+0.2
y=4-0.5*
Mexico QM
CM
mgs
B
-0.2
+0.2
+0.2
+0.3
+0.2
+0.2
+0.45 y=5+0.12x 
+0.3
+0.6
-0.3
+0.4
y=3+0.2x
y*=8+0.08x
Bolivia QM
CM
MGS
B
-0.2
-0.2
+0.2
-0.3
-0.2
+0.2
+0x3
+0.3
+0.4 ys=51-0.8x
Ecuador QM
CM
MGS
B
+0.3
+0.5 y=1.6+0.1x
0.3
-0.4 
-0.4 
-0.5 
-0 .2
y=3.4-0.09x
y=3-0.05x
y=3«5-0.1x
Paraguay QM
CM
MGS
B
-0.4
-0.5
+0.5
y*=27-0.7x
y=26-1.0x
y*:45-2.74x
+0.2
+0.3 t
+0.2
0.7 y=18+l.lx
Sources: See Tables V, VII, and VIII
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and imports as such, but of the total capacity to import and the total pur­
chases of imports of goods and services.. Secondly, because the trend in ex­
ports and imports - despite their fluctuations and downward or upward trends - 
does not reveal the fact that the latter may chronically outrun the former.
This may be reflected in an also chronic balance of trade and payments deficit 
■which may result in frequent devaluations and the curtailment of imports ("both 
highly inflationary forces in Latin America). The fact that the ca'pacity to 
import, despite supply efforts is insufficient to meet the import requirements 
(even when these are contracted) may lead to structural external disequilibrium 
and inflation.
* .This section will concentrate on the behaviour of CM and MGS and the 
cost of living, and leave the comparisons between external revenues and ex­
ternal purchases as reflected on the balance on current account (B) and on 
the balance on capital account (B*) for the following two.
With respect to CM, MGS, and prices, again one may group the countries 
with an unfavourable trend in CM and MGS - Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and 
Uruguay and, somewhat, apart Bolivia and Paraguay - and those with a favour­
able trend - Chile, Peru, Mexico, and Ecuador
In Argentina, the CM has remained stagnant - or even decreased sligktly- 
tkroughout 1947-1964. MSS, on the other hand, have been severely reduced 
(see Table VIl). Such a trend - a foreign exchange bottleneck - has been 
accompanied by inflation, low income growth, and external disequilibrium.
The Brazilian and Colombian cases are very similar. In Brazil both the CM 
and MGS expanded consistently from 1947 to 1951-2; and inflation was mild­
er. But, from 1952 to 1963-64 they fell dramatically and inflation increas­
ed to its present proportions. Although the rate of inflation has been very- 
erratic in Colombia, CM and MGS also grew until 1954, and tended to fall 
more moderately. The CM did not recuperate until 1964, but, meanwhile, the 
curtailment of MGS was reduced only slightly. In Uruguay too when the CM 
and MGS were growing (1947—1955) inflation was milder and and much higher 
when both factors declined. This is of course, what structuralists call an 
external bottleneck.
In Bolivia there was also an increase in the CM and MGS until the 1952 
Revolution. Afterwards, both variables declined until a minimum was reach­
ed in 195S and the rate of inflation became hyperinflationarv. From that 
year there was a rapid increase in the CM, a cautious recovery in MGS, and 
increasing price stability. In Paraguay the trends are less significant.
The CM, however, expanded until 1951 and MGS until 1952; thereafter there 
has been a prolonged stagnation during which prices increased fastly until 
1961 and stabilised afterwards.
*(See footnote in following page).
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3*- In Chile, Peru, Mexico, and Ecuador it is again tine that both CM and MSS 
have suffered frequent setbacks, but over the period their expansion has 
been rather significant* The most remarkable cases are those of Peru and 
Ecuador* Mexico's case is interesting since, although CM and MGS have ex­
panded on inflation has come io halt, MGS has tended to exceed CM consider-t
ably precisely from 1958 when stabilisation was reached* Under these relat­
ively favourable conditions, in principle, the structuralist model seems to 
apply; as the CM improves and MGS increase inflation is reduced, or remains 
moderate* Moreover, the expansion of the external sector may stimulate in­
come* Something that is very true for Mexico and Peru, and only less so for 
Ecuador* The conspicuous exception is that of Chile, where despite the 
relatively favourable trend in CM there has been chronic inflation and slow 
growth (it should be noticed, however that the growth in MGS has been ex­
tremely irregular). This may be taken as an indication that the causes of 
inflation may lie more in the domestic economy and in economic policy*
4*- These comparisons, however, can only be taken as a generalisation of the
9structuralist theory* No annual relationship, despite the adoption of lags, 
can be established between yearly changes in the CM and KGS and the price 
lag, for the reasons already stated* Nonetheless, linear regression analysis 
was tried withvery poor results (see Table Tl). There was either no correla­
tion or its significance was low, and the sign frequently of the wrong sign* 
Again, the study of the CM and MGS in terms of relevant price indices and 
in the context of policy measures would be a very worthwhile exercise*
(6) Deficit or Surplus in the Balance of Trade and Services (b ) and Prices*
A different and important measurement of the foreign exchange bottleneck 
should be the outcome of the absolute relationship between the CM and MGS, 
besides their relative tendencies* When CM is declining - and even though 
IBS are also beingforced down,- the external disequilibrium is reflected on 
the balance of payments* Or, even though CM is growing, it is possible for 
the external gap between expenditure and revenues to be so wide that there 
is a constant tendency towards external disequilibrium, and inflation. A 
simple way of measuring this absolute relationship is the situation in B*
B measures the outcome of all trade transactions (exports usually fob and 
imports usually cif), services transacted (net tourism included), net for­
eign direct investment, and other transactions. It does not include trans—
(from previous page)
The capacity to import, following ECLA's criteria, includes exports of goods, 
tourism revenue, net autonomous capital movements, net foreign investment in­
vestment income, amortisation of trade arrears, balance of payment loans and 
errors and ommissions; and, MGS includes imports of goods and services and 
expenditure in tourism*
fers of private or government capital, both domestic and foreign, the cap­
ital movements of monetary authorities, and errors and omissions* Hence a 
deficit in B indicates how it was impossible to meet MGS with the CM obtain­
ed through trade, services, and foreign investment income (usually called 
the current capacity to import)* l/ith respect to the structuralist argu­
ment, a chronic deficit in B is an indication of a chronic shortage in the 
current CM; something that may lead to price instability, directly through 
devaluation or indirectly through tariffs, controls, taxes, and so on.
The surprising thing ahout the ten countries is that all of them have 
a tendency towards chronic deficits on B. Both the group where the CM and 
MGS have declined or stagnated present such deficits; and the group where 
the CM and MGS have expanded, also presents such a situation (See Table VTIl)
In Argentina, throughout 1947^1965, ® ^as heen in substantial deficit except 
in four years. Despite the fact, and even though CM stagnated and MGS de­
clined, such deficits have tended to be permanent. The disequilibrium has 
been accompanied by rather severe devaluations, the persistent high inflation 
and a declining rate of growth. An important thing, however, is whether some 
relationship can be established between the deficit in 3 and the changes in 
prices. It should be noticed that, allowing for flexible lags, smaller def­
icits or better still small surpluses tend to coincide with severe devalua-
*tions and higher prices. In Brazil the trends in B,P and D have been more 
acute, although it is more difficult to observe a relationship. Uhat is sur­
prising is that, despite the severe disequilibrium in these variables, the 
rate of growth was able to hold on until 1963# Afterwards the situation is 
less unorthodox. YJith the 1963 stabilisation programme there were severe 
devaluations, a surplus on B, very high prices, and a drox> in the rate of 
growth. In Colombia and Uruguay, where the CM and MGS have fluctuated wide­
ly but tended to stagnate, deficitx in B have also heen chronic. Moreover, 
and even more so that in Argentina, a relation can be seen between higher 
prices, devaluation, and small surpluses. But, with respect to the rate of 
growth Colombia is closer to Brazil and Uruguay to Argentina. One can only 
say that the former had more fdynamic1 domestic markets than the latter.
Y/here do these trends leave the strueturalist model? It would appear that 
a foreign exchange bottleneck leads to deficits in B, severe devaluations, 
short-run surpluses in B ( as a consequence of D ) and to the recrudescence 
of the rate of inflation.
Perhaps this is clearer - although in the opposite direction - in the more 
simple economies of Bolivia and Paraguay. Deficits in B have also heen chron 
ic, both during the decline of the. CM and MGS and during their recovery. *
Much depends on the amount of the devaluation and of the quarter where it is 
adopted*
But, while the first period ^-1952 to 1959 in Bolivia and* probably, 1948 
to 1961 in Paraguay - i/as characterised by a fall in the CM and MGS, massive 
devaluations, a very high rate of inflation and smaller deficits or surpluses 
(j) on B, the second period was characterised hy the opposite, i.e. reflected 
in higher deficits on B. This may be taken as evidence of the perversity of 
.the foreign exchange bottleneck.
The experience of the countries with the more favourable external trends has 
been more varied, although their external disequilibrium is present. Mexico 
is interesting because it presents an alternative outcome to that of the 
first group. There has been throughout the period a recrudescence of the def 
icits in B, accompanied by growing CM and MGS; although the latter outstrips 
the former. Thus devaluations have been rare, the rate of inflation has de­
creased, and the rate of growth has accelerated, precisely when deficits in 
•B* have grownj Ecuador, although its economy is different, presents sim­
ilar external trends: growing deficits in B, rare devaluations, not much
change in mild price increases, and a mild rate of growth. In Peru the 
growth of CM and MGS has been relatively more favourable and growth in in­
come fast, but inflation has also been relatively higher. Thus deficits in 
B have been chronic - although perhaps less severe - and devaluations more 
frequent however milder.
Chile is a case all its 01m  (perhaps the most frustrating of the group).
The long-run trends in the CM and MGS have been relatively favourable and 
deficits in B have been large; but, unlike the above three countries, de­
valuations have been severe and persistent, inflation chronic and high, and 
the rate of gr01/th poor. Could then this be taken as a consequence of ’faulty* 
economic policy and of living beyond one’s means?
Linear correlation between B and P was also tried, with expected poor re­
sults (see Table Vi). It is convenient to insist, however, that although 
the significance is low the sign in some of the equations was revealing.
That is, some correlations (between 0.5 and 0.7) were found in Chile, Colom­
bia,. Mexico Bolivia, and Paraguay. In the majority of cases, the correlation 
was positive indicating that higher prices are accompanied by smaller def­
icits in B, in the less inflationary countries or in those that have moved 
towards stability. In Chile this is true with an unlagged assumption. But, 
when a two year lag is adopted (P+2) the opposite is trne: a higher rate
of inflation is accompanied by larger deficits in B. The crudity of these 
relations could be lessened if the trends could be corrected for devaluationsI
and other relevant policy measures.
Without intending to derive here any general conclusion from the behav­
iour of the 3 and price changes, there is one point that should be stressed.
The chronic deficit in B for all countries clearly indicates the existence
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of a chronic foreign exchange bottleneck, at least in these terms. Whether 
CM and MGS where expanding or stagnating, CM (in current terms) has heen in­
sufficient to cover MGS. This may lead to greater or lesser inflation hut 
in an indirect manner. That is, in those countries where external disequi­
librium leads to devaluation, and hence to short-lived surpluses or smaller 
deficits in B, - ile. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, and for 
an important period, Bolivia and Paraguay - the rate of inflation can he 
rather explosive and the rate of growth lower - with the clear exception 
of Brazil and perhaps Colombia. On the contrary, in those countries that 
could get away with chronic deficits in B with less devaluation and increas­
ing MGS, - i.e. Mexico, Peru, and Ecuador - the rate of growth was higher 
and, paradoxically, inflation much milder. All these countries, including 
Chile, had a better CII trend. The latter period in Bolivia and Paraguay 
also presents this trend.
What is fundamental, of course, are the movements on capital account 
(b 1 )• That is, the deficit on B is transmitted at some point to the bal­
ance on B* and to the overall result in the balance .of payments. Thus one
*would have to describe in order to follow the structuralist argument , the
foreign exchange bottleneck as reflected on capital movements.5 Specially
in Mexico where they appear to he non-inflationary, in Peru where they are
**less so, and in Chile where they presumably have been very inflationary. 
Moreover, the inclusion of capital movements should further clarify the per­
sistent inflation of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and °ruguay; and the 
slower pace of inflation in Bolivia and Paraguay in later years.
It would be convenient to include in capital movements net foreign
private investment, foreign loans and aid, and the repatriation of privatei
capita. But, on the other hand, to measure the net effect one should in­
clude the-interests, profits, and amortisations that leave a country on ac­
count of private foreign investment, the interests and amortisations of 
foreign loans and aid; and, the export of domestic capital.
l6l.
*
It is convenient, for example, to remember professor Seer's model.
*-*Mexico appears to have deviced a non-inflationary method to finance 
MGS, which are over-and-above CM and which create accumulated deficits 
in B; while Chile has not.
162.
(iii) External Indebtedness
Before going simplistically into movements oncapital account, it is 
convenient to recollect a few ideas. *The crucial question from the point 
of view of the structural discussion, writes professor Grunwald, it not 
what happened to exports and their purchasing power, hut rather what was the 
course of the volume of imports which could have been used to supplement dom­
estic supply and correct structural bottlenecks* (12). As far as the import 
quantum is concerned (See again Table V), it was seen that such a volume re­
mained stagnant or declined between 1946 and 1965 in Argentina, Brazil, Colom 
bia and Uruguay, and less so in Bolivia. Y/hile the volume of imports expand­
ed in Chile and Peru, Ecuador and Mexico. The situation is not much differ­
ent when MGS is considered (See Table VTl). MGS has tended to decline in Ar­
gentina, * it has done so sharply in Brazil; it has fluctuated widely, but with 
a tendency to fall in Colombia and Urugyay; it has somewhat remained stagnant 
in Paraguay and recovered only in the 1960*s in Bolivia. On the other hand, 
MGS has expanded considerably in Chile, Peru, Mexico and Ecuador. So, at 
least for this second group of countries, one may ask oneself professor Grun- 
wald's question: *Is there an import bottleneck?1 (13)* Moreover, when 
one looks at the balance of trade and services and notices a chronic deficit 
now for all countries, it might be said that despite the tendencies in the
current GM all countries bought MGS which could not very well be afforded.
This would then appear to be only a relative import bottleneck, but, on 
the other hand, it is foreign exchange bottleneck as reflected on B and as 
further reflected on B*, when recourse to exchange reserves and gold and 
foreign credits is needed. It should be clear that in the first group of 
countries the decline in CM, at some point the period of analysis, created 
a financial bottleneck reflected in the balance of payments; and the stag­
nation or decline in MGS created a physical bottleneck. This is what struc­
turalists call an inflationary external bottleneck. Moreover, what is funda­
mental is the historical decline in the CM; the gap that it created between 
the CM, KGS and income; and its overall instability resultant. Structural­
ists, as we have seen, carry the argument further: the disequilibria between
the variables started during the 1929 crisis; CM recovered throughout World 
Y/ar II,. although in some cases the pre-crisis level was not reassumed; and 
tended to stagnate a further lower level in the 1945-1965 period;‘,T*
In the second group, the structuralist argument has to be interpreted in
a different light. In Mexico, Peru and Ecuador, the CM, although reduced by
severe short-term set-backs, has tended to expand and recover in the j>eriod. 
This, however, has not prevented the CM from lagging behind JIGS. It may thus
be said that there was no import bottleneck as such; although much depends 
on the possibility of these countries to attract foreign exchange (tourism 
and foreign exchange paper in Mexico, for example, and private foreign in­
vestment in Peru) to cover their imbalance on B. If this is taken to mean 
that there was no import bottleneck and that the foreign exchange shortage 
was financially net, in structuralist terms it is also true that these coun­
tries have had much lesser inflation and better rates of growth. The pro­
blem with Chile is that although the external trends have been similar, the 
economic results have been the opposite. Ih Chile then only living simply 
beyond her means and thus has only herself to blame for chronic inflation 
and slow growth? What structuralists are going to answer, stretching their 
model, is that for 1929-1960, the decline in CM holds true, although the be­
haviour in imports has improved:
Chile: Annual Compound Rates 
for X, M. and P 
’(1928 - I960)
Io&«HO
Period Purchasing Power of X QX QM COnsumer Prices
1929-30 - 1940-42 -4.4 0.9 -4*6 7.8
1940-42 - 1944-46 -2.8= -0.25 0.1 15.5
1944-49 - 1949-51 1.5 -1.45 4.7 19.8
1949-51 - 1958-60 3.9 2.6 2.6 38.0
1928-29 - 1959-60 -1.5 +0.6 -0.3 19.4
Source: . . • *&.• J. Grunwald (Op. cit, pag. 312).
Thus- while the argument holds true for 1923-1960, it is also true from 
1944-1960 Chile has failed to profit - in lesser inflation and more growth - 
from a modest expansion in the purchasing power of exports and an improve­
ment in imports. This is relevant considering the performances of Mexico 
and Peru, the former with high MST requirements and the latter with a more 
export geared economy.
Returhing to the argument, it is clear that the ten countries have tend­
ed to find other means than the current CM to increase (or at least maintain 
some level) their imports. The fact brings us to how deficits in B were 
covered by capital movements* .
*
* • > (• .  »  *(From previous page)
For a discussion on the subject see again professor Grunwald (14-).
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A source to fill the gap between CM and MGS could in theory be direct 
private investment•• Table Hi, however, shows that United States private in­
vestment iron 190*0 to If 5l van more than offset by profit end interest remit­
tance to the United States, so that these investors received nearly 4 billion
* *X*dollars more than the re*: money they put into them. The date should be read 
only within the current balance oi payments situation and must not be inter­
preted as revealing any magnitude of United States private or public invest­
ors contribution. Moreover, if one looks at recent figures the tendency re­
mains the same: there has been a net outflow of capital on account of invest­
ment income payments, specially during 1963-1965•
TABLE X
Net Foreign 
(Millions
In vc s tment, 1961- 
of US dollars)
VJ!
i
'
1
-
C o u n t r y 1961 * 1962 1965 1964 1965
Argentina . 125 124 -163 +1 “195
Brazil. 32 . 3 -82 -95 -103
Colombia 26 -10 35 153 “117
Chile 50 31 -97 53 “71
Peru 33 -5 “15 “27 53
Mexico 73 30 51 212 -147
Bolivia 10 24.4 16.8 -S 12.8
Ecuador -24 -17 -11 -2 “5
Source: IFS, IMS', 1963.
A second source to fill the rra^  could have been net aid from the United
States (see again table EC). Net US aid after amortisation and interest pay-
meats was positive and did obviously contribute to cover mart of the deficit
in B. However, its amount is insignificant when the absolute values of the 
deficit in current account are considered (see again table VTIl); and when 
the net result-(6 - c) which is dr.iost always negative- is compared to MGS.
In effect, the chronic deficit in 3 was very likely met by long-term 
leans, both private and public (see table XI). The available data for ths
*The global data is for Argentina,* Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru arid Mexico, 
it does not include Uruguay, Bolivia Paraguay or Ecuador; and io includes 
Venezuela. Still, it illustrates the general tendency and the soimduess of 
_^tke argument
Alr’pst 60fj of the net US aid shown on the table was in interest bearing loan
Yaz&QY xnan fiTant,s„
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for tho last years of the period shows that there has heen a net inflow of 
capital into the ten countries (abstracting from the other capital movements) 
on this account. The amount of the loans — speaking in terms of the relative 
size of the economies - has been significont. No generalisations, however, 
can bo made for whole groups. Loans have been large in Argentina, but they 
declined in 1965-6;i. In Brazil, on the other hand, they were negative in 
19o0-6l, but have increased considerably since then. The same is true for 
Peru. On the other hand, they have increased considerably or maintained a 
certain level in Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, Mexico, Bolivia and Paraguay. It 
is worth noticing that the huge loans granted to Mexico and Chile help to ex­
plain how MGS was able to exceed CM sustaincdly. Also, in small economies 
like those of Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay, these loans may have been suf­
ficient to cover deficits in B and stabilise the balance of payments in such 
a way that other recourses (like use of net gold and foreign exchange reserves 
or renegotiation or debts) were not necessary. Cn the other hand, in those 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay) with a stagnant export 
sector and balance-of-trado difficulties long-term loans, as we shall see, 
were insufficient to break the external imbalance. These, of course, with 
the exception of Chile, are most inflationary.
In synthesis, the above exposition only tells us that united States aid 
(in a very moderate way) and long-term loans very likely contributed to bridge 
the gap between the current CM and MGS. It explains nothig more, however, 
about inflation and the external exchange bottleneck.
To continue with the structuralist argument - the external desequilibrium 
as a source of price instability - it is convenient to consider that the 
foreign exchange bottleneck reflects itself not only on current account (b) 
but also on the balance on capital account. Cn capital account it t a k e s  the 
form of increasing foreign indebtedness and an increasing financial inability 
to meet it. That is, loans and aid only solve temporarily the problem of a 
deficit in B because the increasing need to service end repay such loans is 
soon reflected in a degree of indebtedness that further enhances the foreign 
exchange bottleneck, reduces CM, and eventually MGS.
It does not follow, of course, that the argument as we have seen it in 
professor Seer's model is itrinsecally changed. It merely means, that if 
the foreign exchange shortage is first traced to the export-import sector, 
the analysis in terms of the kilance of payments, enables one to go further 
into the financial implications of an external disequilibrium. Besuming, 
structuralists would claim that the connection between inflation nnd its 
structural causes is not only reflected in the CM and the MGS, hut in the 
external indebtedness that an inadequate CM produces on capital account.
It is important in what follows to consider again the two groups of 
countries. First, those whore the stagnation or decline in CM and MGS led 
to a chronic imbalance in B (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay). Se­
cond, those where CM and MGS expanded hut where the disequilibrium between 
a small CM and a large MGS led to chronic deficits in B (Chile, Mexico, Peru 
and much less so, Ecuador). It is by no coincidence that this classification 
obtained independently from the above study is exactly the same as the one 
obtained b3r ECLA in a specific study on Latin America's foreign indebted­
ness. (15).
For lack of data the analysis will not cover Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia and
Paraguay. But as it has been seen the Peruvian and the Ecuatorian cases are
close to that of Mexico; and the Bolivian and Paraguayan to that of the
first group. In Peru, which shows the best relation between CM and MGS, it
is quite probable that loans have been small and payments relatively easy to
- *make. However, Table XI shows that they increased in 1963-65 • It is also 
worth 'remembering that in the smaller economies (Bolivia, Ecuador and Para­
guay) a small amount of 'free aid' may very well help them to balance their 
current account and avoid further balance of payments disequilibrium through 
an induced external indebtedness that reduces foreign exchange. Such free 
aid in the larger economies, Uruguay included, would be insignificant when 
compared with the actual 'deficits in B. Four million dollars worth of free 
aid can go a long way in Bolivia or Paraguay, but mean hardly anything to 
Brazil or Peru.
'Up to a few years ago, writes ECLA, the main concern aroused by balance 
of payments questions was focused on the short-term imbalance that often ap­
peared as a result of export fluctuations'; today the emphasis is shifting 
to 'external indebtedness' (l6). During the last decade (1956-1965) ECLA 
distinguishes two tendencies. In the first, 1956-60, monetary policy tended 
to concentrate on the problems on current account, either because the growth 
of purchasing power or exports was less satisfactory or because import demand 
became more dynamic, nor/ever, save in one or two cases, this did not create 
a serious financing problem thanks to the increased inflow of funds in the 
shape of loans and direct investment. In the first five years of the 60's 
on the other hand, the difference between the purchasing power of exports 
and the growth of imports demand became acute. 'Y/hat happened was that the 
pressure exerted by MGS in recent years had coincided with an increase in the
United States aid to Bolivia has been considerable, and rather small in 
Paraguay (15)-
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burden of servicing and repaying the capital and loans obtained in previous 
years. The result was the problem of indebtedness,' further complicated by 
the need to. obtain new loans, with the accent increasingly placed on short­
term credit and to extend the terms of repayment of outstanding debts. Int­
erest, profits, and amortisation payments thus began to grow more rapidly 
than export earningsf, In relation to this fthe marging of policy, writes 
ECLA, is ceasing to be a matter for independent decision, and is instead be­
coming dependent on the results of negotiations with creditors. Over the 
long term, these entries expand or contract according to the way in which 
the deficit produced by the external imbalance is covered; and it is only 
in the last few years, as a result of the widening of the financial gap, 
that more thought has been given to the future commitments involved and in 
the different ways of closing it (l7)‘.
The fact that the amortisation and servicing on foreign car;ital has 
been steady in increasing throughout 1951-1964 can be seen in Table XII.
The effect that these payments have on the balance of payments may be seen 
in the following comparison. If one takes the CM and substracts from it 
the total income due to foreign investment and the amortisation payments 
of all loans, and compares the figure with MGS the result is a growing and 
chronic disequilibrium in the balance of payments. The disequilibrium il­
lustrates twro things: first, the degree of indebtedness, and second, the
fact that a deficit in B ins transferred to a global financial deficit of 
the balance of payments. The disequilibrium appears both in countries with 
a stagnating foreign sector (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay) and 
quite so in countries with an expanding foreign sector (Chile and Mexico).
The most striking situation of indebtedness, disequilibria and infla­
tion is that of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay, which in 1965 
were forced further to reduce their MGS. Between 1961 and 1965 (specially 
in the last two years) exports were slowly recovering, while MGS fell sharp­
ly. In the two previous five-year periods, MGS had followed the pattern of 
exports more closely. The new pattern of behaviour was determined not so 
much by domestic factors as by the external financial difficulties which 
made it necessary to cut imports. Table XII also shows that between 1965 
and 1964 the imbalance can also be traced to these difficulties since al­
though the gap was narrowed, disbursements under the head of profits, int­
erests and amortisation continued to increase.
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Chile is a country where both CM and MGS expanded, but where growth of 
the latter was steeper in absolute terras than the growth of the former.
The result has been also a considerable indebtedness throughout the period, 
but one that did not contribute to stability. The Mexican situation is 
somewhat different. Mexico did not contract heavy debts before I960, but 
from then on it began to get more deeply in debt; particularly from 1961 
to 1964 when it received as much as 483 million dollars gross loans, more 
than double of what they were in 1956-1960 and short-term liabilities trebled 
what they were in I960. (See Table XIII).
Y/ith respect to the structuralist model it appears that the stagnation 
of the export sector and the growing indebtedness that led to a shortage of 
foreign exchange which reduced MGS, in the first group of countries, was ac­
companied by strong inflation. In Mexico the fact that the external sector 
expanded and that indebtedness for the time being has been covered, led, on 
the other hand, to stability. But the case of Chile, remains to be explain­
ed. It is true that debt commitments are high and have increased, but surely 
the expansion of the foreign sector in physical and financial terms ought to 
have checked inflation. Thus one is inclined to blame inflation on the dom­
estic economy.
It is useful to see the ways in which the differences between current
revenue and expenditure on MGS plus the service and amortisation payments
on capital account were covered (See Table XIIl). That is how the deficit
in capital account was met. Most of the funds available came from direct 
*foreign investment , groww autonomous loans and net short-term liabilities. 
But these funds fell short of requirements, since the outflow of capital 
- whose magnitude can be roughly judged from the movement of short and long­
term assets and from errors and ommissions, made it more and more necessary 
to draw on compensatory financing and foreign exchange reserves - columns 
9 and 10 -.
The bulk of foreign capital available in recent years consisted of 
gross loans, on the one hand; and, since the net result was insufficient 
to reach a balance, a gross- balance of payments leans and sometimes on re­
course to the reserves (i.e. 1962) on the other. fIn general, writes ECLA, 
the governments have little freedom of choice in regards to the type of loan 
and the length of the repayment terms. They arecompelled to resort to de­
ferred medium and short-term financing of imports at higher rates of interest, 
as well as to other types of short-term financing. As regards official
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This, however, in net terms has tended to be hegative.
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credits, the capacity to absorb then has been often feduced by their lack 
of suitability for immediate requirements, rather inelastic terras, and, at 
times, a want of operational capacity in the borrowing countries• This has 
slowed doi.n the pace of disbursement, as indicated by the fact that, in 
1961-65, the loans authorised by IBRD and LOB and the US government averaged 
1096 million dollars annually, but only 736 million were actually paid out 
per year. This marked disparity between the volume of loans authorised and 
actually disbursed, which persisted for five years, can be traced to a var­
iety of reasons, among them administration delays and the difficulty of find­
ing the counterpart national funds, and the insistence that loans should be 
used for certain countries. In addition, new loans have been mainly earmark­
ed for specific projects rather than for general programmes (13)'.
The other source of non-compensatory funds is that provided by short-term 
liabilities, which rose sharply in 1964, and in general, are bound up with 
import payments. These, of course, have increased rapidly in Chile and Mex­
ico, where MGS has expanded; and fluctuated in the stagnant countries.
The difficulty encountered in bridging the gap between Cl-1 and the ex­
penditure on MGS plus profits, interest, and amortisation payments, were ac­
centuated by the increasing outflow 01 capital which added to the imbalance. 
Hence the deficit in B leads to a'deficit* on capital account, reflected on 
the net movements of capital. This ensuing deficit made it necessary to res­
ort increasingly to balance of payments loans and the increase in monetary 
authorities liabilities, the ulterior form of indebtedness and of foreign ex­
change shortage. For the whole group gross dollar balance of payments loans
i treached an annual average of 400 million in 1961-64, while the deterioration 
of the net gold and foreign exchange position meant that pari of the compensa­
tory loans received by -the region had to bo used to reconstitute reserves.
(See again Table XIII). Hence this is the final outcome of a deficit in 2.
The countries with the high decree 01 indebtedness and stagnating for­
eign trade ^Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and b'rugyay - continued to have sub­
stantial deficit balances up to 1968, and were compelled to cut down MGS oven 
further and to resort to external and balance of payments loans, since direct 
investment remained at a low level and net non-compensatory loans were insuf­
ficient. 'Their indebtedness became so acute, writes BCLA, that between 1937 
and 1934, the nonetary-authorities liabilities in general rose to 730 million 
dollars and 505 vis-a-vis the IMF. This combined with gross gold and foreign 
exchange reserves of only 5S5 millions in 1954, made the net position nega­
tive, and led them to renegotiate the terms of payment for debts contracted 
in the past.
In Chile the burden of external debt continued to increase. As may be 
seen gross balance of payments loans have increased sharply and in 1961-64 
the net gold and foreign exchange position deteriorated. So far Mexico has 
not had any particular difficulty in financing its external debt, hor has 
it gone to the IMP*, despite the fact that total loans have increased enorm­
ously* The most outstanding feature i/as the volume of foreign investment 
which in 1961-64 accounted for 44$ of the region's total. But, side by side 
vith this inflow of capital, the payments under the head of profits on 
foreign investment rose at an average annual rate of 18$; and autonomous 
gross loans mounted up (see Tables XII and XII).
In summary, the net contribution of foreign capital to the CM can be 
defined as the difference between the net inflow of foreign autonomous and 
compesatory loans (minus amortisation payments) on the one hand and other 
remittances on foreign investment on the other; that is, the net funds add­
ed - or deducted from - the CM. Where data was available, the following fig­
ures illustrate the net result:
Net Contributions of External Funds to the Capacity to Import 1960-65.
(millions of dollars)
Country Net External Autonomous
and Compensatory Funds profits and other payments 
less amortisation payments on foreign investment.
Interest on External loans, Net Contribu­
tions to CM
Argentina
I960 696.I 88.4 607.7
1961 327.2 165.8 161.4
1962 234.6 80.1 154.5
1963 43.5 71.5 -28.0
1964 -131.4 113.2 -244.6
1965 132.2 94.8 -227.0
Brazil
I960 553.0 198.0 355.0
1961 $54.0 187.0 267.0
1962 471.0 202.0 269.0
1963 236.0 147.0 89.0
1964 76.0 191.0 -115.0
1965 28.0 268.0 296.0Mexico
I960 194.4 190.5 3.9
1961 406.0 204.0 202.0
1962 228.0 257.0 -9.0
1963 359.0 266.0 93.0
1964 711.0 324.0 387.0
1965 201.0 339.0 -138.0
Source: ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, TJN, N.Y. 1968 (pag. 78).
In these terms, the negative position has reduced the CM i n  xArgentina 
since 19^3 (although it has been declining since 19ol), Brazil since 19'G4, 
and Mexico since 1965* 'This negative position, which reflects the extent 
to i/hich the various countries used external funds, was produced 07 f dif­
ferent factors ... in Argentina it was balance-0f-payments (generally med­
ium terms) and non-compensatory loans, whose amortisation payments led to 
a net disinvestment, in addition to the growing size of interest payments 
- while profits on direct private investment followed an irregular pattern; 
in Brazil it was mainly the size of the monetary authorities' short-term 
liabilities, together with an increase in external factor payments; and in 
Mexico it was the fluctuations in the inflow of external funds - almost* en­
tirely non-compensatory - in conjunction with large increases in payments 
under the head of profits, interest and other remunerations on foreign cap­
ital '(20). The experience of these countries, continues ECLA-, reveals the 
present limitations of external financing and tends to reduce its signifi­
cance as a dynamic factor of foreign trade* In other words, the original 
inflationary export bottleneck, will persist in this manner. This is ture 
of external financing as a whole, as well as of its components, including 
direct foreign investment, long-term autonomous loans, balance-of-payments 
compensatory loans, the monetary authorities short-term liabilities and 
the IMF position. Cnee it falls to a certain level, net financing is con­
verted into net disinvestment, mid results in a fall in the CM. The impli­
cations are far reaching, if repayment periods, interest rates and payments 
under the head of profits remain the same and no really effective measures 
are taken to overcome the general problem of a foreign exchange bottleneck.*
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*Ecla specifies that the position was also negative in Colombia and Uruguay, 
but positive in Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay and Ecuador (19)*
* -M-Since 1963* however, the IMF adopted a timid system of compensatory credit 
open to those countries with a declining CM. Since 19o6 these credits will 
be available to up to 50p of the country's subscription (as against a prev­
ious 25/0 ti-iile the country has still access to the Fund's current credit 
facilities. The credits, however, still have to be repaid in three to five 
years. There are also, of course*, the tentative workings on 'special Draw­
ing Bights or gold paper'.
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Except for Mexico, the rest of these countries found it necessary to post­
pone the payments of their external debts. Thanks to an agreement in 1964 
on the rescheduling of its payments, Brazil succeeded in reducing the commit­
ments to 217 million dollars in 1964 and 242 million in 1965. In Colombia, 
as a result of renegotiating only 10# of the external debt had to paid off 
in less than five years. The negotiations conducted in Uruguay in 1965 led 
to the postponement of payment on 92 million dollars that fell due on that 
year, and an additional credit of 55 million was obtained.
The Argentinian case may illustrate these negotiations (See Table XIV)
The weakness of the position with respect to gold and convertible foreign 
exchange by 1955» and the fact payments on the external debt falling due that 
year exceeded the predictable surplus on current account in the balance of 
payments led to rescheduling negotiations with the leading creditors. The 
debt situation, as nay be seen, was heavily affected by short and medium 
term commitments since, over half of them, fell due in 1966-68. The re­
financing of debts payable in 1965> however, has made little difference to 
the position, since 54# of the payment was deferred until 1966-68 and the 
remaining 46# until 1969 or later.
Official forecasts for 1965 indicated that payments totalling 500 million 
dollars falling due that year would have to be rescheduled. To that end, ne­
gotiations took place that deferred payment on 221 million dollars. The 
amount finally refinanced meant that obligations totalling 80 million at 
least would not be met. The Central Bank dealt with the problem by resort­
ing to internal refinancing in the form of successive issues, during 1965t 
of external debt bonds to a value of 120 million dollars, of which 83 million 
were taken up in 1965. The remaining capital out H o w  was financed through 
an increased movement of autonomous capital and a small increase in reserves 
than had not originally heen envisaged.
(vi) Some final remarks
The last step in this section is to make a summary in the manner of a 
re-estatement of the structuralist argument.
Structuralism claims that a shortage of foreign exchange - measured both 
on current account (B) and on capital account (3*) — leads eventually to a 
supply bpttlenck that entails inflation and perhaps slow income growth.
In Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Urugyay, the deficit in B can be 
traced •backwards• in the behaviour of the X-M sector throughout 1947 - 1965.
TABLE XIV
Argentina: Annual Payments falling Due Under tlie Head of External Commitments
as at December 1964 J (millions of dollars US;
Y e a r CentralBank
Public
sector
Private
sector T o t a l
1965 256 175 517 783
1966 164 156 199 519
1967 or later 150 951 536 1607
Amortisation payments 550 1260 1106 2914
Interest payments 51 232 156 440
Total capital plus interest) 601 1492 1261 3354
Results of Negotiations for Refinancing of Loaus due in 1965 in
Argentina 
(millions of US dollars)
Obligations Loans falling due in 1965
Total amount _. . _, . , , Refinancing Terms renegotiated J
Agreement with IIIP 
(i960, 1961, and 1962)
Joint Agreement with 
European and North-
115 67 Postponementsuniil 1967 
and 1968
American Banks* 59 TO 30 Payment deferred until 
1966
Payments Subscription 
with IBPuD
Consolidated debt and re­
financing granted in 1963
7 7 Postponement of conver­
sion into dollars
by Europe and Japan 195 117 Postponement of 60£> of 
the payments due under 
financial *aid'* Repay­
ment in five install­
----- ----- ments
Total 356 221 (1968-72)
Source: a)Xconomic Survey of Latin America, ECLA, 1966*
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But this deficit can also he traced 'forwards' in capital account. For all 
these countries the CM declined or stagnated and there was a fall in MGS. 
Looking merely at the deficit in B would indicate that MGS did not fall suf­
ficiently in relation to CM. * CM, however, also depends on the net result of 
foreign capital movements.
Looking "backwards one can see how there was a decline in the value of 
the CM and MGS. In all countries there was a decline in the value of X and 
M, their coefficient of instability was high, and there was a DTT. Moreover, 
there was instability between the growth of ©IP and the negative trends in X 
and M. The external disequilibrium has forced these countries to cover the 
gap vith increasing foreign loans and aidl The fact has created a 'degree 
of indebtedness* that, through the service and amortisation payments, has 
resulted on a deficit on B', In such circumstances, it has been necessary 
to take recourse to balance of payments loans and to incur in reductions in 
the net gold andforeign exchange reserves. Nonetheless, the ultimate result 
of foreign indebtedness has been the inability to meet foreign creditors.
It is also fundamental to notice that the degree of indebtedness has ulti­
mately decreased the CM. Jlence MGS have been forced down for two reasons: 
the decline in export value and the negative capital movements. This double 
deficit in B and B' is what structuralists nightly call a foreign exchange 
bottleneck.
If one incorporates inflation into the picture it is clear that all
*these countries are very inflationary. Moreover, the rate of inflation 
has increased hand in hand with the deterioration of the foreign sector.
This is more noticeable in Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay, because Argentina 
has maintained a more or less 'steady* high rate of inflation.
If the rate of per capita growth is now incorporated, the picture may 
appear less clear (See Table XI, Part i).
It is true that Argentina (l.l$) and Uruguay (0.5/S) have been stagnant 
economies, and that this accompanied by high inflation (21.4$ and 17.4$ re­
spectively) and the foreign exchange bottleneck. Brazil ;(2.7$ and Colombia 
(2.$) on the other hand, have had relatively high rates of growth, accompan­
ied by severe inflation (24$ and 8.4$ respectively) and a deterioration of 
the foreign sector. It is important to notice, however, that as inflation 
proceeded at a faster rate and the external sector deteriorated, the rate
f
of growth declined. (See Table XII again). Nonetheless, it would appear
Colombia's inflation averages 8.4$, a lower rate when compared to the other 
three. However, it is a rate that has fluctuated violently, it has increas­
ed vith time, and it has been chronic.
that the domestic economies of Brazil and Colombia have been more able to 
maintain an important rate of growth deupite unfavourable external trends,
A lot depends on hoi; MST advanced. But, also, they they are having incx'eas- 
ing difficulties to do so when one sees their balance of payments and infla­
tion problems.
Tn Bolivia and.Paraguay the situation is not really different, allowing 
for the fact that MST has probably a much lesser imjmct on growth. The 
chronic deficit in Bolivia's B can be traced to the fact that CM fell sharp­
ly, and MGS did so much less. »vhen one considers the rate of inflation it is 
necessary to establish two periods: there was almost hyper-inflation between
1950 and 1959 (53^)> while there was relative price stability in 19oO-65 (5£) 
If the inflationary period is interpreted in terns of the CM, a loose connec­
tion can be established between the variables. Moreover, when both CM end 
KGS started to recover (1957-1965) inflation eventually came to a halt. In 
the inflationary period the rate of growth declined (-2.2^) and, when infla­
tion was stopped, there was a recovery in GDP (2.4ft in per capita terms).
In Paraguay, the situation has been semilar, although the foreign sect­
or was more stagnant than in Bolivia. There was a chronic deficit in B, 
despite the fact that MGS grew very slowly. In all cases the CM, the value 
of X, the coefficient of instability, and the terms of trade were rather 
unfavourable• The almost hyper-inflation (l20p) she suffered is confined, 
to 1946-1955; after the rate of inflation was reduced considerable to 12£ 
in 1955-1960, and to 5/> in 1960-65. Despite the fact that the rate of growth 
has been considerably stagnant throughout (l.2p). Very likely there is a 
strong relationship between the slow growth of the foreign sector and the 
slow growth of GDP; hut, the same as in Bolivia, for the almost hypcr-in- 
flationary process it is also useful to look into the domestic economy.
The cases of Chile, Peru, Mexico, and Ecuador are different to the 
above countries. Although it is true that the countries have suffered a 
severe deficit in B and have had problems with B', and their disequilibrium 
stems from the fact that MGS have been much higher than the CM. It is pos­
sible that the CM was unfavourably affected by movements on capital ac­
count; but considering the more favourable trends in X and M the pressure 
on capital account should have been milder than in the others. Tracing 
baclvwards the deficit in B, it was seen that although CM and MGS grew con­
siderably, the growth in MGS was much higher (specially in Mexico). Hence if 
the expansion of CM in relative terns was insufficient this does not mean 
that the export sector was stagnant. There was high growth in experts 
(specially in Chile, Peru, and Ecuador) and in imports (specially in Mexico).
Moreover, instability in the grovrth of exports and imports was low in Mexico 
and only more so in Chile. This was not true, however, for imports in Ecua­
dor and for both imports and exports in Peru. T/ith respecto to the volume 
of trade there was an expansion; and OX was probably raised to compensate 
for DTT (except in Chile). Despite the fact there was a chronic deficit 
in B and, at least Chile and Mexico, have had deficits in 3*. All these 
countries found it necessary to enlarge their CM through foreign loans.
The result has been also a considerable degree of indebtedness that in the 
later years has affected negatively the net CM. Both in Mexico and Chile 
the growing amount of gross loans is enormous and the repayment schedule 
severe. However, Mexico so far has been able to meet its debts, i/hilc Chile 
has had to take recourse of balance—of—payment loans and gold and foreign ex­
change reserves. Thus these countries experience a foreign exchange bottle­
neck as reflected on B* and an increasing foreign indebtedness.
Not everybody agrees. f2xperience has shown, writes professor ^runwald, 
that countries can increase merchandise imports in spite of balance of pay­
ments difficulties. The question remains whether imports would have increas­
ed significantly had the purchasing power of exports risen.faster. One can 
only speculate about this, but there is some doubt as whether credit from 
international agencies, official loans, and grants would be available or
■¥rwould be used to the same extent had exports been growing more vigorously.
Of course, a lasting export boom would unquestionably result in higher im­
ports, but, judging from past experience, the increase probably would be in 
response to consumer demands rather them to the needs of increased producti­
vity and industrialisation... In any case (these countries) managed to 
obtain imports over and above what export growth would have warranted.. .un­
limited imports can solve a lot pf problems, including inflation and also, 
given enough tine, structural maladjustments. This, however, is not a basis 
for any realistic argument because imports can never be expected to grow suf­
ficiently fast to maintain stability and conrect imbalances at the same time*
(21). The structuralist argument is based on a decline or stagnation of the 
CM, something true in six countries. Moreover, it is based on a compatibi­
lity between income growth (at say 5*5,f0 and exports and. imports. The incom­
patibility in these trends takes the form of foreign exchange shortage. It 
is not realistic to talk abovit unlimited imports; but it is realistic to tlink 
about a rate of growth either based on primary exports or in MST industrial- 
isation. On both cases the rate of growth will depend heavily on the extern­
al sector and on the balance of payments.
ifIt appears, however, that foreign credits are incapable of reducing the
foreign exchange bottleneck.
y ^  ■* •This is a questionable statement judging by the import schedule of the semi
/ a m  m a  w a  ^
Nonetheless, when one incorporates the rates of inflation and gro'.rth 
into the picture, the structuralist argument of a foreign exchange "bottle­
neck still is applicable to mexico and Ecuador, only less so to Peru, and 
not very much to Chile. The first three countries are cases where the - 
foreign exchange "bottleneck has "been reduced, and this has led to a milder 
or slackening rate of inflation.
In Mexico there has "been mild inflation (pO/w) and fast growth (2.9^)
But the rate of inflation decreased considerably pari passu with the growth 
of the external sector and the rate of income growth (see Table XII again). 
Hence the rise in exports and foreign loans has permitted an expansion of 
the CM and UCrS, and the possibility to repay foreign debts. The growing 
amount of external indebtedness, however, is worth considering: if it is
maintdned at the same trend, and judging by the moderate growth of exports, 
it will continue to reduce the CM. Ecuador is a similar case in so far as 
there has been mild growth (2£) -with relative price stability (2.1^) and a 
mildly favourable external sector. Peru, on the other hand, is a case of 
average inflation (7.8p) and a good rate of growth (2.4£>) together with the 
fastest growing external sector for these countries. Undoubtedly, the rate 
of grovrth mid the check of inflation is a consequence of the high CM and KGS•
Chile's rate of inflation has been very high (22.6£) while its rate of 
grovrth has been low (l.4£>). This happened despite the growth in the CM, the 
expansion of KGS, and huge foreign loans. Thus the trends in the external 
sector, within.* the whole of the period of study, had a small impact on in­
flation or grovrth. It seems better, whether in monetarist or structuralist
terms, to look for the causes of inflation and slow growth in the domestic *economy.
Professor Grunwald says (22) that there are three general explanations 
for the failure to achieve stability with growth. One that imports were not 
high enough to permit the elimination of bottlenecks (our first group of 
countries) nor were they sufficiently orientated towards this end (perhaps 
the case of Chile). Another is that it takes time to effect structural 
changes and that the twenty-year period is not long enough for the necessary 
adjustments to work thems&lves out. The third interpretation is that struc­
tural adjustments cannot be expected to come mainly via the balance of pay­
ments, but must be based primarily cn fuhdaraental reforms deriving from within 
the economy. For the author the heart of the problem lies in the last two
■H’ . .(from previous page) industrialised countries: the import of intermediate
goods and capital goods has relatively increased more than consumer goods.
-ft " ’ .It should be remembered that, after the simple testing, the monetarist 
thesis was not found suitable.
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elements* lie, however, concedes: 'The foreign sector can provide the means
for holding action to permit the n e c e s s a r y  changes to he effected'. This, 
essentially, has been the variable function of foreign trade in the indus­
trialising countries of Latin America in the recent past* The more rapid­
ly the economy grows, the more rapidly can the nedesary structural changes 
be carried out. This is the problem between the foreign sector and indus­
trialisation, because while this takes place, imbalance will persist and 
financial instability is likely. If the external sector is stagnant, how­
ever, the instability will be greater and the whole process may come to a 
halt.
Hecapitulating, to reach a structure of production sufficiently elastic 
to meet without inflation the demand changes inherent to growth is, for the 
reasons given by structuralists, a big order for Latin America. If the re­
gion is to meet this change sustainedly it will either have to,rely more 
on its traditional exports or continue with MST. On both counts she m i l  
have to rely in imports, so that the balance of payments becomes crucial 
for stability and growth. The trouble is that the industrialisation effort, 
especially when based on MST, has in turn created further structural im­
balances. The next section will study this proposition.
\i
c) Industrialisation and the Price Izvel.
The external sector bottleneck in the structuralist analysis, as it has 
been seen, has as one of its consequences the process of import-substitution 
in Latin America. Industrialisation itself, it is claimed, constitutes a 
further causal factor in the inflationary process. But, differently from 
the other structuralist causes of inflation, this cansal factor is a policy 
induced one. That is, it '’does not spring solely from the underdeveloped 
nature of the economy but from actual decision making. This is a controver­
sial issue that further reveals the differences between structuralists and 
monetarists:
1.- For an ‘extremist monetarist’ - an ideal one - industrialisation as a 
source of inflation is a consequence of conscious economic policy;
2.- For an extremist structuralist industrialisation, policy malting or not, 
was imposed without alternative on some of the Latin-American economies.
3*- There are also intermediate positions where two different steps are
distinguished. Although initial industrialisation, and hence inflation, 
were imposed via the foreign exchange bottleneck, a second phase may be 
distinguished where import-substitution implied a policy 'mistake* and 
that it further contributed to inflation.
Industrialisation has, of course, existed in may Latin-American countries 
since at least the second half of the XIX century. The process was limited to 
coltage industries; food, clothing, and other consumer and raw material pro­
cessing industries. However, the inflationary industrialisation that inter­
ests- structuralists is a different one, import substitution. The structural­
ist position is illustrated in the following quotation. 'After the crisis of 
1929 it became clear that since the existing level of demand remained at vir­
tually the same level, while the capacity to import was sharply reduced, it 
was no longer possible to make an ex-ante adjustment between the structure of 
production and the domestic demand by foreign trade. An ex-post adjustment 
was made through a substantial increase in the relative price of imports, 
which provided a shapr stimulus to domestic import-substitution production.
By making full use or even excessive use of the existing capacity, it was pos­
sible to replace a proportion of the goods formerly imported. Later, by re­
allocation of factors, expecially the foreign exchange that was in such short 
supply, the available capacity to import was used for purchases of capital 
goods and raw materials needed to establish new production and thus continue 
the import-substitution process (l).
The statement, nonetheless, should be taken with certain precautions*
Important qualifications have to be made in the case of Mexico: The Mexicc
Revolution (1910-1920) created a different setting for industrialisation: i
great crash did not affect the economy to such a large extent since this ha 
pened during the reconstructing period; moreover, import substitution did 
not receive its big push until second World War* This last statement is al 
true for the late-comers into the Latin-American industrialisation process, 
for our purposes, Colombia and Peru*
From the point of view of the controversy the arguments are then two:
1.- In what relative terms has import substitution, regardless of its his­
torical appearence, contributed to the inflationary spiral?
2.- To what extent has industrialisation been an erroneous inflationary 
policy - the ideal monetarist standing or to what extent was it imposed 
by the structural nature of the econony - the structuralist argument - ?
Dr* Prebisch writes that *onee exports decline cyclically an import- 
substitution policy has to be improvised. It is generally applied not as a 
prudent measure that anticipates the demand for development and the fluctua­
tions of exports, but as a step inq>osed by critical circumstances when extei 
nal desequilibrium has already occurred* Moreover, the inescapable need to 
protect substitution, and the extreme forms that this protection assumes, 
create conditions unfavourable to export development, and thus increase the 
tendency to disequilibrium1 (2)* Hence import-substitution may be imposed b 
as the process develops it may also imply equivocal policy measures* ECLA 
does not really support this opinion, while professor Grunwald inclines him­
self to consider industrialisation itself as a source of disequilibriu* 
'Allowing for the basic influences of the external sector against which indi 
vidual governments were powerless, says ECLA, there is also support for the 
view that the reasons why industrialisation has generally led to insufficien 
absorption of labour, largely incompetitive market structures and high pro­
duction costs, and an extremely uneven distribution of income is the failure 
to adopt suitable economic policy measures* •• However, it must be recognised 
that within the basic parameters of the import substitution model the indus­
trialisation process could hardly have led to radically different results fr 
those actually produced' (3). On the other hand, the author concludes (..it 
is conceivable that structural problems may arise without any exogenous fact 
ors (i.e. an external bottleneck). Even in the absence of an export decreas< 
government policy may, in an effort to accelerate economic growth, embark th 
country on the path of industrialisation through import-substitution. V/heth 
this will actually lead to imbalances of not will depend upon the size of th<
It is close Chilean, and Uruguayan experienc
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growth effort relative to the economy*s capabilities,. The balance of payments 
above does not make for structural changes. The structural inflation is root­
ed on the desire to grow and industrialise faster than the present structure 
of the economy can accomodate. The emphasis (is)... in placing the responsi-
-ftbility for structural adjustments on internal policy* (4) .
Still, apart from how import-substitution appears, it is true that the 
behaviour of the external sector 't/ill greatly help to shape the process. Let 
us resume the argument following 0. Sunkel (5). The intensity of the indus­
trialisation process depends very largely on the level and rate of growth of 
exports. If there is foreign exchange, the growing diversification needs can 
be progressively taken over by the gradually expanding manufacturing sector.
But if the external conditions are precarious and (or if foreign exchange 
reserves are diminishing, as in the 30’s and 50's in Latin America, the proO 
cess of structural transformation has to proceed very rapidly and at the same 
time the capacity of the country to import is very limited. For this reason 
a large and growing volume of imports in relation to GDP means the most fav­
ourable conditions to achieve a smooth economic growth, while a small and 
contracting proportion of imports means that the industrialisation process 
will encounter great difficulties and have strong imbalancing effects. Thus 
one cannot dissociate the import substitution from the causal behaviour of 
the external sector.
This study shall adopt a structuralist criteria, with some qualifications 
First, import-substitution was adopted - imposed if one insists - as a con­
sequence of exogenous factors. Second, industrialisation in itself is regard­
ed in Latin-America as a primer objective of economic policy. In the words 
of Dr. Prebisch: *Why is industrialisation advocated to increase the rate of
growth and income distribution? Because the shifting of manpower from relative­
ly improductive activites - agriculture, cottage industries, and services - 
represents a net increase in the average per capita product of the economy (6). 
Third, onee import substitution was instituted, the process, policy and struc- 
turally-wise, revealed a tendency to enhance the price and external disequili­
bria. Fourth, industrialisation policy has presented, whether inescapably or 
not, serious problems to the process of growth.
The objective- of this section is only to explore the relationship between
import-substitution as a polcy and inflation. However, to analyse the subject
it would be necessary to evaluate the Latin-American industrialisation process,**something that lies outside of the scope of the paper. Therefore, only super-
The hypothesis has been explored in the previous section (b).
**For an introductory bibliography into the subject see notes (?)
superficial attention will be dedicated to the structuralist import-sbustitu- 
tion model, before saying something about its inflationary nature. This sec­
tion, is formed by: (l) the structuralist import-substitution model; (2) the 
inflationary nature of the model and its future; and (3) some empirical evi­
dence and recommendations for further research.
The survey will include those countries that have had price instability 
and relatively considerable import-substitution processes. Because today al­
most all Latin-American countries*have industries. That is, the selective 
criteria adopted in the introduction, with respect to the historical back­
ground of inflation and industrialisation, will be followed. The countries 
selected may be simply divided into two groups: (l) those that industrialis­
ed earlier and as a consequence of the 1929 crisis, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Uruguay, and Mexico, and (2) the late-comers, Colombia and Peru.
(l) The Structuralist Bnport-Substitutuion Model
Whether the structural change started as a consequence of the Great 1929
Crisis, as in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay; as a consequence of the
Agrarian revolution and Second World War, as in Mexico; as a consequence of
this war and further instability in the external sector, as in Colombia and
Peru, the structuralist thesis is that new conditions were created for growth
and stability or instability. The new growth model would have the following 
*characteristies:
1.- A decline in the external sector's contribution to National Income.
2.- An increase in the contribution of the industrial sector to GDP.
3#- An alteration in the composition of imports by reducing certain
imports in favour of intermediate and capital goods.
4.- An industrial expansion within the narrow framework of the dom­
estic economy, which imposed a closed character to growth.
Generally speaking this is what is understood by import-substitution (>2 
The term MST is often used in a simple and literal way to denote the reducti< 
or elimination of certain imports and their replacement by domestic industri* 
production (visible MST). This definition is unsatisfactory because it givei 
the false impression that the process consists solely in the removal or re­
duction of the components of the import structure and the replacement by na­
tional products. Thus it might be assumed that tht tendency is towards self-
sufficiency (apparent MST). Experience has shown that nothing could be fur-
**ther from the truth •
Historically a very uneven process througout time and in the different 
countries.
■ 0—  wM-Sftirranliv recommended (8).
The substitution process may not reduce the over-all import quantum. When 
it occurs it is a result of restrictions in the external sector rather than 
an aim in itself. The place of the ousted goods is taken by others, and as 
the process gains momentum it generates an increase in a derived demand for 
imports of intermediate and capital goods which may lead to greater depend­
ence on the external sector than during the earlier stages of the substitu­
tion process (real MST). Dr. Prebisch puts it in the following words:
•Little progress has been made in elucidating the problem of the feasibili­
ty of import substitution. It is a policy of circumstances rather than a
selective criterion. In the face of external disequilibrium it is usual
to restrict imports of consumer goods which usually promote substitution 
processes, regardless of the types of goods concerned. The policy facili­
tates the import of goods essential to economic activity and leads to an in­
creasing rigidity in the composition of imports. The structure can be dis­
torted to only include raw materials, vital intermediate goods and a few 
capital goods, together with essential items for consumption. As a result 
a contraction in the capacity to import has a depressive effect on the eco-
z  \  *nomy and creates a new external vulnerability (9)*
What are then some examples when import-substitution does not necessa­
rily bring a relative or absolute fall in certain imports?
1.- The extreme case would occur when no change takes place in the structure
of imports. In such an event there is no visible substitution, even 
though an effective process of substitution nay be taking place through 
an increase in the domestic industry's contribution to an expanding 
domestic supply, which would be reflected only in a reduction of the 
economy's import coefficient.
2.- 1/hen new products appear it is difficult to compare the schedules of
imports in the different periods. When new durable goods appear, as
after Second World War, their domestic production cannot be strictly**described as 'substitution* in terms of pre-war products.
3*-- The decline of consumer goods as a result of exchange policies aimed 
at reconciling the overall level of imports with the CM. It nay well 
happen that some of these products are not actualle replaced because 
of the size of the market is small or because factors of production 
are not available, and that tieir reduced share in the import structure 
is virtually aiributable to import controls. If these were eased, im­
ports of such goods would climb.
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The proqess, on the other hand, may lead to price instability via the ex­
ternal sector if imports are not really reduced and/or via the industrial 
sector if demand is expanded and production costs increase.
** (See footnote in the*foilowing page).
4.— The obvious case, of course, is that when real substitution is usually 
much less than the apparent substitution manifested in the reduction 
of certain imports. That is, when the import demand for final goods, 
is substituted by the demand for basic inputs, payments for technical 
services, capital goods, and so forth.
Hence there is visible MST, reflected in the import structure; appar­
ent MST, reflected in absolute reduction of some imports; and real MST, re­
flected in the import coefficient, among other indicators. A ieduced defi­
nition of MST is then closer to reality. That is, it is true the MST pro­
cess becomes apparently less dependent on external sources and transforms 
its dependence. The process will give rise to a number of structural modi­
fications in the economy tending to resolve the contradiction between the 
growth of National. Income and the behaviour of the external sector. But, 
it is also fair to advance that, as the process develops, the external and 
internal problems, both structural and financial, tend to accumulate to the 
point where they act as a brake on the process. To fully understand the de­
velopment of the model it is necessary to take account of the following indi­
cators;
1.- The import coefficie nt is the main macro-economic aggregate which 
shows the share of the external sector in the economy. A reduction 
of it means real MST.
2.- The share of imported goods in total consumption and the share of im­
ported investment goods in total gross fixed investment. A reduction 
may mean ro& substitution, but changes in relative weights point cnly 
to visible and/»r apparent substitution.
3*- Simply, the percentual weight of industry, mainly manufacturing, in 
total GDP, which also reveals real substituion, if imports decrease 
or apparent if imports increase.
4.— A comparison of the evolution of GDP and industrial production, maihly 
manufacturing, shows the increase in industrialisation with respect to 
other sectors.
5.- The evolution of the import quantum in general and the index of in­
dustrial production, on the assumption of initial MST because later 
an increase in the import quantum may be compatible with industrial
growth where 2*IST is taking place relatively between consumer goods and 
intermediate and capital goods. This visible or apparent substitution 
may only be measured in terms of more detailed indices.
**'from previous page )
This is a theoretical "‘assumption more than a practical result. It is difficu 
to find domestic .production of goods for which there was no previous domestic 
demand satisfied by imports.
6.- The relative changes in the import structure or schedule. Two classi­
fications may show such a movement:
a) The more usual one divides the import structure by categories:
I. Consumer Goods.
A. Durable
B. Non-Durable
II. Fuels and Lubricants
ilIII. Raw Materials and Intermediate Products
A. Metal-goods (spare parts ana sub-total)
B. Non-metal goods.
IV. Construction and Building Materials
V. Capital Goods.
v
A. For Agriculture
B. For transport
C. For industry and others
VI. Various.
b) The import structure by economic use and destination.
I. By type of use
A. Intermediate products (consumption or investment)
B. End products (consumption or investment)
II. By destination
A. For consumption
B. For Investment
7.- A comparison, on the micro-economic level, between the evolution of 
the relevant series of industrial production, the different imports
and apparent consumption and between their respective rates of growth,
in an attempt to assess how far the rate of the former was able to re­
duce or at least curve the growth rate of the latter. This is a cru­
cial point if one wants to measure the financial instability that MST 
may create seen through comparative costs and prices.
Coning back to the process, MST may be taken, in the general sense, as 
one of expansion and diversification of domestic production - specially manu­
facturing - in face of the limitations of the capacity to import. 'If the 
import substitution process is to be successful, writes CCLA, and is to permit 
domestic ^ economic expansion, given a capacity to import which increases slowly 
or sometimes remains stationary or even declines, it is essential that some
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import categories be reduced, eliminated or prevented from increasing at the 
same rate as the overall quantum, in order that others may be maintained or 
expanded an<^  new products, indispensable for continual development, may be 
incorporated1 (10). It has also been said that the substitution effort can­
not be measures only tn terms of the decrease in imports* Even where single 
products are concerned, substitution may be taking place without any apparen 
contraction of purchases abroad* This necessarily implies that the expansio 
of consumption is being more than proportionally covered by domestic product 
ion or in other words that the percentage of total supply represented by im­
ports is diminishing. Up to here the MST taking place may be observed in in 
dicators 1 to 5*
Moreover, the first phase of import-substitution is reflected in the import
structure by a reduction in the proportion of finished consumer goods and an
increase in the proportion of intermediate goods. However, once this proces
is completed the persistence of the same import structure (say in consumer,
intermediate, and capital goods) may means that a sbustitution is being effe
ed in several of these categories and at the same time, MST then goes on wit 
*each group.
The possibility of maintaining MST depends on the degree of flexibility
in the structure of imports - when the capacity to import is limited - which
in turn depends 'on creating as soon as possible' certain intermediate produ
tion units which are of strategic importance for furthering the process. In
other words, the feasibility of proceeding with sxibstitution depends upon th
types of substitution already effected. If substitution were confined to fi
consumer goods, the import schedule would be virtually limited to the impori
needed to maintain current production, with no margin left for the entry of
new products and in particular the necessary capital goods for the expansior
of capacity. Thus a second step implies embarking promptly with substitutioi
in respect to additional categories, especially of intermediate and capital**goods, before a rigid import structure stops the process.
In this intermediate production sector - and to some extent in the capi 
tal goods sector - it is agreed that there is a considerable time lag betwec 
the decision to produce and entry into operation. So that if import-substi­
tution is not undertaken until these products are in large demand and form 
an important proportion in the import structure, most certainly there will 1 
excessive pressure on thb foreign exchange supply and instability. Accordii
*  i.  ......  ■■■
***
(Footnotes * and ** in the following page)
According to ECLA, it is practically impossible for the industrialisation pro­
cess to proceed from the base to the apex of the production pyramid, that is 
to start with the more simple consumer goods and progress gradually until it 
includes capital goods. The smooth MST would depend, among other things, on:
(i) a degree of foresight in MST that depends on autonomous decisions of the 
government and entrepreneurs; and (2) the limitations of the foreign sector, 
in sofar as the capacity to import, an inflow of foreign capital, and the com­
position of foreign debt.
Taking the second classification of the import schedule in end and in­
termediate products, as MST progresses one would expect an increasing parti­
cipation of intermediate goods. This is consistent with the normal modifi­
cation of the import structure that accompanies industrialisation in a Latin- 
American country where the capacity to import does not increase rapidly.
The long term continuity of such a trend, however, may lead to a n imbalance 
and or stagnation. Given the limitations of the capacity to import with 
respect to the growth of income, the relative contraction of end products in 
relation to intermediate products may ultimately become a decrease in absolute 
terms; the rigidity of the import schedule would be ultimately aggravated; 
and imports of capital goods, which are the most important and the most flex­
ible under the head of end products, would be restricted. This would not only 
retard the growth process but would also increase the external vulnerability 
of the economy, since the maintenance of the existing industrial activity it­
self would depend on the imports of intermediate goods.
With either classification, if the maintenance of the capacity to import 
is achieved at the cost of more and more external borrowing and the margin of 
imports for investment purposes could be secured by only virtue of a discri­
minatory exchange policy and a considerable inflow of foreign capital, the 
process of continuing the MST are not really very encouraging. (See the pre­
vious section). And the maintenance of the existing overall import coefficient 
would -imply a substantial increase in the already rigid import schedule, since
(From previous page)
*ECLA on the experience of Brazil writes that in the general categcreies MST 
is sometimes not visible. This happens, for instance, with durable consumer 
goods as a whole because, despite substitution, new products appear and there 
are periods of ‘squandering of foreign reserves', i.e. after the War. Also, 
raw materials and intermediate products in general may not show a decline be­
cause they comprise the basis inputs for the industries producing non-durable 
. consumer goods, in which substitution is accelerated when an external bottle­
neck appears. But descending to the item level would on may occasions reveal 
MST, both in relative and absolute terms (11).
The point may very -well be that the 'second wave of MST' also ends in a rigid 
import structure.
the margin of imports susceptible of restriction is becoming steadily narro 
er. In this terms the next logical step would be the substitution of capit 
goods, something relatively new to the experience of Latin America. In any 
case ECLA referring to the Brazilian case where the MST has advanced furthe 
writes: while the growth model ’through MST may have played a reasonably
useful part in the diversification and expansion of Brazil's industrial act 
vity in its various stages, the dynamic impulse with industrialisation by 
this method seems to have been vitually exhausted' (12). Still, this is so 
things that has to be explored in the context of the selected countries.
The only object of this exercise, besides describing the structrualist 
MST model, has been to point that two main causes render the model rigid an 
unstable. First, its dependence on the behaviour of the capacity to import 
the external sector bottleneck which was analysed in the previous section. 
Second, the fact that rigidity in the MST process may also obey to the char 
acteristics of the domestic economy; a point which will be made in what fo 
lows. Because what one is trying to see is how the MST rigidities - both 
external, the foreign exchange bottleneck, and domestic, a policy-induced 
factor by the detractors and a policy imposed one by the defenders - reflec 
themselves on the inflationary spiral.
(2) The Inflationary nature of the model
As it has been said, within an MST model the foreign exchange bottle­
neck may create rigidity in the import structure. But, this rigidity in ti 
import structure (which leads to some amount of inflation) is also a conse­
quence of domestic factors. Among them the most important ones are the 
structure of the national market, the nature of technological progress, the 
natural resource endowment, the distribution of income, and the existence c 
structural unemployment. The structuralist thesis may be interpreted as 01 
where these factors act as a brake on the growth potential of an MST proces 
besides inducing inflation and a host of policy problems. But the fact 
should not be taken to mean that MST ought to be discarded as such. Struci 
alists are merely point out the mistakes in the MST experience of Latin Amc 
ica and the need of revising the subject within such an experience. Here \ 
shall concentrate on the rigidities of MST, leaving their solution, if any, 
to a section dealing with structuralist reforms.
What are then the real domestic conditions that affect MST in Latin
America and that further enhanced price stability? What nay be considered
t^he most important ones are presented in the three following groupings:
%
*For a discussion on the subject see S. Macario, and on Mexico, B. Izquie:
1#— The nature of modern technology in relation to MST* The argument is
whether UDC should use capital intensive or labour intensive investment
in their IkT process* The more accepted thesis is that because of the
other characteristics of the model, there is hardly any important al-
*temative to capital intensive investments* But what interests us 
here is that MST may be faced in Latin America with the structural 
unemployment of unskilled labour and may further contribute to it.
This technological condition reflects itself on two other phenomena 
that define MST: the size of the market and the distribution of in­
come* Two factors contribute to the unemployment tendency: the popu­
lation growth and the high capital-intensive technology adopted in the**modern branches of industry. Within an MST model that advances, such 
unemployment could in theory be absorbed by the services sector or by 
public works programmes. Even so the future does not appear favour­
able to this solution. Further use of computers is envisaged in the 
tertiary sector. In the public work sector the technology adopted
XXXalso entails a lower level of man-power absqption.
2*- The availability of productive resources. That is, there is a dis­
proportion between the supply of fvarious factors: natural resources
and unskilled manpower may be relatively abundant, while skilled man­
power and capital are scarce. Consequently, it is claimed the ideal 
macro-economic patterns of production which would be more in keeping 
with such supplies of resources are completely different from those 
resulting from the sum of the micro-economic patterns actually adopt­
ed by entrepreneurs in the MST process, on the basis of the existing 
system of relative prices. This disproportion tends to widen as the 
process advances, in that increasing quantities of scarce factors are 
used in the secondary sector, while the rest of the economy remains 
unaltered. The situation is also largely responsible for the serious 
struactural unemployment of unskilled labour and for potentially pro­
ductive reserves left idle*
3o- The size and structure of the domestic market. The previous set of
For 8 discussion on the subject see the bibliography recommended at the 
beginning of this section.
**The highly theoretical solution to the problem of unemployment versus 
technology is seen not within the MST context but in terms of a develop­
ment plan, where government investment is the determinant*
MST, however, should not be equalled to the general problem of indus­
trialisation and technological progress in an UDC. The problem of 
technological progress would still be present whether via MST, Auto­
nomous1 industrialisation or, say, agricultural development which 
may require capital intensive techniques.
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conditions shape this third one, where the problem of price instability 
becomes more evident. *As far as the internal conditions are concerned 
says D m  Sunke jL, the first is the size of the domestic market for manu­
factures* It is not only that income per head is low in Latin-American 
countries, but that the very unequal distribution of income reduces the 
possibility of developing mass markets for most manufactures. On the
\other hand, modem technology has been created for mass markets, so that 
relatively small markets may mean the un-economical use of avanguard equ: 
ment, or alernatively, the use of deficient techniques or worn-out equip­
ment. •• Thus the size of the market will certainly determine the stage 
of diversification industry can reach* (l4). In other words, the size 
of the market - which is fundamental for the shape of the MST process
will take - is determined by modem technology, the availability of re-*sources, the structural unemployment and the distribution of income.
The size and diversification in industry is determined by domestic 
demand and its future growth in Latin America. This depends on the exisi 
ing and future level and distribution of income. Now, structuralists as­
sume that, the demand for MST products was initially determined by high- 
income groups. This encouraged industrialisation, but it ’entailed dis­
advantages in terms of cost structure and concentration of production.
It follows an inevitable trend towards a concentration of economic acti­
vities since it -was inconceivable that a large number of enterprises cou! 
be established on a competitive yet profitable basis, to fight for singli 
product markets that were very small (%/ith the exception of certain mark 
ets for consumer goods). Moreover, the problem grows more complex with 
intermediate goods since these require a still larger scale of productio: 
in relation to the size of the market. On the other hand, one could as­
sume that the initial MST of non-durable goods expanded the market in 
two ways: through the increase in income of high income groups and 
through the employment of workers. However, as MST progresses, and es­
pecially as it includes more categories of durable consumdr goods, the 
relative growth of the market becomes mainly vertical, that is, it is 
still based on the income of high-income sectors. This happens because: 
(l) the high density of capital reduces a large absroption of labour; 
and (2) the high unit value of goods permits the entry into the consumer 
markets of only small sectors of the population.
Section (e) is dedicated to the distribution of incomA-aa a feature 
of the structuralist school. 011 03 * SNOS SNiTiOD ’
Mr. D. Felix also analyses the handicap of the size of the market, but 
does not stress the role of income distribution (15)* For the author, the 
previous concentration of production - 'a highly protective monopolistic en­
vironment' - does not induce private investment to increase productive ef­
ficiency. The consequence for him is that even with modern plants and low 
wages, domestic industries tend to have considerably higher unit costs. A 
second major difficulty ensues with 'the tendency of widening of the indus­
trial base'; the movement of substitution to intermediate goods. Its pace,
Mr; Felix writes, has been more rapid the more sluggish the capacity to import 
in order to save foreign exchange through MST. This has given industry a bias 
for producing middle class products, suck as consumer durables. When correct­
ion is intende, policy still tends to favour new industries (exchange . and 
tax subsidies), as agains the modernisation and expansion of existing ones.
Two consequences follow from the precarious widening of the industrial base.
(l) it means a rapid movement towards the production of sophisticated indus­
trial goods, with a small domestic market that cuts fundamental economies of 
scale; and (2) output curves tend to be linked, rising rapidly when imports 
are being replaced, but flattened when future growth depends in the growth 
of domestic income. Profits have also followed this pattern. Thus such in­
dustries may fall into monopolistic quiescence with lower profit rates, a 
reduced level of investment, and aging plant and equipment.
The fact is that this lack of competition, the smallness of the market, 
and the advancing MST process reflect themselves in higher costs. The pro­
blem of costs may be defined in terms of comparisons between domestic and 
foreign prices. For ECLA, however, the main significance, in practice, stems 
from the domestic standpoint and relates to such macro-economic questions as 
the wastage of scarce resources and the inadquate utilisation of the reserves 
or labour (l6).
The point then is to see how these higher costs theoretically traduce them­
selves into inflation.
The explanation from the orthodox Point of view is simple. Assume neutral 
monetary, budgetary and income policies and a balance of payments in equili­
brium. The variable element is an MST policy. The hypothesis is that, with 
a given exchange rate that accounts for the general conditions in wages and 
productivity, the new industries will have higher costs than their foreign 
competitors. Initial protection is thus necessary. Thus MST will make goods 
more expensive for those already employed. If the employed achieve an increase 
in wages,*the setting is ready for an industrialisation policy that leads to 
inflation
Industrial protection will specially lead to inflation if the goods sub 
stituted are those consumed by the employed, if workers are unwilling to ac­
cept a temporary reduction in their level of consumption caused by higher 
costs (wages increase); or, if prices of agricultural products increase.
On the other hand, the increase in employment leads to a higher income lev­
el which puts price pressure via demand on existing capacity and on the bal < 
ance of payments.
Resuming, the conclusion usually reached is that production designed 
to replace imports is generally more costly and that such is the price for 
industrialisation. But, as was mentioned, industrialisation is advocated 
as the means of increasing the rate of growth and income redistribution. 
Because in theory the shifting of manpower from relatively improductive 
activities represents a net increase in the average per capita product of 
the economy as a whole. Moreover, the higher cost of MST is supposed to be 
absorbed in the over-all economy. The process, may not be such when infla­
tion advances.
The problem, writes Dr. Prebisch, is that MST does not come gradually, 
bht it is imposed by the external desequilibrium originated in exports. If 
the process were carried out gradually and the cyclic rise in the import co­
efficient af-fected only those which have no impact on the level of consump­
tion in the masses, the higher cost of substituting activities could also 
be absorbed gradually. But this is not what happened, and the increase in 
costs occursf precisely when income per capita declines or when its growth 
is slowed down... The impact is strongest when imports decline instead of 
rising and when there is a very wide gap in per capita product as between 
export and substitution activities (17) • What are then for the author the 
treasons for the inflationary cost of MST?
1.- Substitution has had to he improvised during critical situations 
without economic feasibility considerations.
2.- The smallness of domestic markets make it necessary to incur in 
exorbitant costs*
3.- The MST process has assumed excessive proportions because of the 
failure to expand export activities pari passu with MST.
When this point of the discussion is reached - the inflationary cost 
of MST -, Dr. Prebisch and other structuralists readily admit that some­
thing has to be done about it-. That is, MST is not discarded and such 
policy induced or autonomous pistakes are recognised, and multiple propo­
sitions are made to construct a new MST policy in the 'context of Latin- 
America's structural and financial problems.
(*See footnote in following page)
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We shall deal with this 'new MST policy* under the heading of 'the Structur­
alist Refora*, although it is fair to advance that not much is to he ex­
pected as we shall note in the following paragraph. Still, resuming, the 
main recommendations centre around the following topics:
1.- The amount and length of protection from the foreign market, or, 
alternatively, the amount of competition reoommfended in the case 
of certain goods.
2.- A foreign trade policy based on subsidies and not tariffs, intended 
to avoid the domestic production of non-essentials and the import 
of essentials.
3.- Regional integration in Latin America, a common market.
4.- The expansion - or creation - of industrial exports to advanced 
countries,
5.-* A foreign exchange policy, with different rates versus devaluation.
6.- In other words enlargening the size of the domestic market (which 
is simply the growth objective) and setting a chain reaction which 
would alter the other structural limitations: income distribution,
unemployment, the use of modern technology, the capacity to import, 
and so forth.
Two major doubts rest in this context. First, the fact the growth 
potential - and hence the tendency to some stability - of the MST model, 
as we shall further see, is a subject of controversy. Second, the need 
of a specific empirical sfcidy on the inflationary cost of MST leaves much 
to be desired. That is, it is not enough to claim that structuralist as 
a rule, based on theoretical logic, arrive simply at the answer of higher 
prices induced by MST. Although there are partial studies on the subject, 
a major effort outside of the scope if this paper is necessary to explore 
the MST inflation in Latin America. There is a need for fundamental na­
tional and sectorial quantitative analysis if one is really to see the role 
of higher costs in the over-all structuralist inflationary thesis.
(From previous page)
In another place Dr. Prebisch writes: 'There is a failure to promote exports. 
There has been discrimination in favour of industrial bustitution and against 
exports, mainly industrial exports... some countries conscious of the need to 
encourage exports, have resorted to multiple rates of exchange. Multiple ex­
change rates have been rejected by monetary orthodox}’, without the applica­
tion of a rational subsidy policy. However, it can happen that, by increas­
ing exnorts beyond a certain point, prices fall both for the increase and 
those that already existed, and the resultant net product is lower than what 
would have heen obtained by substituting activities, and may even be negative. 
This is 'the basic argument in favour of protection in Latin America (lS).
An agenda for future research, improvising, could follow the next process: 
1#- The comparison of the different costs between domestic and foreign 
goods in the different industrial branches.
2.- The construction of a relevant industrial production index that 
comprises those industries where MST appears to be inflationary 
and another where cost disadvantages do not appear.
3*- Based on this data, the construction of an inflationary industrial 
price index.
4.- The measurement of the contribution such an index plays within 
the wholesale and cost of living indices. This %/ould mean not 
only the necessary proof for the structuralist thesis but a course 
for policy decisions, both financial and productive.
Returning to the theoretical doubt on the future of MST models, ECLA. 
writes: . 'The inability of MST to carry the development of most of the Latin 
American countries very much further is a premise that is %/idely accepted by 
economists of the region.•• The Brazilian economy (for example) is no%/ faced 
with a problem of strategy, coupled %/ith other short-term problems, deriving 
from the fact that MST as a development model has already reached its final 
stage and it is no%/ imperative to move on to%/ards a ne%/ and trulyautonomous 
phase (l9).*
As far as the results of continual 2<IST are concerned, other things heir 
equal, it %/ould tend to slow do%vn economic gro%/th. Given the lo%/ import co€ 
ficients - in Argentina and Brqzil two of the lo%/est in the V/e stern %/orld - 
and given the kind of goods that currently constitute the rage of inports
i. e. essentials such as fuels and intermediate goods plus capital goods - 
substitution would lead to investment %/ith a high capital output ratio. In 
other %/ords, it %/ould bring about, over the short-term at least, a process 
of gro%/th %/ith diminishing macro-economic returns. Consequently, for an ec< 
nomy to keep its present pattern, the present rate of expansion %/ould obvioi 
ly be difficult to maintain unless a more intensive rate of investment is 
achieved than has hitherto been the case.
In actual fact, the external bottleneck may paradoxically stimulate 
the gro%/th process only to the extent that there was excess internal demand 
for imported consumdr goods. Substitution of these imports expands the dom­
estic market and generates a demand for capital and intermediate goods %/hic] 
in their turn, produce a fresh external bottleneck, another %/ave of substiti 
tion and so on in succession. •'When, ho%/ever, the process reaches such an a< 
vanced stage that, on the ont hand, the imports not yet replaced by the sub­
stitution process consist chiefly of capital goods, raw materials and in­
termediate products for industry and on the other, the consumer goods
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industries have reached maturity and exhausted the market which was theirs 
by reason of the external bottleneck, the latter ceases to act as an in­
centive to investment and hence to growth, and becomes merely an obstacle.
In other words, the point is reached where the items that make the import 
structure and include categories suitable for substitution are capital 
goods. These may be, however, the products of a consequential demand 
which hoes not in itself justify substitution. Where will the demand come 
from to warrant such substitution) This happens when the expansion of the 
more dynamic consumer goods industries has lost its initial momentum (with 
the saturation of the reserved market) and has come to the point where 
future growth will tend to depend on the rate of income growth.
From this it may be inferred that, when an external bottleneck exists, 
the continuity of the grovrth process depends fundamentally on an autonomous 
demand for capital goods; thereby freeing foreign exchange and thus permit- 
ing the imports of certain raw materials and intermediate goods for which 
domestic production .facilities are inadequate. Autonomous demand of this 
kind has, moreover, an important short-term function to perform, which is 
to prevent the loss of momentum which may well plunge the capitalist sector 
into a depression (in which caase the external bottleneck would be attenuat­
ed, at least as far as the pressure of imports is concerned). Thus, for ECLA 
the strategic problem is how to make the transition from an MST model to a 
self-sustaining grovrth model. In accomplishing the task of bridging the gap 
between the two models, the decisive variable will be the demand for capital 
goods and the volume and composition of government investment. Thus ECLA 
says that only the public sector, with its relative significance within the 
economy is capable of providing autonomous demand on a sufficient scale to 
counterbalance the negative effects of the exhaustion of the external sti­
mulus and a restricted market for domestic consumer goods.
(3) Some empirical evidence
The obvious evidence of MST is to be found in the relative weight of 
the external sector. Following the indicators mentioned above, a reduction 
in the import coefficient with respect to GNP shows the existence of real 
MST (as well as the effect of import contrcJs).
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The Import Coefficient as a Percentage of GNP 1945-64a
Country 1945 1950 1955 I960 1963 1964
Argentina 19.1 7.4 5.7 6.7 5.6 5.6
Brazil 16.6 7.5 5.6 5.7 4.9 4.0
Chile 21.8 11.2 11.6 14.0 12.7 13.7
Colombia 18.7 10.9 13.0 910 7.8 8.6
Peru - 13.0 16.5 14.3 18.1 17.8
Uruguay - 22.2 20.2 14.8 11.1 11.4
Mexico 19.4 11.2 10.5 9.4 9.0 9.8
a) Source: Economic Survey for Latin America, 1966 andl953> U.N. New Yorl
The ahove tplbe shows that in all cases - except for Peru - the im­
port coefficient has been reduced and indicates the possible parallel groi 
of the industrial sector and of MST* Although the 1945 figures appear to 
•too high', the trend reveals that in Brazil and Uruguay the decrease in ■ 
relative importance of the external sector has been remarkable; the same 
true, although there has been fluctuations and a more moderate trend, in i 
gentina, Colombia, and Mexico* In Chile, the import coefficient has tend* 
to fluctuate with a tendency to increase between 1950 and 1964. Pefu of­
fers no doubt: the external sector has gained importance* Thus one may
gather that there was real or absolute MST in the first five countries, 
while MST, if any, was only relative or within the import structure in th< 
last two*
Alternatively, this evidence should be reflected in the increasing 
importance of the industrial sector with respect to GNP.
Manufacturing as a Percentage of GNP - (1950-1965)a
Country 1950 1953 1958 I960 1965
Argentina 29 27 32 32 34
Brazil^) 16#5 18.9 • • 23.4 24.1
Chile 18 17 19 18 18
Colombia 16 15 16 17 18
Peru 14 15 15 17 18
Uruguay0^ 18 19 22 21 23
Mexido * • 23 24 25 26 29
(See Sources in the following page)
a) Sources: For Brazil, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1964,
U.N., New York;
For all the rest, United Nationas Statistical Yearbook, 1966,
U.N., New York.
b) The 1965 figure is an average for 1965-64 and the 1955 figure is 
for 1955.
c) It includes mining which has an insignificant relative importance.
d) The figure is for the whole industrial sector* and construction.
Accordingly, the manufacturing coefficient (and industrialisation and 
MST) has gained relative importance in %/eight in Brazil and only slightly 
less so in Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay. On the other hand, 
the fact that in Chile the import coefficient has not really declined is 
compatible with the almost constant %/eight of manufacturing. Peru presents 
an interesting case where the manufacturing sector has gained importance 
together %/ith a higher import coefficient. Here MST is not visible. This 
could be taken as evidence of gro%/th in t%/o fronts: the expansion of the
external sector has made possible a simultaneous MST process %/ith lesser 
imbalance. Moreover, this is consistent %/ith the fact that the Peruvian 
economy is a gro%/ing one, %/kile the Chilean is stagnating. In all countries, 
of course, the relative weight of the manufacturing sector reveals the degree 
of industrialisation.
Given the indicator of a contracting coefficient for imports, one also 
could measure in principle the MST process observing the behaviour of the 
volume, and.value of imports in absolute terms. That is, the relative de­
crease in the import coefficient could be reflected in absolute terms on the 
value and quantum of imports. This is under the assumption of visible MST 
where no account is taken of substitution happening %/ithin the import struc­
ture - industrialisation taking place at the same time imports increase.
The question is: ho%/ much did the relative decrease in imports re­
flect itself on the actual value and volume of imports? (See tables III 
and V in section b). This %/ould not happen in those co%mtries where the 
importance of the external sector tended to increase. True enough there 
was substantial growth in the value and quantum of Peru's and Chile's im­
ports. The value find quantum of imports has tended to decrease C— although 
severe fluctuations are present - in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uru­
guay. Mexico, on the other hand, despite its relative increase in the ex­
port sector presents a more or less siistained rate of gro%/th in the ab­
solute value of imports. This has made MST easier to carry.
Taking into account that new industrialisation was occuring in all 
countries except perhaps for Chile, how can this information be interpret­
ed with reference specially to the pace of inflation which is the main 
point of interest? A hypothesis can he advanced where a shortage of im­
ports, although stimulating MST, creates a strain on the process that caus­
es increasing inflation. For example, the more scarce imports become the 
higher the strain on existing capacity plus higher costs for imported in­
termediate goods, specially if devaluations and controls are recurrent.
It is true that in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay, where import
shortage has become chronic, inflation has speeded up. But, again, no
*simple correlation could be established • The same is true for Mexico:growingit may'well be that relatively/imports allowed the industrialisation pro­
cess to proceed with a much milder inflation. The Chilean case remains 
to be explained. With an increasing in imports one would have expected a 
slower pace of inflation and hence a lesser strain on the slow industrial­
isation process.
Another indicator of the importance of MST appears in the comparison 
between the rates of growth of GNP and manufacturing (See Table I). In 
broad terns*, it can be said that from 1948 to 1965 the manufacturing secto: 
tended to grow at a much faster rate than GNP. Very fast rates of growth 
can be noted in Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Mexico. In Argentina, Uruguay 
and Chile industrial growth has been more irregular. It appears that Ar­
gentinian manufacturing growth, within the period of study, took place be­
tween 1948 and 1953; after that there was a severe industrial crisis whic! 
lasted until 1963; thereon there seems to he a sharp redovery in 1964-65. 
In Uruguay, on the other hand, the stagnation trend in the early 60's is 
accompanied by a fall in manufacturing growth.
Abstracting from the behaviour in imports, what is important for the 
analysis of the structuralist model is whether there is a relation between 
the 'strained industrialisation taking place' and the rate of inflation. 
Within the theoretical MST model one would expect that the more the indus­
trialisation growth the higher the inflationary tendencies. The state­
ment may be somewhat true for Argentina and Brazil, Chile and Colombia.
In Argentina and Uruguay the stagnation of the industrial sector (1959- 
1962 and 1958-1964) were not accompanied by a fall in the rate of inflatio
Linear regression analysis did not prove useful in the sense (see the 
previous section).
TABLE I
Index Numbers for Real Growth Rates of GNP and Manufacturing 
and the Cost of Living Index - (1965-1948)^
Country 1948 1953 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963
i
1964 1965
Argentina
GNP 78 100 94 102 109 107 103 111 120
MAN 67 65 100 92 • 98 108 100 94 108 120
F 14 46 100 214 282 309 395 491 600 771
Brazil
GNP — 75 100 107 114 123 129 131 136 142
MAN 41 63 100 108 125 138 148 148 153 153
P 25 42 100 137 185 256 390 684 1270 2050
Chile
GNP 89 100 103 100 108 116 119 125 129
MAN 66 94 100 114 112 119 131 139 146 153
P 5 13 100 139 155 167 190 274 400 512
Colombia
GNP 83 100 107 111 116 122 126 134 138
MAN 48 73 100 108 115 122 130 136 144 -
P 45 66 100 107 111 121 124 164 192 199
Peru
GNP 80 100 104 113 122 133 151 149
MAN 62 78 100 109 125 138 152 163 179 -
P 45 74 100 113 122 131 138 148 164 191
Uruguay
GNP 'W 100 ‘ 97 101 104 101 100 102
MAN - — 100 96 99 97 97 96 101 102
P 41 47 100 140 194 207 263 317 454 710
Mexico
GNP 69 100 103 111 115 121 128 141 149
MAN 51 60 100 109 118 123 131 143 162 174
P 47 66 100 102 108 109 110 111 114 118
a) Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1966, UN, New York.
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In Mexico, moreover, as industrialisation proceeded the inflationary rate 
was reduced and in Peru, inflation was mild. These different patterns in­
dicate that it is not convenient to abstract oneself from the external 
sector.
In other words, the general industrialisation evidence should be com­
patible in the structuralist model with the trends found in the external 
sector in the previous section.
In fact, different tendencies should be distinguished. In the group
of countries with relatively favourable external sectors - Chile, Mexico
and pern - the experience was varied. In Peru the growth of the CM and
MGS was reflected in a high import coefficient, a significant rate of -
growth, and mild inflation. And, although important industrialisation
was taking place, growth was more export oriented. In Mexico, there was
expansion in the CM and MGS, in the industrialisation process, in the rat(
of growth and inflation was halted; but the import coefficient declined <
*Thus there was important MST in a realtively stable setting. Chile pre­
sented the worse of all alternatives. Despite the fact that there was a 
cyclical growth of the CM and MGS, the import coefficient and industrial­
isation, the rate of growth tended to stagnate, while inflation was severe 
In the rest of the countries, which experienced a contracting external 
sector, MST has been substantial and the rate of inflation high. Brazil 
and Colombia were capable up to some point in the early 60*s, however, of 
maintaining a high rate of growth. While Argentina and Uruguay were not. 
In Argentina the indicators point that MST had advanced considerably by 
1950 while the Uruguayan domestic market probably offered little more scoi 
for further MST. All these four countries faced a serious external bottle 
neck which has presumably - as it has been seen in the model - made the MS 
process painful and financially more unstable.
Summarising, the relation between the external sector, MST, and infla 
tion offers three experiences in the period of study:
1.- A foreign exchange bottleneck, advancing MST, inflation, and growth
(Brazil and Colombia).
2.- A foreign exchange bottleneck, MST within an industrial crisis, in--
flation, and stagnation (Argentina and Uruguay).
3*- A relatively favourable external sector, advancing MST, mild infla-
tion, and high growth (Mexico and less so Peru).
*In structuralist terms this should not be taken to mean that MST man not 
induce inflation. Simply, when the external sector is expanding and forei 
commitments can be met or postponed, industrialisation may advance with 
considerable “less strain on prices.n n
(See footnote in following page).
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Let us try to look a bit more closely to the MST process and infla­
tion in support of these tentative conclusions.
More conclusive comments can he made in respect to MST as seen 
through changes in the composition of the import structure. There is ev­
idence that the majority of these countries have in these terms, experienc­
ed a good deal of visible MST (see Table Ii). If one takes the consiimcr
goods coefficient it is obvious that substitution has taken place within
this group. The countries that have reduced the coefficient to a very 
small fraction over the 1947-1965 period are, in order of MST importance, 
the following: Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay. Moreover,
this sort of substitution has proceeded at a very faxt pace in all of them 
except for Argentina where this sort of MST started at an earlier date.
'Over-all, Chile does not reveal much substitution in these terms, however,
it is necessary to analyse each country to find the categories and the
periods when visible substitution was taking place and to explore the range
* •of experiences in Latin-Anerica's MST process.
Brazil, for obvious reasons, is the country where the substitution 
process has been more intensive. The consumer-goods coefficient has been 
highly reduced between 1948 and I960. Both categories, non-durable and dur­
able consumer goods, decreased sharply in terms of relative imports; from 
9.8 to 4.p> and from 7*5 to 1.7/b, respectively. After that there was some 
relaxation in protection which pernited slightly increasing imports. Cn 
the other hand, fuel and intermediate product imports have increased their 
importance very much as a corolary of the grovrth in industrial demand and 
the induced demand for imports. The fact that fuels represent 20^ of total 
imports by 1965 is taken as an indicator of rigidity in the import structure. 
Moreover, within the category of intermediate products there is evidence 
that there has been substitution of metallic products, mainly spare parts 
(21). With respect to capital goods there also appears to be considerable 
MST. However, such evidence should he taken with precautions because cap­
ital goods imports have been reduced not so much because of MST as because 
they were the only items that could be cut down in the face of a growing 
bottleneck and balance of payments disequilibrium without paralising in­
dustry. Nonetheless, the creation of the Brazilian car industry has reduc­
ed sharply the import of goods destined to transport.
**(Prom previous page)
The idea that the relationship could resuit in a stable model is an assump­
tion worth exploring in the context of underdevelopment and Latin-American 
case study industrialisation. That is, a ’model1 where an expanding external 
sector,'a ’new1 industrialisation policy, an autonomous demand for capital 
goods, price stability, and sustained grovth are present.
*For specific bibliography on the subject see the footnote (20).
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Argentina's MST process, although less spectacular, has also had 
major proportions* Non-durahle consumer goods' imports were further re­
duced from 7*6 to 3*2$ between 1948 and I960, the same is true for dur­
able consumer goods between 194S and 1963 (from 5.0 to 3*1$)* However, 
reductions in the early 60"*s may be due more to the severe financial and 
production crisis than to MST* On any event, by 1965 the consumer-goods 
coefficient is up to 9*0$ Such MST has been, alternatively, accompanied 
by the increasing importance of intermediate-product imports; in 1965, 
they amount to 52$ of total imports* Fuel imports, on the other,hand, 
have reduced their importance as a consequence of the growing petroleum ex 
ploitation. Capital goods' imports have remained the same between 1948 an 
1965, although they have suffered sharp falls as a result of the fluctua­
tions #of GDP and the deflationary policies (see the case study)* It is 
quite plausible to think that variations were caused by the availability 
of foreign exchange, the sacrifice of the rate of growth, and the gfowing 
restrictiveness of the market*
The MST process in Colombia, as seen in the reduction of the consumei 
goods coefficient, is astonishing. Both durable and Don-durable consumer 
goods' imports have been sharply and consistently reduced from 194? to 19^ 
Ovenll they amounted to 30$ in 1947-49 and only to 11*1$ in 1965* This ea 
troordinary substitution is explained by the fact that Colombia is a late- 
starter in the MST industrialisation model* As a consequence of the pro­
duction of consumer goods, intermediate goods imports and, to a lesser ex­
tent capital goods' imports have increased sustainedly their relative im­
portance* Capital goods have fluctuated perhaps closely %/ith the trend oi 
the CM. ‘ Fuels have never amounted to a significant proportion of Colom­
bia's imports; and, on any event, this small fraction was further reducec
(to 0.9f> in 1965).
Mexico's reduction of consumer goods imports is also very impressive, 
The coefficient %/as sustainedly decreased from 19*0 to 12*1$ bet%/een 1947 
and I960* Both the durable and non-durable proportion of imports was re­
duced* The fact reflected itself in an equally high increase of the pro­
portion of intermediate goods %/hich moved from 53$ in 1947 - 49 to 50$ in 
1965. However, there also appears to be some intermediate-product substi­
tution %/ithin the category* Non-netallic intermediate goods have increas­
ed sharply, %/hile metallic imports have tended to stabilise their propor­
tion* Capital goods' imports rhave also tended to decline, but here the 
reason may again be a shortage of foreign exchange*
*The 1964-65 increase is a result of the more liberal attitude tov/ards im­
ported consumer goods adopted by the military take-over*
3
On
' t
\c\
VO
o\
rH
I
i
H ^
M
% I9 a
I
03
1
I
i
t
o
frt
M'S
1 3
• P
1 3
• o
•  3
3 3
• -P
S 3
S I
I s
H
* 3  • •
«  S
£
r
M 4
I s
5 S
s
H
UN «4> KN 00 H O
O O O O r-l iH iH
CM H CM
r-t VO COKN CO CO Ov VO ON
• • • • • • • • •
C M r-.C O '4 'U N O C M O v C M  
CM CM r -i K\ KV M- M- KV N
O  in vo • • •
t— un un
os un vo • • •
KN ON VO 
H H H
UN O • •
KN H
00 H UN ON ON O ON CM V©
CM KN ON O 00 in KN M- O
ri rt CM rH CM CM iH r-t
UN CM t*- O• • • •
CM KN KN •H"
00
CM CM
Kf VO ON CM
UN 00 rH UN VO «4" O
• • • • • • • • •
VO t— ^  UN CM KN UN NN ■H'
Ov CO 
• • 
Ov UN 
kT KN
00
O
ON rH KN O
CM VO 
KN KN UN
VO *4" rH ON KN VO 00 VO O
& rH CM KN KN KN pM VOCM CM CM KN UN KN KN
CO VO 00 ON UN KN KN t-- O
cm cm r— -h- r*-
VO ON S  M rH
-H- CM t— KN O 03
H rH rH- rt rH
ON H
H iH
KN O O • • •
t— ON O
VO rH CM VO • • «
KN OV ON ON
t— o KN O » • •
f -  00 ON
t— C*- H O OO KN UN
• • ON •
UN •H" • VO UN KN KN
CM
VO
CM
V
00
00 
CO VO
KN CM O O• • • •
KN *4 -4- -4*
00 KN O • •
UN
ON
UN O iH CM KN *4" UN
UN VO VO VO VO VO VO
On ON On Ov On On On On
rH rH rH iH iH iH
KN CM CM 
• • • 
O O O
kn un m  in in 
• • • • • 0 0 0 0 0
KN O UN KN 00 VO KN UN
ON M- CO 
KN KN CM ft UN UN KN KN O CO KN CM CM
ON UN CM 00 KN VO *4
I 00 On vo o  ^  CO N  in
iH rH
M- m  co hON h- rH rH UN• • • • • •
CD UN 1*- rH KN ON
rH iH rH CM CM rH
CM KN O On On VO »H O• • • • • • • «
VO KN UN KN CM CM KN KN
CM KN M- 00 VO -rf KN KN• • • • • • • «
KN KN CM KN CM KN CM CM
KN O
O KN t— UN VO CO H CM vo
KN KN KN KN KN KN KT
UN CM UN K*- CM O CM KN O
• • • • « » ♦ « »
KN Q) H 00 ON rH CM UN VO
CM CM KN CM CM KN KN KN KN
On ir KN rH UN vo O O
• • • • • • • •
vo in  vo C" C—  t—  On C— O
O
KN KN CM VO CM VO -H" VO C'-
c— in  ov un vo vo
O UN O O CM KN KN H• • « • • • • •
KN KN rH CO f - vo vo ON
r -i CM rH rH iH rH rH
t-
UN ON CO 
• • rH
N  in  H
un t—• • 
r l rt •
co ^• • •
rH rH H
CO -Vj- «H UN CM VO CM KN• • • •
UN UN VO VO
CO O UN O rH CM KN *4’ UN
UN UN VO VO VO VO VO vo
On on On on on On on on on 
r H t H i H r H H r H r H H » H
oJ
• H
as
O -P
“ I
J *h* O Eh£• o
4  rH
5 3
5 4
3 1
*4
9 S  
. 3  « S  
« £
K\ rH <4- <4-• • • • •o o o o o
o o\ o 
• • • 
CM O rH
O  rH h* On
in
ON
r** 00 On ^
»  s i  $  \o kn <?\ k\ tn  cmKJV KN KN KN KN
3  ^  ^©. vo On
CM
O
CM UN CM CM rH VO• • • • • •
KN Ot KN ON O CO
rH rH rH rH
VO KN O CO CO KN KN
O O O v ^ - r H C M K N C M ^ C M
H r H H C V I C M C M C M C M C M
O K N ^ H O ^ C O C N C N
K N r H K f - C M K N C M r H r H H
O t -  • •VO vo
IT) (0 IA H • • • •
KN KN UN UN 3 3
00 • •
O ^ t - N N C M I A V O H
rH KN O CM CM CM ON 00 rH 
M H ^ K N K N K N K N K N m
O KN KN KN CVJ M IA KN« • « » • • • • *
UN CD r*- ON ON ON t— UN 00
KN KN KN CM CM CH KN KN KN
O H M H
VO
UN CO• •
UN KN KN KN CM
CO
CM
rH 00 • *
KN CM
a  s
00 UN • • rH
KN O • rH rH vo
co un t*— o• • • •
UN UN
o rH CM CO UN CO IIN
• • • • • • • • •
CM CM KN UN UN VO UN KN UN
rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH
O KN CO rH CO O VO O• • • • • • • • •
KN CM CM ■4- 'H' KN KN CM CM
O CO VO t— CO ON t -
• • • • • • • • •
s
ON
s S a
CM
rH
CM
rH S
KN
rH
?
22. Q UN Q rH CM KN UNUN UN vO VO VO vo vo VO
00 ON ON ON ON ON ON On ON
rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH
UN NO CM KN VO t—• VO rH 
I O O r H r H r H r H r H C M
UN CM ^  KN CM ON CO CO CM 
C p K N O N O r — t— C O O K N( A i a » > ^ k v k \!a h h
H ON UNVO H  CA IA VO• • • • •
I O rH ON CO GO O ON 00
O M CO CO H KN CO
CO CM M- KN M- H  VO
rH CM CM CM CM CM CM
VO vo vo ON CM VO 
• • • * * * *  
UN UN v* UN
KN
UN
H- ON CO t *  H 00 rH rH CO• • • • • • • • •
UN vo M’ UN Vt H1 in H*
O CO H- vo co ON ■H- UN
KN UN rH O 
CM KN KV M KN’' S U S S
( O C M H H h - V O I A H  • • • • • • • •
I rH t— KN rH KN KN CM KN
KN CM KN KN KN KN KN KN
O CM UN CM CO
I "H- vl- VO UN
O CO t— On t—• • • • •
KN CM KN rH rH
CO rt ON• • •
rH rH O
O C O r H K N O N r H C M O N r H
O O t*- #H vo, KN CM Tt- rH. 
K N C M r H r H r H r H r H f H r H
A- rH VO UNCO t— t*-ON • • • • • • • •I h h M - C O M K N K N K N
T
£
rH
r H O  N  H  KN UN PI CM
KN O VO CO CO CO 00 C*"*
Q U N O r H C M K N ^ f U N  
UN UN VO VO VO VO VO VO 
Ov on On on on on On on 
r H r H r H i H r H r H r H r H
Yea
r 
Con
sum
er 
Goo
da 
Fue
ls 
R.M
. 
and
 
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
 
Pro
duc
ts 
Co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
 
Cap
ita
l 
Goo
ds 
to:
 
• 
, 
Va
ri
ou
s 
Non
-Du
r 
Dur
abl
e 
Tot
al 
Me
ta
ll
ic
 
No
n-
Me
ta
ll
io
 
Tot
al 
Ma
te
ria
ls 
Ag
ri
cu
l*
 
Ind
ust
ry 
Tra
nsp
, 
To
ta
l
I r H r H O O O O O O
o VO VO t - On UN ON
• • • • • • • • •
ON KN iH UN t*- O o UN
KN KN KN KN KN k*- KN
ON KN t "
KN ON ON H CO
• • • • •
CM •H CM iH o
rH rH rH H H
O IC\
• •■*£ VO CM iH
VO
rH UN ON CO CM
• • • • • •
rH CM VO k* CM KN
CM CM CM CM CM CM
O vo CO VO VO VO
• • • ON • • •
KN CM •
CM
CM CM CM
O VO o VO
• • • •trv ir\ co •*}-
KN ON ON
• • • •
UN UN vc
o CM t*7 rH t— rH O CM rH• • H • « « • • *
KN
KN a ONCM CMKN a COCM t-~CM ONCM OKN
O r- ON VO VO VO vo VO rH
• • • • • • • • 4
ON vo VO UN KN CM UN
CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CJ CJ
O l f t f f l l A H I A M ' i O  
• • • • • • • • •M - K V M - i A i n M ' M ' M ' l A
o O rH VO KN rH CO rH CM
• • • • • • • • •
CM CM KN KN KN CM KN KN
O O UN f - VO O CO rH« • • • • • • • •
CM t— vo CM CM rH UN UN M-
CM CM CM. CM CM CM CM CM CM
O f- o CM o KN c- VO CO
• • • • • • • • •
KN t— ON CO ON 00 ON a ON
o VO UN UN VO kJ- KN CM KN
• • • • • • • • •
On ON f - •’H- KN KN UN UN
rH rH H rH rH rH rH rH rH
§I
rH H
UN O rH CM KN UN
UN VO VO VO VO vo VO
ON ON ON ON ON ON ON
rH rH rH rH H rH rH
vo
I u n c m  co
VO KN CM On ON O t—
• • • • • • • •
rH k* UN ■'3’ VO CM CO KN
KN CM CM CM CM KN CM CM
CM ■**- CO t—  k n  o n  o n• • • • • •IA t—  CVI UN CM t—
*** UN rH ON CM ON ON
• • • • • • •
CO UN CM UN KN
rH rH rH rH ■rH rH H
O  M- K\ KV M  CM C\
KV H  H rH rH O
Ov O  M  l f» ( 0 KV Ift• • • • • • •
KN CM CM CM KN KN
VO r- UN
• • •
CM r- rH
CM KN kJ-
ON VO CO rH
Q vo
KN CM
rH UN ON
• • •
rH Tj- rH
KN KN KN
• •
O  ITv
KN
rHKN
VO o CM t- rH CM rH *
• • • • . • • •
VO ON UN UN vo
KN o t— KN KN ON CO
• • • • • • • •
ON t— UN CO rH CM CM vo
rH rH H rH rH rH
C- H CM O CM O O KN
• • • • • • • •vo vo ON ON rH f'-
KN CM rH rH rH rH CM rH
VO VO t— KN CO rH VO
• • • • • • •
1 VO KN KN UN KN CM rH
UN VO KN ON CM ON• • • • • •
1 r - o rH KN UN 00 UN«H rH rH rH rH rH rH
Tr- o UN O rH CM KN
UN UN VO VO VO VO VO
On On On ON ON On ON ON
rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH
co
nt
in
ue
d
IO CM KN OO • K* KN o
<m -«t h  a\ t>» kn *t o  • • • • • •  • •  O l ^ ( A T f ( \ J N r ) ( D  
"rf HA KN KN KN 04 '•J- KN
IO r- IO oo KN IO rH KN
• • • • • • • •
'V- IO r- KN KN r - IO
O t - O IO IO f -
• • • • • • • •
KN CM -V •"V CM rH o CM
CM CM CM CM CM CM KN KN
NO o CM ON 00 KN NO KN
• • • • • • • •
IO KN CM r -i CM KN KN
00 ON t*- r -i IO UN o
• • • • • • • •
t— IO KN KN CM CM
T t N ^ O N i n O f f l N
ON f -  t— O KN ONKNKN^-^tTj-lT\Nt, '<t
ON 00 O t** O ON
CO VO KN o  KN UN | |
CNI CNJ KN KN KN KN
IfN ^  CNI (A H• • • • • •
O O H Nt <«t I Ir-i r-i r-i r-i r-i r-i
r -i NO H NO UN lO 00 r -i
• • • • • • • •
•< r- KN CM CM rH CM
o o rH OO CM KN CM O
• • • • • • • •
UN UN CM CM KN CM O o
rH r-l «—1 H rH t- i rH r-i
IO UN o NO t—
• • • • • • • •
C" 00 IO NO UN UN IO
KN o NO 00 NO ON UN NO
• • • • • • • •
00 t— VO NO t"- VO UN -*■
IO S rH CM KN IOUN VO VO VO VO VO
ON ON ON ON ON ON ON
r -i r -i rH rH rH rH rH
.) 
S
o
u
rd
e
* 
E
c
o
n
o
a
io
 
S
u
rv
e
y
s 
fo
r 
L
a
ti
n
 
A
n
e
r
io
a
, 
19
67
, 
19
56
 
an
d 
19
52
, 
U
*N
*f 
Ne
* 
Y
o
rk
parison vitli international price trends and their integration into the 
wholesale and cost of living indices, once their relative weight is det- 
ermied would presumably reveal the real role MST has played in the infla­
tionary process. In so far as much quantitative information is unavailable 
the structuralist argument remains inconclusive* This is not to say that 
the particular theoretical model appears unconvincing - ana analysis of 
the structure of the domestic market indeed reveals reason to expect in­
flation and induced financial instability - but merely that the verifica­
tion and the empirical process remains to be done.
However, so as not to end this section vith such inconclusiveness, a 
aodeSt and indirect test was devised to try to establish a statistical re­
lationship between MST and inflation, Annual • changes in the relative weight 
of some' import groups within the import structure. Consumer goods and in­
termediate products where visible MST was present in the majority of cases 
were reduced to time series and correlated linearly to changes in the cost 
of living (see Table III). Surprisingly enough in the important cases the 
correlation was high and of the correct sign. That is, as industrialisa­
tion advanced MST was reflected in a drop in the relative weight of non­
durable and durable consumer-goods imports; and the fact was negatively 
and significantly correlated to annual increases in prices. Alternative­
ly, MST was reflected in an increase in the relative weight of raw-mater­
ial and intermediate-product imports; and the fact was positively and sig- 
aificantly correlated to annual increases in prices. There are, of course, 
axceptions to this tentative test.
The best correlations were found in Brazil, (-0.68 and + 0.86), Colom­
bia (-0.69 and +0.76), Mexico (-0.92 find +0.S3) aud only less so in Argen­
tina (-0.84 and +0.99)* In /Argentina, although the total correlations are 
significant, there were no correlations in the cases of consumer durable 
Imports and non-metallie intermediate-product imports. This does not mean 
that there was no MST in durable-consumer imports. As it nay be seen in 
Table II, the first group only amounted to 4£ of total imports by 1965» and 
the second absorbed 35^ of total imports in the same year, l/hat this means 
Is that MST of durable consumer goods had taken its significant step before 
the 1950's while non-metallic imports were so high already by the same years 
that they could net be increased further without sacrificing what perhaps were 
essential import items in the other groups or that import controls were in­
troduced as a consequence of the external disequilibrium.
Individual wholesale price indices for each of the groups of imported goods 
would have been much preferable; unfortimately compatible domestic price 
indices for these classification or sufficiently long series were not found.
Uruguay also - despite its small domestic market - presents conj 
able MST in the consumer goods sector* Although in this case the re< 
of the proportion of imports is with respect to durable consumer goo< 
while non-durables, essential for Uruguay*s economy, have tended to i 
tain their proportion* Moreover, by the mid-1960's it is true that i 
imports have also been reduced because of the financial crisis the e< 
is experiencing* Still, in so far as MST has advanced in this secto] 
proportion of fuel and intermediate product imports has tended to cl] 
especially in those years when the foreign exchange bottleneck was 1< 
severe* On any event, by 1964 these two categories add up to more tl 
of total imports. The rigidity in these items is reflected in the f* 
the proportion of capital goods* imports have fluctuated with a tend< 
decline* •
0
Chile and Peru do not present any sharp changes in the structure
imports* In Peru there have hardly been any changes in the proportit
intermediate and capital goods* imports; in any case, both have tenc
decrease* This is reflected in a slight increase of the proportion c
sumer goods* However, while it is true that the importance of durab]
suraer goods* has increased considerably imports of non-durables have 
*weight * The picture may be interpreted as a case where the MST pro< 
only beginning to take place and where the expansion of the capacity 
port hides any visible MST. Chile*s case, although similar in quantd 
terms, is a different one. Presumably here industrialisation took p] 
before the 1950*s. That it, the durable consumer-goods coefficient \ 
ready 3«0$ in 1948 and 2*0$ in 1965* Non-durables have increased the 
proportion because they represent essential food imports. On the ot! 
hand, if no MST has been taking place in consumer goods and intermedd 
goods imports have remained more or less the same, fuel imports have 
importance and capital goods' have increased slightly. The first ma} 
count for some substitution and the second for the maintenance of the 
pacity in the industrial sector*
However much these changes in the composition of imports tell at 
MST, they say nothing about the inflationary nature of the prodess, 
information, as it was said, could be used to construct the relevant 
dustrial production and price series where MST takes place. Their ic
The fall in the import of foodstffs could be also related to the rec 
distribution of income (see section e^ and case study).
In Peru and Uruguay, as expected, the correlations were only occasion­
al* MST, vitliin the import structure, in Peru is only visible in non-dur- 
able consumer goods and in the fact that the importance of metallic inter­
mediate products has increased* In Uruguay no reduction of non-durable 
consumer goods could be expected as the country is dependent on imported 
foodstuffs; but the reduction in the relative importance of durable con­
sumer imports was somewhat related to inflation (-052). Moreover, the 
limited scope of industrialisation and the fact that the economy was stag­
nant from I960 to 1965 is reflected in a stagnation of the importance of 
intermediate-product imports. Nonetheless, this last group absorbed 37? 
of total imports in 1964 (See again Table II),
In Chile no significant correlations were found, and those found were 
of the’wrong sign. Inflation was, of course, very strong, but industrial­
isation as reflected on the import structure and within 1948-1965 was very 
weak. The positive coefficient of 0.67 for consumer non-durable imports 
merely indicates that Chile's need for imported foodstuffs has been increas­
ing together with inflation. The fact that there was a correlation of also 
the wrong sign (-0.66) for metallic-intermediate product imports is not very 
significant. Beca\ise its weight on the import structure (5 to 6^) has al­
ways been low (See Table II). ' Two hypothesis, however, could be advanced: 
(1) there was MST in this category; or (2) tr«* weak industrialisation pro- 
sess has not been able to afford such items.
Returning to the significant correlations, the indirectness of the 
best should be stressed. A more appropriate test ought to be the direct 
sorrelation between the domestic production of import substitutes for con­
sumer goods and their wholesale price indices, '.vith respect to the increas­
ing derived demand for intermediate-product imports the 'indirectness* is 
juite obvious. The inflationary impact of this demand comes via the pro- 
>lems it may cause in the balance of pajanents, the exchange rate, and tariffs 
tnd controls.
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d) Infrastructure (Public Expenditure and Income).
Perhaps within the structuralist inflationary thesis the cause of infla­
tion that has been dealt with less is the one that relates to what may ini­
tially be called infrastructure bottlenecks. In many of the best known struc­
turalist models - for example with Dr. Prebisch, profesor Seers, Dr. Sunkel, 
etc — one only reads that, among other structural factors, inflation may be
accelerated by an inelastic supply of infrastructure works and services, es-*pecially assuming growth. Sunkel puts it in the following words: 'The in­
dustrialisation process has been shown to mean largely a process of integra­
tion of a domestic market economy of a fractured nature. It requires there 
fore a network of roads, railways, energy and communications systems and 
other forms of basic social capital... as industrialisation proceeds, bottle­
necks may develop in these sectors and the flow of production will be obsta 
culised and inputs may become more expensive... This picture of rigid and 
outdated economic and institutional structures incapable of responding to 
the demands of a dynamic industrial sector and a growing urban population 
is probably the main explanatory element of the sectorial distortions, in­
flationary pressures, balnnce of payments deficits and social tensions, that 
lend to appear along the process of transformation of the economy' (l).
Insufficient attention lias been given to the study of the relationships 
between the structural functioning of the whole Latin-American public appara­
tus - with emphasis on infrastructure - and the inflationary spiral. This 
is not to say that monetarists have not looked into the matter. They have 
but in a non-structural manner. That is, from an orthodox point of view 
monetarists consider that budget deficits, deficit financing, and debt manag­
ing are one of the main, if not the first, causes of inflation. Structural­
ists, on the other hand, and with important qualifications, admit that this 
is a propagating or secondary cause of inflation; but insist that the main 
cause of inflation within the public sector lies not in the process of def­
icit financing but in the 'structural reasons' - the behaviour of public in­
vestment and public incomes - that result in bud&et deficits. In the analysis 
of these 'structural reasons' lies the link between budget deficits and the 
behaviour of a nation's infrastructure. However, it appears that the link 
is only implicit in the structuralist argum ent. Thus the intention of this 
work is to establish the link in cm explicit fashion that will further dif­
ferentiate the monetarist and structuralist positions and that will enable 
one to see, however superficially, the role of the public sector through
It is usually said that through population growth, KST industrialisation, wage 
and salary demands pressure is exerted an infrastructure and inflationary tottl 
necks appear; something which depends on the trend of public investment.
infrastructure in inflation* However, before going into this proposition 
it is convenient to say something about the conven 11 tliehretical back­
ground, terminology, and the limitations the work will find*
The role of infrastructure bottlenecks in inflation, or alternative­
ly, the aim of public investment in reaching long-run equilibrium may be 
said to be a corollary of Keynesian economics* In contrast to the more 
orthodox public finances of the XIX century, which aimed at the lowest 
possible level of state expenditure and at minimum interference with the 
free play of private interests, recent public finances are characterised 
by active state participation in the economy with a view to weakening viol­
ent cyclical fulctuations, maintaining the level of employment and, what 
structuralists emphasise, promoting the growth of income, correcting mal­
adjustments in certain parts of the economic mechanism and even producing 
a distribution of national income in harmony with some set of social prin­
ciples* These objectives have been accompanied by an enormous increase in 
state expenditure, revenues, and public debt; something which is a char­
acteristic of most countries today, specially those which are highly indus­
trialised* With respect to Monetarists and Structuralists, they broadly 
agree with these objectives*
Heiatively speaking, advanced countries have been more successful in 
these objectives and use of policy than the Latin-American nations* The 
lack of success may be interpreted in Latin America in terms of the contro­
versy and of the persistent disequilibrium* In eclectic terms it is said 
that in Latin America modifications and reforms in taxation systems and 
the structure of expenditure are in 'their formative years' and have not 
been established in accordance with plans formulated for long-term require­
ments, but rather have been carried out as emergency measures to meet chang* 
ing conditions in the economy* The general idea is that governments, apart 
from social or political behaviour, have been obliged to undertake the coon 
truction of railways, highways, ports, electric energy plants, and irriga­
tion words, plus other subsidies, as well as expenditure on health, educa­
tion, research, and technological training, plus agrarian and industrial 
undertakings, and the protection of the domestic economy from trends or 
fluctuations in the external sector. But for structuralists the role of 
the state in promoting conditions favourable to growth is not restricted 
only to these expenditures* Its functions are even more important when 
considered from the angle of the need to increase national savings and to 
channel investment towards productive actitities* 'The most suitable in­
vestment, writes ECLA, from the aspect of the overall economy does not al­
ways coincide with the interests or inclinations of the private investor
in countries where consumption has absorbed and tends to absorb a growing 
proportion of income, where an exaggerated propensity for luxury consump­
tion or for non-production investment exists, or where a substantial share 
of total savings usually immigrates abroad* (2)* Fiscal measures are 
thought to be among the most suitable, if not the best, instruments for ac­
complishing productive and social aims. The fact has created the need to 
obtain capital and credit for specific private and public activities, par­
ticularly in agriculture and industry, which have no other satisfactory 
financial resources than those of the state. Hence the pressure on State 
expenditure has not only come from traditional demands ibut from growth 
requirements. Moreover, a substantial additional burden for the govern­
ment of the inflationary countries has been the policy of maintd.ning relat-
0
ive low prices for essential goods and for certain goods and services of 
prime necessity, such as fuels, transports, and some raw materials requir­
ed for consumer industries. This has been the case in Argentina, Chile, 
Brazil and Mexico. In some, cases these subsidies, have been absorbing in­
creasing proportions of the budget, as compared with smaller increases on 
current expenditure on administration and public investment.
Stating demands on public expenditure in these terms, however, shows 
different policy thinking between structuralists and monetarists. The lat­
ter agree to the use of public expenditure within the framework of ortho­
dox fiscal and monetary policies but admit lesser state interference in 
the form of direct controls or certain typos of public investment. Atten­
tion to such a controversy was given in another place; here what interests 
us with respect to inflation is the fact that monetarists, in a crude gene­
ralisation only admit that public expenditure that can be *afforded' in 
fiscal and monetary-equilibrium terms and regard budget deficits and debt 
financing as a source of inflation. Structuralists, also an very crude 
terms, would insist on the need to go ahead with public investment as a 
means of reducing infrastructure bottlenecks and hence reducing cost- 
price inflation in the long-run. Vihether such an approach is permissive 
in an inflationary sense would depend on the short and medium term precau­
tions that are taken by monetary and budgetary policy to finance expendi­
tures in a nore-or-less inflationary way.
")
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The problem is related to the broader one of the strudture of taxation 
in Latin America. A rapid solution for meeting the growing requirements of 
the state appears to be the expansion of the tax system. A first limitation 
is the low level of per capita income and the impossibility or undesirabili­
ty of reducing the consumption capacity of broader sectors of the population 
With high-income groups the danger of the incidence of a very high taxation 
is to discourage private investment or stimulate the outflow of capital, as 
well as discourage private investment, although this has not been proven. 
Another relative limitation is the inadequate technical level of the public 
administration for the efficient handling of fiscal resources and expendi­
tures as well as eliminating corruption. The post-war fiscal experience in
Latin America inclines one to think this is a iong-run obstacle.
The result of the trends in public expenditure and incomes are insuf­
ficient public savings to cover a broad set of government requirements.*Such an outcome reflects itself on budget deficits and on the different 
methods of deficit financing. The obvious point is that the pressure on 
public expenditure has contributed on a large scale - together with the 
passivity of the taxation structure - to the inflation of the region. It
is convenient to remember, however, that monetarists concentrate on the ex­
istence of budget deficits as an important cause in the inflationary spiral, 
while structuralists are interested on the processes that created such def­
icits and such inflationary financing and, paradoxically, an infrastructure 
analysis which creates the need to stimulate public investment if inflation 
is to be stopped some day. Professor Grunwald puts it in the following 
terms :
'The other category of structural factors has to do with the in-
V /stability of government revenues in the face of the figidity of y~ 
government expenditures... current expenditures are relatively 
rigid consisting principally of salaries and social security con­
tributions. If, for some reason, public employment cannot be 
reduced significantly, it is clear that when revenues drop to 
lower income, the only item that can be effectively curtailed 
is public investments. The first factor, the curtailing of pub­
lic investments, will be detrimental to economic development; 
the second, deficit financing, will create inflationary pressures.
With respect to central government finances it was seen that considerable 
budget deficits persist in the inflationary countries (See chapter 2).
* *
The above quotation should he understood with precautions: it applies
to Chile.
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Yet institutional obstacles make it difficult to expand public 
revenues. Tax collection is deficient and the government re­
lies heavily upon indirect taxation, -which is relatively easy 
to administer. This makes the tax system less progressive- than 
it could be... the indirect tax structure is in itself inflation­
ary because whenever revenues have to be increased, recourse to 
this tax system will have a direct effect on increasing the price 
level' (3).
With this introduction in mind the next stop it to establish what was 
called the explicit thesis behind the structuralist generalisations on the
0
role of infrastructure bottlenecks in inflation.
(l)A Theoretical proposition and its limitations
It is useful to start with a general and somewaht arbitrary summary of 
the monetarist positions
a) The fact that chronic and significant budget deficits persist in these 
Latin-American countries means that public expenditure has exceeded sub­
stantially public incomes.
b) Recourse has been taken to inflationary deficit-financing devises.
c) Deficit financing may be executed through foreign debt, domestic debt 
of the printing of money. With respect to domestic debt, the floating of 
public debt, let alone the creation of money, increases the liquidity of 
the monetary system and leads to new credit formation. Assuming a given 
behaviour in the velocity of circulation, bank rate policy, liquidity and 
cash ratio controls, the characteristics of the capital market, and so on, 
the result may well be an expansion in the supply of money and inflation.
d) The initial cure is to reduce dificit financing and to balance budgets.
The implicit structuralist position is better understood from an un­
orthodox angle:
a) Fiscal policy and inflation, in general and infrastructure and budget 
deficits, in particular, should not be analysed outside the process of 
growth. This means evaluating the role of public investment, a growth 
factor which perhaps is inflationary in the short-run and as stabilising 
policy measure in the long-run.
b) Nonetheless, the structuralist argument implies vaguely - aside from 
the existence of budget deficits - that the perseverance of infra­
structural bottlenecks reflects itself in the short-run on higher 
costs, dis-economies of scale, public subsidies and so on, some­
thing which contributes substantially to inflation.
c) Hie following extremist proposition may be deduced. A fall in the
rate of public investment will lead to further inflation in the 
setting of a country undergoing industrialisation. Monetarists, 
explicitly, recommend a reduction in public expenditure when bud­
get deficits are chronic.
d) Coming to the fiscal system, structuralists would stress the exis­
tence of an inelastic tax structure and inadequate budgetary ex­
penditure, and hence budget deficits; and, cuts in public invest-
0
ment, infrastructure bottlenecks, and hence inflation 9 •
e) The cure does not lie in cutting budget deficits per se hut in modi­
fying the structure of public expenditure and income. The analysis 
could he undertaken in the form of the fiscal reform proposed by 
structuralists. This section, however, will concentrate on how 
budget deficits arise, how public investment explains the existence 
of the reduction of infrastructure bottlenecks and to what extent 
the variables involved are reflected in price movements.
Said in the above terms the proposition, both in theoretical implica­
tions and because of empirical limitations, lies outside the scope of this 
work. Theoretically wise the generalisations and simplifications are too 
vide; one would have to define the sort of public sector one is referring 
to; the ‘dividing line* between the public sector and the private sector 
is a controversial issue. Furthermore, a study of the overall public 
sector in many Latin-American countries will meet with serious if not in­
superable statistical and classification limitations.
The first thing to clarify is that, in the context of the structural­
ist argument, one is referring to the setting of a 'mixed-econongr semi-in- 
dustrialised country', where, in some cases, private and public activities 
can be easily separated and where, in other, private and public enterpris 
es appear in a mixed fashion. A simple way of clarifying such different 
or mingling functions may be achieved by defining the term infrastructure. 
Terms such as infrastructure, social overhead capital, public works, or
total public investment within the overall government sector are usually
*employed as synonims. Infrastructure in a restricted sense, means the 
*'For a discussion on the subject, vith reference to UDC, see R. Nurkse 
and A. 0. Eirschman (4).
foundation underlying a nation's economy (transportation and communication 
systems, power facilities, and other public services) upon which the de­
gree of economic activity depends (industry, agriculture and trade)..It 
may include such intangible assets as the educational level, social atti­
tudes, industrial skills, and administrative experience. Because of its 
essential nature it is discussed in connection Kith the growth problems 
of UDC* The building of the infrastructure, which generally involves 
high initial costs and a very long payoff period, is mostly carried out 
by the public sector (although in some special cases there might be private 
intervention). This definition, however, is too restricted if one wants 
to evaluate the overall role of public investment in Latin-America; a role 
that in many cases goes beyond the traditional state intervention in the 
form of public services. Under such an assumption, infrastructure would 
have to include all the projects adopted by the government (and the parti­
cipation of the government in private undertakings) that are not undertaken 
(or are insufficiently undertaken) by citizens or private enterprises and 
that are essential for the growth and other economic objectives of the 
country.
This global definition of public investment would, of course, have 
to include all other public sector current expenditure and its counterpoint; 
fiscal and non fiscal revenues* The main serious limitation is that a sys­
tem for classifying within one account the overall transactions of the pub­
lic sector does not exist, at least for our ^atin-American countries and**the period of study. Moreover, the poverty of the statistical material 
and the nature of the national classification criteria hinder comparabili­
ty between the different countries. Let us then point out the limitations 
we sense, grouping them and starting with the government sector and working 
up towards the overall public sector. The exercise may be significant be­
cause it is necessary to overcome such limitations if one is to understand 
how infrastructure bottenecks have - or have not- been met by different gov­
ernments and how the existence of such cost inflation is being reduced or 
let to develop, Without such information, the structuralist thesis on the 
causes of inflation is vague and incomplete.
Limitations
a) The economic classification total government expenditure should in­
clude central government, local authorities, and municipalities.
These consolidated accounts, in the case of international statis­
tics are available for Brazil, Chile and Peru. Argentina*s, Col- 
onbi'a's and Ecuador's presentations include the central govera-
*This is, a generalisation for the inflationary countries. Since the early
60*s Chile has had consolidated accounts for fiscal and public sectors and
Argentina Brazil and Mexico are working towards a consolidation. But in no case are there consolidated accounts for the 104b-6ri neriorl-
ment plus the expenditures of public or decentralised institu­
tions, but do not include provincial expenditure. Mexico's ac­
counts, for the greater part of the 1946-65 period, only include 
federal government expenditure. For these cases where public ex­
penditure is incomplete ECLA (5) has estimated that the relative 
weight of provincial and municipal expenditure in government ex­
penditure is around 22$ in Argentina, 40$ in Colombia, 18$ in 
Mexico and 36$ in Ecuador, ^ence the figures that shall be used 
are short of about these percentages.
b) With respect to fiscal incomes the limitation is less serious.
It is not exaggerated to claim that in Latin America the over­
whelming collection of revenues is done by the central govern­
ment.
c) The main problem is to incorporate to the government's fiscal 
accounts the expenditure and revenues of autonomous or semi- 
autonomous government agencies or mixed enterprises. The ad­
dition of both components would result in the pubic sector's 
total accounts. It is obvious that these 'autnnomous enter­
prises' are determinant in so far as infrastructure is concerned.*
d) With respect to public investment and infrastructure trends, the 
problem remains to aggregate the accounts into the fiscal sys­
tem. When these enterprises mobilise non-fiscal financial re­
sources - through the attraction of private savings or foreign 
loans - the effects on the economy from the fiscal point of view 
may not be measurable. Moreover, the oudes and the amount of 
their expenditure, as well as of their profits or deficits may 
not appear in the government's accounts. Sufficient data for 
this purpose were not available and, as a consequence, only 
those funds contributed by the government sector will be in­
cluded (this time for most of the 50's, while in later years 
some figures are found for wider parts of the public sector,
except for Mexico.
e) In summary (following ECLA.) the increasing importance of auto­
nomous enterprises - in the proportion of fiscal investment and
as recipients of foreign credits - are creating problems to public 
administration, especially in the coordination of these activities
*They include enterprises of a commercial or industrial nature; housing 
institutions and public works; agencies that regulate production or the 
market por certain products; credit institutions; social security in­
stitutes, and so on. In general they have arisen and developed because 
their functions required operating, financing, administrative and account­
ing devices which are normally different from those used in fiscal adminii 
tration or because certain governments may be prohibited from underdaking 
certain activities.
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with those of the government sector. The knowledge and solution 
of these problems is determinant for the future of fiscal policy.
With the limitations - fiscal sistenatisation aid lack of proper 
date - the next step is to examine the thesis on inflationary bottle­
necks* This comprises the study of how budget deficits appear (that is, 
the trends in public expenditure and revenue) and the trends in public 
investment. The first point is the structuralist answer to the monetar­
ist argument that seeks 'the balancing of budgets' and does not probe 
deeper into the causes of such deficits, as it was seen in its proper 
place. The second part relates to how far public investment contributed 
to reduce infrastructure bottlenecks and hence inflation, in the context 
of growth.
(2) The behaviour of some fiscal indicators and inflation.
0
With respect to monetarism, this study reached the conclusion that
one cannot generalise in Latin America about therelationship between in-**flation and budget deficits. Except for a high correlation in Brazil, 
and insignificant ones in Argentina and Colombia, there is insufficient 
evidence that budgetary deficits are an 'original'cause of inflation nor 
are they sufficiently related in a statistical sense to prices. In fact, 
negative correlations were found in Mexico and Chile; meaning that the 
higher the deficits the lower the pace of inflation. At best, following 
monetarism, it could be said that in those countries with large budget 
deficits (Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia only) the rate of inflation was 
higher and that, sometimes, years of very high inflation were preceeded by 
large deficits.
In Brazil it is fair to insist, however, that monetarists have a case. 
This may be seen apart from the large deficits, in the fact that current 
government expenditure has expanded significantly while, the capital forma­
tion of the government sector has stagnated from 1950 to 1966 and the total 
gross fixed capital formation of the public sector has declined.
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This section will not include Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay. In all 
cases the date available was insufficient and disconnected. This is 
particularly infortunate, because, especially in Bolivia and Paraguay, 
monetarists believe that excessive current-administration expenditure 
was an original cause of inflation. See the works of Mr, Zondag and 
Mr. J. Pincus (6). In general terms the Uruguayan case, following ECLA 
is close to the Argentinian (?)•
Turn back to Chapter II, the section on budget deficits
Brazil: Gross Current Expenditure (GCE) and Gross Capital Formation
(GKF) of the Government sector and Gross Formation of Fixed Capital 
(GFFK) of the Public Sector as a: $ of G N P
213
Year GCE- GKF GFFK
1947 10.7 2.8 17.4
1948 11.8 3.8 16.2
1949 12.7 4.4 . 15.1
1950 12.7 4.6 13.4
1955 13.6 3.2 14.4
I960 15.5% 5.3 16.7
1963 16.7 5.1 16.6
'1966 14.2 4.9 12.9
Source: 0. de Bulhoes, The Brazilian economy in The Unilever
Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 298, 1968/9.
Monetarism implies that the rise in public expenditure carried a faulty 
economic policy that largely contributes to the inflation of the region. 
Structuralism, on the other hand, implies that expenditure increases are not 
as ‘terrible1 as mere budget deficits lead to believe; that one has to see 
how these budget deficits were created and what was the distribution of bud­
getary expenditure; and, that much depends on the structural trend of public 
revenues.
Public Expenditure and Public Hevenue
Judging from the monetarist position and from budget deficits, it i 
would have heen expected that the public sector was making larger claims on 
the national product of these inflationary countries. Table I shows the rel­
ative relation between GNP and public expenditure and receipts for 1945-65.
Professor Maynard rightly says: ‘The ratio of public expenditure to
national product does not seem crucial in determining the extent to which 
Countries suffered from inflation* Moreover, neither expenditure nor income 
rations appear 'too high* when compared to those of the United States, which 
ranges from 20 to 26$ and in the advanced countries of Europe, where they 
range from about 25 to 45$ .(8)'. In the Latin-American group the public ex­
penditure coefficient ragnes from 7$ to 23$ and the public income coefficient 
from 7 to 25$
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Between the Latin-.Anerican countries themselves no relation can be
established at this stage between higher rates of inflation and a highei
*public claim on GNP. Only in Erazil and Chile, both very inflationary 
countries, is there a persistent increase in public expenditure as a pel 
centage of GNP throughout the period (from 16 to 23$ and from 17 to 21$j 
respectively). Part of such a considerable increase, however, is due t< 
the inclusion of a greater number of public enterprises in the accounts 
by the late 50*s. Peru is also a case where, public expenditure has in­
creased its weight, while inflation has been moderate* But, in Colombia 
where the public expenditure ratio is very low (only 8$ in 1965) and whc 
no significant change has occurred in it, the rate of inflation is high< 
that that of the Peruvian inflation* It is the Argentinian case, the oi 
that shows that no relationship can be simple established between inflai 
and relative public expenditure. In Argentina the coefficient has fall< 
dramatically from 19$ in 1945 to 12$ in 1965 and inflation has proceedec 
unperturbed. ‘The cause of the (public) deficit, writes ECLA, has not j 
isen from higher expenditure... its level as a percentage of GNP was we] 
below that of the early 60*s. Declining income has produced the.large 
deficit (9) *. On the contrary, in Ecuador - the least inflationary coui 
of the group- the coefficient has increased substantially from 10$ in 1< 
to 15$ in 1965* Mexico's coefficient, as it is shown, is not much use 1 
cause it only reflects the expenditure of the government secfe>r* At bes' 
it shows a certain neutrality; as the r^te of inflation has fallen, th< 
weight of government expenditure has tended to remain constant* .Howeve: 
if one includes public enterprises (it is estimated that the coefficien- 
would then be 16$) then it may be said, that as public expenditure incr 
ed as a $ of GNP the rate of inflation was reduced.
V/hat seems clear for the majority of countries is that public rece: 
as a percentage of GNP tended to lag well behind the expenditure coeffi­
cient. Thus it would appear, with respect to these indicators, that pul 
expenditure did not get out of hand so much and that the inelasticity o: 
public revenues helps to explain the appearance of budget deficits. He: 
the cause for deficits lies in the ‘structural* characteristics of the 
taxation system and/or in political priorities. The conclusion does no
A word of precaution, however: comparisons between countries are limi
by the degree to which public enterprises are included more or less coi 
prehensibly in consolidated accounts. It is impossible to know 2 with 
exactitude how ‘consolidated1 the accounts really are (see footnotes o: 
Table i). The indicators may only be taken as a very general guidelin
apply to Mexico or to Chile. In the first case because government accounts 
are insufficient as a measure in public trends; and, in the second, because 
Chile's budgetary policy requires careful interpretation with respect to 
fluctuations in revenues from the external sector. Nonetheless, in general 
terms it may he said that there is not a relationship between the expenditure 
coefficient and different rates of inflation. Let us now turn to the growth 
rates of public expenditure and receipts.
The Growth of Public Expenditure and Receipts and Inflation
Looking at public expenditure at current prices in the most inflation­
ary countries of the group would indicate almost explosive rates of growth. 
However, if the figures are deflated with the cost of living index the in­
crease in expenditure appears restrained if not decreasing as in Argentina 
(See Table II). Again, one cannot say that the most inflationary countries 
are those where expenditure increased the most. Nor can it be said that as 
inflation proceeded, jmblic expenditure grew; this is true for Brazil, Chile,
■jfand Colombia, but not for the rest. First let us turn to the cases, where 
the monetarist argument does hot seem to apply:
1.- In Argentina there has been a fall in public expenditure from 1958 and
the rate of inflation has increased. This is particularly true during 
the 1958^60 stabilisation programme when, as it will be seen, public 
investment fell sharply and inflation continued. Public receipts, 
moreover, fell throuout the 50fs, recovered during the early 60*s and 
experienced serious setbacks afterwards. In these circumstances bud­
get deficits have been persistently high. Thus, depending on the com­
position of expenditure, it is feasible that the structuralist argu­
ment was at work: as public expenditure was reduced and revenues lag­
ged infrastructure bottlenecks were enhanced auc contributed to the
inflationary spiral. The Mexican and Equatcrian cases may also be in­
terpreted in structuralist terms, but in the opposite direction. In 
Mexico both public expenditure and revenues grew relatively at fast- 
rates, and the rate of inflation diminished. Presumably this would 
mean that over the long-run public investment has reduced infrastruc­
ture bottlenecks. Ecuador's expenditure was the fastest growing of 
the group and, although also growing revenues tended to lagg behind, 
still there was price stability in many years. Moreover, in both 
countries budget deficits tended to increase I
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Taking "the whole period and not year to year relathionships.
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2#- la the rest of the countries, however, a case may be made for noheta: 
public expenditure and inflation expanded hand in hand. Still, Peru 
a border case, Eer inflation was relatively milder and, although pul 
accounts expanded thei3 fluctuations were so vide that they may have 
contributed to inflation. The same is true for Colombia with more i] 
flation and a larger lagg in revenues, in Brazil and Chile public a< 
counts expanded fastly and budget deficits increased noticeably, and 
these countries are the most inflationary. However, Chile’s accounts suf: 
ed a serious setback in 1953-1956 and Brazil’s revenues have lagged behin 
expenditure consisterily.
It is useful to insist in these trends looking now at annual changes 
the variables (Table III):
1.- In none of the countries is it possible to distinguish a year to yea 
relationship between the four variables. Within the first group, ho- 
ever, in Argentina it is true that the rate of inflation has increas 
the more the drops in expenditure and revenue, while budget deficits 
are persistently high. In Mexico one dan see that before 1959 publi 
accounts fluctuated, had sharp falls, there were years of surplus an 
inflation was faster and after, the opposite is very much present#
2.- In the countries where the monetarist argument is more present, for 
the sake of a ’structuralist position’, several points can be made. 
In Colombia two periods will be distinguished: from 1952 to I960 
Jmblic accounts expanded fastly (with the exception of 1956 and 1958 
and the rate of inflation was an average milder than in the next per 
(1960-65) when these accounts contracted. In Chile it is intprestin 
to see that the years of high inflation - i.e. 195^> 1956, 1963* 196 
were years when expenditure and revenues fell.
3#- Linear regression analysis was tried between annual changes in publi 
expenditure and revenue and the cost of living index (see below). Th 
correlation coefficients, however, were not significant or simple no 
present, ^ke only case where there was a statistifcal relationship 
between the three variables is Argentina. It appears that increases 
in expenditure were associated with increases in prices (0.68). Thi 
is very misleading for twro reasons: (l) it also appears that the hi
er the revenue the more the inflation (0.72); and (2) public expend 
ture has decreased in Argentina, as it has been seen.
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Tab
le 
II
Correlation Coefficients (r) and Standard error (se) for annual changes 
in Public Expenditure (E) and in Public Avenues (it) with annual changes
in the cost of living (P) (1951-65V
Country E R
r se r s e
Argentina 0.6S 0.15 0.72 0.13
Brazil +0.33 0.28 -0.01 +0.31
Chile -0.30 0.23 -0.38 0.23
Colombia 0.26 0.25 0.17 0.26
Peru -0.36 0.23 -0.39 0.23
Mexico +0.01 0.27 0.06 0.27
Ecuador -0.36 0.23 -0.55 0.18
Source; See Table III
a) Prices are for year P+l so as to allow for a one year lag
The inconclusiveness of the above comparisons based on Tables II and 
III (although they go a long way in showing that arbitrary expansions in 
public expenditure are not so present in Latin America's inflation as one 
would expect from the monetarist argument) may be a consequence of dealing 
with aggregate expenditure. Ylith respect to inflation nranh depends on the 
kind of expenditure the public sector undertook^ whether it was an infla­
tionary current expenditure or on investment prqjects.
The Distribution of Public Expenditure.
The different components of public expenditure, according to the
economic classification, can be divided into current expenditure, trans-
*fer payments, and public investment. A relative groirfch in current expen­
diture, especially if financed by a deficit, represents a consumption of an 
inflationary nature. Transfer payments do not constitute an element of 
final consumption by the administration but a shift of purchasing power to 
other sectors of the econoiry. Nonetheless, to a considerable extent they 
represent consumption in the form of budgetary contributions to provincial 
governments and municipalities, payments of interest on public debt, con-
For a discussion of the limitations in the criteria used in the economic 
classification and in working in aggregate terms terms see the work by 
ECLA quoted (lO).
contributions to social security institutions, welfare assistance, pensions, 
sundries, and subsidies directly paid by the Treasyry. ' Transfer payments 
however, accrue to public institutions and autonomous enterprises which 
spent part of such grants on investment. ECLA writes: 'The grouping of
these disboursements under this heading is justified because, given the au­
tonomy in expenditure enjoyed by such institutions, no prior assessment can 
be made either by the shares to be used in consumption and for investment 
respectively, or of the composition of such expenditure. Any consolidation 
of the public sector's accounts would have to make this distinction, and 
the various items would have to be grouped according to the final destina­
tion of jhe expenditure (ll)'. Y/ithout this knowledge the assessment of 
the overall role of the public sector in contributing over the short-run 
to inflationary faces or in the long-run to reducing infrastructure bottle­
necks can only be partial and misleading.
. Eence the part of expenditure under public investment is the one that 
on aggregate may explain the non-inflationary policy of governments and 
justify the different uses of deficit financing. In so far as public in­
vestment represents a net increase in the production capital, it results in 
growth and perhaps stability. It also exerts influence by providing the 
economy with public works which in addition to their own contribution to 
the expansion of production and revenue, also provide an incentive to pri­
vate investment. The ideal system to assess the productive share of public 
investment would be to brake it down according to its nature and final pur­
pose. A distinction should be made between direct and indirect investment 
The former relates to works carried out by the public sector, while the lat­
ter includes loans to the private sector for purposed of real asset forma­
tion* A distinction should also he made between real investment and finan­
cial investment, ^he first one represents the purchase of new assets and 
the second the purchase of previously produced assets. In most cases in 
Latin America, however, it is not possible except for recent years, to clas­
sify public investment and arrive to real investment. In order to appraise 
the nature of investment in relation to inflation and growth, it is very 
necessary to apply these classification criteria - or others - to the con­
solidated public investment. Moreover, the means would provide the basis 
for academic comparisons between countries. In the meantime, one has to 
content oneself with aggregate figures which scarcely provide more than 
the broad outlines of public expenditure and, in consequence, only very few 
conclusions may be derived in assessing the inflationary or non-inflationary 
and growth roles of the public sector*
Let us then turn to the aggregate distribution of expenditure (Table 
IV) and try to follow the initial classification betveen the structuralist 
and monetarist cases:
1*- In Argentina, again, it can be seen that inflation has been accom­
panied by a fall in the proportion of investment expenditure. Con­
sequently, current expenditure has gained enormous weight. Trans-
*fer payments are not only neutral but far 'too low' . 'In fact, 
writes professor Maynard, of course, the increase in the 'ordinary' 
expenditure proportion in Argentina and Chile was the consequence 
of deliberate, if unsuccessful, anti-inflationary policies pursued 
by these countries, the main plank of which was a cut in public » 
investment* (13)* In Mexico, 011 the other hand, public investment 
gained weight until 1953 and inflation was milder and grew slower 
(afterwards, the decline is only apparent, as vp shall see, since 
the majority of public investment tended to be channeled through 
the autonomous public enterprises). In Ecuador one cannot make of 
it a case for structuralism any more since the share of investment 
declined]
Transfer accounts are not much use for our purpose, since there is a con- 
tinous re-classification of accounts between current and transfer payments 
And, what is more important, ECLA writes that the predominant trend during 
the 50's was towards a relative reduction in the interest paid on public 
debt (12). The reasons why the financial burden originating in government 
debt, despite deficit financing, represents a relatively unimportant factor 
in the budgets of these countries is the fact that governments have made 
little use of the traditional sources of public credit. They have tended 
to finance deficits either with foreign debt or with central bank issues; 
largely because domestic financial markets are small or because they have 
been eroded by inflation. Also, a substantial part of the newly contracted 
debt has been channeled through autonomous agencies responsible for the int­
erest. Hence the overall financial incidence of the public debt is far 
greater than that revealed by the available statistics. The apparent con­
tradiction between a growing deficit financing and the decline in the im­
portance of transfer payments may be explained by: (l) in the absence of
a well developed security market, the outstanding debt is held rather close­
ly by official financial institutions; (2) iri.th severe inflation the relat­
ive valve of debt tends to diminish rapidly; and (3) the issue of new money 
and floating debt does not usually require service payments. On the other 
hand this may be contrarrested by increases in transfer payments due to an 
increase in subsidies for public enterprise and private activities. An ob­
jective has been the maintenance of low prices and tariffs for essential 
consumer goods or services of public interest and losses of individual cr 
ccrporate bodies being offset by direct state subsidies. Obviously, the 
actual measurement of these expenditures is necessary to understand the in­
flationary role of the state.
aDistribution of Public Expenditure 
(percentages)
TABLE IV
C o u n t r y  1945 1950 1954 1955 1958 1962 1964 1965
Argentina
Current Expenditure 40 28 44 71 65 72 80
Transfer payments 25 35 35 9 7 10 9
Investment 35 27 21 20 28 18 - 11
Brazil
Current Expenditure - 47 48 . - 44 36 28
Transfer Payments - 26 26 - - 38 44 38
Investment - 27 26 - - 18 22 34
Chile*)
Current Expenditure 49 54 54 55 42 30 38 38
Transfer Payments 22 26 27 29 42 47 28 26
Investment 29 20 19 16 16 23 34 36
Colombia
Current Expenditure 47 50 52 38°) 42°) 40
Transfer Payments 27 20 18 - 20 28 - 27
Investment 26 30 30 — 42 30 - 33
Peru
Current Expenditure 43 43 34 64 61 54 ' 52 54
Transfer Payments 16 19 27 15 18 13 12 11
Investment 35 34 38 21 21 33 36 35
Mexicoe' , \
Current Expenditure 81 61 59 - 31 ' 37 39 41
Transfer Payments 12 24 18 - 26 34 48 47
Investment 7 15 23 - 43 29 13 12
Ecuador
Current Expenditure - 48 50 54 52 48 39 41
Transfer Payments - 19 26 26 35 37 48 47
Investment — 24 26 20 13 15 13 12
Source: For 1945-1954 ECLA*s Government incope and expenditure, oc cit*
distribution applies only within the federal or central govern­
ments* For 1955-65 United Nationas Satistical Yearbook (1959- 
1966) and Economic Survey of Latin America (1964-1966); distri­
bution includes the total public sector on a certain number of 
public enterprises*
h ) From 1962 the whole of the public sector
c) 1959 and 1963, respectively
d) 1963
e) Only the federal government*
f) 1959.
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2.- Colombia and Peru, however, can he interpreted as intermediate cases. 
In hoth of them the proportion of investment dxpenditure was very sub­
stantial and inflation was mild. On the other hand, in Brazil and Chile 
- the closes cases to monetarism - when one comes to investment it can be 
seen that its proportion is relatively low and inflation faster. Some­
thing which coincides with the initial evidence on Brazil. This amounts 
to saying, according to monetarism, that faulty budgetary policy was pre­
sent and, according to structuralism, that the small proportion of invest­
ment expenditure contributed to inflation.
3*- *Eut, of course, writes professor Maynard, if the distribution of
expenditure does not help much to explain the extent of inflation in Latin
America, it may go a substantial way in explaining the comparative rates 
0
of growth (l4). In those countries where there has been stagnation of 
very slow growth - Argentina and Chile - the proportion of investment ex­
penditure has fallen considerably. On the contrary, in Mexico, Colombia 
and Peru the share of investment has been high and the respective rates 
of growth relatively ranch more high, as well as inflation milder. Brazil, 
however, is an exception.
Turning now to real overall investment - public gross capital forma 
tion deflated by the cost of livng index - and inflation, the picture is
not really different (See Table ?V)*
1.- Once more in Argentina total public investment tended to stagnate
during 1951-61 (only showing a slight recovery in 1964) while inflation
has been rampant. Mexico, on the other hand, has experienced very fast 
growth in public investment and inflation has diminished significantly. 
Before 1958 the rate of public capital formation was slower and inflation 
faster, The same applies to Ecuador^ before 1958 capital formation was 
increasing faster and there was price stability.
2.- In Colombia public investment has expanded at an amazing speed from 
1951 to I960 and inflation, although considerable, is relatively milder. 
Moreover, when the rate of capital formation declined in 1961-63, prices 
accelerated, fhe situation is similar in Peru. Here too, during the 
stabilisation programme of 1958-60, public investment was halfed and 
growth fell. However, throughout the period public investment and GNP 
have expanded and inflation has also been milder.
International comparison, incidentally, have greater validity with the 
National Accounts than with Fiscal Accounts.
This is ’the 1964-1965 recovery in the way of investment for these 
years the amox-nts are quite consolidated.
ft 1)Indices for Beal Public Investment (Si) and for the Cost of Living (p)
(1958 =100)
TABLE \r
C o u, n t r y 1951 1953 1955 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 19
Argentina SI 88 74 62 100 69 87 92 - - 109 1
P 44 48 61 214 272 309 395 491 600 771 10
Brazil
0
SI 59 53 54 100 92 100 105 146 107 140
P 35 50 73 137 185 256 390 684 1270 2050
Chile SI Neg Neg. 65 100 - 106 99 120 131 127
p 23 64 139 - 167 190 274 400 512
Colombia SI 10 14 23 100 105 130 131 127 124 -
p 61 72 76 107 111 121 124 164 142 -
Peru SI 36d 82® 147 100 57 54 122 87 194 146 1
p 64 82 86 113 122 131 138 148 164 191 2
Mexico SI 8 8 68 79 100 102 124 - - - 233 2
p 66 70 84 102 108 109 110 111 114 118 1
Ecuador SI 49 65 113 100 104 132 152 159 119 120 1
p 98 101 98 100 102 106 109 115 120 123 1
Sources: Boletfn Estadistico de America Latina, ON, 1966 and Yearbood
of National Account Statistics, ON, 1966-1961.
a) Gross Public fixed capital formation was deflated by 
the cost of living index
b) Prices are for the next year so as to allow for a rudimentary 
year lag,
c) 1952
d) 1956
e) 195^
3.- Lastly, in Brazil and Chile, total public investment has been very 
erratic and the rates of inflation the fastest in the group. It should 
be pointed out that when public investment expanded - as it happened in 
several years of the period - this appeared to have done little to reduce 
the rate of inflation. The evidence is inconclusive since there wras 
growth in Brazil and stagnation in Chile.
With respect to the.ahare of public investment in total fixed capit­
al formation (TAVLE VI) the relation again appears to be between growth 
and euch expenditure, rather than with inflation. It is true, of course, 
that in Argentina a shrinking share of public investment is accompanied 
by a slow rate of growth and fast inflation; and, that in Mexico higher 
relative public > investment appears with a weakening of inflation and con­
siderable grovrth. But, on the other hand, in Brazil, Colombia and Peru 
there has been an increasing share of public investment, growth, and per­
sistent inflation. Chile, which is both stagnant and inflationary, has 
an increasing share of public investment; hut the fact, as it was said 
is partially due to the slackness in private investment nore than overall 
dynamic investment.
From the experience one may gather that, although public investment 
may contribute to slow down inflation over the long-run, by itself it is 
iicapable of doing so. Structuralists would stress the agricultural and 
foreign exchange bottlenecks and the role of MST. Still, much depends on 
the methods used in deficit financing and on the behaviour of revenues, 
to which we shall now turn.
TABLE VI
Fixed Investment of the Public Sector, 1945-1964.
(as a percentage of total gross investment)
Country 1945 1950 1953 1955 1958 i960 1962 1964
Argentina 42.0 20.8 22.2 22.6 26.2 22.1 21.8a -
Brazil 8.7* 19.5 12.0 24.0 40.1 42.8 46.2 41.6
Chile 39.2 30.2 23.9 - - 58.5 52.3 58.0
Colombia 2.2 10.0 13.8'21.S .16.2 14.8 20.4 17.4d
Peru - - - 14.0 - 10.2 18.8 25.4
Mexico 35.4 47.0 43.0 - - 46.8 43.7 49.3
Ecuador - 29.6 CO.-tf 41.4 37.4 47.5 27.1 35.7
Sources: Chile, Peru and Mexico from thw Economic Survey for Latin-
America, 1953-1966; the rest frcn Boletfn Estadistico de 
America Latina, Vol. Ill, 1966.
a) 1961, b) 1947, c) 1952, d) 1965. :
Public Egvenue
It has been seen that the percentage of public sector ordinary revenue
to ©IP is appreciably smaller in Latin America than in the advanced countri*
In 1965 it ranged from 7£ in Colombia to C25$ in Chile, It was also said 
in general that receipts, as a percentage of ©IP or in terms of their real 
rate of growth, tend to lag behind public expenditure. This led to the 
initial conclusion that lagging public revenues are an important reason for 
budget deficits. In fact public expenditure has not increased so much - it 
has been reduced on several occasions - as one would have expented from the 
monetarist argument. Still, national differences have to be accountedfor. 
Over the long-run, it was felt that the structuralist argument was closer 
to Argentina, Mexico and Ecuador; that Colombia and Peru were intermediate
0
cases; and, that Brazil and Chile were closer to monetarism.
The next step is to see if these tendencies and differences are bettei 
explained with the help of the taxation structure. For the purpose of this 
work, this involves surveying the composition of taxes in two broad groups; 
those derived from the external sector and the relative weights of direct 
and indirect taxation,
•Among the general economic factors, writes ECLA, which have a major 
effect upon the tax revenue and structure of Latin America and on tax bur­
dens, is the chronic inflation to which a number of countries have been 
subject (lp)*• Inflation, it is claimed, tends to reduce both incidence 
and revenues in real terms in the cases of certain types of taxes, not onl; 
absolutely but also in relation to other taxes. It is apt to create a 
lag in income tax which reduces the real burden: tax obligatioie of one
year are paid in the next in a depreciated currency. The incidence may 
also be altered because many indirect taxes, which are comparably easy to 
collect and to adjust to inflation, tend to gain in importance. On the 
other hand, income tax exemptions are often reduced; many groups in in­
termediate-income brackets are forced into upper categories with higher 
rates; and, those in the maximum bracket, where the rate ceases to in­
crease, often pay lower taxes because of currency depreciation. This is 
why special attention should be given to the composition of taxes.
(i) Public Revenues from the external sector.
•On the one hand, writes Dr. Sunkel, some governments have clearly 
spent wastefully and unwisely, these being mainly the case with respect 
to military expenditure and transfer payments. On the other hand, the
#' -The Chilean figure applies to total public sector receipts.
It should be clear that the argument can be interpreted both in 
monetarist and structuralist terms.
fiscal system of almost all Latin-American countries has been incapable 
of providing the revenue needed to finance higher government spending.
This is due to various causes, most of them inherent in the tax struc­
ture. In most of the countries a large part of tax revenues originates 
in the foreign sector either through taxes on exports or by means of im­
port duties. But the foreign sector has tended to shrink in relation to 
GDP as a result of lagging imports. Therefore, apart from being as un­
stable as foreign trade itself, revenues derived from the foreign sector 
have tended to shrink in relative importances as sources of fiscal reve­
nue in spite of important increases in rates and duties. This process 
has been aggravated by two factors: (i) many import taxes or even im­
port duties are of a specific type, therefore losing their real incidence 
with devaluation and international price increases; and (2) the changing 
structure of imports has gradually reduced the volume of imports of high- 
duty final consumer goods, replacing them by low duty or even duty-free 
imports of raw materials and capital goods* (l6). Professor Maynard also 
says that public revenues were subject to fluctuations because in some 
countries they are highly dependent on foreign receipts and these have 
fluctuated (l7). Instability has therefore been introduced into the mon*- 
etary system by the fact that external receipts and therefore public rev­
enue have not been under the control of governments, v/hen receipts are 
rising, moreover, governments often expand public investment from which 
they cannot easily disengage themselves when receipts and revenue decline. 
They are thus forced into budget deficits and credit creation, often at a 
time when real income from the external sector has suffered a check and 
there are balance of payments problems.
Assuming fluctuating and lagging external revenues - something quite 
feasible in the marjority of countries in terms of total receipts (see 
Table II again) - the question is how large is the dependence on the ex­
ternal sector revenues. Or, alternatively, have they decreased so much 
as to reduce an important share of possible revenues? If we now turn to 
Table VII, the problem is that the above structuralist argument is not 
present in a straight-forvard manner in any of the countries.1 Moreover, 
it is difiicult to establish a logical sequence between our previous con­
clusions and trends in external revenues. The best solution thus is to 
see each country by itself:
1.- In Argentina external fiscal revenues have expanded very noticeably 
but in the context of shrinking public accounts. Eence to relation 
can be established between the evidence and the rate of inflation.
Revenue from the External Sector as a Percentage of Total Receipts
(1953-1965)
TABLE VII
C o u n t r y
Argentina
Total
External sector 
H Duties 
X Duties
Brazil 
Total 
External 
M Duties 
X Duties
Chile 
Total 
External 
M Duties 
X Duties
Colombia 
Total 
External 
M Duties 
X Duties
Peru 
Total 
External 
M Duties 
X IXities
Sector
Sector
Sector
Sector
1953 19 55 1958 1961 1965
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
6.1 2.1 3.5 25.5 19.6
6.0 2.1 *
-
100.0 O O . o 100.0 100.0
11.0 2.7 - 11.9 6.9
10.0 2.7 - mm -
1.0 — — — —
100.0 100.0a)
45.0 47.0 - - —
13.0 21.0 - - —
32.0 26.0 — — —
100.0 100.0 100.0 b) 100.0 7 100.0
25.0 — 30.4 18.6 25.7
16.0 - - - -
5.0 “ — —
100o0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
29.0 21.0 12.7 . 8.5 12.0
20.0 20.0 12.0 8.0 12.0
9.0 11.0 0.7 0.5 Neg.
Mexico 
Total 
External 
M Duties 
X Duties
Sector
Ecuador
Total
External sector 
M Duties 
X Duties
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
28.0 25.0 24.0 24.0 17.0
14.0 15.0 12.0 15.0 14.0
14.0 20.0 12.0 9.0 3.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
38.0 47.0 42.0 47.0 50.0
36.0 59.0 56.0 41.0 40.0
2.0 8.0 6.0 6.0 10.0
Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1959-1966.
a) 1966
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2.- In Mexico it may be seen that the weight oi these revenues has :> de­
clined; export duties have fallen sharply and import duties have 
tended to remain constant.
Stretching the structuralist argument, it could he said that as lesser 
reliance was placed on external taxes there was a shift towards price sta­
bility.
3.- In Ecuador, which is just as stable, the importance of external reve­
nues is very high and has tended to increase. Still, it can be said
that as external revenues and total, receipts have expanded - as in­
deed they have - pride stability has been more feasible. It is worth
noticing, however, that import duties account for the m a r jo r i t y  of 
*such receipts.► *
4.- In Colombia external tax revenues have had a considerable weight. 
Moreover, their importance fell in the 1960's when inflation accel­
erated.
6.- Peru, in the context of a buoyant external sector, is perhaps close 
to Mexico. External sector revenues have lost importance at a very 
fast rate and inflation has been mild. Still it cannot be taken as 
evidence for the structuralist argument; specially considering that 
the argument (in the opposite direction) is used for Colombia.
6.- In Brazil, on the surface, it is difficult to make a case for struc­
turalism. Because for the greater part of the last two decades, ex­
ternal revenues represent a small proportion of revenues and total 
revenues, although fluctuating, have expanded. The fact remains, 
however, that in this case public expenditure is spent on the ex­
port sector in the form of subsidies to coffee exports. ECLA 
writes: ,:i?owards the end of the 50's the forces underlying infla­
tion began to shift, and the relatively favourable situation was 
undermined. The turning point came with the coffee crisis. From 
1957 to 1961 production was far in excess of the amount which could 
be sold in world markets, and resort was had to the traditional pol­
icy of withholding stocks from the market in an effort to support 
world prices. The funds paid out in the process of maintaining 
this programme were large, and with the peak coffee crop of 1959 
amounted to nearly 5? of GDP. Combined with a government deficit
One has to remember that - following ECLA - when a large share of revenues 
is derived from import duties rather than exports (as in Mexico, Ecuador 
and Peru) dependence of the external sector is mitigated, but noe eliminat­
ed. Fiscal receipts from import taxes are ultimately, though indirectly, 
dependent on the foreign exchange from exports (is).
in the same year these outlays led to a rise in the price level of 
over 40}$ (19)* Here, although the case is different, structuralists 
will argue that the drop in exports was the main cause of inflation 
and of forcing the government to some extent, into deficit financing. 
7*- Chile is usually the classic case to illustrate the extreme dependence 
on revenues from the external sector (see alst Table VIII) and of the 
fiscal and price instability resulting from such dependence. 'The greai 
extent to which government receipts from copper, writes ECLA, are vul­
nerable to sharp fluctuations in the price and demand for this commo­
dity is evident. The fluctuations have tended to cause or aggravate 
budget deficits, and have been a key factor in accelerating inflation
(20)'. The extreme dependen and the fluctuations of external taxation*are indeed very present until at least 1955*
Prom these conflicting regional trends, one may conclude that with
varying importance (more so in Ecuador and Chile and less so in Brazil, for
example) the influence of external revenues on total receipts, their insta£ 
bility, budget deficits, and inflation may be applied according to the rel­
ative importance of the external sector.
(ii) The relative importance of direct and indirect taxes.
'Relatively stagnating revenues from foreign trade, says Dr. Sunkel, 
have confronted governments with increasing expenditure commitments with the 
need of shifting the tax burden from external to domestic economic activity. 
Income and property taxes could hardly be extedted fto pfey a significant 
role as new important sources of revenue since the groups that approve the 
budget in congress represented precisely by the owners of most productive 
resources to which most of the income from those resources accrues. There­
fore, indirect sales or production taxes, easily shifted to the consumer, 
have become the largest source of fiscal revenue. In view of the relative 
stagnation of foreign trade revenues, the existence of many specific taxes, 
the time lag between the assessment of the tax and the collection of the 
tevenue, the inefficiency and the corruption of the tax administration, the 
regressiveness of the tax system and other factors, the total sum of revenues 
tends to fall consistently short of government expenditure requirements.
This inelasticity of the tax system tends to gradually accentuate its regres­
siveness, since governments have to take refuge in successive increases in 
the rates and variety of indirect taxes. The perverse nature of this pro­
cess takes its worse form when the economy is stagnating, because in an ex­
panding economy there is at lease one positive element present, a growing 
tbx base' (20). ^
* It is particularly unfortunate that, from the above year, the Chilean revei 
accounts no longer distinguish export duties in the general presentation (<
TABLE VIII
Chile
Central Government Taxation Avenues 
(percentages)
Year Total
Revenue Total
External Taxation 
M Duties X Taxes
Internal
Taxation
1945 100 50 16 34 50
1946 100 50 18 32 50
1947 100 57 15 42 42
1948 100 54 15 38 46
1949 100 49 ' 17 32 51
1950 100 50 15 35 50
.1951 100 57 17 34 49
1952 100 60 16 46 40
1953 100 48 14 35 51
Source: Economic Survey of Latin America, 1956.
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The structuralist argument, according to the ahove circumstances, 
simple states that the more regressive the tax structure the more likely 
its inflationary impact. Cn the other hand, they would emphasise that 
public expenditure - especially if channeled to investment - and budget 
deficits as such are not necessarily inflationary.
The broad classification in direct and indirect taxes gives only a
*preliminary idea of the tax incidence. But, the nain structuralist assump­
tion is that the predominance of indirect taxation in Latin .America indi-* i
cates a high degree of regressiveness. In so far as regressiveness from 
the economic point of view one should expect in the inflationary countries 
erosion, inelasticity, and fluctuations in total revenues. Something that 
will contribute to budget deficits and inflation. How regressive is then 
the tax structure in the selected Latin .American countries? In general the 
predominance of indirect taxes is very strong in all countries (See Table 
IX). The fact is specially noticeable in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru 
- all inflationary countries - and in Ecuador, a relatively stable country. 
In this last one the fact is caused, however, by the extreme importance of 
import duties. Moreover, in Argentina the share of indirect taxes has in­
creased considerably. In countries, like Colombia and Mexico, the share 
is less important and inflation milder, specially in the latter.
TABLE m
Indirect Taxes as a Percentage of Current 
Income 
(1945 - 1965)
Country 1945 1948 1950 1955 1955 1958 i960 1962 1965
Argentina 73 69 63 64 63 70 79 85 84
Brazil - 76 74 68 61 67 70 74 71
Chile 51 54 60 62 67 72 »i— 75 53
Colombia 52 49 50 49 61 58 - 48 56
Peru 57 55 59 72 74 61 53 73 76
Mexico 63 67 54 61 - 74 67 66 56
Eduador - - 87 87 84 85 84 86 -
Sources: Economic Survey of Latin America, 1956; and united
Nations Yearbook, 1959-1966.
Footnote on following page.
♦(from previous page)
Hence one cannot ascertain that from 1956 the trend has been the same 
How assume that copper export revenues although fluctuation have in­
creased something that is very likely (See Chapter II, section b). Ho 
would one explain increasing budget deficits and at least part of the 
inflation?
The discussion of the trends in public expenditure and revenue brings 
us once again to the existence of "budget deficits and the problem of infla­
tion. The closing remarks and conclusions vill thus be around this subject.
Budget Defitits
The post-var growth of the public sector in Latin-Anerican countries 
has been accompanied by accumulated budget deficits which in all countries 
have tended to exceed surpluses (see again Table Ii). This trend is an ob­
vious result of the disparity in the growth of public revenues and expendi­
ture, but where a key factor is the behaviour of public investment. The 
three variables are of special relevance when one thinks of the relation­
ship between the public sector and inflation and growth.
The disparity is reflected on the fluctuations of public savings. 
Government savings are defined as the difference between ordinary revenues 
and current expenditure. These are part of the funds avilable to finance 
public investment.. In relative terms they may be measured as a percentage 
of ordinary revenues (See Table X).
TABLE X
Governmental Savings as a Percentage of Ordinary 
Revenue, 1945-1965
Country 1945 1948 1950 1953 1955 1958 I960 1962 1965
Argentina= -6.6 10.3 2.6 -3.0 5.5 -3.0 17.9 - -
Brazil ■ - 16.1 12.9 18.2 7.4 17.6 16.5 - -
Chile 19.5 24.5 9.4 -6.5 - 5.2 11.0 6.1 22.0
Colombia 10o6 20.6 29.7 7.3 56.2 40.7 39.2 18.0 -
Peru 13.0 6.6
Mexico 22.2 18.0 36.9 39.4 - - 27.1 15.6 22.6a
Ecuador — — 13.5 10.4 22.1 25.2 21.5 19.1 25.8
Sources: See Table VI
a) 1964 
(from previous page)
A more exact classification should be one which distributes direct taxes 
into taxes on income and profits, on exports, on inheritance and donations, 
* on wealth, and on others; and direct taxes irpo taxes on imports, oncon- 
sumption, and others. These can again be divided into sub-groups. For 
reasons of the scope of this work no attention will given to the subject.
From the monetarist point of view one would have expected large arbitr; 
expansion of current expenditure and negative public savings leading to bud­
get deficits. In certain countries, i. e. Argentina and Chile, they have b< 
negative in some years signifying that current expenditure alone has exceed< 
ordinary revenue. But, Argentina is a country where public expenditure has
tended to fallj Hence it is the contracting public sector as a whole which 
* ! *has led to budget defitits, and not vice versa. Moreover, in the rest of 
the countries public savings have been positive, revenues superior to cur­
rent expenditure. It appears then that public expenditure was not excessive 
from this angle.
Still, looking at it in figures, it is obvious that public savings ha^  
fluctuated very significantly, but perhaps more so in the more inflationary 
countries, Brazil, Chile and Colombia. Such fluctuations are a function, o: 
course,'of trends in both public expenditure and revenues. They areeasily 
explained, however, by the fact that public savings are the net difference 
between anticipated revenue and projected revenues. Also, it is recognised 
in Latin America that a decisive role has been played by the external secto: 
in determining these trends. .Such instability may explain an important par- 
of the budget deficits.
Looking at each country, the worse fluctuations and the lowest coeffi­
cient, except for some years, is that of Chile, a very inflationary country, 
In Brazil public savings have remained constant between 1948 and 1965* Col­
ombian public savings, although fluctuating, have been considerable and ex­
plain the growth of public investment. The coefficients are more stable an< 
considerable in Mexico and Ecuador, countries with much less inflation and j 
corresponding growth of public investment. Eut, while public savings reveal 
that current expenditure has not been excessive and that non-inflationary 
revenues were found to finance public investment, the final picture is still 
one of budget deficits. Public savings have not really resulted in budget s
It is thus clear that budget deficits, for the majority of years, have 
been difficult to cover without foreign loans or resorting, whether directly 
or indirectly to the issue of new money* 'Such inflationary financing, wri- 
ECLA, has been greater in the countries where 'fiscal income has not grown ai 
has tended to lag in relative terms' (22). Public debt has thus risen in 
various forms, although the relative importance of debt service payments, 
as we saw, has tended to decline.
There are different ways of covering budget deficits: ia) with cash
balances accumulated from the surpluses of previous years; (b) by external*-*er domestic borrowing; (c) or by the issue of new money. The first oeth
(see both footnotes in the following page)
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has been limited by the fact that deficits have tended to exceed surpluses 
by a fairly wide margin. Public borrowing - the kind that represents the 
transfer of savings or credits from abroad - depends on the availability 
of loanable funds. Latin-American governments - as distinct from semi-au­
tonomous institutions or public enterprises - have had to draw mainly upon 
internal resources to finance these deficits. Experience, however, shows 
that this method nas met with serious difficulties:
a) Security markets in Latin America are not highly developed and their 
capacity to absorb new public debt issues is strictly limited. This, 
of course, varies from country to country and there are instances of 
develqpment of the money and capital markets throughout the period.
#b) The bals: ing systems do not usually possess large excess reserves, 
and the purchase of long term bonds is restricted by stringent in­
vestment requirements.
c) Private financial institutions do not voluntarily purchase more than 
a minimum of low interest bearing securities essential for the diver­
sification of their portfolios.
d) With inflation, investors naturally prefer stocks with a variable 
rate of return and offering the prospect of capital gains.
These conditions demonstrate that only relatively small amounts of 
public bonds are likely to be purchased voluntarily by the private sector. 
The extreme cases are those of Argentina and Chile, in which for some years, 
even current expenditure has had to be financed by credit. Nonetheless, in 
the other countries, a good share of public investment has had also to be 
financed with credits, ‘^he persistent situation has compiled public autho­
rities to find imaginative ways to promote the sale of their securities and, 
failing to cover the full amount of the deficit, resort to measures which 
more directly result in a creation of money or to foreign credits. External 
debt usually includes credits extended to public enterprises, and in some 
countries liabilities connected with balance of payments deficits.
(from previous page)
Y/ith respect to the Argentinian variables, ECLA writes that *tliese figures 
do not include social security institutions.^ whose funds have been used 
to finance a large part of public investment. Therefore the inflationary 
effect of public finance has not been due to deficits but to the operation 
of other public entities* (2l).
For a superficial discussion on the subject see the bibliography (23).
Methods to promote public debt allotments can be divided in (l) 
special incentives to encourage the voluntary purchase of public bonds 
and (2) obligatory purchases. The next are a few of the imaginative me­
thods used in Latin America:
1,- In Chile it has been suggested to issue bonds which bear an int­
erest that varies with changes in prices. Or, alternatively, as 
in Brazil, where bonds have sold at such a discount, that the int­
erest rate rendered is very high.
2.- Exemption from taxes or advanced payments of intereat(Brazil).
3*- An attractive measure - important in the context of recurrent
devaluations - is to make bonds payable in a foreign currency.
(As in Mexico) Of course, this method may only aggravate the 
problem of the balance of payments and the instability of the 
national currency.
(4) In general issues made by autonomous public agencies may have 
better reception than public bonds.
(5) Make bonds freely negotiable or discountable at the central 
bank. But with a small bond market it may happen that in ef­
fect the government purchases bonds from itself %/ith fiscal 
resources or bank credit and through a regulating body. The 
danger of the system is the threat to the solvency of the in­
termediate institution and speculative selling, together with 
the fact that to a certain extent they are inflationary.
(6) The obligatory purchase of bonds by private enterprises (Brazil 
and Colombia)
(7) To the extent that social security funds are large, governments 
have used them to absorb public debt (Argentina and Uruguay)
The method, however, gets out of hand when such reserves are
usted to covert- part of the current expenditure. The moment 
when they cannot be replaced usually appears very soon.
Resuming, however, it is clear that these methods have been insuf­
ficient to cover the complete budget deficit. Eesort to Central Bank 
credit has been taken in all countries. Extreme examples are those of 
Chile where the system is to float debt from one year to the next; or, 
Brazil %/here periodically the government’s debt %/ith the Banco de Brasil
is simply cancelled. The object of this superficial exercise is only to
establish the very %/ell kno%;n fact that budget deficits have led to infla­
tionary financing methods.
So in tlie end "both monetarists and structuralists are faced with 
budget deficits and lesser or greater inflationary financing. But this 
is where the similitudes end. Something that is fundamental to establish 
if one is to understand how almost diametrically opx>osed policy measures 
are recommended.
For an ideal monetarist huuget deficits have arisen mainly because 
of excessive public expenditure and inflationary .recourse to deficit fin­
ancing, and, secondarily, by lagging public receipts. The policy measures 
are orthodox monetary and fiscal policy or, in other words, the reduction 
of public expenditure and debt, public investment as a whole included.
This is his road to stability. The existance of inflationary infrastructure 
bottlenecks remains.
For ideal structuralists budget deficits are a result of lagging public 
reiienues and necessary - although insufficient and sometimes wasteful - 
public expenditure. Their objective is to reduce infrastructure bottlenecks 
and hence set the road to stability. In fact, they face the problem of in­
flation and public expenditure with a growth priority. With respect to pol­
icy measures they would recommend the expansion of public investment - and 
they would recommend public expenditure - and propose a fiscal reform.
They presumably contemplate stability as a long run objective to be achiev­
ed through growth and the expansion of the public sector. If pushed to ex­
tremes they would rationalise the need to increase public investment, even 
if this meant deficit financing and short-run inflationary repercussions.
With respect to the explicit proposition on the structuralist thesis, 
it was seen that there is a considerable relationship between the trends 
in public expenditure, public revenues, the composition of expenditure, 
and public investment - this last one being a clue variable - when analysed 
in terms of changes in prices and the overall rate of growth. That is, el­
asticity in public accounts may lead to growth and sometimes to stability; 
the opposite - a fall in public investment and lagging revenues - may lead 
to further inflation and stagnation. Structuralists, it has to be remember­
ed, consider budget deficits a propagating or secondary cause of inflation.
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(e) 3?he Distribution of Income
Structuralists believe that the existing distribution of income es­
pecially in the selected semi-industrialised countries, is another funda-
. *mental factor behind Latin Americans inflation. The purpose of this sec­
tion is to establish the possibility of such a relationship. In one sense 
this parte is a continuation of the monetarist argument which was entitled 
A reduced discussion on savings find investment (.Chapter II) and which ’show­
ed* inflation as a function of these variables.
The distribution of income, aside from instability, is in itself a 
particularly problematic field. By problematic one means that in this 
field - yith more relevance than in other parts of economic theory - econ­
omic principles are subject to sociological and ethical considerations.
This has not always been helpful, in so far as the establishment of un­
equivocal principles on the distribution of income. Professor L. Reynolds 
writes: ’I've studied welfare economics and I realise perfectly %/ell that
as an economist I’m not entitled to say anything about what constitutes a 
proper distribution of income, but I’m going to do it anyway. I'm going 
to speak of a shift to%/ards greater equality of income as an iraprovemennt, 
and a shift to%/ards greater inequality as a %/orsening of income distribu­
tion. This is a value judgment, if you %/ish (l)'. Mrs. Navarrete quotes 
G. Stigler as %/riting: 'if economists as a class have al%/ays been against
an unequal distribution of income this does not mean that they are in fav­
our of an equalitarian distribution (2)*. 'When speaking of the distri­
bution of income, %/rites Mr. M. Flores, another Mexican economist, one 
may claim that it is inconvenient, unfair and unequal. These objectives, 
however, are not alT./ays compatible. In general, a fair and convenient 
distribution has to be unequal and, in some cases, an unfair distribution 
of income has been convenient. Confusion has arisen because of the use 
of concepts like equality, fairness, and convenience' (5)* Due to these 
considerations and due to the fact that straightford%/ardness is desired 
the follo%/ing system of exposition is adopted.
(1) A general description of the structuralist income distribution 
position.
(2) Incorporate to the above the problem of chronic inflation.
(3) An ' unorthodox* structuralist thesis - stretching the meaning, 
of the word on the relation between income distribution, insta­
bility and gro%/th.
(4) Income distribution trends in Latin America.
yf m m,m ' " 111 "" ' "(See footnote on the following page)
(1) On the general structuralist thesis of income distribution.
If abstraction is made of many factors, the distribution of income ma; 
studied in the following three ways:
1.- It can be measured as the distribution of GNP between the different 
sectors or production, i.e. agriculture, industry, services and gov­
ernment.
2.- As the distribution of income between the factors pf production or*national income at factor cost.
The distribution of personal income. This classification does not 
consider whether the personal income accrues to labour or to capital. 
Nonetheless, it bears a relationship with the distribution atfactor 
cost, because generally speaking, personal' income composed wf wages 
and salaries are lower than those derived from capital. A perfect di: 
tribution of income would be one where all the individuals have the s< 
income (a perfectly progressive one). An imperfect distribution of ii 
come would be one where great differences are found between the highe]
y y
personal incomes and the lover personal incomes (a regressive one).
In the context of what follows the more relevant classifications are 
the two last ones.
The distribution of income, writes Nrs. Navarrete 'firstly presents a 
statistical problem. Second, it presents the problem of analysing the cau* 
or forees that determine a given pattern of distribution. Lastly, distribx 
tion may be seen as a problem of economic policy; something that implies * 
possibility of changing a given distribution of income through policy tool*
(5) This study is only concerned with the second problem and only inasmucl 
as it will help to establish the structuralist position. That is, the worl 
is concerned vith the determination of a given distribution of income; th< 
changes that occur in such a distribution; and, the arguments raised agaii 
a regressive distribution, in the context of a semi-industrialised Latin-Ai
v  v v.Tv AT Aican economy.
A given distribution of income
If one assumes a country where the average level of income satisfies 
the essential and normal needs of an individual and where income is equally 
distributed among all the families, the distribution would be perfectly pr< 
gressive. Differences in the habits of consumption and savings may exist 
without perturbing the distribution when, in overall terms, savings equal 
investment in such a manner as to maintain the
*(from previous page)
The statistics on income distribution in Latin America, as in other region* 
are.scanty, tentative and unreliable. Something which stresses the marked 
theoretical character of the subject.
If   ----------For the purpose of this work it is importat to stress that the income acc: 
ing to capital may be distributed among capitalists according to their pe; 
sonal stock of capital something that changes with capital accumulation. 
(See footnotes ** and in the following page)
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stock of capital. The result would be a stationary economy with net sav­
ings and investment equal to zero. The given distribution may change the 
moment there is population growth and technological changes. This only 
goes to show, of course, that inequality in the distribution of income 
is impossible under dynamic assumptions. For a structuralist the question 
is what degree of inequality or equality is 'best' to achieve net capital 
formation. Mrs. Navarrete says that a conspicous regressive distribution 
does not contribute to growth and, alternatively, that a more progressive 
distribution may be compatible with a high rate of economic growth.
However, a very frequent economic principle of income has been the 
one that claims that a regressive distribution of income contributes to 
growth, since overall consumption is contained and savings may increase.
A more progressive distribution would result in higher consumption and 
lower savings, capital formation, and growth. Before going into opposite 
changes in the distribution of income, it is convenient to see how struc­
turalists analyse a given distribution.
Assume first a regressive distribution of personal incomes, where 
low income groups are the majority. In such a situation the majority of 
the population will have low incomes and will only consumer*essential1 
goods. A high proportion of income, concentrated in a minority, will be 
saved or used to consume 'non-essentials'. Such a distribution brings 
forth the possibility (not the existence, notes Mr. Flores) of a relative­
ly higher rate of savings. Moreover, the regressive distribution per se 
may result in higher savings*
A fundamental determinant of this is the existence of attractive in­
vestment opportunities. If these are not present the savings of the nigh 
income group may be consumed. Imagine, for instance, that demand for es­
sentials (that one mainly formed by the lower income groups) is already 
satisfied. Still, investment opportunities may be found in the production 
of non-*esseniials consumed by the high income group. But, imagine, that 
the production of non-essentials is easily satiated (since its market is 
small) or that, for technical reasons, they cannot be produced domestically.
"(From previous page)
For the theoretical measurements of the distribution of income between 
income groups - according to Pareto, Gini and Lorenz - See Mr. M. Flores 
xxChapter II (4).
The exposition that follows relies heavily on the cited works of Mrs. 
Navarrete (See Chapter I) and Mr. Flores (see Chapters I and III). No 
specific quotations except in some cases, will be given because their 
arguments are not used verbatim.
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In either case, the lack of investment opportunities may result in a hi^i 
consumption of imports which puts pressure on the balance of payments. 
Alternatively, investment nay be channeled to export activities, but 
this depends on any elastic external demand.
A regressive distribution of income is obviously a function of many 
variables. One, however, has important significance. Savings accumulat­
ed through time, and in a regressive fashion. (The distribution of wealt
•.Such a distribution may be seen from a different angle. That is, 
simply, to determine who receives the goods and services produced in a 
given period. In a system of private enterprise, and under statid as­
sumptions, this resolves itself, for better or worse, through the price 
mechanism that equates the supply and demand of the different factors of 
production. For instance, if in a given activity the level of wages in­
creases over-and-above that of other activities, the labour force employ­
ed in these last ones will come over to the activity with high wages. In 
fact the supply of labour for the activity increases in such a way that 
wages are reduced, while in the other activities the reduced supply of 
labour will increase i/ages: in the end all activities will tend to have
the same level of wages. In the same fashion, the price system will 
equate the rate of profits in the different activities.
If capital happens to be available in greater proportion than labour 
those entrepreneurs, who maintain the same combination of factors of pro­
duction, will have to give higher wages to the relatively scarce labour. 
But the tendency towards higher wages will induce entrepreneurs to em­
ploy relatively less labour to capital. In the long run there will be 
a new combination of factors of production with more capital per worker 
higher average wage, and a lower rate of profits.
With respect to the distribution of capital among Entrepreneurs* 
the price system only indicates the final results; it does not show 
the distribution of capital among the individual capitalists. Because 
each capitalist receives an income that bears some relation to his stock 
of capital, something which depends on the distribution of wealth. Thus 
the capital of each individual is determined by the accumulated capital 
or savings, by the propensity to save, and the time that has elapsed 
while capital was being accumulated.
In conclusion, under the above assumptions, the regressive distri­
bution of income determines the possibility of having larger savings;
■which in turn depends on the propensity to save and on the availability of
investment opportunities; and the distribution of income is determined
by the price system and the distribution of wealth.
Changes in the distribution of income
Assume first what follows:
!♦- A regressive distribution of income where the wage sector is formed 
by the lower groups of personal income.
2.- The growth of real output per capita increases the capital forma­
tion per worker.
3.- Total savings increase capital formation at a higher rate than the 
growth of population.
4.- There is full employment of the factors of production.
5*- Savings increase more than proportionately than increases in personal 
income and that savings are formed mainly by entrepreneurs.
Second, what happens then to the distribution of income?
1.- If capital accumulation is increasing at a higher pace than the
growth of population, entrepreneurs will be competing among them­
selves for the relatively scarce labour and wages will increase.
2.- Entrepreneurs will thus he induced to change the composition of
factors of production and they will increase the amount of capital
per worker.
3.- The increase in wages will tend to diminish the rate of profits 
per unit of capital.
4.- Each entrepreneur will receive lower profits per unit of worker,
but, having invested more savings, will have increased its stock
of capital.
5.- In the end, labour will have higher average wages and entrepreneurs 
will have increased their income as a consequence of the additional 
investment,
6.- So far it would seem that an increase in savings, investment, and 
income and the final distribution of this income does not necessari­
ly alter the initial distribution of income.
* Y/hat are then the factors that change the distribution of income?
1.- If there is unemployment, wages will not tend to increase. Income 
will increase and entrepreneurial personal incomes will too push 
the regressive distribution further. Although the weakness of ef­
fective demand r^i.11 act as a brake on the process.
2.- Technological innovations will appear, reduce labour employment, and
2:
3.-
4.-
5.-
6.-
1.-
contributes to the regressive distribution of income, Innovations can also 
contribute in another fashion to the concentration of income; those entre­
preneurs who first apply innovations vill be more competitive than the rest 
enabling then to absorb the less innovating entrepreneurs,
A technological innovation, on the other hand, vill tend to reduce costs an< 
prices and hence result in a gain for consumers, A reduction in prices wi. 
not occur if there are strong tendencies towards monopoly or if the externa] 
demand is very elastic, VJhen a reduction in costs is not accompanied by a 
reduction in prices, the new profits "will accrue completely to the entrepre­
neur, j
Oligopolistic concentrations may lead to the control of supply and to a mom 
psonic demand for the factor of production. Such tendencies may reinforce 
the concentration of income in the entrepreneurial sector,
A credit expansion to the entrepreneurs may constitute a transference that
0places a greater proportion of total income at their disposal.
An increase in wages and salaries and a reduction of profits vill redistri­
bute income progressively. The reduction of profits is not unnecessary, if 
credit covers wage increases.
One is here interested in possibilities 5 and 6, in structuralist terms. 
Assume that the redistribution of income has turned out to be regressive 
and that there are increased savings potentialities. The lover personal 
income groups save unnoticeably and are not able to increase their consump­
tion, On the other hand, in the high income group the fact that potential 
savings turn out to be savings depends, as was said, on the investment op­
portunities. If these are not present, they vill consume - not save - their 
new income. But they vill not consume more essentials; they will consume 
luxuries. This means that the demand for non-essentials will become more el 
astic. Investment in non-essential industries may increase, but it is also 
highly probably that imports of luxuries also increase. The regressive 
distribution of income vill change the structure of production in the 
following ways: (a) a higher production of non-essentials and exports;
0>) a stagnation of the production of essentials; and (c) higher imports 
especially of luxury goods and services. It was seen in the sections b and 
c that such changes in the structure of production and expenditure may be 
inflationary namely through a pressure in the balance of payments and high c
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industrialisation.
Assume, on the other hand, that there is a progressive distribution of 
income which iahcs the form of higher wages. The 1 ow income groups re­
ceive an increasing proportion of total income. Sat, since their sav­
ings are negligible, the demand for consumer goods increases. Overll 
savings only increase slightly, because savers have suffered a relative 
.decrease in their income. Nonetheless, the elastic demand for essen­
tials will create new investment opportimities.. Sat since savings are 
insufficient, imports, both of essentials and non-essentials, will in­
crease and create a deficit in the balance of payments. This may well 
lead to inflation. £wo factors are likely to be relevant. First, a 
devaluation will tend to be inflationary and distribute income regres- 
sively (part III, Chapter l). Second, an expansion of credit will en­
sue (to avoid stagnation) which may increase profits and decrease real 
wages. Whether the distribution of income turns out to be regressive 
or not will depend on the competition for income shares between work­
ers and entrepreneurs. The existence of unemployment may prove det­
erminant. Bat, in conclusion, writes Mr. Flores, fthe tendency towards 
a more uniform distribution of income in an UDC, tends to unbalance the 
system because of the pressure it exerts on prices and on the balance 
of payments (6)'.
It appears from a theoretical point of view that, at this state, either 
way, regressive or progressive wise, a change in the distribution may 
probe inflationary. With respect to Latin-American countries, Mr.. N. 
Yferman commented (7): *Any distribution of income may be inflrfc’ionary or 
not*. This does not mean that most structuralists regard inflation as 
inevitable. Still, one has to see why they recommend a progressive dis­
tribution of income, before going into the problem of instability.
A progressive distribution of income
Aside from inflationary pressures, structuralists are against *an ex­
cessively regressive distribution of income1. They simply believe that 
the traditional principle of a high propensity to save with the concen­
tration of income has fallen into discredit, especially in UDC. It is 
thus convenient to list the core of their arguments!
A high volume of savings is not desirable per se. If investment oppor­
tunities are limited with respect to savings, the higher the equality 
in the distribution of income the higher the propensity to consume and, 
thus there will be higher levels of demand, employment and production.
If income inequality means a high volume of potential savings that are 
not invested - because of ,under-consumpiionthere will be deflation 
in the short-run and stagnation in the long-run.
2.- A regressive distribution of income does not necessarily result in 
a high volume of savings, 'when the high income groups are composed 
by a class whose set of values are not commercially directed, writes 
Mfs. Navarrete, emphasis will be place on extravagance and wasteful­
ness, attributes which are not compatible with the austerity and 
thrift of a capitalis class1.
3*- Statistical measurements have shown how personal savings have lost 
importance as a source of capital formation and how institutional 
savings, formed within enterprises - public and private - insurance 
companies and social security institutions, etc, have gained relative­
ly.
4.- Professor Kidznets has described, ina historical sense, different 
combinations between wavings and investment and growth. Savings 
and investment can be rdatively high and the rate of growth also high,
like in Japan; they can be really average and still growth high, like
in Sweden and perhaps in the United States; or they can be high with
a mild rate of growth like in Great Britain.
5.- A regressive distribution of income - because of the structure of
demand that accompanies it - may stimulate investment with a low cap-*ital content where investment productivity per worker is low. If 
the size of the market is small and capital scarce, the movement of 
labour from agriculture will move into activities which have a low 
capital productivity per worker, like services and cottage industries.
6.- High income groups may satisfy partially their propensity to consume 
with inports. Yrhen the import of consumer durables is very restrict­
ed, the demand for raw materials and intermediate products for their 
domestic production will grow vexy noticeably. Moreover, national 
tourism may increase. This may easily put pressure on the balance
of payments especially if the demand for inports is less elastic to 
changes in income than investment.
7.- With chronic inflation, the balance of payments may fall into chronic 
disequilibrium, investments's structure will be distorted. Investment 
will hedge against inflation in real estate, inventory formation, 
savings in foreign exchange or, if conditions are favourable, in 
export activities.
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*There are, of course, may exceptions when capital intensive luxuries 
•may be produced domestically.
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8.- A regressive distribution oi income may not only distort savings 
and expenditure, it may also limit supply* A regressive distri­
bution of income is reflected in large population groups with a 
very low level oi productivity. This may be caused, among other 
things, by the small opportunities of significantly remunerative 
employment. If consumption of the low income groups were to in­
crease, it would mean higher mobility and productivity in the * 
under-employed labour. The supply of labour would be made more 
elastic*
9«- A more progrdssive distribution of income seems to accompany 
the development of a higher income per capita. With time, the 
proportion of concentrated income in high income families has de­
creased; middle-income groups have become larger; and mass pov­
erty has been virtually eliminated in many countries.
This line of argument has led structuralists to certain policy recom-
*mendations, into which we shall not go here into ; and to the * economic 
phylosophy1 we have been noticing all along the exposition of the structur­
alist school. The following quotation from krs. Navarrete makes the fact 
explicit:
*if one considers that, in an UDC, a functional distribution of income 
(from the angle of economic, growth and thus less regressive) is not attain­
able by itself nor as a simple and spontaneous result of the process of 
growth, because there are no factors that automatically guarantee an op­
timal distribution of income. Situations are created where the distribu­
tion deteriorates and the rate of development is reduced. Since the Great 
Crisis, it is admitted that the competition and market forces do not re­
sult in the best of all possible worlds and hence the promoting interven­
tion of the State. It is necessary, in the same fashion, an intervention 
of the State which guarantees a policy of distribution of income. The 
purpose xrf which would be to correct unbalances and reduce the wasteful­
ness produced by the market and accelerate the process of growth, in the 
face of scarce caj^ital and abundant labour (8)*.
Attaining a less regressive distribution of income which would leod 
to a higher rate of growth, involves in structuralist terms the following:
The policy objective is, of course, a more progressive distribution of in­
come. The economic policies, in general, include: fiscal measures, taxa­
tion and expenditure wise; an incomes policy, which comprises higher em­
ployment goals, minimum wage legislation, a higher load of productivity 
and skills, etc; wage participation in the enterprises profits; anti- 
monopolistic legislation; an agrarian reform, and so on.
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1.- A higher surplus resulting from an increasing national income and 
the level of consumption. This should he based on graduated in­
creases in the consumption of essentials aud the reduction of non- 
essential consumption.
2.— Investment should be oriented in such a way that the inequality in 
the average productivity per worker is reduced in the different 
sectors and branches of industry.
3»- The increase in the consumption of essentials should enlarge the 
market and lead to larger economies-of-scale.
4.- A more progressive distribution of income should be induced up to
the point where savings and investment are as large as possible and*essential consumption is encouraged.
0In conclusion, structuralists are interested in establishing a relation* 
ship between a progressive distribution of income and the growth of output. 
The distribution of income, writes Mrs. Navarrete, influences the volume and 
composition of demand and the volume and selection of investment* Aud, on 
the other hand, it influences the composition of the supply of labour, 
through changes in productivity. If the distribution cf income is more 
progressive, there is an element of economic stability a§ the level of 
consumption increases and an element of growth as productive investment 
is directly stimulated and results in a higher aggregate value. In the 
same manner, Mr. Flores concludes that the marked concentration of income 
reduces capital formation because it limits effective demand.
Having arrived at these structuralist conclusions, our fundamental 
problem remains: what happens when chronic inflation is incorporated to
the growth assumptions of a more progressive distribution of income? It 
has been seen, however, that ■any* distribution of income may prove to be 
inflationary. How structuralists handle this proposition, in terms of 
the controversy, is the main objective of the section that follows. It is 
convenient to advance the way in which professor Balogh focuses the pro­
blem (10). Hedistribution towards the rich, which is commonly regarded as 
a means to increase savings, investment, and economic progress certainly 
produces no such results in Latin America. *t might even lead to a worsen­
ing in the balance of payments and to unemployment as domestic products 
are displaced by high-grade imports because of a high propensity to con­
sume. A redistribution of income towards the low income groups in general
The theoretical analysis which develops these considerations may be seen, 
among others, in the work of P. A. Ear on <,, G. Hyrdal, and H.W. Singer (9)*
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•would not lead to a fall in savings. Even if it did, it might lead to an 
improvement in the quality of investment - less luxury construction and 
investment in the production of luxury consumer goods. But, a redistri­
bution of income towards the poor if, on the other hand, leads to invest­
ment in popular consumer industries may bring about a fall in the propen­
sity to save. This would have to he very carefully managed, as it might 
get out of hand and cause inflation. Superficially it thus appears that 
•more' inflation is inevitable.
(2) Inflation ana the regressive distribution of income.
It is convenient to start with the controversy itself and again, as­
sume the existence of typical monetarists and structuralists. Contrary 
0
to what it may appear, it seems that monetarists, when working with an 
inflationary setting, do not regard the regressive distribution of income 
as a source of potential savings and investment. That is, where inflation 
to concentrate income on entrepreneurs, a monetarist would stop it for the 
sale of stability. Once this is achieved and competitive factor alloca­
tion reached through competition, the problem of increasing the propensity 
to save in a Latin-American country would be another and different from 
the one derived from an inflationary setting. But this does not mean that 
monetarists are not interested in a more progressive distribution of income. 
It simply means that their set of priorities is different from that of the 
structuralist thesis just described. Professor Reynolds writes that for 
may reasons there has been an equalising tendency in the distribution of 
income in the United States. 1Since 1950 there seems to have been little 
change. So it may be that marked changes in income distribution occur in 
sharp ' bursts and that it takes some catalytic agent such a s a war or a 
great depression to set them off. But the main direction of change is 
reasonably clear. If we had right now income distributions for 1930 or 
• 1990, I would be surprised if they were not more equal than the distribu­
tion of 1965; and Ithink this will be tine for the other mature industrial 
nations. How comforting this is to the countries in the early stages of 
development, I do not know. It may amount to saying, "when you get rich 
enough your problems will be easier - including the problem of income dis­
tribution.1" (ll)o This could be interpreted as monetarists making a pro­
gressive distribution of income a very long run objective. Structuralists 
do not only find the thesis discomforting, but refuse to wait for the price 
system to re-distribute income progressively.
Moreover, monetarists claim that inflation is likely to produce force 
which reduce and divert savings to excessive accumulation of inventories 
and luxury construction, rather than to productive long-term investment 
and popular housing. Of the productive investment actually made, a bias 
will develop towards short-term projects, while resources may be diverted 
from basic necessities and investment goods to the production of consumer 
goods, particularly luxuries. Inflation will also discourage foreign in­
vestment and induce a fl ight of capital and the purchase of foreign ex- 
change and securities (a somewhat indeterminate evidence for these fact­
ors is discussed in Chapter Ii). In these terms the agreement between mon 
etarists and structuralists would appear within reach. The differences 
between them, however, are indeed very great.
0
Concentrating on the distribution of income, the theoretical differ­
ences of the schools may be explained - among many possible ways - start­
ing with the structuralist set of priorities.
1«- Assume that a structuralist has a more progressive distribution of 
income as a short-run or, at the very most, a s a medium-term ob­
jective*
2.- Assume, secondly, that he is dealing with an inflationary economy.
3.- Assume, thirdly, that inflation may be a function of alternative 
changes on the distribution of income (it is, of course, very con­
ceivable that inflation may have •simultaneously1 a regressive and 
progressive effect on the distribution).
a) Abstracting from a combination of tendencies, assume growth 
and a more regressive distribution of income which induces more 
inflation. The fact, as we have seen, is explained mainly by 
the lack of effective demand, a high propensity to consume 
of the high income groups and hence a low propensity to save, 
a high propensity to import consumer durables or their com­
ponents, inappropriate investment opportunities, an improduct- 
ive labour force, and so on. This line of argument forms the 
main body of the structuralist thesis (a very good example of 
it is the work of Mr. Flores de la Pena (12). Professor Grun- 
wald resumes it in the following words: •another structural
impediment for a more elastic supply of products is said to 
be the very unequal distribution of personal income. This 
income distribution in itself implies a certain composition 
... of demand both domestically and for imports, which is not con­
ducive "to a high rate oi growth. Domestic production and im­
ports would cater to the restricted higher income groups0
Therefore, it is argued, investment and import substitution 
would he geared toward such production to the detriment of 
growth industries and investment in social overhead which 
would give greater flexibility to the economy (l3)f* 
Structuralists, within their set of priorities, are interest­
ed in devicing ways of redistributing income and hence reduce 
its inflationary consequences,
B)But also, assume that a more progressive distribution of in­
come as was also said, induces inflation. Such inflation 
would appear when the demand for essentials increases :• 1
as a result of higher real wages or other measures that amount 
to higher personal incomes for the low income groups; and 
when *non-inflationary savings' are not available and set 
various inflationary fanes in motion (structural or propa­
gating), Because of the weight of the previous argument, it 
would appear that structuralists wTould be less interested in 
curbing these causes of inflation. Hence the idea that struc­
turalists, as it has been said, are ’more permissive* towards 
inflation than monetarists. The time has come to qualify this . 
concept.
The inflationary consequences of a redistribution of income may also 
be seen as a problem for economic policy, nowever, among structuralists 
there are no general consensus of opinion in the matter. Dr, Prebisch in 
his ’false dilemma* proposition represents those who are not permissive 
towards inflation Cn the other extreme, there are those, like pro­
fessor Baer and Hr. I, Kerstenetzky, that for totally opposite reasons con­
template the possibility of continuing inflation. In superficial terms, 
again, the question is one of the priorities and compatibility of growth 
and stability objectives. Me shall deal here with the assumptions made 
and the propositions of Dr. Prebisch and others. In a later section there 
will be a discussion of what has been called an unorthodox structuralist 
thesis or permissiveness towards inflationary forces.
Structuralists have to explain their assumption of the compatibility 
of' progressive distribution of income with growth and stability; or al­
ternatively, how the concentration of income may lead to further infla­
tion, stagnation or to a dangerous pattern of growth. An element of spe­
cial significance is to explain how structuralists deal with the fact that 
increases in wrages and a progressive distribution of income (necessary as 
they may be) may also lead to inflation and slow growth.
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In general terms, monetarists accuse structuralists of sacrificing 
stability for a dangerous - and eventually unattainable - groirth object­
ive. Structuralists, according to what has been said, reject the accusa-* •tion. The missunderstanding has occurred because (some structuralist1 
— only some — have reached the conclusion that inflation is inevitable 
and the regressive distribution of income perhaps inescapable. Such ar­
guments vill be discribed in the following section. Here, one has to in­
sist that the main body of structuralists are devoted to the problem of 
achieving fast growth with stability and a tendency towards greater in­
come equality.
The problem involves a structural change. Monetarists, however, 
seem to think this is being permissive with inflation. Their proposition 
is much simpler: inflation has been caused by monetary and fiscal per­
missiveness; it should be stopped with orthodox policies which will first 
achieve stability, then growth, and much later a more progressive distri­
bution of income.
For structuralists, on the other hand and other things being equal, 
a change towards a progressive distribution is necessary to achieve growth 
with stability because of the savings process in Latin America. Savings 
are not only relatively low in the region because of low levels in income 
per capita but because of its distribution and the patterns of consump­
tion. An increase in savings calls for a change in distribution and con­
sumption and in the structure of production and imports, so that increased 
savings may be converted into capital goods. This is a structural change. 
For them, it is the resistance to these structural changes, necessary for 
a rise in savings, which often leads to inflation.
A structural change - growth with stability - implies essentially an 
increase in the productivity of labour. Moreover, for Dr. Prebisch, such 
a change does not appear to require a restriction in the consumption of th 
bulk of the population, which on the whole is too low, in order to accumu­
late the capital required for industrialisation and for the technical im­
provement of agriculture (l5)* Hence the emphasis on a progressive dis­
tribution of income. Productivity is to be increased through the indus­
trial employment of the uneirq)loyed and the scope for technical progress 
in agriculture. Technical progress should result in a net increase in 
national income and hence in an increasing margin of savings.
This is, again, Dr. Frebisch*s false dilemma of growth or stability;t 
where, in academic terms, the objectives are argued compatible without
L  A J i
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Savings depend ultimately on the sustained increase of labour producti­
vity, it is said that in Latin America productivity is low because of a rel 
ative lack of capital and that the lack of capital is due to low savings 
resulting from the low productivity (the vicious circle theory). The cir­
cle breaks, in structuralist terms, when low savings are viewed (at least
partially) as a consequence of the conspicous consumption created by the*regressive distribution of income. How is this incorporated into an in­
flationary setting?
In principle, it appears that inflation makes it possible to raise 
the level of public and private savings and investment, but the structural­
ist thesis is that by swelling the profits of high income groups, it also 
causes an .increase in consumption, generally on a higher scale than invest­
ment. It is therefore a socially costly and regressive method of raising 
the savings coefficient. If a large part of the profits, writes Dr. Pre­
bisch arising out of inflation had actually been saved and invested the 
domestic consequences of inflation would have been beneficial, but exper­
ience does not prove this. It seems that the proportion of profits con­
sumed has been considerable. Moreover, the high income groups have a high 
import coefficient and it is not surprising t at foreign exchange is spent 
in products not essential for economic development... Even if inflationary 
expansion were a practical expedient for nurturing the low savings margins, 
there are better ways of achieving that purpose '(l6). Y/hyis this so?
Some groui>s benefit considerably from inflation while others must lose. 
Traditionally it is said that the middle-class and fixed-income groups 
are those who bear the weight of the transfer of real income to entrepren­
eurs and other beneficiaries, as well as the wage sector. The better organ­
ised trade unions should also in principle be able to transfer the cost of 
inflation. With the increase in employment during the first phases of an 
expansionary process there might he a real increase in the income of labour. 
This, of course, depends in the lag with which wages are adjusted to rising 
prices. All this redistribution of income brought about by inflation creates 
in the sectors that benefit a money illusion, even though real income may 
cease to increase once the stage of moderate inflationary expansion has 
passed. The illusion begins to fade when different sectors compete for a 
stagnating level of income. This further increases inflation. In a third 
phase a painful readjustment is needed; one that usually brings down the 
standard of living of all, x>rofit earners, wage earners and the rest. In 
short, if the savings which accumulate through inflation arc furnished by 
many sectors of the community where as the benefits accrue only to some,
&5Jat?5a!lfsc§i5i?Sys’i:fife,1^ e^SiS“8fcifiiIe®g?ea32?22i§“ S the arSUJU°nt that
tlie question arises whether it is not possible to device other forms of 
savings by which resources could he better devoted to productive ends, 
vithout the serious disadvantages of inflation and a regressive distri­
bution of income.
Having established that structuralists are against a regressive 
distribution and inflation, the factor of the inflationary nature of wage 
increases remains to be answered in strusturalist terms. Dr. Prebisch 
will be followed in this point (l?)*
The author says that there are three main elements in this regres­
sive movement which derives from growth itself: (l) the cost of import
substitution, (2) the higher cost of agricultural products, and (3) the 
rise in taxes and duties which affect mass-consumption. Thus to raise 
wages is a very understandable reaction. The author concedes, however, 
that this fails to solve the problem of growth and inflation. Nor is the 
solution in the policy of a credit squeeze: if Central Banks do not in­
crease credit when wage increases, they cause a contraction in economic 
activity. Hence the contraction may be due not only to the structural 
characteristics of the Latin-ihnerican countries, which have now been de­
scribed, but to the use of monetary policy to deal inappropriately with 
the consequences of structural flaws.
But this does not mean that a structuralist, like Dr. Prebisch, is 
willing to let wages increase indefinitely. First, inflation is not an 
effective way of redistributing income from the point of view of the mas­
ses. Second, there are better ways of doing it: taxation; trade union
action that guarantees effective increases in productivity, instead of 
wasting their energy on securing wage increases which are soon cancelled 
by the inflationary spiral. Vhat is needed, writes Dr; Prebisch, is a 
wages policy which leads to such goals and at the same part ensures the 
growing participation of the broad masses in the process of national cap­
ital formation. The defense actions aimed at correcting this regressive 
distribution need not be inflationary: it is up to the banks to use 
credit facilities to compel the entrepreneurs to absorb the wage increas­
es by means of their inflation swollen profits.
Hence, an essential measure to achieve monetary stability without 
detriment to gro’rth is the stabilisation of wages. The rise in prices 
brought about by an inflationary demand - or by devaluation - exceeding 
the increase in costs rises the profits of firms, so that it is possible 
to restore the previous level of real wages without a further rise in 
prices and without the need to implement a credit squeeze which reduces 
private and public investment.
In the cost-price spiral, the relationship "between the real amount of 
wages and prices and profits fluctuates continually. After wages increase, 
in general, the real level of wages decreases again and profits rise. If 
wages are then stabilised their real level tends to "be lower than the aver­
age level resulting from these fluctuations. And, if there is no further 
adjustment effective demand is reduced. Similarly the deflation reduces 
profits and demand for the high income groups. There is a force which 
tends to arrest this movement, blien prices and profits fall there is a 
further increase in real wages which will continue until wage demand ab­
sorbs the entire output. At this point the process of contraction stops, 
but usually at a lower level of activity than had previously reached. But, 
asks Dr. Prebisch, is it really necessary to go through this process of 
contraction and recovery when it could have been avoided by devising the 
right point at which to stabilise wages?
On the other hand, in Latin America the inflationary spiral usually 
constitutes a:psychological safety-valve when the contraction of income 
and its regressiveness militate against an upward trend in the standard 
of living. Inflation has not proved an instrument of progressive distri­
bution in favour of the masses, since the credit system makes sure that 
the burden of illusory vrage increases or social security contributions 
is shifted back on to their own shoulders. Hence the defensive posture 
in the wage sector is not inflationary but a correction to the effects of 
inflation. That wage increases higher than what can be absorbed by prof­
its or productivity culminate in a spiral is an incontrovertible fact, but 
it must not be supposed that as a preventive step the stabilisation of 
wages constitutes by itself a basic solution to the problem. Such a sta­
bilisation of wages also implies a reduction in effective demand and the 
freezing of the regressive distribution of income. The fact, may not only 
reduce growth but eventually enhance inflation. The problem resolves it­
self in the following conclusions:
lo- The redistribution of income assumes a new characteristic in Latin 
America. In the capitalist evolution of advanced countries, capital 
accumulation proceeded redistribution. In our countries the two ope­
rations have to be performed simultaneously. Hence the need to seek 
the compatibility between a progressive distribution of income and 
growth.
2.- Within the domestic economy the solution lies in increasing savings, 
but without recourse to inflation. Savings depend on productivity 
and in the restriction in the consumption of the high income groups.
3.- The solution of restricting mass consumption cannot he perpetuated; 
firstly because present levels are unsatisfactory and secondly be­
cause such restriction of consumption is affected by transferring 
the margin of savings to entrepreneurs, and only a fraction of it 
is used for Capital formation. Moreover, a proportion of the lat­
ter is represented by investment stimulated by the increase of dem­
and of the higher income groups.
4.- That inflation may have dynamic effects is undeniable. It reduces
the contraction of the economy and allows the investment coefficient
to increase. But this implies an expensive and wasteful manner of
securing savings and a regressive distribution of income, unadmis—
sible frrra the structuralist point of view.
#
5;- In summary, structurally regard the progressive distribution of in­
come as a convenient measure to attain sustained growth. This im­
plies the grovrth of effective demand, changes in the present patterns 
of consumption - increases in the supply of essentials and decreases 
in the supply of non-essentials - higher savings, and higher producti 
vity. One of the necessary conditions to achieve compatibility be­
tween these variables would be an incomes policy; but one that does 
not freeze either wages or prifits. v/hat seems clear is that, with­
out growth, inflation is the easy way out where different income 
groups compete in an illusory way for income. The political and 
social dangers of such an inflationary spiral are only too clear.
Dr. Prebisch puts it in the following words: *These considerations
allow to approach the complex problem of inflation in Latin America. In 
actual fact, it merges with the problem of development. There is infla­
tion because the economy is structurally vulnerable, because of a regres­
sive distribution of income, because savings are not sufficient to expe­
dite investment. By means of an intensive economic development policy 
the maxima# resistance can be offered to these inflationary forces and the 
policy of monetary stability can be upheld as an integral part of economic 
development policy (l8)’.
(3) An 1 Unorthodox* Structuralist Position.
There is one group of structuralists, as it has been said, which have 
a more permissive attitude towards an inflationary setting. It is presum­
ably with them that monetarists are in bitter disagreement. With respect 
to income distribution such structuralists believe that rapid economic 
growth will make* it more regressive. The reasons were suggested a long
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time ago by the classical economists, but they have been re-emphasised 
more recently by the much publicised work of professor W.A. Lewis and 
others (l9)* In other words, there is also a possibility of benificial 
Schumpeterian effects which inflationary pressures may exert upon the 
investment process in UDC.
We shall take here as representatives of this position the work of 
professor V/. Baer and Mr. I. Xertenetzky (20) and that of professor G. 
Maynard (2l), who although more cautious than the former still contem­
plates the possibility of ’forcing savings’ tliDough inflation. It would 
be possible to avoid this digression were it convenient to regard such
work as 'non-structural'• It shall be considered structural work, how- 
0ever, for two simple reasons: agrowth priority and the existence of
structural bottlenecks as the main causes of inflation. This is not to 
say that one has to go into a second confrontation between different va­
rieties of Latin-Americcan structuralists, although this could turn out 
to be a revealing experience. That is, this section is only concerned 
with the problem of income distribution and inflation.
Professor Baer would concede from a start that inflation concen­
trates income in a regressive fashion, although not quite in t ese words. 
’What hit home, as far as I was concerned, was professor Lutz' remark 
that forced savings is a bad thing, especially because you are producihg 
growth at the expense of the poor, who are usually losing out in an infla­
tion where forced savings occur... it is quite elementary to all of us 
economists that in a growing economy, and one which is starting to indus­
trialise, a large proportion of the increment in the national product has
to be reinvested... (in Brazil) the forced savings process did not result
*in a lowering of the populations' living standard. It simply resulted in 
a redistribution of the increment in the national output in favour iof in­
vestments' (22).
This really means going into the opposite of what has been said:
1.- Inflation would have a favourable effect on growth, when it increases 
savings.
2.- Inflation may not misallocate investment (at least not the greater 
proportion).
3.- A progressive distribution is not necessary over the short-run for 
Latin-American growth.
>This, by 1964, is a very debatable statement.
The ideas centre around professor Lewis who believes that an in­
flationary process can have benificial effects when it redistributes in­
come to the saving classes who will turn it into productive investment*
It follows that inflations which are useful to capital formation are 
self-destructive, in the sense that new capital will eventually produce 
a flow of consumer goods which will check prices or presumably lower them.
The second explanation is that inflation is a substitute for taxa­
tion. Since the fiscal system of most Latin-American countries is not 
well developed nor effective, inflation may be the best way out until the 
fiscal and institutional systems develop. It is interesting to quote what
Dr. Navarrete, another Mexican economist, says about this with respect to 
0
Mexico:
t'In 1934, whether you were a structuralist or not, a credit and fin­
ancial policy had to be decided to carry out Mexico's first Development 
Plan. The Plan included rapid land reform and rapid industrialisation. 
Could we have established at the time either direct-income taxation or 
an indirect-expenditure tax system? Experience has shown that a modem 
tax system requires a modem administration. And this you cannot produce 
overnight. Could we have restored to a nonexisting capital market or 
could we have appealed to voluntary savings of the wealthy, opposed as 
they were to the Revolution? This is why Mexico, oin order to finance 
agriculture and industry, resorted at that time to an ample overdraft on 
the government account with the Central Bank. This action contributed 1b 
a 14£ average annual rate of inflation in the late 30's and early 40*s.
The peso was twice devalued... But ly 1954 Mexico could increase its 
tax burden: tax revenues amounted to 10c/o of GNP but added the whole of
the public sector it reached l6£ (today it is 26<S). The security market 
expanded and now channels and finances at least 15^20$ of domestic invest­
ment. Mexico is self-sufficient in foodstuffs. The rate of growth in per 
capita terms has been of (1950-63) and there has heen exchange stability 
for 14 years. It seems to me that in the absence of an adequate tax systei 
and capital market to provide the financing for a sustained investment 
programme, inflation may serve for a time as w weapon to ex&ct the needed 
higher volume of savings; but its usefulness wears off and inflation evem 
ually becomes self-defeating as it encourages nonsumption in the private 
and public sectors. In Mexico we have solved the structuralist-monetarist 
controversy in a pragmatic way. This implies that there can be no siructuj 
al justification for sheer monetary mismanagement and fiscal irresponsibil: 
ty, but it also means that financial decisions have tq he geared towards 
the field of investment, nroduetivitv and 0-rowth1
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Still, this may "be taken as a warning against permissiveness with in­
flation. Together with the need of productive investment, With respect 
to inflationary investment, Professor Aaldor has developed the following 
ideas (24)j An important priority facing UDC is the direction of a policy 
of investment and the reduction of structural "bottlenecks (credit expan­
sion) of the creation of demand through public works). Assuming perfect 
competition - and thus a market mechanism which allocates investment - in­
flation would increase ‘differentials’ and grovrth.' A differential is a risk 
premium, small but above the rate of interest that induces greater invest­
ment. The larger the differential - in money or in real terms - the.’larger 
investment'would be* A positive feature of inflation, through the increase 
in the differential, would be higher savings and lower consumption, Wages 
can only be constant, under the assumption of higher profits and a higher 
propensity to save. In such a model, moderate bounds of inflation reduce 
consumption and increase investment, capital accumulation and growth.
But a small rate of inflation that starts in profits, will gain momentum 
and turn itself into a wage-price spiral and hence into a costo inflation. 
The picture is complicated when imperfections - a regressive distribution 
of income unemployment, and so on - are introduced into the model. In fact, 
investment will tend to be misallocated and savings will tend to escape into 
foreign exchange. With inflation and without perfect competition, differen­
tials i/ill be reater in non-essential industries than in agriculture or in 
certain industries. Inflation thus reinforces bottlenecks, monopolistic 
positions, and improductive investment. The question of whether inflation 
is favourable or unfavourable to growth resolves itself in evaluating the 
short-run consequences which might be positive v/ith the long-run negative 
consequences. Simplistically, Mr. N. Warman concludes that the long-run 
negative consequences appear 'very soon1* Moreover, the question whether 
the rate of inflation can be kept moderate remains.
For professor Maynard (25) an ideal case for using inflation to pro­
mote growth would involve the following conditions:
1*- The existence of surplus labour which can be used to produce capital 
goods, v/ith no real cost in terns oi consumer goods.
2.- The presence of money illusion in the labour supply and savings 
schedules.
3*- A high propensity to save in those groups which gain with inflation.
4.- A general agreement as to the desirable distribution of real income 
and consumption.
5.- Productive investment projects.
6.- Strong monetary authorities in the event of hyper-inflation.
Are these conditions present in the semi-industrialised Latin-America 
countries? The most important one is agreement on the distribution of sa­
crifices and gains arising from growth; something which, as was seen woul 
involve a policy on wages and profits. Professor Maynard only commits him 
self to saying that the conditions are more lilely in advanced countries, 
rather than in UDC.
Still, one is left with professor Baer's and Mr. Kertenetzky's pro­
position that 'in many UDC inflation is inevitable and beneficial up to
*a certain limit, The policy should be 'warranted vs. unwarranted rates 
of inflation* )26). In another article (27) the first author, however, saj 
' the object of this paper has not been to give a full-fledged defense of 
inflation as the best method for growing or the most efficient one*. None­
theless, the professor goes on to argue that inflation did not misallocate 
investment in Brazil. It should be clafified that his experience is base 
mainly on a thorough study of the Brazilian case; however, he believes the 
such an experience should be projected further. The main body of his argu­
ments oh the relation between Brazil's severe inflation and savings and in­
vestment is resumed on his article Brazil: Inflation and Economic Bfficien
cy (23). Professor Baer arrives to the following set of conclusions based
on Brazilian experience from 1950 to I960:
1.0 If investment allocation was not perfect there is neither evidence 
of negative inflationary causes:
a) Inventory investment did not tend to increase with inflation.
b) Investment was not channeled excessively to construction.
c) Growth was higher in capital formation industries than in 
consumer industries.
2.- Savings of corporate industries vere a main source of finance.
3#- Relative price fluctuations were not noticeably influenced by infla­
tionary forces, but by direct government policies (price controls) or
to natural changes in prices, reflecting changes of supply and dem­
and.
4.- Although the real rate of interest was in fact tnegative this was 
immaterial: most large firms in industry do not rely much on 
credit fjorc^financial institutions.
*Mr. N. l/arman says tiiat inflation is not a method, but a consequence of
** structurally difficult growth.
For an alternative position see the cited work of Dr. Simonsen.
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The authors argue 011 the last resort that inflation resulted in a 
higher rate of growth because the factor proportion of wage income fc1! (30). 
Structuralists, as has heen said, regard this as a dangerous state of affairs 
which may lead to some growth but inevitably ends up with more inflation and 
lesser growth. In fact, for the authors the explicit assumption is that 
inflations which lead to growth eventually reduce the rate of inflation, 
something which is certainly not present in Brazil. There are, of course, 
numerous studies which have tried to prove that inflation has had very neg­
ative effects on savings and investment. The subject was discussed in Part XI, 
chapter 2, section d. Ifith respect Brazil one may refer hack to the work by 
Dr. Siraonsen mentioned; to a special study by ECLA (29); and also to Mr. A. 
Ruderraan's article (30).
The basic defense for the former authors is the fact that Brazil was
experiencing fast growth and inflation. From 1950 to I960 the compound rate
of inflation was an average 25 to 30$, while GNP grew at a rate of 6-7$*
But from 1962 onwards, while inflation was well above 35$ (see Part I, table
XII) the rate of growth fell down dramatically and with it all the alleged
favourable effects of inflation. Per capita income only averaged 0.7
between I960 and 1966 and was reduced to - 1.2 in 1966 (32). Thus the only
example of a possible positive correlation between growth and inflation in
*semi-industrialized Latin-American countries has gone sour
The object of the exercise has been to see how 'unorthodox structuralists1 
have to assure fast growth and instability with a regressive distribution of 
income. Conversely, structuralists in general seek a rate of growth compatible 
with a progressive income distribution.
* Some structuralists are going to argue that if the rate of growth in out put 
fell, it was a consequence of the stabilization programme introduced in 1964 
by the military junta. The point remains that since 1962 growth fell and 
spiralling inflation was very likely miss—allocating investment.
4.- Prices\nay be rising in part because the community expects them 
to rise Vather than because of pre-existing pressures of demand 
against resources.
5*- Y/hen inflation is a relatively open contest among competing
groups for the distribution of income, this happens where infla­
tion has led tfe little or no gnwtk. This has been important in 
Argentina, ChilY and Uruguay, but not in Brazil; and this is 
from where professor Baer starts to develop his argument.
Still, up to this point, it is for everyone to decide how the authori
exposition stands before >he structuralist arguments stated in the previoi
section, the exposition inNfche present one, and the monetarist survey car] 
ied oiit in a different chaptYr.
Returning to our problem (if income distribution, it is fundamental tc 
establish that professor 3aer'sNargument depends essentially on ’the fact 
that prices have to : keep ahead ojE labour costs.* He develops this assum­
ption, together with Mr. IverteneztlV, in two other of his articles to whic 
we shall now turn (30). \
The function of the inflationary Wocess, write the authors, is to
force the consuming sector to save in omer to reduce imports, and to in­
crease planned productive capacity. SuclYsavings would not be possible 
if the inon-investing sector where strong plough to safeguard its money
earnings. A lag in wages and consumption isYthus a sine qua non for mak-\ T" * "ing the inflationary process an ultimately productive one. It should 
thus be obvious that deliberate anti-inflationaty policies would be harm­
ful to the growth objective. For example, monetYy policy in contracting
the supply of money would not ensure an optimal rate of investment in basi
overhead capital facilities, in import-substitution\ and new export indus­
tries. Is there a chance for inflation not fulfilling its purposes, ask 
the authors, or degenerating into hyper-inflation? Th\s depends for them 
on the degree to which wages and salaries advances can ue kept in check, 
thus avoiding the wage-price spiral, and to the degree thVfc inflation does 
misdirect resources into improductive investment (somethin^ which perhaps 
beg the question, since effective demand will b° presumably Yor luxury in­
vestment). It should happen that by the time the labour sector is shophis 
ticated so as to succeed in incone rises, the grovrth of the fis\cal machine 
ry and other control mechanisms vill have been such so as to direct resour- 
ces into grovrth. \
*Tiie statement, of course, ignores the weight of the theoretical arguments 
of the previous section.
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(4) Trends in the distribution of income.
The distribution of income in Latin America, be it by factor share, by 
personal income groups, by sectors of the economy, or by regions within each 
country, is very unequal. It has been discussed how such a distribution can 
be measures in terms of personal income groups. Before going into the sub­
ject, however, the regressive distribution can also be understood comparing 
in relative terms the position of Latin America with that one of Western Eu­
rope and the United States, According to a theoretical study of ECLA (33) 
the differences would be the following (See Tables I and III):
1.- There is greater concentration of income in a small percentage of the 
population which is the social sector that the highest levels of in­
come* Vi/here as in Latin America a third of all income is concentrat­
ed on 5/o of the population, in the industrialised Western countries 
the top income group, representing the same proportion of total popu- 
ltion, receives a much lower proportion of total income, 21$
2.- In Latin America the social sectors in the lowest income groups, re­
presenting 50$ of the population, receive only 16$ of total income, 
while in the industrialised countries the same group receives at least 
21$ of total income.
3*- Comparison of the lowest income groups with the average of the region, 
gives an index of only 32 in Latin America and 45 in the industrial­
ised countries.
4.- Comparison of the income levels in the highst gorups with tie average 
also reveals substantial differences. In Latin America the index is 
6.5 times the average, whereas in advanced countries it is 4.2 times 
the average.
5#- Moreover, in Latin America the high group is 20 times the lower group, 
whereas in advanced countries it is only 10 times as great, and in the 
United States even less.
Mrs. Navarrete illustrates the same phenomenon in the following table
(34)
TABLE I
•Country Year $ of families $ of personal in
come
United States 
Great Britain
Mexico
1950
1947
1950
5
5
5
21
24.
40
TABLE II
Conjetural Distribution of Income in Latin 
America I960 .
Category Proportion of 
the Population
Proportion of 
Total Personal 
Income
Average Annual Per Cap Income 
Batio to Average USA Do1lari
I 50 16 30 120
II 45 51 110 400
III 3 14 470 1750
IV 2 19 950 3500
TOTAL 100 100 100 370
Source: The Economic Development of Latin America in the Post-War Period
B,N., N. Y., 1964.
TABLE III
Relative Differences in the Distribution of Personal Income 
In Latin America, We stern Europe and the United States
me
kets
Population LATIN AMERICA
Income With Respect
to average per­
sonal Income(100)
WESTERN EUROPE
Income With Res­
pect to av­
erage pers. 
income(100)
UNITED
Income
STATES
With Res­
pect to av­
erage pers, 
income (100
Igh 5 33 660 22 436 20 400
nter- - 
tediate
45 51 113 56 124 57 127
*>W 50 16 32 22 44 23 46
•ce j See previous Table
The next step is to return to personal income groups and to try to es 
tablish the trends in income distribution in the semi-industrialised Latin 
American countries* 'As in almost every part of the world, writes Dr* Sun 
kel9 statistics on the distribution of income are also in Latin America 
rather scanty and of doubtful reliability (35) • * Taking this into conside 
at ion, the results of several surfeys - taken during the last decade and t 
early part of this one - for only three countries have been united in Tabl 
IV.
Both Argentina and Mexico show a regressive trend in the distribution 
of income according to personal income groups. There has been a decline i 
the income earned by the poorer 60$ of the population* But while in Argen 
tina it was the upper 10$ of the population which gained at the cost of tb 
rest, jot the 90$ of the population; in Mexico the upper 10$ and the lower 
60$ of the population lost and contributed to an increase in the middle 20 
of the population.
In Chile, on the other hand, the distribution was more progressive 
from 1950 to 1956: the upper^lO^ lost considerably to the middle 30$ and
to the lower 60$* The trend, however, was reversed by I960, where once 
again the lower and middle group of the population (90$) lost to the high- 
income group, although less considerably. Looking at a recent survey (see
Table V) - which unfortunately was taken only for urban Santiago - it can'
be seen that in 1965 the distribution of income was very regressive still 
(the lower quarter of the population had only 6*18$ of the total income)* 
If the Chilean pattern were the same as that of Latin America, an inclusi< 
of the rural sector would make the redistribution worse*
A hypothetical income distribution for Brazil reveals a similar re­
gressiveness, although more marked* If this were the case 5$ of the popu­
lation receives 34$ of total income, while 50$ of the population ohly re­
ceives 16$ of such income*
The persistence of such a regressive distribution of income, in the 
four most industrialised countries of the region, has led structuralists 
to emphasise the stagnating and inflationary role of a lack of effective 
demand*
The apex of the pyramid, resulting from the distribution (the upper 
10$ of the population) represents a large consumer market, whose purchas­
ing power may be sufficient to ensure a market for durable goods or, when 
these are not domestically produced, to demand imports* The intermediate 
group, which represents about 30$ of the population, may not represent 
any considerably purchasing power, except for essential products* Lastly
TABLE IV
Surveys of Income Distribution by Personal Income Groups 
($ of Total Population and Income)
Argentina
Population 1953 Income 1961
0 - 6 0  
6l - 90 
91 - 100
31*7
31.2
37.1
1959
28.6
29.1
42. 1
30.2
30.7
39.1
Source: U. A. Parafso, Economic Bulletin for Latin America,
Chile
Vol. XI, 196(
Population 1950-52 1954-56 1958-60
0 - 6 0 18.5 24.0 24.0
61 - 90 34.8 42.2 40.3
91 - 100 46.7 33.5 35.7
Source: 0.
in
Sunkel, The Structural Background of Development Problems 
Latin America, op. cit.
Mexico
Population 1950 1957 1963oVO1o 24.6 21.2 23.3
61 - 90 26.6 32.1 36.7
91 - 100 49.0 46.7 40.0
Sources: I.M. Navarrete, La Distribucidn del ingreso en Mexico, op* cit.
A. Labra Manjarrez, La concentracidn del ingreso en Mexico, 
Revista de Comercio Exterior, Mexico.
Brazil: Hypothetical Income Distribution in I960
Population Income
0 1 Ul o 16.0
-------------- 51 - 95 50.0
96 - 100 34.0
Source: The growth and decline of import-substitution in Brazil,
Econ. Bulletin for Latin America. VOL* IX. 1964*
the large part of the population (more than half) may be at subsistence 
levels.In other words, the size of the market has been determined by a 
slow growing effective demand so this for structuralists is a cause of 
iflation and slow growth. Before going into the existing regressive 
distribution of income and inflation, let us look with more detail into 
• Argentina and Mexico, where data was available (See Table V).
In Argentina by 1961 there is a considerable concentration of income 
in the highest income groups. The top 30$ of the personal income groups 
received 6l.6$ of all income, the top 3$ alone received 29*3$ end the top 
1$ received 14.3$ of all income. However, the sharpest increase in ine­
quality appeared in the 1959 estimate, which was characterised by a sub­
stantial increase in the share of income received by the top 10$ at the 
expense of all other groups. Each group below the top 10$ had a smaller 
share of the total in 1959 than it had received in 1953# Comparing 1953 
and 1961, a significant increase in inequality occurred, and the shift oc 
curred in the same groups the top 19$ increases its share ot total income, 
and all other groups lost. The relative gains and losses were not, however, 
evenly shared. Nearly all the gains went to the top 5$. While the 5$ just 
below the top group gained, the gain was much smaller. Among the groups 
which lost, the lowest 60$ group lost considerably more in relative terms 
than the other groups. Thus, from the early 1950's to the beginning of 
the 60's a significant regressive movement occurred in the distribution 
of income. The lowest 60$ of all income groups reduced their share in 
total imcome. The top 10$ achieved a substantial increase in its share of
the total, and this gain wan largely concentrated in the upper half of the 
*group.
From her study of income distribution in Argentina, Miss Parafso de­
duced some very important conclusions in the context of this work (36):
1.- The broad conclusion which can be drawn is that the overall inequali­
ty in the distribution of income results in a large extent from dif­
ferences in income levels of wage and salary earners on the one hand, 
and the entrepreneurial group on the other. Wage and salary earners' 
families dominate the lower part of the distribution, then steadily 
decline in relative importance, and account for only slightly over
The analysis in detail of these changes, particularly, with respect to 
inflation and the various methods taken to control it, is being carried 
out currently by the Argentinian Joint Tax Conmittee in collaboration 
with ECLA and the QAX (37)* The results, unfortunately, have not yet 
been made public.
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of the families in the highest income decile; and in the top 1$ they 
less than 10$ of the families. This goes on to prove the point made 
tially: personal income groups coincide, although obviously not per­
tly, with the distribution of income at factor cost.
income structure in Argentina reveals a predominance of a large number 
Individual producers with relatively large incomes. This type of econ- 
5 structure has often been associated with a tendency towards high unit 
c-ups and low sales volume per individual enterprise. It has as its 
iterpart relatively high prices, especially in those lines where large 
Le production may result in substantial economies of scale. The size 
the market is thus restricted below what it might be in more favourable 
sumstances, and the lower income groups in particular remain excluded 
a the market of many products. The limitation is thus one where a small 
ket encourages small-scale operations.
Turning to Mexico, it is convenient to note the conclusions reached on 
subject in two surveys, one for 1950 and another for 1957* In the first, 
Flores, found a distribution of income for the employed where 1000 indiv- 
als received one third of the total income and where 90$ of all the em- 
yred received the rest (37)* This state of affairs, in relative terms, 
deteriorated further by 1957. For this year Mrs. Navarrete found the 
lowing tendencies (39): 
lower 20$ of the incomes groups last income both in relative and ab­
ate terms. Thus the poorest population did not only not benefit from 
wth, but it lost.
next 40$ of the income groups, lost in relative terms, but received 
her real incomes.
next to the top group - that is, 37*6$ of the population - increased 
ir relative and absolute level of income. The top 2.4$ of the popula- 
n lost in relative terms and only slightly in absolute.
Tutning now to Table V, the overall picture from 1950 to 1963 seems 
be the same. The lowest income groups have either deteriorated their 
ticipation in total income (the lowest 2<Q$ of the population) or remained 
ignant in their participation (the second lowest 50$ of the population), 
isidering the tgrovth of income, the regressiveness in its distribution 
i increased. However, within the middle group (that one which includes 
i of the population) there has been a progressive distribution of income 
ling from the top 10$. Two tendencies should be distinguished in the 
> 10$ group. From 1950 to 1957 it was the upper 5$ which lost to the 
Idle group, while the lower 5$ increased its share. From 1957 to 1963
Some Details on the Income Distribution According to Income Goups
Argentina 1961 
(*)
TABLE V
Income Groups Proportion of Total
Income
0 - 20 77.1
21 -• 70 31.3
71 -• 95 32.3
96 - 100 29.4
Source: U. A. Paraiso, op* cit*
MEXICO
(«
Income Groups 1950 1957 Income Groups 1963
0 - 2 0 6.1 4.4 0 - 25 6.1
21 - 70 24.5 24*2 26 - 68 24*2
71 - 90 20.6 24.7 69 - 89 35.9
91 - 96.2 16.7 22.7 89 - 96 10.6
96.3 - 100 32.3 24.0 97 0 100 23.2
Sourdes: I.M. Navarrete, op* cit.
A. Labra Manjarrez, op* cit*
Great Santiago 
(1965)
Income Groups Proportion of Total
Income
24.3 6.18
52.6 39.15
22.4 54.67
Source: ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin
America, BN, N.Y., 1965*
it was the lower 5$ which lost dramatically to the middle class, while 
the upper 5$ maintained its share. Hence in Mexico there is a regres­
sive distribution of income towards the poorer 70$ of the population; 
and a progressive distribution of income towards the middle 20$ of the 
population, coming from varying gorups of the top 10$ of the population.
While the cases of Argentina, Chile and Mexico may serve to illus­
trate the obvious regressive distribution of income - and the trend to­
wards more regressiveness - in our countries, trying to establish a re­
lationship between this variable and the rates of growth and inflation 
may prove unwarranted. Argentina, it is true, has had a regressive trend 
accompanied by slow growth and high inflation. And Mexico, it is also 
true, has had a somewhat progressive distribution trend among the top 30$ 
of the population accompanied by growth and increasing stability. Would 
this examples satisfy structuralists? It seems unlikely because Chile has 
had both regressiveness and progressiveness, in the above terms and its 
growth rate is lower than Argentina's and its inflation high. At these 
levels of generality, it appears best not to venture judgement. Still, 
the next step is to see the income distribution by factor share.
Table VT distributes income between wages and salaries and entre­
preneurial and property income in the selected Latin-American countries. 
The distribution is not considered an alltogether significant index; 
mainly because there is an unknown number of entrepreneurs who pay them­
selves in wages. However, for the'measurement'of the structuralist argu­
ment, one may consider it an approximation under the following assumption:
1.- That the distribution coincides significantly with the distribution 
according to personal income groups, as in the cases of Mexico and 
Argentina. That is, that the low income groui>s are mostly formed 
by wage.earners, while the upper income groups are mostly formed by 
income earners.
2.- That entrepreneurs, although they save dispose of a large fraction 
of their income in the consumption of non-essentials,in imports of 
consumer goods (seeking ways in which to evade tariffs and controls) 
and in investments and travel abroad, [ c c
3.- That the higher the percentage of profits and other property income 
the more the regressiveness in the distribution and vice-versa.
Distribution of Income According to Income Shares
a)
TABLE VI
(Percentage of National Income 
at Factor Cost)
Compensation Entrepreneurial anc
Country Period of Bnployees Property Incomes
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
ChileJO
Peru
Uruguay
Ecuador
Mexicod)
Bolivia
1950-52
1959-61
1950-52
1959-60
1950-52
1959-61
1963
1965
1961
1963
1965
1950
1958
I960
1963
1955
I960
1950-52
1958-59
1962
1965
1940
1950
I960
1966
1958
I960
1965
47.4
40.5
42.5
47.3
39.0
42.0
46.5
44.6
46.2
43.4
46.8
55.1 
37.6
37.1 
47.8
53.1
48.1
48.2
51.8 
51.2  
50.0
36.3
28.9 
35.7 
33.5
43.5
42.6 
43.9
46.3
52.0
53.9
46.7
57.1
52.5
47.3
49.6
53.8
56,6
53.2
c)
48.1
45.8
47.3
41.4
45.2
49.3
45.6
40.3
39.4
37.7
64.0
71.3
64.6'
a) Sources Boletin Estadistico de America Latina, UN, N.Y., 19&4
b) ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, UN, N.Y. 1965.
c) All non-vage-sahry income
67.7°
58.2
56.6
51.5
and 1967"
d) Cited by A. Buira, Development and price stability in Mexico, Welt- 
virtschaftliches Archiv, Hamburg, 1968
The structuralist argument would then be one where an increase in the 
percentage of profit and property incomes results in a regressive distri­
bution. The fact, together with the other structural bottlenecks such a 
distribution enhances, may result in continous inflation and low growth 
rates.
In these terms, there is evidence for the thesis in Argentina (from 
1950 to 196l) find in Uruguay (from 1955 to I960). In both countries wage 
receipts fell considerably, inflation was very severe, and growth came to 
a halt.
On the contrary in Colombia and Peru (from 1950 to 1963) there was 
a consistent movement towards a more progressive distribution of income, 
something that was accompanied by relatively high rates of growth. More­
over, inflation was much milder than in Argentina dna Uduruay. Still, a 
more progressive distribution does not seem to have brought along greater 
price stability.
Also in Brazil during the last decade there was only an apparent move­
ment towards a more progressive distribution of income. One has to remem­
ber professor Baer's warning about the necessity of having the distribution 
of oincome after taxes. But, of course, this criticism is applicable to 
all countries. Nonetheless, the Brazilian figures are only significant for
aurban population since rural wages have not been included - and rural po­
pulation amounts to one half the total. Still, taking the index at face 
value, in Brazil a more progressive distribution was accompanied by a Kgh 
rate of growth and an increasing rate of inflation. In Chile, considering 
the previous tables, there appears to be no change in the first half of 
this decade in the distribution of income.
Turning now to the less inflationary countries of the group, Mexico 
and Ecuador, one could make a case for structuralism for the latter. The 
distribution of income in Ecuador appears to be rather progressive and in­
creasingly so from 1950 to 1965* This structural characteristic was ac­
companied by a mild rate of growth and a very mild inflation. In Mexico 
it appears that the distribution of income became very regressive during 
the 1940's which is also a relatively masre inflationary decade. From 
1950 there appears to be a change towards a more progressive distribution 
and inflation starts to become milder in the late 1950's.
Still, by i960 the distribution is regressive as compared with 1940. 
Moreover, again in 1966 the distribution appears to be still more regres­
sive. The fact that the process has presented fast growth and increasing
•g.
*41 though the 1965 ratios f?eru look 'too high to be true'.
stability presents a case all its own in the context of the controversy*
Thus the structuralist argument on the inflationary forces of a re­
gressive distribution of income rests on the theoretical proposition de­
viced in the first part of the section and on this scanty evidence* It 
is obvious that the subject represents a new field of research, perhaps 
more pertinent to specific cases and one much in need of appropriate sta­
tistical information* Nonetheless, it is convenient to insist that, when 
approaching the problem of income distribution in Latin America, one should 
be careful not to apply criteria deviced for the savings and consumption
problems and the combination of factors of production peculiar to advanced *countries* This seems to be the main proposition of the structural thesis, 
especially in the words of Dr* Prebisch*
Thp object of this long chapter, formed by an introduction and five 
sections, has been to construct a structuralist theory on the causes of 
inflation, where each cause was studied more or less in abstraction from 
the others* A causal relationship between the different structural bottle­
necks of inflation - in agriculture, foreign exchange, industry, public in­
vestment, and income distribution - could in principle be established - 
between themselves and each with respect to an appropriate price index - in 
a multiple regression model, where different causes were given different 
weights. Moreover, to such a model one would have to add the quantitative
impact on prices of what structuralists call propagating causes of infla- 
Mltion : the supply of money, public deficit financing, wage increases and
mark-up rpricing, and devaluation*
In all cases, when it was possible, the analysis has included theoreti 
cal propositions and a very general empirical enquiry. Thus statistical re 
lationships between the price level and the different structural bottlenecks 
have been established with some interesting results* The same system was 
applied in the previous chapter to the monetarists' causes of inflation*
Attention will be given in the following chapter to what has been call* 
ed the structuralist reform* That is, to the subject of the 'structural' 
policy measures recommended to reduce structural bottlenecks and - our main 
interest - the future of the inflationary spiral, in the event these mea­
sures were adopted* In very crude terms this places the following question, 
Obviously the reduction of structural bottlenecks would be 'the way' toward) 
stability and external equilibrium, but would the policy measures with suhh 
a global objective stop or further enhance the rate of inflation?
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PART III 
Economic Policy
The Structuralist Reform
CHAPTER I. 265.
The question of what causes inflation is usually inseparably linked 
with the problem of how to cure it# The object of this chapter, thus, is 
to examine the policy measures and economic objectives that structuralist 
propose# This is, of course, en extensive subject which, according to the 
purpose and scope of the work, can only be examined here in the general 
terms of Latin America's inflationary spiral. Moreover, such an examina­
tion ought to be done following the outline established with respect to 
the Monetarist-Structuralist Controversy. Broadly speaking this can be 
done in the following two ways+
1#- Presenting in a straightforward way the policy recommendations 
structuralists make as a result of the study of the structural 
bottlenecks that face our Latin-Araerican countries; and exam­
ining them in terms of internal stability and external equili­
brium priorities#
2.- Presenting the structuralist point of view with respect to ortho­
dox stabilisation programmes; and, thus indirectly examining 
what they have to say when confronted with the policy measures 
that hope to attain price stability as a primer objective, which 
they tend to oppose.
Before going into the exposition system, however, it is convenient to 
repeal a few of the structuralist and monetarist positions that have alrea­
dy been stated along the work; and that should form a background for the 
present chapter.
The proposal of *a structuralist reform1 places a simple question#
Are the structuralist policy objectives - growth, employment, redistribution 
of income and equilibrium - feasible or merely academical? Still, in simpler 
words it means asking oneself whether the growth and stability priorities 
are compatible in Latin America. Dr. Prebisch, in a complex manner, re­
jects the idea of a policy dilemma, as we have seen, and states that, with
*a relevant economic criteria, they are indeed compatible. Moreover, struc­
turalists, according to professor Grunwald, believe that price stability can 
only be attained by economic growth, and not vice-versa (l). Let us remem­
ber rapidly how Dr. Prebisch explains the policy criteria of a structuralist 
reform (2)*
*
The analysis of this hypothesis is our main concern here.
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1#- ECLA. does not believe that inflation is inevitable in the economic 
development of Latin America.
2.- It is agreed that a supreme effort must be made to arrest inflation 
and achieve stability, hut not at the expense of a decline, l a stag­
nation, or of a slowing-down of the rate of development.
3.- The general mistake persists of considering inflation as apurely mon­
etary phenomenon to he combated as such. Inflation cannot he explain* 
ed as something divorced from the economic and social maladjustment 
of these countries; nor can serious thought he given to an autonom­
ous anti-inflationary policy, as if only monetary considerations were 
involved. It must be an integral part of develqjment policy.
4.- Economic development calls for a constant change in the forms or pro­
duction, in the economic and social structure, and in the patterns of
■income distribution. Failure to make these changes - or to adopt thei 
only partially - leads to the maladjustments which release the power­
ful forces of Latin-American inflation. This should not he taken to 
mean that inflation is inevitable. To avoid inflation, however, ther< 
must be a policy of economic and social development, in other words, 
an essentially new approach. This is not merely a technical problei 
it is essentially a political one.
5*- These reforms should unable the economy to grow faster than primary 
exports, to cushion the internal impact of their fluctuations, and 
to remove obstacles to development.
6.- Rightly considered, it is a change in economic conditions that favouri 
the action of inflationary foces. But, if development policy promote* 
a steady growth in income and if income distribution were progressive 
the maximum degree of resistance to inflation would be ensured, where* 
by to maintain monetary stability.
7b In reality it is not difficult to maintain monetary stability in a 
situation of relative economic stagnation. But social pressures act 
on this precarious equilibrium and inflation puts an end to monetary 
stability* New social groups force their way into politics and econ­
omic affairs and resort to inflation. Thus inflation is a manifesta­
tion of economic and social change, an essential dynamic phenomenon. 
Consequently, campaigns to prevent it cannot he only autonomous mone­
tary measures, but must form part of a general development policy.
8*- The orthodox position ignores the phenomena of economic development, 
(inflation is attacked only with the help of deflationary measures). 
This is much to be regretted: monetary policy should not be expect­
ed to yield results which it cannot produce alone. It is impossible 
to coikat inflation or prevent it by purely monetary measures; they
must be part of an economic development policy which ensures struc-*tural equilibrium* The main objective of a sound monetary policy 
is to stabilise the external equilibrium of the economy; not, how­
ever, its structural equilibrium. Structural equilibrium is not a 
matter for monetary policy.
Neither inflation nor orthodoxy is the conclusion of Dr. Prebish.
The time has come to formulate a monetary policy which meets the re- 
equirements of an economic development policy. The theoretical def­
ense of orthodoxy, on the other hand, will strengten the notion that 
economic development and monetary stability are incompatible concepts. 
And this is certainly not: monetary stability is indispensable to the
steady development of the economy. Once structural equilibrium has 
been established by virtue of an energetic development policy, monet­
ary policy can perform its functions of correcting deviations there-
*
from.
10*- If the proposed system is not applicable, the future is bleak. Be­
cause inflation as an alternative leads nowhere, for it corrodes the 
economy and dangerously disrupts society*
Thus our main interest is to discuss and present briefly this system 
that would make growth compatible with domestic and external stability.
And describe, as professor Seers puts it, 'that a country which pursues sta­
bility at the expense of growth, may find that it ends up with neither' (3)* 
The thesis is one where stability cannot be hoped to be achieved in isola­
tion of the growth problem of the economy* that is, outside a development 
policy. Moreover, it should be clear that inflation is not regarded by 
structuralists as a 'policy tool1* It is, in words of Mr. Felix, 'a mani­
festation of a mal-deformed economy' (4).
Unfortunately, the links between growth and inflation are not helpful 
in such a manner that controversy can be avoided - despite the previous 
statements. Professor Seers puts the conflict in the following ideas (5):
1.- The structural characteristics of Latin America imply that monetarist 
policies are insufficient to ensure that transformation and economic 
growth take place at a fast enough pace.
(See footnote in the following page).
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2#- The question is not whether inflation is helpful to growth. There is
no need to list the distorting effects of inflation in the long-run.
Other things being equal stability favours growth and governments who
are too expansive in monetary policy aggravate the problem,
3*- The question of whether inflation causes or hinders growth or whether
inflation is cost—induced or demand-induced, or how much inflation can
be really afforded are really irrelevant questions derived from foreign,*not Latin-American experience,
4,- It is more fruitful to ask whether rapid growth can take place without 
price increases, unless export markets are booming. So far as the sta 
tistics can be trusted, the national product has not grown significant­
ly faster than exports without at least a moderate degree of inflation. 
Suppose it is really hard for structural change to occur without price 
rises: then the attempt to supress inflation by financial policy can
only succeed if structural change, and thus development, is slowed down. 
This is a terrible price to pay in an UDC.
5*- With deep structural problems, global financial policies are inappro­
priate, So the monetarist has two alternatives: he can either argue
that structural problems are not important, or that they can be cured 
rapidly. As we saw in the previous chapter it is difficult to argue 
that structural problems are negligible. Certainly reforms in the dif­
ferent structural bottlenecks would make the economy more flexible to 
price changes. But these are fundamental economic changes, outside the 
scope of monetary policy. Only in a quite different system would the 
price mechanism exert an efficient allocation of resources. Monetarists 
somehow do not stress the classical conditions necessary for the effect­
iveness of monetary policy.
Thus, if monetarist acuse structuralists of regarding inflation as a 
•growth policy*, they are mistaken. But two gross questions remain to 
be answered. First, the idea that those policies conducive to growth are not 
necessarily those that bring price stability, and vice-versa. Something that 
again brings up the question of the inevitability of inflation. Second, it
* (From previous page) STAjjujJTX — -
Structural cquilibri m rls~71yQamic, that is, it must adapt itself to the new 
changes in demands of economic development. In the Latin-American countries 
this means a continous transformation of the structure of production and the 
composition of imports so that the rate of growth may exceed that of exports,
* (Above)
The second part of this sentence appears to be a too radical point of view.
is obvious that growth and inflation in practice are connected in a very 
variable and complex fashion; hut one main stress a particular phenomenon: 
attempts to grow rapidly (to effect structural changes?) result in infla­
tion. Moreover, remembering Dr. de Oliveira Campos, monetarists argue that 
inflation has been caused by the incompetence and imprudent actions of mon­
etary authorities.
Resuming, let us state in our own words how we interpret the contro­
versy, from the policy point of view. An effective development policy - 
should discard the extreme forms of the controversy: permissiveness to­
wards an inflationary process which would presumably accelerate or maintain 
the rate of growth; or an orthodox restrictive policy which would imply 
•that by itself and with time it would create the most favourable conditions 
for creating savings and productive investment opportunities. It is, of 
course, malicious and superficial to think that monetarists would stop the 
gnwth of an economy to achieve an stability that makes lifepleasant for 
foreign capital and trusts in the erratic behaviour of domestic capital.
The same may be said about structuralism: it is unfair to think that it
would indulge in the expansion of credit, budget deficits, and wage and 
profit increases without regard for the financial stability of a country.
The problem is that, apart from what causes inflation, the well-intention­
ed policy measures taken by monetarist would err on the side of an unaccept- 
able-economically and politically-deflation.. While structuralist measures 
- which seek to create both growth and stability - would paradoxically err 
on the side of permissiveness towards inflation. The problematics of the 
controversy can thus he seen in terms of adequate policy measures. Can 
monetarism bring stability without halting growth? Can structuralism cor­
rect inflationary structural bottlenecks - and hence promote growth with­
out incurring in further inflation?
It is the intention of this work, as it has been said, that monetarism 
and structuralism in Datin America differ basically - both in theory with 
respect to the causes of inflation (as it was seen in previous chapters) 
and in economic philosophy, and less so in policy thinking. The contro­
versy involves a deep disagreement over the ability of the price mechanism 
to bring about a socially acceptable rate of growth, as well as a progres­
sive distribution of income. Moreover, with respect to policy measures,
it is dangerous to exaggerate similarities between monetarists and structur- 
*alists. That is, the idea that monetarist policy could he a chapter within 
the structuralist reform.
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(See footnote in the following page)
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Lastly, structuralism should be interpreted from three angles: as
contribution to economic theory, something that has been dealt vith; 
as a collection of policy measures that should be interpreted in terms 
of stabilisation; and, as a case study of Latin America*
According to what has already been said, this chapter vill comprise 
two sections* The first one, KLicy Measures, shall describe in a straight­
forward way the structuralist policy objectives and economic tools, only 
vith respect to the problem of inflation* The second one, The achievements 
and failures of stabilisation programmes, shall analyse how structuralists 
contemplate orthodox policies; and thus indirectly understand their posi­
tion to inflation. The outline is as follows:
A; Policy Measures
(a) Orthodox policies
(i) Monetary Policy (the supply of money)
(ii) Fiscal Policy (deficit financing)
(iii) Incomes policy (wage increases)
(iv) Exchange rate measures (devaluation)
(b) Domestic Structural Economic Policies
(i) Agricultural Policies
(ii) Industrialisation Policies
(iii) Redistribution of Income Policies 
(c) Foreign Structural Economic Policies
(o) The core of the matter
(ii) Dr* Prebisch*s Structural anti-cyclic policy
(iii) The promotion of Industrial Exports
(iv) A Latin-American Common Market
(v) The Role of Foreign Capital
(vi) Exchange-Rate Policy
B) The achievements and failures of stabilisation programmes
Because of structuralists violent dislike of stabilisation programmes; the
serious doubts about the effectiveness of monetary policy in influencing 
in a viable manner demand, apart from cost-push considerations; and, the 
circumscribing of the scope of monetary policy, although recognising its 
role* Still, there may be major agreement in fiscal policy, less so in 
exchange rate measures, and obscure eontroversy in incomes policy and othei 
direct controls*
**It ought to be clarified that the outline is a rudimentary classification 
system* Several of the sub-headings can be moved from one place to ano­
ther* For instance, exchange policy could be included under foreign econ- 
(continued in the following page)
(a) Structuralists versus the IMF
(b) The Argentinian Frondizi Plan (1959-1963) and Preliminars
(c) The Chilean Klein Saks Mission (1955-1958) and the 
Alessandri Plan (1959-60)
(&) The Peruvian IMF Plan (1958-1961)
Two words of warning ought to be given with respect to the above out­
line. First, serious doubts have been expressed about the Structuralist 
Reform. The policy proposals of the structuralists, writes professor Grun­
wald, are vague. The policy objectives are rather clear, but what is the 
concrete economic policy recommended by the structuralist school? For the 
process of economic development it has not yet been possible to specify a 
body of internally consistent mechanisms, ^hey do not wish to discard mon­
etary policy altogether (?), but they believe it must be subordinated to 
the objective of correcting the basic maladjustments. There is, however, 
no policy programme (6). To some extent the doubt ought to be confirmed . 
or rejected in function of what follows.
Second, the exposition will only pretend to be a very general outline 
of the structural policies aimed at growth and stability; of their stabil­
ising or inflationary nature; and, of their relative consistency. Thus 
this chapter to a great extent, although not completely, is concerned with 
what policy measures ought to be, not what they really are. That there is 
a divergence between structuralist recommendations and actual policy making 
is obvious and reflected in the disequilibria these countries suffer. This, 
of course, raises the question of what has happened in Latin-American econ­
omic policy making. There is here, first, the need for case studies, and, 
second, the making of generalisations. If one were very pessimistic one 
would say that in the majority of cases economic policy, more than an ef­
fective influence on economic behaviour, has been at the mercy of economic 
forces, both structural and propagating. Unfortunately, as fascinating 
and challenging as this subject is, it lies outside the scope of this work 
for obvious reasons of space and time.
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(Continued...)
omic policies instead of under orthodox measures. Also, agricultural and 
industrial policies obviously include fiscal measures. Incomes policy is 
not considered on orthodox measure, while the redistribution of income 
- which presumably includes a wages policy, but also measures on the dis­
tribution of profits - is considered structural. One ought of course, to 
be careful here to work with different concepts, not merely to play with 
words*
272.
Policy Measures
•The persistence of the basic structural problems confronting the 
Latin American countries, writes ECLA, maintains the objectives of develop­
ment policy constant (7)1 • Thus theere is a tendency to integrate separate 
development and stabilisation objectives in a general strategy whose primer 
aim is sustained growth and development, which harmonises such objectives 
within an overall policy. ‘This endeavour, writes the same source, is ap­
parent in the nature of the anti-inflationary policy pursued by some count­
ries; but its clearest formal manifestation is to be found in the prepa­
ration of overall plans and in the steps taken to establish a planning sys­
tem (8)*. What concerns us here - remembering Dr. Prebisch - is that, at 
least in theory, the priority of the growth objective has come before other 
objectives throughout 1946-1965.
Thus it may be generally argued that, with respect to the countries 
that concern this work, the policy tendency has been to fundamentally con­
template the imposition of structural economic policies. The majority of 
countries, however, have applied stabilisation programmes with an overall 
priority, for short periods, and with varying degrees of severity. They 
were regarded as emergency measures facing spiralling and acute inflation. 
Their results in the majority of cases have been ephemeral and inflation 
has re-emerged with renewed vigour in Argentina, Chile, Peru. On the other 
hand, the stabilisation measures Bolivia and Paraguay underwent in the late 
1950's and early 1960*s have been relatively successful. Uruguay and Brazil 
on the contraiy, hardly had any policies that could be said to have a sta* 
bilisation priority, at least for more than a year. By 1965, however,
Brazil was launching a strict freeze on wages and public expenditure which 
has somewhat reduced the rate of inflation, resulted in a negative rate of 
growth(1967), and caused a grave political situation (1968). The pattern 
is similar to that of Argentina from 1959 to 1963* Mexico is a tentative 
exception, where from structural-inflationary policies in the 1940*s the 
movement was toward greated emphasis on stabilisation, especially by the 
mid-1960*s. The price stabilisation movement has been largely successful, 
although it can be argued that it is a consequence of a somewhat continous 
application of structural policies, especially in the public sector. We 
shall come back to stabilisation programmes in the second part of this 
chapter. In the meantime, it is convenient to think that academically 
and politically wise, though the practice may differ considerably, the 
overall emphasis has been on finding structural policies and on the prior­
ity of structural objectives over stabilisation programmes, except for
short lapses* 273
Diagram I presents a rough set of theoretical objectives and correspond- 
*ing policy measures* The economic objectives for the semi-industrialised 
Latin-American countries are arranged more or less in order or priority. 
Policy measures &re divided in structural policies and in orthodox policies* 
The Structuralist Reform, as we have seen, would claim to make the object­
ives compatible 'some time in the future1; when a certain combination of 
the policy measures was achieved* Let us then start with the orthodox econ­
omic policies*
(a) Orthodox policies
This sub-section ought to be considered as a continuation of the discus­
sion on the monetarist causes of inflation: the sections on the supply of
money, budget deficits, devaluation, wage inflation and on the objectives 
of economic stabilisation (see Part II Cahpter 2). Moreover, in principle, 
the study of the structural causes of inflation ought to have included a 
part on what structuralists call the secondary or propagating causes of in­
flation* However, to avoid more repetititon it is thought best to make any 
comment on these theoretical causes of inflation in the context of policy 
measures*
The propagating or non-structural causes of inflation are those that 
feed back and aggravate the inflationary spiral. They arise from the capa­
city of the various sectors to defend their real income through: (l) the
monetary mechanism, (2) government and public deficit spending; (3 ) and 
automatic cost-of-living wage adjustment and mar-up pricing; (4) as well 
as the immediate consequences of recurrent devaluations. As it Las been 
repeatedly said, structuralists are well aware of the inflationary force of 
these variables, although important qualifications are made* Here the one 
that concerns us is with respect to the effectiveness of orthodox policies 
in Latin America. Orthodox policies could be very well effective when dir 
ected at these propagating factors: the core of the measures aim at a re­
duction in demand. The problem in structural terms, however, is that infla­
tion is not only caused by excess demand but by cost-push. Hence structur­
alists strive to cure the structural causes of inflation and to subject or­
thodox measures to this aim. This, of course, does not mean that they want 
to discard orthodox policies or stabilisation; but, it does mean that they 
want 'to submit them to their structural policies and objectives.'
For a comparison with an interpretation of the economic objectives and policy 
measures in advanced countries see the Diagram. In the background paper
I wrote on theories of inflation and monetary policy (Pag. 93)•
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Orthodox policies can achieve external and internal equilibrium for a 
short time if demand is violently reduced and if the rate of growth is slow­
ed down; moreover these measures can be taken ignoring the existence of 
cost inflation and structural bottlenecks. Structuralists reject violent­
ly measures taken in abstraction of the structuralist problems. Professor 
Grunwald puts the structuralist case in the following ideas (9)* The result 
of orthodox policies is that the output of the most dynamic sectors of the 
economy - manufactures - is reduced to the level of backward sectors, the 
ones with the lowest elasticity of supply. If there is a change in the com­
position of demand prices go up in some sectors and down in others; if they 
do not, because of price rigidity, there will be inflation and unemployment. 
If the government grants wage adjustments then inflation will accelerate, 
but unemployment will be cut. Monetary policy, admit the structuralists, 
is working -when the labour market is weak. But, if the credit control is 
maintained it aggravates the cost situation of the economy. At best, the 
control of the propagating factors will achieve some stability at the cost 
of growth by reducing activity to the common denominator of the lowest sector
(i) Monetary Policy and the Supply of Money
It should be established clearly that structuralists consider the ex­
pansion of the supply of money as a source of inflation. But it is an ex­
pansion of money that comes as a consequence of the structuralists character­
istics of the economy and not merely as a consequence of arbitrary policy 
measures. The second thing one has to remember is that structuralists do 
not obviously want to do away with monetarypolicy: they recognise, as we
shall see, the urgent need of a monetary policy compatible with the overall 
development policy. Professor Grunwald, discussing structuralism, writes: 
•They (monetary and fiscal policies) should be geared to create the condi­
tions to obtain the desired changes in the structure of production, govern­
ment finance and volume and direction of investment. One of the basic as­
sumptions in this respect is that qualitative credit controls are possible 
and must be introduced. Nevertheless, in this view the expansion of money 
must be kept constant, that is to say, in step with any increase in the cost 
of output. If money is kept completely passive, permanent inflation will 
resultsnnless costs are being restrained. Credit controls in the private 
sector oil the economy would have to be tightened whenever the government 
sector was forced to increase its borrowing for necessary purposes.•• In 
general, the structuralist position is that the investment rate can and 
m £ t  be increased. Orthodox anti-inflationary policy dictates that planned
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investments should be reduced to equal planned savings. Development policy,
however, should have the opposite objective, that is increasing the rate of
/ \** savings (10) *
Since concern exists for the supply of money and for a circumscribed 
monetary policy, the next step is to state that structuralists, not altoge­
ther paradoxically, have serious complaints about monetary policy, and theory, 
as such:
1.— It can be a very inefficient policy tool - a concept that derives 
from theoretical monetary considerations and from the theoretical 
analysis of inflation as a consequence of both excess demand and 
cost push.
2.- It can be a dangerous policy tool with respect to price stability 
— a concept that derives from the experience of virulent credit 
squeezes not only on aggregate demand but on output and employment*
•If the contraction of the credit system, writes professor Uri, re­
presents a tool to end an anarquical creation of means of payment, 
such a contraction is, in principle, the worse system to stop an 
inflationary process. It means the application of a rudimentary 
quantitative theory and of the use cf a credit squeeze as the main 
tool in economic policy,... it runs the risk on the other hand, of 
increasing unemployment and misallocating investment into luxury 
producing industries (12)1 *
Thus this could be interpreted as the wish of structuralists to have 
•a new* monetary policy - not to do away with it. The idea implies two al­
ternative propositions+
1.- Start from scratch and construct a monetary theory and policy in res­
ponse to the structural characteristics of Latin America and its development 
policy requirements; something favoured, as we shall see, by professor Seers.
2*- Adppt the 'natural* evolution of monetary thought to Latin American 
conditions in the manner of revising theoretical assumptions and economic 
objectives.
Increasing and controlling savings (and investment)could in principle be 
function of monetary and fiscal policies and a redistribution of income 
(See professor Kaldor,*ll). As it will be seen, structuralists are pessi­
mistic about the effects of monetary policy.
y K
Later on the same author writes: 'Let it be clear, though, that if excess 
demand were not controlled by the Central Bank liquidity would increase in 
a totally disproportionate way and according to the wishes of persons and 
enterprises. ^Continues in the following page).
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These considerations bring three sets of far-fetched questions* First­
ly, how can monetary policy be shaped to function in the structural charact­
eristics of Latin America? Secondly, what are the objections (its limiations 
its bluntness, its inefficiency) raised agains monetary policy? Thirdly, 
how can a 'new* monetary policy function efficiently when Latin America has 
an unavoidable growth priority? Let us work backwards.
Does the execution of a monetary policy with the objective of checking 
inflation involve the loss of the positive effects it may have and lead to 
a contraction of the economy? Is this the price that must be paid to check 
inflation and to achieve monetary stability? Dr. Prebisch (14) believes 
that there is no real reason why a stabilisation policy would necessarily 
lead to contraction, except in the extreme case when basic services are in­
sufficient to maintain the level of economic activity. A contraction in 
the economy is a result of the type of anti-inflationary policy adopted 
rather than the unescapable result of checking the inflationary process.
There are three main cases when such a policy may bring contraction:
(a) When there is a restriction of investment without simultaneous mea­
sures to offset their effects.
(b) When an attempt is made to neutralise the effects of the public def­
icit by a deflationary policy in the private sector.
(c) When the level of wages and salaries are stabilised at a level so 
low that effective demand cannot absorb the production.
Inflation in Latin America, continues the author, usually entails an 
inflationary expansion of credit brought on by a surplus of investment in 
relation to the actual resources available. This inflationary investment 
stimulates internal demand, the use of idel capacity, and encourages new 
investment. It leads to increased employment and overall income, although 
at some point brings external disequilibrium since higher income leads to 
more imports. Inflationary investment allows a level of investment higher 
than is justifies by exports.
(Continued from previous page)
But it happens that in many cases the contraction of credit is only taken 
as a measure to substitute certain political decisions difficult to take, 
like fiscal measures. A wide experience, not only confined to UDC, reveals 
that stability may only be reached by these means at the expanse of growth 
and. unemployment (13) *•
To check inflation it is essential to restrict the credit expansion
behind it. But if this step is not accompanied by other measures of a
compensatory nature, income will shrink. Contraction then may lead to a
cut in imports and external equilibrium. This is the orthodox formula
for monetary stability, that makes no secret of the fact that a temporary
sacrifice must be made for the good of the economy. In development terras
some other non-orthodox formula for monetary stabilisation is therefore 
*urgently needed. Inflation must be checked without the contraction of 
income •
Before going into the subject of a 'new monetary policy', any such 
subject ought to be founded on the evaluation of monetary policy as such. 
Today in advanced countries monetary policy has the short-run objective 
of maintaining a balance between aggregate demand and supply - the stabi­
lity objective which involves domestic and external equilibrial It large­
ly works on the assumption of excess demand and under the constraints of 
achieving full employment - although it is now considered that a '2.5 to 
5$' unemployment would make the policy more flexible - and within the li­
mitations imposed by the management of public debt. Moreover the short- 
run objective ought to be compatible with the long-run objective of in­
creasing productivity - the growth objective. It is more-or-less agreed 
that both objectives may be incompatible in the short-run and subjec+o 
priorities, dictated both by political and economic considerations. Last­
ly. it is recognised that monetary policy should be complemented by fiscal
measures (which can be an alternative), by an incomes policy, and by con-
**trols on the balance of payments.
When evaluating the role and the scope of monetary policy in a semi­
industrialised Latin-Araerican economy, it seems convenient to revise one's 
assumptions. In general terms, this would involve the following (the over­
ruling priority of growth):
1.- In Latin America one cannot speak of a full employment objective, 
because there is no full-eraployment position near the flexible 2.5 
to 5/*• The constraint of monetary policy, rather is the creation 
of more jobs (in proportion to the rate of growth of population 
and the pyramidal composition of age groups) and the avoidance of 
under-employment. This means that monetary policy is less flexible 
and compatible with other economic objectives than price stability*
Dr. Prebisch, thinks monetary policy should be complemented with foreign 
capital, fiscal messures, MST policies and the redistribution of income. 
See the background paper on Monetary Policy (pags. 88-94)
2.- The existence of large unemployment means that the concept of ex­
cess demand has to be revised* Strictly from the point of price in­
stability and external disequilibrium one can stress the presence of 
excess demand, although cost-push should not be minimised* Bat when 
labour unemployment, excess capacity, and wastage of other factors 
of production appear together with inflation the validity of the 
concept of excess demand is reduced* Hence one **has to think more 
in terms of creating effective demand rather than reducing it* This
<kshould not be taken to mean that monetary policy and price stability 
are impossible concepts in Latin America: it means that the struc­
ture of demand has to be revised and selective monetary tools thought 
of.
3*- If the constraints of debt management imposed on monetary policy are
a major preoccupation in advanced countries, the problem appears to
be greater in Latin America. That is, the possibilities of stopping
the government from borrowing directly from the Central Bank and from
increasing liquidity are smaller in Latin America. Many limitations
should be considered: the relatively smaller size of the capital and
money markets; their greater market imperfections^ the erosion
caused on the band and gilt-edge paper by decades of inflation; the
lack of confidence and the difficulty of altering expectations; the*great attractiveness of foreign exchange and securities, and so on* 
Moreover, the possibility of reducing public investment and expanding 
revenues are less elastic when consideration is given to the priority 
of the reduction of structural bottlenecks which are regarded as the 
main source of dieequilibria* The cost of public debt is bound to be 
more onerous, something which brings us to a last point*
■i .
4*- An increase in the rate of interest is supposed to attract both dom­
estic capital that has been exported and foreign capital, as well as 
check excess demand* Latin-American countries cannot ?look toward 
this, when the rate of interest is very high (it can reach 30-40# 
and still be negative in real terms). Moreover, because of the im- 
peffections in the financial market, the bank rate would have to be 
increased enormously to have any effect on short and long term paper. 
Even if it were possible, this would increase the already heavy bur­
den of public debt to costs beyond reach* 'In Latin America, writes 
professor Uri, what matters is not the rate of interest but the ratic 
ing of Credit; limiting bank credit and selecting its uses' (l5)«
*See Chapter III, section d*
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With this assumptions in mind, the next step is to evaluate the in-
■&fluence of monetaiy policy with respect to price stability* Instability 
may be caused by either excess demand, cost inflation or a combination 
of both* Let us first assume excessderaand inflation*
Excess Demand
Monetary policy should affect investment, the propensities to con­
sume and save, and thus the supply and demand of loanable funds to reduce 
excess demand. The tools of monetary policy are namely:
1.- Changes in the interest-rate (the interest-effect):
a) Changes in the structure of the rate of interest in the free 
market,
b) Changes in Bank Rate.
c) The psychological effect and changes in expectations.
2.- Changes in the liquidity of the financial system (the liquidity-effect).
a) The control of the supply of money
b) The control of non-banking financial intermediaries.
c) A viable assumption on the velocity of circulation.
Starting with the rate of interest - assuming perfect competition - 
there should be a very high interest-elasticity in the savings and invest- 
ment function. Hence this would give great scope to influence demand.
With imperfect competition and state intervention it is a change in Bank
V, V V
Rate which would control excess demand. What are then the effects of
Bank Rate and the long term rates on the components of aggregate demand?
1.- It is agreed that consumption is not affected to any considerable 
extent by changes in short term rate, except for hire-purchase loans 
which only have a once-and-for-all effect (i.e. the Radcliffe Report, 
16).
2.- There is a reluctance to ascertain its alternate effects on savings; 
although, of course, it is granted that wide swings in the rate 
would have effect, (something which may lead more to instability 
than equilibrium) On balance authors like professors Kaldor and 
and Row and Messrs. Little, Nield and Ross think that the effect is 
negligible (17). Hence, excess demand can be little affected.
The comments that followed are based on the background research mentioned, 
(pags. 94-139).
Idem (pags. 97 to 111)XXXIdem (pags. 32 to 42)
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Any important influence of the rate should he an investment* However 
again there is great scepticism since the General Theory*
a) It is believed that the incentive to invest depends on non­
monetary factors; that is, the cost implied by the rate is 
almost negligible and thus risk minimised* Investment is like­
ly to be determined by the internal finance of the enterprise
(profits, depreciation, and future volume of sales considera-
*
tions)*
b) The conclusion is extended to fixed investment (See again Rad- 
cliffe and the authors mentioned). Changes on the rate may of 
course have effects on private construction and public services.0
c) Vith respect to inventory investment, professor Kaldor does not 
belibve that the interest rate is of primer importance* Vhat 
is generally important, claims Mr. V* T. Newly, is the ability 
to pass on costs to higher prices (18).
d) Long-term rates of interest a vill only be affected with vadLent 
changes in short-rates so as to affect capital investment. Cn 
the other hand, small variations will have little effect, ac­
cording to professor Kaldor, because long-term rates are very 
sluggish in relation to short-term rates.
e) However, it is argued that the interest-effect is much more 
psychological than real* That is, a small change in Bank Rate 
will make investment move in the desired direction, more than 
in the proportion to the change in the interest-rate. A climb 
in a Bank Rate is a sure indication of a contraction in credit. 
The author mentioned claims that, at least, in a setting of 
chronic inflation the psychological effect may be extremely un­
reliable or totally non-existent. In such a case an increase
in interest rates brings by no means an increase in the demand
*for long-term fixed-interest securities!
4.- The conclusions reached were that widely fluctuating rates would 
affect capital movements and reduce demand; but, paradoxically, 
by introducing violent fluctuations in the economy; specifically, 
instability in the bond market,plus a high cost for public debt.
«See pags. 104-107 in the paper mentioned.
So if consumer goods, other than some durables, are paid out of income 
and not financed by borrowing; if the effect on savings is similarly 
negligible; if nationalised investment is dubject to other factors; 
if total private investment (fixed and inventory) susceptible of inter- 
est-elasticity is a small # of total expenditure; if interest rates are 
only a small proportion of total business costs; and, if a large propor­
tion of expenditure is financed out of the firms* profits and reserves,
then it is probable that a good deal of expenditure is insulated from
*the interest-effect, and thus excess demand*
|| y
The next step is to turn to the liquidity effect , within the con­
straints imposed by the management of public debt and increasing employ­
ment. In other words how can the contraction of money and credit reduce 
excess demand?
1.- The supply of bank notes is controlled by the Central Bank and put***into effect by the cash ratio.
2C- The supply of money can, in principle, be controlled through open- 
market operations and the cash and liquidity ratios.
3*- If public debt management makes these tools inefficient it is neces­
sary to take direct measures in the discount market, revise the role 
of the central bank as lender of last resort, introduce special de-
X X X X Xposits and treasury deposit receipts.
Moreover capital issue controls can control the supply of quasi-mon- 
etery assets. Overall, taken both effects, a reduction of demand is certain.
4.- There are, however, two main limitations:
a) The role of non-banking financial intermediaties and the diffi­
culty of controlling their impact on the expansion of the sup­
ply of money. Inasmuch as the Guriy and Shaw approach can be 
taken and such sources of credit are controlled, it is more 
certain that monetary policy can work in a selective manner
in the banking system, avoiding discrimination (19). In Latin- 
America, where this sort of credit is speculative and of a large 
cost, its control is a sine qua non for the urgent need and ap­
plicability of selective credit controls.
b) The theoretical and practical limitations imposed by the vel­
ocity of circulation. There are two possible assumptions that 
have to be explored thoroughly:
(1) increase in the supply of money is what increases V.-
   __   the extreme case would by hyper-inflation - in which case
a credit contraction looks more viable.
(Footnotes in following page)
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(2) A contraction in the supply of money is accompanied
•by an increase in V. The historical evidence here
has been very inconclusive so that the approach may • * well be that of case studies*
e , .
5.- A general conclusion is that the liquidity effect, together with the 
Bank Bate, will have an effect, but that, both in theory and practice, 
assessing its results is very difficult. The role of monetary policy 
is self-evident: surely an economy requires it to manage its finan­
cial structure and, although unreliably, demand. Without it inflation 
would be worse. But, with respect to its scope and given general econ­
omic policy, not much reliance should be placed on it alone in the face 
of growing inflation. The supply of money, together with the rate of 
interest, have obviouslyto be administered through monetary instruments, 
but what cannot be expected for the time being is that aggregate demand 
will respond in a significant measure. That is, unless blunt shock 
treatment is used; something that in Latin America is incompatible 
with the growth priority and with the non-reappearence of inflation.
Cost inflation
Let us now assume that Latin-American inflation is caused solely by 
cost-push or structural bottlenecks. What would then be the effect of mon­
etary policy?
1.- It is agreed, as it will be seen, that if this were the case monetary 
policy has little scope in the control of inflation. Still, for a 
period of time monetary stability can be maintained if there is a - 
violent economic contraction that affects employment, profits, wages 
and reduces cost pressure on production.
2*- Bnphasis on cost inflation advocates running the economy near physical 
capacity, while increasing employment, in order to achieve a high pro­
ductivity and a rapid growth. But such an emphasis relies not so much 
on monetary policy as in fiscal measures, an incomes policy and govern­
ment controls to keep prices and costs in check. Thus, thinking of
(Prom previous page)*Orthodox monetary theory, of course, does not support these conclusions, 
which for the purpose of this work illustrate structuralist thought.
Both effects cannot be formally separated because the supply of money and 
the rate of interest are 'interdependent'. This is only a simplistic anal- 
lytic device commonly used (See J. Bow pag. 105 and W.T. Newlyn, pag 98)
***Idera (pags. 6-12) *****
**** Idem (pags 12-15 Idem (pag 113-118)
(On this page) See the work mentioned (pags 123-4) and N. Haldor op. cit.
structuralism, it would appear that when they are thinking of a *new mon­
etary policy* they mean more complementing of subjecting monetary policy 
to other policies.
*3.- Still, according to professor Brown , what could be the effects of 
monetary policy on rising costs.
a) With respect to import prices it is ineffective, unless one thinks 
of the control the United States and the Common Market have on some 
commodities and, perhaps, when a country is the sole or almost the 
sole p£oducertofna certain "product! facing^'elastic demand.
b) With respect to wage increases there is an indirect connection: 
if monetary policy reduces activity this might decrease producti­
vity and wages. Professor Brown says that for dealing with wage 
and salary inflation it is hoped that a more difect and better 
means of control (than monetary policy) may not prove unattaina­
ble. But, could monetary policy affect wage bargaining? This v
depends on the force of the supply of labour. The tr&de unions
in concrete, and on the demand for labour. The action of the for- 
former in broad terras is a function of the cost of living index, 
the level of profits and activity, the level of ther wages, and 
the degree of employment. The latter is subject to business ex­
pectations, the degree of competition, the ability to pass on 
costs to prices, wage-drift situations, and the wage pressure
exerted by trade unions. Would employers grant less wage increas­
es if they are short of credit? In a situation of excess demand 
it is very unlikely, because as was said the cost of a higher int­
erest rate may be small compared to the rate of profits. If they 
cannot borrow they might sell stocks and economise on capital form 
ation rather than reduce wages, or alternatively, introduce labour 
saving investment. However, again, if monetary policy succeeds in 
reducing demand, the enterprise may be forced into creating unem­
ployment and a change in expectations with respect to prices.
There is no evidence, write professors Kaldor and Kohn, of how 
much unemployment would be necessary to achieve price stabilitjr, 
and what the implications of such a policy would be for growth.
See the work mentioned (pags 130-3) (20).
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Idem (pags 132-5)* '
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c) Profit margins on the other hand, expressed as a fraction of prime 
costs may be rather inflexible; so that variations in profit mar­
gins as a proportion of total costs are attained mostly through "var­
iations in the level of activity* Thus monetary restriction is 
more likely to reduce profits by reducing activity rather than by 
affecting costs (primary production is an exception inasmuch as it 
is sensitive to demand)*
4.- Thus the emphasis on cost inflation usually leads to the ‘adoption*
of an incomes policy as a means of guaranteeing some price stability*
Professor Kohn, says that with an incomes policy, monetary and fiscal
policies would be more effective (2l)* The.best solution, according 
to Lord Balogh, is a greater investment as a way to achieve price 
stability*•• a rate of growth of • 4-6$ can enable better agreement 
with trade unions about a policy of income distributioh plus its ef- 
fectson effective demand (22)*
Here, of course, there is a tendency to go into other policy measures
without which monetary policy may be made more unreliable (we shall turn to
these below)* However, one conclusion should be clear: remembering that
inflation in Latin America is very probably caused by a peculiar inter­
action of excess demand and cost-push - where structural bottlenecks should 
be emphasised - orthodox monetary policy as it stands appears to be an un­
reliable and dangerous measure to face the full force of inflation and the 
inescapable growth priority of the region* This is important because mon­
etarists still maintain that an orthodox monetary policy is the cure for 
inflation*
Professor Seers writes that, after the Great Crash government was made
responsible for avoiding large scale unemployment, something that changed
economic policy (23)* This implied a much more active fiscal and monetary
policies than previously* Controversy naturally focused on the quantita-
*. tive theory* The contemporary position accepts some association between 
a change in the quantity of money and the price level; whatever increases 
the money supply (budget deficits or an extension of bank credit) may well 
raise demand too, directly through its effect on purchasing power or in­
directly because of changes in asset structure* But the effect on prices 
depends also on the conditions of supply. Moreover, the veolcity of cir­
culation is a focus of many influences, and lacks the stability one would 
need to predict the rate of inflation from changes in the supply of money*
See, again, the background paper on Contemporary Monetary Theory (pags42-8)
Monetary fundamentalism has therefore fallen out of favour in academic cir­
cles (except perhaps for Chicago and the universities of the Soviet block),*
It is felt to be misleadingly facile, and the emphasis is now primarily on 
income flows. However, the quantity theory remains favourite with some lay­
men, including bankers and politicians. Policies of monetary restraint were 
widely adopted in the late 1950's in the attempt to check prices (and, in 
the late 1960's again in an attempt to balance foreign accounts). Bat 
since that decade turned out to be one of slow growth, and prices continued 
to rise, disillusion with monetary policy spread. Among the criticisms was 
that it only cured inflation and payment deficits at the cost of unemploy­
ment and semi-stagnation. If there were upward pressures on costs, special­
ly from trade unions and rigid profit margins. It was a blunt weapon which 
might not merely lower investment but also change its composition in ways 
unfavourable to growth.
Since all the modifications in the classical doctrine, especially in 
monetary policy, concludes the professor, have accepted in advanced countries 
it is surprising to see them reappearing in Latin America like a handed-down 
suit that no longer fits the original owner. The reasons for these modifica­
tions in advanced countries, obviously, suggest that even far-reaching quali­
fications are needed if one is considering applying this doctrine to the case
of Latin America. The 'difference' in Latin America means that economic de-**velopment has been and is more urgent.
The above policies, moreover, says the same author in another place (24) 
were made for advanced countries and under certain assumptions. For instance, 
stimulating the economy by deficit finance rests on the assumption of elastic 
supply conditions throughout the economy, so that expenditure could rise with­
out rising costs or imports. This is true at times of excess capacity and 
unemployment. Even if there was spare capcity in Latin America, there are 
limits to the expansion of output in some sectors without imports. This means 
inflation and/or a payments deficit. On the other hand, monetary policy may 
be successful as a regulator only if the following conditions apply: 
an integrated econony with competition in the markets for factors of produc­
tion and products; responsiveness in savings and investment to the rate of 
interest; full employment of labour and exports which can be promoted or dis­
couraged by changes in domestic consumption. These assumptions are not appli­
cable to Latin America.
■x-Bjy the mid 60's monetary policy has again become popular.
6^*96Confidence in monetary policy declined in the early 1960's with the appear­
ance of the Radcliffe Report and the Joint Committee Report. Their influence 
was however very short lived: first, there was the appearance of Non Unani­
mous and later the international monetary sitation enforced again restric­
tive policies. Whatever the result in advanced countries, the fact remains 
that theirs may not be the answer for Latin America.
America nor can they be easily developed as long as inflation prevails.
This leaves one with the need of a 'new monetary policy* or one that is 
applicable to Latin America.
Looking for a 'new monetary theory and policy' in Latin America, 
as far as one knows is alltogether improbable. However, there seems to 
be more scope in adopting monetary principles to the structural condi­
tions of Latin-American inflation. Still, perhaps there is reason to be 
more optimistic in terms of complementing monetary policy with other
m
short-term policies, both orthodox and structural.
The general objective is to combine the control of the supply of
money (and indeed the contraction of credit, if it were feasible) with
an expansion of investment and a reasonable rate of growth.
#
Thinking only of excess demand, there might be ample justification 
for a reduction of demand through very selective credit controls. This 
means altering the structure of demand indirectly: excess demand in non-
essential and luxury industries has to be reduced, even if profits are 
high; while effective demand has to be stimulated, through larger in­
vestment on foodstuffs and essential commodities, even if profits are 
low in a given moment. In order to combat inflation through a reduction 
of the demand for non-essential and increase the supply and demand of es­
sentials so that wages are not forced to increase. Moreover, that would 
allow a greater flexibility in the structure of imports and the discourage­
ment of certain imports. 'Those industries that produce essentials, writes 
Mr. Uri, have as a rule less marginal profits than those which produce 
non-essentials for high-income groups. A restriction of credit would af­
fect more the former than the latter'. (25)# Second, investment could 
be reduced in those export industries that ore declining, while it should 
be expanded in thos industries that could turn exporters. Third, when 
there is a savings potential - now used in luxury consumption and the ex­
port of capital - future savings ought to be channeled to the banking sys­
tem in such a way that real reserves create the possibility of a more flex­
ible and selective monetary policy. Again, professor Uri says+ 'Credit 
should be reserved according to a priority criteria to those essential ac­
tivities whose rate of profit could be lower. There is no need to insist 
that, in the conditions of an UDC, this policy is neither a simple disci­
pline to maintain nor a discrimination that can easily be applied (26)'.
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For Dr. Prebisch inflation must be checked without a contraction of
income. He thinks that monetary policy can be complemented by other pol­
icy measures in this aim:
1*- That is, an excess demand for imports must be eliminated and diverted 
to maintain the demand for the factors of production employed in in­
vestment, and in a non-inflationary way (27) • (We shall turn to this 
below).
2.- ‘Taxation combined with international loans are the most suitable 
means to achieve this purpose. A reducible margin is necessary to 
imports; one that does not affect neither economic activity nor mass 
consumption. In the absence of such a margin, international assist­
ance-alone could avert the deimage. The fundamental error or ortho­
dox monetary policy resides in exactly these two points: use has 
been had neither of taxation nor of timetly international assistance*.
3.- Investment need not be reduced but rather progressively financed from 
taxation and international resources as restrictions on inflationary 
credit are imposed. This, on the other hand, is not a reason for not 
rearranging the composition of investment in order that economic growth 
and external equilibrium are made compatible.
4.- In Latin America credit restrictions are usually applied without a 
savings effort having first been maae. This is left until income has 
already fallen, bringing the capacity to save down with it. All this 
is the fault of traditional monetary policy. Credit is restricted 
without application of other development measures, in the hope that 
once inflation has been eliminated spontaneous forces in the economy 
will first bring recovery and later growth. In advanced countries 
the idea of spontaneous economic recovery is conceivable because the 
external trade trends are usually contrary to those of Latin America.
7 The nature of their imports is such that demand for them tends to in­
crease more slowly than income. Likewise in an advanced country a 
slight contraction in income is usually sufficient to enable exports 
to increase at the expense of internal consumption, while in Latin 
America this is not usually the case. V/ith the growth of exports 
combined with a decline in imports, there might be a stimulus that 
leads to recovery.
288
Economic policy should thus be based on reducing the scope of mon­
etary policy to the objectives of a development plan and to complement­
ing such a policy with other measures and foreign assistance. What re­
mains to be answered is the following. To what extent would the balance 
-of some contractions in non-essential investment and consumption and in­
creases in savings and of some other expansions in investment and con­
sumption- turn out to be stabilising or inflationary is, of course, the 
real question. For the time being, let us only say here that this depends 
either on the short run (the stability objective) or on the long-run cri­
teria (the growth objective) adopted by economic policy. Today, it seems 
that advanced countries have inclined themselves for therformer. In Latin 
America structuralists, are inclined to the latter.
(ii) Fiscal policy (budget deficits and deficit financing)
nuation of the structuralist thesis on infrastructure and public expendi­
ture and income (Chapter 3» section d). We do not, however, propose to go 
here into the subject,; rather, only some comments shall be made on the 
structuralist thesis in terms of the role of fiscal policy in a structur­
alist reform for an inflationary economy. For a specific introduction into 
the subject of Latin American fiscal matters it is good to start with pro­
fessor Kaldor's articles - specially his last summary one - as well as Mr. 
R. N. Sommerfeld•s recent book (28) and the relevant bibliography already 
cited.
To round up the structuralist fiscal thesis it is worth to remember 
that structuralists are well-aware of the existence of 'a fiscal inflation1 
a propagating cause of inflation - which reflects itself an recurrent bud­
get deficits and deficit financing. Dr. Prebisch writes: *With an econ­
omic contraction fiscal resources will diminish, leading to a deficit or 
aggravating the already existing deficit. In addition it is not easy to 
eliminate a deficit, particularly when the contraction has reduced the 
fiscal resources (29)** The author concludes that the fact will result 
in inflationary pressure of fiscal origin, which nonetheless, should not 
be combated by depriving enterprises through monetary measures of resources
This sub-section ought to be considered as a continuation of the 
monetarist argument on budget deficits (Part I, Chapter 2) and as a conti-
J
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for their circulating capital*
This granted, structuralists go on to explain how budget deficits ar- 
rise abstracting from non-fiscal factors:
1.- Lagging public revenues,
2.- An inadequate tax structure, where the emphasis is on indirect taxes 
and on the dependence on external trade taxes,
3«- Necessary, although insufficient and sometimes wasteful, public ex­
penditure,
4,- Indirectly and in the long run, a reduction of public investment.
Thus, as it has been said, for a structuralist the causes of inflatio­
nary budget deficits are in a general way:
1,— The tax structure.
2.- Inadequate budgetary expenditure,
3«- Reductions in public investment.
4,- Despite the fact that public savings may grow and finance investment, 
they are insufficient when compared to total expenditure. They have 
not resulted in budget surpluses.
5,- Public investment, and in some cases current expenditure, has had to 
be financed through the creation of liquidity in various fashions.
The result of these conditions is an inflationary setting. But, in 
terms of policy making, economic objectives and the priority of growth, 
structuralists emphasise the need for increasing in a non-inflationary way 
public investment - so as to reduce infrastructure bottlenecks and thus 
create the conditions for growth and price stability. The fiscal tools 
he would recommend are hence obvious: an expansion or public revenues,
as in advanced countries, and the expansion of public investment as an anti- 
inf lationary measure. Would their fiscal policies then be inflationary?
The answer is no in principle when they are based on:
l) raising public revenues
a) increasing public savings 
3) exi>anding public investment
The next question to ask oneself is whether such an academical solu­
tion is feasible in Latin America. Let us answer this in terras of what may 
be called a structuralist fiscal reform:
•To avoid such a situation, writes Dr. Prebisch, it is essential that the 
private sector should continue to have credit, for if prices rise as a result 
of inflationary pressure of fiscal origin, profits wili also rise and this 
enables the meeting of increased requirements for circulating capital.,..
(Continues in following page. Also, fottnote **)
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a) A financial policy in Latin America ought be based on the very sel­
ective restriction of public expenditure and, in almost all instances,4Hton a fiscal reform. 'The Latin-American countries, writes ECLA, still 
have a long way to go before bringing their fiscal and tax policies in­
to line with an overall development policy which would mobilise their 
potential resources stimulate the expansion of public and private in­
vestment, and improve their living conditions' (31)•
b) It is fundamental that contractions in public expenditure do not affect
the public investment necessary to achieve a certain rate of growth and
stability 'Neither fiscal nor budgetary policies, writes H. Uri, can be 
considered global policies. But it is obvious that inflated deficits 
should be evaded by increasing normal revenues above current expendi­
ture, *in such a way that public savings finance investment. What is 
important is the expansion of public investment, the distribution of 
expenditure, and the nature and composition of public revenues (32)'.
For a structuralist it is obvious that the distribution of expenditure 
can establish a fundamental condition for growth, something that will 
expand fiscal revenues and contribute to price stability.
The subject has to be dealt in terms of an ideal fiscal system for an 
inflationary mixed-economy that has a growth priority, something which re­
quires a special study. Still, it is worth emphasising that structuralists 
give a fundamental role to a fiscal reform that acts as a complement or al­
ternative to monetary measures. Ln an inflationary setting - where cost push 
and demand pull interact - the need for a selective expansion requires dir­
ect controls on savings and investment and consumption which fall within the 
reach of fiscal and expenditure measures. But with respect to the rate of 
inflation, the question of 'how soon' can fiscal measures be implemented 
and 'how soon' they will produce results remains a delicate policy issue 
in Latin America. On a different level, fiscal policy measures may be an 
integral part of a structural policy. That is, structuralists envisage 
sifcal tools as part of a policy of a redistribution of income, together 
with an incomes policy.
(from previous page)The policy should be one of flexible taxes and duties 
Such taxes and duties would have the advantage of providing the state with 
additional resources to counteract inflation instead of increasing bank 
gains and profits of money-lenders.
One has the feeling that if a structuralist were pushed to extreme situa­
tions, he would reconxnend increases in phblic investment, even if it meant 
deficit financing and short-run inflationary repercussions. The point is 
that the policies will continue to be inflationary until a substantial in­
frastructure headway has been made and the fiscal feform is implemented and 
instituted **This footnote on following page
In synthesis, one can only say here that structuralists "believe that a 
fiscal reform or its implementation is fundamental, hut that such a reform 
has to he part of an overall development policy. 'I wouldn't claim , says 
professor Kaldor,.that fiscal reform would necessarily hring Latin-American 
inflations to an end; however, I don't think they can he brought to an end 
without it. Nor would I claim that monetary stability is the most important 
reason for fiscal reform. I think the most important reason for fiscal reform 
is to achieve a better and more rational use of resources of the countries of 
Latin America* (33)* Fiscal measures, as monetary policy, are considered a 
complement to wider sectorial policies in agriculture, industry, and the ex­
ternal sector; as well as being directly connected with an incomes policy 
and the wider objective of a redistribution of income. Let us they say just 
a few words on incomes policy.
(iii) Incomes policy (wage and salary increases).
As it was seen (wage inflation, Chapter 2), monetarists are convinced 
that one of the major causes of Latin America's inflation is built on wage 
escalation. Structuralists, on the contrary, are very reluctant to give wage 
and s a l a r y  increases, even as a propagating or secondary factor, importance 
as a real factor behind the inflation of the region. 'With very few excep­
tions, writes professor Seers, wage policy does not seem to have had in 
Latin America the significance attributed to it in the analysis of inflation 
in advanced countries. The reasons are not hard to find. Most of the popu­
lation is employed in agriculture; trade unions are not very powerful; em­
ployment incomes are relatively small as a proportion of national income; 
and, there has been little promotion of wage increases' (3^)*
But wage movements can play a significant role in the development of **inflation. There are certain groups of wage or salary earners highly or­
ganised, whose achievements in wage claims provide targets for the other 
weaker sections. And while wage-earners have at%times been powerless to 
ahieve real increases they have been able to prevent a reduction in their
(From previous page..
With respect to a fiscal reform, writes M. Uri, one should consider that 
a revision of existing laws is less necessary than the administrative im­
plementation of the existing rules (30)•
(This page)
*This of course is a generalisation. It is possible to find in some countries 
namely Argentina and Brazil - and for short periods the possibility of a high­
er rate of growth in wages than in prices. The question of the role of in­
flated profits on the other hand, remains rather unexplore.
The wage inflation in Argentina during the 19^0*s is taken as an example of 
* this, but the opposite may be argued for the 1950*s when nominal wage (overleaf
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normal remunerations* Still, increases in wage rates which equal that of 
prices cannot be considered an autonomous source of inflation. Because 
of improvements in productivity, it permits the rise in prices to slow-up*
If moxements in prices and wages are not parallel this means that real 
wages fluctuate violently. An increase in real wages in a sector which 
paralleled the upward trend in productivity could be considered in a sense 
•neutral*. But sharp unparallel fluctuations mean that the influence of 
wage increases - perhaps as a result of policy - are far from neutral.
The problem, however, is to know what is happening to profits at the same 
time. *In the wage-price spiral, writes Dr. Prebisch, the relationship 
between the real amount of wages and prices and entrepreneurs* profits 
is fluctuation continually. When wages initially increase, in general, the 
real level of wages will decrease again and profits rise* (36).
Still, if structuralists are reluctant to put a considerable weight 
of the blame of inflation on wages, this does not mean that they are not 
willing to contemplate the need for an incomes policy. We arrived at this 
conclusion after the discussion on the distribution of income as a struc­
tural source of inflation (see section e again). Moreover, the notes around 
structuralist thoxight on orthodox monetary and fiscal policies also led to 
the idea of the role of an incomes policy.
•In the post war, writes professor Uri, it has become evident that mon­
etary and fiscal policies aimed at the sole objective of stability, requires
an incomes policy that maintains remunerations in level with the value of 
*resources*. Statistical and political problems have prevented the appli­
cation of an incomes policy as an obvious policy measure. •• Experience in 
Latin America has revealed that price instability, external disequilibrium 
and a fluctuating rate of growth are affected by much as fiscal policy and 
wages and profits as by the credit system.(37)* Moreover, Dr. Prebisch 
says that 'another measure essential to achieve monetary stability without 
detriment to economic activity is the stabilisation of wages. The rise in 
prices brought on by inflationary demand or by devaluation exceeding the 
increase in costs, rises the profits of firms, and it is possible to re­
store the previous level of real wages without a further rise in prices by 
the use of a policy of tighter credit provided that inflation has been at­
tacked simultaneously on other fronts* (39)•
(From previous page: increases lagged behind increases in the cost of
living index. (35)
(This page) For two works relevant to the subject see bibliography (39)*
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(iv) Exchange rate measures (devaluation)*
Devaluation of the exchange rate may be regarded as a propagating 
cause of inflation; as an economic event imposed by domestic and extern­
al economic circumstances; and, as a policy tool. Monetarists and struc­
turalists, as we have seen (see Chapter 2) agree that, recurrent devalua­
tions are behind every major or mild Latin-American inflation. However, 
structuralists ought to be distinguished in that they consider devaluation 
only one aspect of a major foreign exchange bottleneck; which derives 
both from the trade and capital movements with other countries.
The empirical and theoretical evidence behind the inflationary nature 
of devaluations in Latin America is vast. In the theoretical section we 
relied mainly on the work of professor Harberger, a mild monetarist (41). 
Besides the empirical evidence we noted in the relevant places of this 
study some specific studies in this subject are the following: for Chile
again professor Harberger*s other work (42) and the one by Mr. Pinto (42). 
For the inflationary nature of Mexico's 1954 devaluation the study of the 
United Nations Concejo Econdmico y Social (44); for Argentina the work of 
Messrs. Ferrer and Diaz Alejandro (45); for an introduction into Peruvian 
inflation the work of Miss It. Thorpe (46); and for Brazil, Colombia and 
Uruguay, among other works, the long term analysis of ECLA (47).
Having established the severe inflationary consequences of a devalua­
tion in Latin America, the problems of the likelihood of massive devalua­
tions and of the movements in the exchange rate as policy remain. Even the 
staunchest of structuralists, of course are aware that major structural re­
forms have started and will probably have to start again with devaluations. 
'Devaluation,' writes Dr. Prebisch, is essential if costs have increased more 
than international prices' (48). Measures aimed at tie conservation of for­
eign exchange, says professor Seers, caused explosive upward movements in 
prices when exchange rates were adjusted belatedly, after having been held 
unchanged and overvalued for years. In many casis the domestic value of 
some currencies became completely divorced from international price patterns, 
as exemplified by those current in the United States. In Argentina, for 
example, while the index of wholesale prices (l939=100) rose to 927 in 1953 
the exchange rate increased in the same time only 85yj in Chile, Brazil, 
and Colombia similar discrepancies can be seen (49). The apparent contra­
dictions between inflation and devaluation as a necessity and as a rational 
policy is well explained by M. Uri:
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•A superficial analysis of the balance of payments in Latin America 
has revealed that indescriminate recourse to devaluation, as a means to 
restore external equilibrium, leads to loud failures. This is not to say 
that absurd rates of exchange have not been maintained and that urgent 
correction is not necessary. Except for these cases devaluation is only 
convenient when exports can be increased (that is, when exports can be di­
versified), when they do not compete directly with domestic consumption, 
and when they represent a large share of the world market. Nonetheless, 
the likely risk is that devaluation will have a very severe impact on the 
cost of living. Thus certain measures - like tariffs, subsidies, or a 
double exchange rate - have been recommended*(50), This point leads to 
the search for an ad hoc exchange rate policy for Latin America that may 
well involve an initial massive devaluation. On the other hand, if ex­
ternal disequilibrium were seen to be only temporary, for example as a- 
consequence of a ciclical and violent contraction in the demand for ex­
ports, devaluation would then be inefficient and dangerous. The inter­
national monetary system would then function in such a way that foreign
credits are made available until the temporal contraction passes and for- 
eigh reserves are built up again in the upswing. The structuralist ar­
gument, of course, is that the foreign exchange bottleneck in the major-*ity of Latin-American c^ses is not temporary but chronic.
Be turning to the need of major devaluations, one could still argue that
if devaluation was accompanied by corresponding monetary, fiscal, and 
wage policies much of its inflationary pressure could be evaded. Ex­
perience in Latin America has shown - following professor Harberger — 
that these corresponding measures would have to be short of draconian to 
have any effect on the inflationary nature of a devaluation.
Moreover, as we shall see, in practice a major stabilisation program­
me may soon fail, lead to further price increases, and to another devalua­
tion; this establishing the recurrent devaluation pattern structuralists 
want to avoid. On any event such a devaluation accompanied by orthodox 
measures surely implies the short-term sacrifice ef the growth objective, 
something unacceptable for structuralists.
If the balance of payments crisis in a country is not temporary, writes 
professor Seers, but chronic, there can be no question of correcting by 
monetary restriction or devaluation, indeed, if such measures lower in­
vestment, they will postpone the date when the economy will be viable in 
foreign trade. (The IMF has a problem beyond its means) (5l) '•
But, despite all these rationalisations, a structuralist reform may 
still he faced with the inescapable need to devalue. In very crude terms, 
a structuralist has to face the fact that a devaluation may be a deflatio­
nary measure, both in terms of growth and employment unless it is accompan­
ied by strict and selective controls on the foreign sector; an economic 
policy that places external equilibrium above all other objectives; one 
that does not insure price stability; and, one that distributes income re- 
gressively. With this in mind, the next step is to examine devaluation as 
a policy measure.
V/hen exchange rate policy as such is undertaken, there is no longer 
agreement between structuralists and monetarists. There are three possible 
alternative policy measures in this respect:
.a) a massive devaluation - which may be unavoidable, but following it;
b) an adjustable peg system (double or multiple exchange rate plus imT>ort
taxes and controls), defended by some structuralists.
c) a free or fliictuating exchange rate, usually defended by monetarists.
Dr. Prebisch writes: '(Structural equilibrium cannot be a consequence
of successive devaluations; this is a fantastic theory, which purports 
to show that if the exchange rate is left to find its own level through 
the machinery of free interplay, the readjustments... will be achieved 
without the necessity of deliberate action' (52).
Leaving aside the selection of a free or a controlled exchange rate, 
the point is that such 'a choice* may only come once a major devaluation 
has been made. Let us then analyse devaluation under this assumttion. It 
is convenient, however, to start first with a brief review of how a struc­
turalist - in this case Mr. Ferrer, referring to Argentinian inflation (53)*- 
explains the devaluation-inflation spiral. That is the vicious circle that 
starts with a massive devaluation, redistributes income, induces non-essen­
tial consumption, leads to further price increases, and culminates in another
devaluation. What follows is derived from Argentinian experience but with
*modifications, may be applied to the rest of the inflationary countries.
A) The question Mr. Ferrer asks himself is why since the liberalisation 
of the exchange rate system and the establishment of a 'free and fluc­
tuating type of exchange rate in 1959 the peso has suffered successive 
and pronounced devaluations.
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For further confirmation see Mr. J. Villanueva's article on the same source
(54).
b) The price in pesos received by the export sector is conditioned by 
the prices in foreign exchange for the exported products and the ex­
change rate. The price in foreign currency depends on the conditions
• of the world market. Traditionally the domestic price of agricultur­
al products has been conditioned by export prices (in pesos)* In 
this way the exchange rate has had a decisive influence on the price 
of agricultural products. Because the prices of industry and services 
do not move automatically or in the same direction as agricultural pri­
ces, a devaluation changes the relative ^-prices of farm products. Mo­
dification of relative prices implies a transfer of income to the agri­
cultural sector* In 1959$ as a consequence of devaluation, agricultur­
al prides went up 137/6, while industrial and service prices went up 
only 100 and 89$, respectively* Deflating these increases, farm pro­
ducts went up by 37$f industrial prices remained stable, and service 
prices went down 10$, Thus with devaluation agriculture benefits while 
the other sectors are hurt. With a diversified export structure, as 
in many advanced countries, the devaluation affects the economy as a 
whole*
c) The modification of the price structure produced by devaluation not 
only generates intersectorial transfers of income, it also changes the 
distribution of income between wages, interest, and profits in the fol­
lowing ways:
(1) In agriculture the remuneration of labour amounts to about 25$ 
of net income and profits, interest, and rents to 75$# In industry 
and services the remuneration of labour is 55$ and the rest 45$* If
a modification in the price structure is brought about and the sectors 
of highest labour participation in income transfer income to the sect­
or with less labour participation in income, there will necessarily 
diminish the share of labour in National Income.
(2) Between 1958 and I960 the participation of labour in the net 
income of the agricultural sector dropped from 29 to 21$*
Because of these two factors the devaluation of the peso has strongly affect­
ed the participation of labour in the economy as a whole (it was 53$ in 
1958 and only 46$ in 1959).
d) Devaluation has immediate repercussions on the general price level due 
to?
(l) The simulatanoeous increase of prices of commercialised agriculture 
output and the prices, in pesos, of exports*
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(2) Cost increases in industries which utilise imported inputs 
or capital goods.
e) The interpal price increases of agricultural output and the raise 
in industrial prices cause a fall in real wages. There are thus 
wage demands. On the other hand the fall of the real income share 
of the labour sector causes an even greater fall in the demand for 
less essential consumer goods. The adjustment in highly concentrat­
ed industries may be brought about by a reduction of the quantity pro­
duced and not by a fall in prices. Given the large participation of 
high income sectors in the income of the agricultural sector, expend­
iture is deviated from industrial consumer goods to luxury consuption 
and investment and to hoarding of foreign exchange which put pressure 
on the balance of payments and on the free rates. In this way, deva­
luation may lower real wages, induce a fall in effective demand for 
wage goods and growing idel capacity, and produce a wave of secondary 
effects on the price level via the Jjalance of payments. They produce 
furthermore, a growing pressure on the new value of the peso and a new 
devaluation and a second round of effects. The role of devaluation
in Argentina, permits to explain how inflation continues despite a fall 
in wages and effective demand.
f) It is understood that devaluation, b y  raising prices and costs, in­
creases the financial needs of the private sector and the total ex­
penditure of the public sector. While renevue remains constant, due 
to the fall in economic activity, expanditure increases because of 
government employment, increases in wages, subsidised public utili­
ties and so on, and budget defitits expand. The greater demand for 
meands of payment by the private sector, the growing budget deficit 
and the raises in wages then fully operate to propagate inflation, 
which, in this sense, has its origin on the continued devaluation of 
the peso. Stopping these outlets, credit, higher wages, and public 
expenditure, produced in Argentina a serious financial penury. There 
was a spiral of real deflation, while prices continued to climb.
g) The inflationary impulse which has its origin on devaluation is ranch 
stronger than that produced by public expenditure, the expansion of
credit or huge wage increases. Between 1946 and 1949 there was an 
expansionary’ policy of public expenditure, of cheap money, and of 
general wage increases and the cost of living went up 98£>,between 
1958 and 1962, with a policy of credit rectriction, the reduction of
the budget deficit, and the dampening of workers' demand, the
increase in the cost of living was 323^*
The lesson one derives from Argentina's experience is that massive 
and/or recurrent devaluations, together with orthodox policies - namelyT *
a deflationary policy in terns of economic activity,- does not guarantee 
in any sense price stability, especially after a short period has ealpsed.
In the analysis of devaluation it was seen that modem theory stres­
ses the effects of devaluation on real income and expenditure (the absorp­
tion effect) and pessimism on the elasticities of supply and demand in the 
short-run. Devaluation by changing relative prices affects the patterns 
of production, changes the allocation of factors of production, and re­
distributes income between sectors and factors. Income flows from the 
domestic sector to the sector producing for the foreign market or into 
import-substitution industries. It also transfers income from the wage 
sector to the profit earners, assuming a wage lag and certain propensi­
ties to save and consumein both wage-earaers and entrepreneurs. A deva­
luation will bring forth a fall in output and an improvement in the bal­
ance of payments, more through changes in expenditure than in income. The 
model is clearer if one assumes unchanged tariffs and controls and neutral 
monetary and fiscal policies, although not necessarily. The wage lag, on 
the other hand, is a sine qua non. Thus an improvement in the balance of 
trade will not be followed by an increase in output. Depending on the el­
asticities of exports and imports, output, of course, would tend to in­
crease. But this simple assumption changes when the effects of devalua­
tion ori the distribution of income are considered* The induced redistri­
bution of income will have aq nicker effect on expenditure (the absorp­
tion effect)than on the price effect (output). So that in the short-run, 
a devaluation, assuming a wage lag and reduction in the profits of the in­
dustries that produce for the domestic market, will reduce expenditure and 
contribute to the external equilibrium; while the changes in prices, that
supposedly bring a change in allocation, would work slowly in the foreign
*sector industries, so that over-the-econoray output falles.
•While the domestic demand and supply of imports and exports will be 
very important in determining the impact of devaluation on the balance of 
payments, writes Mr. Dias, the short-run redistribution effect is based 
essentially on the savings propensities of the different social classes*
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For a discussion on the effects in a semi-industrialised economy of a 60$ 
devaluation on the balance of payments, prices, output, and income dis­
tribution see the work of Mr. Diaz Alejandro (55)*
So long as the non-wage earners have a larger marginal propensity to save 
than wage earners, the balance of payments will improve, but depending on 
the propensities of the different social groups to sepnd on imports, import- 
substitution and export themselves (56)'• In the long run a devaluation 'is 
expected to induce greater investment in industries producing iranort-substi- 
tutes and exports either at the expanse of investment in the 'purely1 dom­
estic industries or in the context of larger capital accujnulation. A redis­
tribution of income towards the non-vage sector arising from devaluation 
should induce greater investment in the first type of industries and will 
also tend to change the consumption and investment mix of national income in 
favour of the latter. But structuralists refuse to work on such an optimist­
ic notion when they consider the propensity to consume of non-wage earners an- 
the decline in effective demand for essentials. Is it possible that as a con­
sequence of the effects of devaluation an expansion of the domestic market 
can be expected? Within the structural characteristics of a semi-indus­
trialised Latin-American country this is unlikely.
'The long run considerations raise the question of whether the invest­
ment incentives generated by a devaluation are so strong as to induce, even 
in the short-run, an increase in investment. If this were the case, the re­
distribution effect will not result in an improvement in the balance of pay­
ments in the short run, although it may still yield a fall in domestic out­
put if the additional expenditure of non-wage earners has a low home-good 
component and a high import-component which woulddeteriorate the balance of 
payments. For such a situation to happen it would be necessary for invest­
ment in MST and export industries to increase very rapidly after the devalua­
tion. This, according to Mr. Dorrance, is unlikely because such investment 
only increases after an unavoidable time lag. Thus yielding an increase in 
hoarding in the short-run. (57) It may be noted that there is a conflict 
between the short and the long-run improvement in the balance of trade follow­
ing a devaluation: for any given rate of increase in investment in 1ST the
smaller the short-run improvement but the greater the long-run improvement 
in the balance of payments. So, at first, for an improvement in the balance 
of payments is necessary that devaluation decrease investment in both types of 
industries. In the long-run the favourable or negative effects of devaluation 
will depend on the export market, on the import content of MST, on the situa­
tion left on the domestic market,; that is, on the effective demand of the 
wage sector.
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Short-run changes in non-wage income, concludes Mr. Dfaz, have not been 
found, through devaluation, to haye a significant impact on the level of pri­
vate investment. Hence, the assumption that the redistribution effect will 
result in a net increase in hoarding or in non-essential consumption appears 
justified. Moreover, the forces that influence private investment in the 
short-run are other than devaluation: credit availability, the level of
non-wage income, the value of investment projects underway, government pol­
icies to stimulate investment, changes in the level of protection and in the 
regulations of imports of capital goods, the relative prices of capital goods, 
and so on. But, the overall conclusion remains that in the short-run devalua­
tion will induce a fall in domestic output
Returtiing to Argentina, Mr. Dfaz (58), observes that the country has a 
very high short-run marginal propensity to import, which is linked to the 
high import content of domestic investment and to the high marginal propensi­
ty to import of the non-wage earners. The nature of imports and the lack of 
resource mobility leads to a priceelasticity in the demand for imports that 
is likely to be very low. The aggregate supply of exports is also suspected 
of having a low price elasticity, especially in the short-run. Despite the 
fact, exports may be increased even in the short-run via the income mechanism 
(that is, real domestic deflation), but with doubtful results if only the rel 
ative prices of exports are increased with respect to home goods. It has bee 
found that the private savings and investment responses in Argentina are such 
that a devaluation-wage lag is likely to lead to a real income deflation, via 
price inflation and the redistribution effect. The real deflation will tend 
to reduce the domestic demand for imports and exports , although the
fall will not be so large as it would have been if the demand of non-wage 
earners for imports had not been greater than that of wager earner s. The ex­
istence and the duration of the wage lag is of critical importance; if the 
trade unions succeed in obtaining wage increases shortly after devaluation 
by the full extent of the price increase, neither income distribution nor 
domestic relative prices are likely to remain changed for a period sufficien-t 
ly long to have a significant influence on the balance of payments; and the., 
stage would be set for a new round of devaluation and inflation.
Structuralists reject this emohasis on the necessary sacrifice of the 
labour sector and the fact that ite considered the main source of inflation 
after a devaluation. Such an analysis does not consider the structural cause 
of inflation nor does it consider, policy wise, the •opposite* need of expenc 
ing effective demand and the size of the market as part of the solution of 
inflation and the behaviour of consumption in the non-wage sector. Price
elaxticities of exports and imports are the determinants in this case; 
the flexibility of the domestic productive resources will be reflected 
in the demand for imports and the supply of exports* When these elasti­
cities are high the objectives of full employment and external equilibrium 
may be obtained in the long run. If the structure of production is immo­
bile or frozen - the rhoice is very likely to be either deflation and unem­
ployment and/or another balance of paymets disequilibrium. The role fhat 
the wage level plays on this is secondary, so that it appears unfounded 
to place the burden of policy on it.
Let us return to Mr. Diaz (59)* Earlier discussion, he writes, has
put emphasis on the key role of money wage behaviour as a determinant of
*success or failure of stabilisation policies. Following a devaluation, 
large increases in wages would:
1*- Wipe out any chance of cutting the absorption of income by the wage 
sector.
2*- Lead to further domestic price increases (unless firms can be convinc­
ed to finance wages increases out of profits or by an unlikely short- 
run improvement in productivity.
Both of these results would reduce the effectiveness of devaluation in cor­
recting the balance of trade.
1*- By failing to cut down on imports and on domestic consumption of ex­
ports.
2*- By increasing domestic costs and thus reducing profit margins and re­
ducing the incentives of exports and import-substitution sectors.
Still, the emphasis on wage increase, seems artificial because of two 
opposite assumptions. If one is working on an inflationary setting, sure** 
ly inflated profits could take-on some of the inflationary pressure and a 
high marginal propensity to consume of the non-wage sector should be reduc­
ed. Alternatively, if a deflationary policy has been introduced such a 
policy bears the responsibility for behaviour in exports and import-sub- 
sitution and not only the wage sector.
The problem is that the reduction of the wage sector's income is pre­
sumably a means to an end. The main fador, if any, is a reallocation of 
resources if devaluation is to have a medium-term success and make both 
browth and external equilibrium feasible. But, the fact is that devaluation 
and wage-lag as such lead to failure in terms of these objectives:
Structuralists as we have seen, say that a certain iabilisation of wages play 
a role, but never the key part if growth and stability are to be achieved. 
Moreover, they maintain the need to expand the market and to redistribute 
income progressively.
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In Argentina it vas claimed that devaluation and a concentration of in­
come would help in the reallocation of factors. It distributed income towards 
the agricultural export sector and industry towards entrepreneurs and a/ay from 
labour. Structuralists insist that such policies are theoretically mistaken 
and, besides in practice they do not fulfull their externa-interaal equilibria 
objectives. Bor two things: effective demand and the conditions in the ex­
ternal market are bound to alter the picture.
For example: the ^rondizi government wanted to maintain a wage lag at
all costs after the devaluation of 1958. The first step was to control trade 
union discontent. The army was often used to quell general and other strikes. 
Public authorities proclaimed that no bank credit would be allowed to finance 
wage increases. The impact of devaluation plus the state of siege conditions 
affected real industrial wages. In 1959 the fall in real wages was harsh on 
ufoan workers; the recovery of real wages during I960 and 1961 left real wages 
in many sectors below the levels reached during 1958 (see Table in op. cit. 
pag. 155)* Employment opportunities dwindled and as a result of these forces 
the share of gross’ wage income at factor cost fell down from 46# in 1958 to 
40# in 1959f rising slowly to 43# in 1962. At the same time the rate of growth 
dropped and industry was stagnant. On the other hand, the object of the de­
flat ion-wage freeze was to trsnssfe£ income to the agricultural sector, some­
thing that did occur automatically. ‘The redistribution of income in Argentina, 
writes Mr. Diaz in his conclusions, through devaluation and frozen wages should 
lead to a *desired* investment process. The stabilisation plan (l958-196l) 
failed because of the low-re—investment coefficient of the rural sector*.(60). 
One could also argue^ : of course, that it failed because it put confidence on a 
devaluation-wage freeze, abstracting from the structural causes of inflation. 
The fact is that industries producing for the wage sector were ruined.
After devaluation of the peso in 1958 to 82. 3 pesos per dollar, a free ex­
change rate was maintained until after the first half of 1959. After that 
the peso was realled pegged by the central bank for all practical purposes.
The balance of payments — if not the balance of trade - had improved con­
siderably. ‘Since the main cause for the excess of supply of foreign ex- 
change at the rate of 82 — 83 was the capital inflow, the central banks' pol­
icy was wise, writes Hr. Diaz. The downward stickiness of domestic prices
♦ •It appears tha the whole income gain of the rural sector was obtained at the 
expense of urban workers, and to a lesser extent from an improvement in the ex­
ternal terms of trade.
This was mostly formed by a huge foreign investment in petroleum and by 
balance of payments loans.
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and costs (prices, in fact, had continued to increase despite the severe 
freeze) and the low-level of foreign exchange reserves. During 1959 also 
justifies the policy of keeping the peso from appreciating as a result of 
athe capital inflow* (6l), Already by 1961 the central bank began to enter 
the market as a systematic seller of foreign exchange. The drain of reser­
ves, despite the stabilisation measures, continued. In 1962 president Fron- 
dizi was over-thrown and the political and economical crisis was again ex- 
ploicit. In 1962 the new administration freed the peso once more; there 
was a new devaluation of 60$; and, a new deflationary policy was adopted, 
but the capital flight continued. The political, financial and economic si­
tuations were chaotic.
While real output fell sharply in 1962 and 1963 > leading to undmploy- 
ment, the price level once again increased rapidly (the inflationary rate 
was slower in i960 and 1961), The over-r-all wholesale price index rose by 
4 4 while wholesale rural and import prices rose by 57}o; wages rose only 
by 29/^  and the money supply increased a mere 8/0, What ware the causes of 
this? A highly restrictive monetary policy - with increased velocity of 
circulation? The situation seems to be a result of the above 195S-1961 de- 
valuation-wage-freeze policies and of the political situation it created. 
During 196P and 1963 both the public and the private sector defaulted in 
their financial obligations to each other; tax evasion soared up, while 
the public sector delayed its payments, i.e, to the civil service. The li­
quidity shortage resulted in an incredible growth of special private means 
of payment, including I0U*s, cheques, with endless endorsements, and so on. 
Together with devaluation, foreign exchange reserves continued to fall this 
time, primarily as a result of foreign debt payments.
Let us resume these somewhat disjointed comments following again the 
conclusions of Hr, Dfaz (62):
1,- Due to upward movement of the general price level and pegging of the 
exchange rate following major devaluations, after a short period of 
time most of the changes in relative prices have been wiped out.
The conflict that arises with a devaluation between wage earners and 
non-wage earners and rural and urban producers, home consumption and 
exports are important in determining the level of expenditure relat­
ive to output and for both the short and long-runs. By introducing 
explicitly income redistribution into devaluation theory, it is pos-
 ...  sible to view devaluation as just another weapon in the struggle of
different sectors in the economy for larger shares in a National income, 
that as a consequence of orthodox policies, may be stagnating*
In the case of Argentina, the effects of a massive devaluation to­
gether with orthodox policies achieved external equilibrium - and 
not price stability - in 1959 at a great cost because real per capi-- 
ta GNP was only 2^ the 1958 in 1961• Foreign capital and a reduc-
*r
tion in real consumption of wage earners made this possible. The 
modest achievements in the balance of payments position in 1959 and 
in price stability in I960, collapsed dramatically by 1962. The 
main reasons for the failure were the application of an ill-conceiv­
ed stabilisation programme, the disregard for the structural causes 
of the inflationary process, the stagnation of rural output which 
should have benefited by the measures, and the high level of for­
eign indebtedness with an unfavourable repayment schedule. The 
fact that in 1963 per capita GLiP was about 12fo lower than in 1961 
is attributed to a disastrous restrictive monetary policy, in part­
icular, and to the political situation that emerged. The Frondizi 
government had put too much emphasis on the results of a deflation 
and redistribution effect, and not enough on eno our aging the long- 
run effect: a reallocation of resources. Mr. Diaz analysis, none­
theless, seems too mild in its criticism. How could a stabilisation 
policy based on an ill-conceived monetary restriction, reduced public 
savings and investment, inelastic agricultural production, stagnating 
exports, flight of domestic capital, inadquate - onerous and wasted - 
foreign indebtedness, and so on, lead to more rational investment and 
consumption patterns? Authorities, writes the author, had an unwar­
ranted faith in laissez-faire and its short-run effects. A more care-? 
ful application of orthodox measures and the adoption of direct mea­
sures in agricultural and industrial investment above and beyond those 
signalled by the price mechanism, as well as of other non-price pol­
icies, would have resulted in a real transfer of resources towards 
bottlenecks and in a greater increase in productivity.
The experience showed that the price mechanism did not serve as a 
guide to reallocate resources or to solve severe structural imbalances 
- made more difficult by a high propensity to import and stagnating 
exports - which make external equilibrium, growth and investment at 
the expanse of consumption very difficult.
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4.- Returning to exchange policy, adopting a massive devaluation leaves 
policy with two further choicest
a) Monetarists advocate a free exchange rate that fluctuates 
freely pari passu with inflation. But a policy of more or 
less steady devaluation would much likely tend to acceler­
ate inflation and depress the wage sector*
b) Dual or multiple exchange rate controls. In the light of 
past Latin-American experience, it seems doubtful that a pol­
icy of complete exchange control (usually overvalued rates) 
would induce the reallocation of resources to obtain external 
equilibrium in the context oi rapid growth, even in coupled 
with policies to raise productivity in exports and MST indus­
tries. However, we shall return to the subject below,
5.- The key goal, for Hr. Dfaz, should be to divorce exchange rates and 
other relative prices as much as possible from determining income dis­
tribution, Fiscal policy, and not price signals, should be used to 
remove unwanted changes in relative prices and income distribution, 
together with measures to increase productivity. Tax policy, credits, 
and subsidisation of strategic inputs should be used to discriminate 
against producers whose output and productivity remain stagnant, while 
helping dynamic producers, Rephrasing this in structuralist terminol­
ogy it would mean subjecting orthodox policy measures, including de­
valuation, to the wider objectives and measures of a structural reform.
6.- In any case, the conclusion of the authro is that the issue of income 
distribution is at the root of the inflationary process; and only 
when an implicit agreement is reached among the government and the 
several social sectors will it be stopped.
7.- The above conclusions appear, however, tooeelectic when one has to 
face the need of the best possible exchange rate policy:
a) Mild orthodox policies, together with 'some' controls on the 
exchange rate, especially if taken in terms of long-run ob­
jectives, will induce again short-run inflation; which perhaps 
may be reduced in the medium-term if structural changes are made.
b )  a free exchange rate with an accompaniyng severe economic squeeze
may bring initial price and external stability, for a time and
*with a high cost in terms of the rate of growth .
y •It is doubtful that a shock treatment, writes Jlr, Diaz, could succeed wnen 
Jhe soft treatment fails, while a fall in output is much more likely with thej
Resuming, structuralists in their theoretical policy thinking obvious­
ly have to face, in the context of the actual inflationary Latin-American 
setting, the need of a severe devaluation in the short run and of the pos­
sibility of recurrent devaluation in the long-run. As it was said devalua­
tion may be,regarded as an 'inescapable need* imposed by domestic and exter­
nal circumstances and as a policy tool, When conceiving a structural reform, 
that includes both structural and orthodox measures, devaluation is bound to 
be an integral part of such endeavours. Moreover, the inflationary nature 
of devaluations, particularly when they are likely to be massive is an over­
all structural reform is projected, is a fact. In this sense, the imple­
mentation of such a reform would be initially inflationary when it inescap­
ably includes a major devaluation, but, for the matter, so would it be in
the case .of a monetarist stabilisation programme that gives secondary prior-*ity to the growth objective. In a structuralist sense, even if other or­
thodox policies - monetary, fiscal, and incomes — were highly selective and **refined in such a way that price stability were made compatible with 
growth, the appearance of a devaluation would make the overall policy infla­
tionary to some varying extent in the short-run. It is important to emphas­
ise this obvious point with respect of economic objectives taken for the 
short-run or the long-run. The need to devaluate imposes clearly the over­
ruling priority of external equilibrium over all other objectives. Moreover, 
if the reasoning is sound, it would appear that over the short-run inflation­
ary Latin-American countries cannot achieve 'immediate price stability, even 
if a shock treatment that sacrifices investment is applied. The decision to 
devaluate in Latin America is an extremely delicate and paradoxical object­
ive; but more so is the exchange rate policy adopted henceforth. The deva- 
luation-inflation-devaluation vicious circle is only too evident. Thinking 
that devaluation can be avoided through foreign credits is wishful-thinking 
when the balance of payments deficit is chronic. Mounting foreign indebted­
ness may also lead to further devaluation. 'The IMF, according to the quota­
tion from professor Seers, may have a problem beyond its means.
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(from preceding page... former than with the latter'.
Devaluation has shown itself capable in Latin America of rising prices 
even if very restrictive orthodox measures are taken. Because ignoring 
the structural conditions of the economy, leads at some point to the fail- 
. ure of the stabilisation effort; being the cause the trends in consump­
tion, in exports and imports, in agricultural and industrial output, in 
wages, in the expansion of credit or public expenditure, in the repayment 
of foreign debt, in the need for further devaluations, and so on.
Something that is highly ini ike ly judging by degree of evolution of such 
policies in advanced countries that face less serious structural bottleneck
When one thinks that structuralista are not only concerned with or­
thodox measures - monetary, fiscal, wages and devaluation - the problem of 
achieving stability in the short-term becomes more complex. That is, a 
structuralist reform is primarily based on accelerating growth - and com­
bating inflation - through agricultural, industrial, foreign sector, and 
progressive income redistribution measures. The question is: can these
policies afford to be non-inflationary in the short run, or on the medium 
term? We shall now turn very superficially to the subject,
b) Domestic Structural Economic Policies
The moment orthodox or short-term policies are left aside, the policy 
implications of a structuralist reform become complex. Long-run structural­
ist policies imply in themselves a special Latin-American ideology which is 
not necessarily neither parlamentary in the western sense nor marxist in 
the Soviet sense. It involves different degrees of public interventionism 
which could go from absolute state control to mild interference. The clos­
est one can get to such an ideology here is to say that it involves a *spe­
cial brand1 of nationalism which, under precarious conditions, aims at 'con­
tinental nationalism* in the sense of Latin America as a whole. It is con­
venient to mention this so as to understand the profound 'sense of change' 
a structuralist reform explicitly or implicitly, seeks. Such a reform is 
based at least on three overall premises:
1,- A fundamental economic change in supply and demand conditions 
and in distribution of income
2,- Basic institutional and administrative changes.
3*- A necessary political and social setting.
Restricting oneself to the economic angle, the reform implies the crea­
tion of an overall development policy], the compatibility of economic mea­
sures and objectives; an over all socio-economic programme; a planning sys­
tem - whether in terms of the sole public sector, in the context of a mixed 
econoiqy, or as authoritarian planning control -, or, however one wants to 
call it. This a further premise the 'systematisation' of economic policy 
suited for the structural characteristics of Latin America,
The main objective of the structural reform or development policy is 
economic growth and less unemployment, Moreover, the long-run policy ex­
plicitly includes a redistribution of income that increases mass-consumption 
and the dispensation of public services, in a setting of fast demographic 
growth. 2\eedless to say it works under the assumption or constraint of 
achieving a 'tolerable' external equilibrium. On a secondary level, the
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theoretical reform includes the objective of price stability, working within 
the constraint (at least) of public debt management policy.
*We are concerned here only with the compatibility of the structural 
growth policies with price stability and its corresponding short-run ortho­
dox or serai-orthodox measures. Aside from an overall developmental system, 
the structuralist policies have been simply divided into domestic policies 
-agricultural, industrial, incomes, and fiscal reform - and foreign policies 
-international trade, foreign capital, and exchange rate measures -•
It is obvious that these policies are conceived as the means to create 
greater elasticity in aggregate supply and changes in the composition of ag­
gregate demand or greater mobility and increases in the factors of production, 
In structuralist terms it means reducing the agricultural bottleneck, the for* 
eign exchange shortage, the contradictory industrialisation system, the infra* 
structure bottleneck, and the regressive distribution of income. It is be- 
iiend. that reducing these bottlenecks and thus changing the underdeveloped 
nature of aggregate supply and demand structures and the mobility of factors 
would conduce first to a higher rate of growth (assuming that the initial thre< 
premises are in operation). What is interesting here, is that such a funda­
mental change is also the major condition for price stability. In fact, such 
a growth policy, following the series of structuralist authors studied, is 
the road towards price stability and external equilibrium. Professor Seers 
puts it in the words that follow (63):
•The reduction of price distortion is a constructive feature 
of several stabilisation plans, but a basic and lasting cure 
can only come through the internal structural changes needed 
to enable growth to continue.•• a pre-condition of the struc­
tural change involved, as well of making the economy sufficient­
ly flexible during the interval until it has been achieved, is in­
creased factor mobility. This in turn implies the need for land 
feform, educational advance, and new fiscal systems, to break 
down the existing social structures, which are based on highly 
unequal distribution of income, restricted educational oppor­
tunity, find regressive tax systems. The essence of a fundament­
al stabilisation policy is a long-term development programme to 
achieve the structural changes which are needed, Any sort of
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Structural in the sense defined on the introduction to rart II.
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other stabilisation policy is a palliative. It is dangerous 
to insist, as the DIP does, on indiscriminate policies of fin­
ancial restraint. The result is a serious check to growth and 
there is no reason to expect the resultant level and pattern 
of investment to be compatible with development needs'*
For the sake of argument it could be asked in general whether long-term 
structural policies, one by one or as whole, are compatible with price sta­
bility, In principle, as it has been seen through this exposition of struc­
turalist thought, they are. However, there is scope for a wide range of ac­
ademical and empirical doubts. One way of insisting on this question is to 
interpret the development policy versus price stability in terras of the short 
and long runs. Compatibility would then raise several possibilities:
1*- Immediate price stability with the empleraentation of a structuralist 
reform something hardly possible,
2,— A reduction in the rate of inflation in the short-run,
3*- An increase in the rate of inflation in the short-run,
4.- Price stability in the long-run,
5.- The impossibility to determine future trends in prices,
6.- Permanent inflation with growth.
It is obvious that t::ere one has no simple answer for these possibili­
ties that arise from a theoretical structuralist reform. However, it is 
not unfounded to diaim that the majority of structuralists would suscribe to 
numbers 2 and 4, The problem is, of course, that structuralists as far as 
one knows, have not yet provided a theoretical model that analyses a struc­
tural reform and its components in terms of its applicability and its imme­
diate effects on the rate of inflation.
Insisting on the question with respect to empirical situations in Latin
American countries creates an ever more complex problem. One could, of course,
point out that no overall structuralist reform has ever been applied, Cuba
is no exception if it is considered as an experiment on marxism and Soviet
policies, which, nonetheless, presumably provides an alternative ato a struc-
trualist reform. Still, it can be argued that partial structural reforms have
been applied in some of our countries and at different times. But, except for 
*Mexico , there is a shortage of inflationary economies that have become stable 
and have grown and where a structural reform can be identifided as the source.
Bolivia too could be interpreted from the angel of the results of the 19?2 
Devolution,
It would seem that the problem of whether structural policies have been real­
ly applied remains a question? This is a necessary field of research for 
case studies, where one should first try to identify a structural policy (or 
an overall programme) and then its stabilising or inflationary consequences, 
say land reform in Chile or public investment in Brazil. In the meantime, 
one has to content oneself with making general comments on the subject.
/ \ **(i) Agricultural policies
In a traditional sense, structuralist policies usually start with an 
agricultural reform. *The first objective (of a structuralist reform) writes 
professor Grunwald, isto eliminate the obstacles that limit the flexibility
of production, principally towards agriculture* (64). That is, government
investment in agricultural infrastructure. Bat, in an inflationary setting, 
if price controls contribute to an agricultural bottleneck, the improvement 
of prices in agriculture depends on improving the relative prices in the sec­
tor and a redistribution of income so that the purchasing power of the masses
increases. The greatest obstacle, writes the author, that structuralists no­
tice is the present land tenure system. Agrarian reform is then a policy, 
both towards the agricultural bottleneck and the redistribution of income. 
Taxation, moreover, is regarded as another instrument which should be ajust- 
ed to induce an increase in agricultural production.
To put it in very simple words, structuralist agricultural policy aims 
mainly at:
1.- Increasing productivity, in terms of,
2.- increasing the agricultural supply, or alternatively,
3*- finding the most economical way of importing foodstuffs - or raw
materials, if it were the case - through higher exports and the
least burdensome foreign loans.
4.- Redistributing agricultural income.
5»- Creating the most possible efficient agricultural infrastructure.
6.- A land reform, the key-stone, economically and socially, to the 
whole agricultural reform.
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This sub-section should be regarded as a continuation of section (a),
The agricultural bottleneck, in Chapter III. There, with serious statis­
tical limitations, it was determined that the inelasticity of agricultural 
production was an important cause of food and cost of living inflation, 
especially if relative comparisons are made between the inflationary coun­
tries*
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In Western economic circles, outside of Latin America, land reform 
is usually regarded with suspicion or pessimism. In Latin America, on 
the contrary, it is not only academically accepted as 'the solution1 to 
the agricultural bottleneck but it is explicitly accepted even by some 
of the most right-winged regimes. That is, land reform is politically 
acceptable; something that does not prevent governments from then fol­
lowing to store it away in a drawer. We are not concerned here why his­
torically it has been accepted in political terms. In a contemporary 
sense - apart from Mexico, Bolivia and Cuba - this is mainly a conse­
quence of the Conferencia de Punta del Este and the premises of the Al­
liance for Progress. 'The problem facing the Latin-Araerican countries 
today, writes ECLA, is not whether they should or should not introduce 
land reform but in what form, with what scope, and with what financing.1 
For some, land feform means supervised credit, rural electrification, 
increased extension work and research, forced or induced migration, 
settlement of new land and labour and tenency legislation. 'But, writes 
ECLA, these are only supplementary measures, not land reform per se. '
Land reform proper seeks a large-scale redistribution of land and there­
fore power for the rural sector, which can only be achieved by expropriat­
ing private farms for the benefit of the landless workers and minifundia 
farmers, who would be given land under a new system of land tenure, wither 
with privately owned farms, co-operatively owned or co-operatively worked 
forms or state farms (65).
But this is merely the statement of a theoretical need. On the other
hand, ECLA writes: 'Thus far (1967) land reform activities have made only
*a very small dent in the land tenure system, and none of the programmes 
have reached the prox^ortion of a real land reform (66) •'
Thus one is faced with the problem of applying a land reform. The
economical need, abstracting from social or political decisions, can be 
summarised in the following statement of Dr. Sunkel and also in tne words
of a non Latin-American who in this case is unorthodox, Lord Balogh.
'The existence of an anti-economic structure of land ownership - mini­
fundia and latifundia prevail - constitutex a strong obstacle to the intro­
duction of modem technology and the full use of agricultural resources.
. . . . . .  ----------The statement is not meant to be applied to Mexico, Bolivia or Cuba, but 
it is applicable to the countries that concern this study.
i?or an excellent discussion on the stagnation and contradiction in land 
reform measures see the same source (Chapter III).
It is therefore very difficult to raise yields and productivity of land 
and labour, and achieve the expansion of agricultural production neces­
sary to achieve growth. In the cases of the countries exporting agricul­
tural goods, this may lead to a fall in exports, therefore putting pres­
sure on the balance of payments. In other countries, the increased dem­
and may be supplied through imports, but this would reduce the possibility 
of importing equipment (67)*•
The reasons for the economical acceptance of land reform, one also 
given by Lord Balogh (68). The classical mechanism of readjustment, he 
says, is based on the existence of a large area of marginal choices. Mar­
ginal in this sense means divisible and small. Such marginal choices, even 
in the cases where the technical rigidities do not rule them out altogether, 
presupposes that industrial growth has been already achieved and that the 
increased mobility of labour and capital has led to an equalization of fact­
or remuneration. As a picture of the conditions of UDC this could not be 
further from reality. Eural mobilisation is a condition for growth; while 
only a decisive increase in agricultural production and productivity can 
supply the food necessary to allow for industrialisation, without an intol­
erable burden on the balance of payments. 'The conventional working of the 
market mechanism is ofter impeded in considerable sections of the agricul­
tural sector because of the inequality of the distribution of land. The 
motivation in both latifundia and minifundia differ considerably from what 
is assumed in the instantaneous profit maximisation model of perfect com­
petition (which has become also highly inaccurate in fully industrialised 
areas dominated by oligopolies). There might be no incentive to maximise 
output in the short-run.
Apart from this, policies can be used to stop inflation in agricultural 
prices, writes professor Maynard (69)* Prices in manufactures would have to 
be reduced to clear the market, but profitability and growth would suffer. 
Eence reducing the level of income is not a very good solution. Food prices 
to urban workers could be subsidised or controlled. Food could be imported 
but this places a strain on the balance of payments. Governments may thereO- 
fore.be forced to choose between, on the one hand, allowing the rate of agri­
cultural growth determine the rate of growth or, on the other, breaking the 
restriction by permiting inflation. The usual remedy of reducing total con­
sumption demand -isnot appropriate, since if it is carried enough to produce 
equilibrium in the food market, it will create a defficiency of demand for 
industrial consumer goods, thereby removing the industrial stimulus to growth. 
Inflation in UDC, concluding, results from a lack of balance of their economie
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This lack of balance takes the form of low productivity in agriculture and 
in the heavy dependence on primary exports. The fact that the latter large­
ly determines the rate of growth is a strong incentive for government to 
promote diversification: to encourage manufacturing relatively to agri­
culture, and to concentrate on domestic industries rather than on export 
ones. This may result in extreme inflation. The specialisation may event­
ually lead towards a concentration of manufacturing output, a large part
*of which is exported in exchange for foodstuffs.
■**The study of land reform is outside the scope of this work. Among 
the problems or questions it may present, , however, something should be 
said about the financing of such a policy. That is, the problem of the 
stabilising or inflationary nature of an agricultural reform policy. It is 
fairly obvious that a successful agricultural policy in theory and over the 
long-run would bring price stability. But the immediate - or even, medium- 
term - consequence of financing and finding the resources to finance it 
creates serious questions; one of which is the possibility of its infla­
tionary nature. That the financial load would be extreme is self-evident. 
But, it is difficult to estimate accurately the funds required to implement 
a mass modernisation and structural reform programme for the agricultural 
sector. For the moment, writes ECLA, no specific and accurate information 
is available concerning the resources actually invested in agriculture, 
which might serve as a basis for a projection. There is no complete list 
of projects to be implemented in the various countries, much less their
-Y V V  V•  v A  A  A Acost (7 1).
Financing agricultural policy - investment and urban and rural consump­
tion - depends simply on:
1.— The availability of domestic resources
2.- Foreign loans and higher exports.
Neither with respect to private or public savings nor with the majority 
of primary product markets and foreign indebtedness is it possible to be op-
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For a discussion on relative prices see the section on agricultural bottle­
necks (Chapter III, part a).
IHtA relevant and interesting introduction into the subject - in the context 
of structuralism - may be gained from the works of the following authors:
0. Delgado (a contemporary summary), R.F. Schoedel, Messrs. S.L. Barro- 
chaugh and A. L. Domike, and J. Chonchol (?0). The widest literature on 
the subject is the one concerned with the Mexican agrarian reform, biblio­
graphy suggestions, however, are better left in the hands of the specialist.
(for foortnotes *•** and **** see the following page)
timistic. ECLA, nonetheless, contemplates the following possibilities.
•The bulk of additional capital will have to come from domestic sources.
The redistribution of agricultural property and income brought about by 
taxation and other methods (land reform) would make it possible to ear­
mark for investment resources which had hitherto been used for luxury con­
sumption and sent out of the country. Total investment and credit resour­
ces will also have to be re-allocated to favour agriculture... It is not 
the purpose of this study to show a strategy for the financing of a vo­
lume of investment so much greater than in the past. This could be done 
as part of an overall economic development policy for the region. But, 
it can be predicted that, for investment purposes, a fuller utilisation 
of the work capacity of the un-employed or under-employed rural popula­
tion might be to some extent relieving of the pressure on the financial 
resources available.
A substantial proportion of the new agricultural investment would 
have to be imported (tractors, all sorts of equipment, some inputs and 
capital goods for infrastructure projects. With respect to the possibi­
lity of foreign credits contributing to all this investment, ECLA puts 
in the following words: *It is therefore imperative to make the grant­
ing of external loans contingent upon overall objectives and priorities 
from development plans; otherwise, external resources might be channel­
ed into low priority projects, aggravating the external debt positions 
without promoting development* (73)• One mentions this here, because it 
is worth stressing that usually structuralists conceive the financial pro­
blem and the role of foreign capital only in the context of a development 
. policy.
(ii) Industrialisation policies
The inflationary impact of structural industrialisation policies on 
the price level has been studied - with severe empirical limitations - 
on the section on Industrialisation and the price level (Chapter 3 section
c). That is, one can arrive at the conclusion that given the manner indus­
trialisation policies have occurred in Latin America a variable push on
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(Footnotes from preceeding page)
1
Just to mention a few; private and public investment projects; the 
technological criteria, whether capital or labour intensive if alter­
natives are possible; employment policies, in terms of an excess sup- 
- .ply of labour or under-employment; in terms of balance of payment de­
cisions; in terms of the parallel MST process , the problem of sector­
ial balanced or un-balanced growth and relative prices.
****A group of agencies - FAO, IBB, IBRD, and ECLA - is conducting research
(see next page.)
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prices is to be expected. But, the statement says nothing about how their 
industrialisation process can be theoretically reformed so as to arrive at 
internal and external equilibria. Let us resume then the previous structur­
alist conclusions:
1,- Import substitution industrialisation is an important cause
behind the inflationary process of some of the selected countries; 
whether as a policy induced cause or one imposed by external econ­
omic circumstances.
2,- MST industrialisation was adopted - imposed if one insists - be­
cause of external trends in commodities and capital movements and 
the priority of maintaining a certain level of income,
3..- Nonetheless, industrialisation in itself is regarded by structur­
alists as a primer objective of economic policy, productivity wise.
4.- Industrialisation has been capable of inflationary consequences and 
of disrupting the balance of payments equilibrium. Thus bringing
in conflict the objectives of growth and employment with the object­
ives of overall equilibrium,
5.- As MST proceeds, it is possible that even the growth objective be­
comes less feasible with respect to the prevailing structural char­
acteristics of the economy. That is because of its dependence on 
the capacity to import, the rigidity of the domextic econon^y, and 
the induced changes in the structure oi imports.
6.- The factors that determine the domextic rigidity in the MST process
and that result in inflation are:
a) The effects of modern technology, the mobility and availa­
bility of factors of production, unemployment, the distri­
bution of income, etc.
b )  These in turn reflect a reduced size in the domextic market, 
monopolistic tendencies, low profits, and so on.
7.- There is much need for research to determine how higher costs trans­
late themselves into inflation, empirically speaking.
(Continued from previous page
with the object ox determining as accurately as possible the re­
sources actually required for agrarian purposes in several Latin- 
Ameriean countries. Their findings are not yet available, but 
for estimates for the whole of Latin America see the study quoted 
above and the work of Mr. T. F. Carroll (72).
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8.-
9.-
When this point of the discussion is reached - the inflationary cost 
of MST - structuralists readily admit that something has to be done 
about it. That is, for them MST is not to be discarded as such, pol­
icy induced or autonomous mistakes are recognised, and multiple pro­
positions are made to construct a ‘new' MST policy in the context of 
today*s Latin-American structural and financial problematic.
The pboblem, however, is not so simple. The following conclusion was 
reached: the strategic problem is how to make the transition from
an MST model to a self-sustained grovrth model. In accomplishing the 
task of bridging the gap between the two models, the decisive variable 
is public investment. Moreover, when an external bottleneck exists, 
the continuity of the growth process depends fundamentally on an au­
tonomous demand for capital goods; freeing foreign exchange and thus 
permitting the import of crucial raw materials and intermediate goods, 
as well as consumer goods and foodstuffs, for which domestic facili­
ties are inadequate.
Structuralists, of course, have been aware for a long time of the limita­
tions and the inflationary nature of the MST process as such. *MST policy, 
writes Dr. Prebisch, has been applied in a discriminatory way, without a pro­
moting a corresponding expansion in exports, and thus it has been carried 
further than it might have been. Only recently an attempt has been made to 
break the national markets by means of a gradual economic integration of 
Latin America. •• The cost of substitution has thus been exaggerated to the 
detriment of mass consumption, particularly when increases in productivity 
have been small in the rest of the economy* (agriculture, particularly) (74). 
*MST industrialisation, writes Mr. Felix, has also proven inadequate to main­
tain self-sustaining growth.•• The analysis underlines — if such emphasis is 
still needed - the necessity to accelerate agricultural development by agri­
cultural reforms and related m^.sures of public investment in infrastructure. 
MST industrialisation, aside from its limitations, has created industrial 
. skills and experience which should be used to supplement their primary ex­
ports. Indeed, the viability of their economies .(semi-industialised Latin- 
American economies) requires xhis, for the growth of their traditional ex— . 
ports is hardly likely alone to support the import needs. In brief, they 
must also turn to industrial exporting * (75)* Lord Balogh also agrees: 
the relative cost of industrial production prevented an orderlo process of 
unprotected MST. In periods of relative affluence, he goes on referring to 
the export sector, import controls are generally relaxed and investment in 
import substitution is not specially encouraged. In the absence of cons-
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cious planning and the encouragement of MST during favourable times, the 
process is likely to place in periods of crisis, i.e. a failure of foreign 
supplies. Thus it will be difficult to prevent the emergence of large < - 
profit margins of newly created monopoly power. The loss in real income 
produced by the shift from imports to home production may be accompanied 
by a redistribution of income from the lower to the higher income groups, 
i.e. from real wages to profits. Thus the relative prices of manufactures 
express social opportunity costs as little as those of agriculture. They 
are expression of relative monopoly power and the bargaining power of trade 
unions. A downward rigidity is imparted to manufacturing prices. It is 
quite possible that a high share of investment will be frustrated by mono­
polistic influence keeping output low and prices high. Excess capacity 
would be created in this way. The inelasticity in the supply of manufac­
tures is joined to that of agriculture and monopoly powers can transmit a 
cost-inflationary spiral (?6).
One may conclude that 1contemporary structuralism* (within the struc­
turalist reform) aims at implementing industrialisation policies which re­
duce the rigidity of the MST process and continuing with industrialisation, 
but as a response to the behaviour of the external sector A *new' MST policy 
would be based, alternatively, on the following structuralist criteria:
1.- An anti-cyclical policy with respect to the trends in exports, im­
ports, and foreign capital, in the words of Dr. Prebisch.
2.- What we have called foreign structural economic policies.
This only goes on to say that structuralist industrialisation policies are 
not conceived in abstraction of the foreign sector. In juunciple, of course, 
they would be divided into domestic industrialisation measures and 'external 
sector* industrialisation measures (we shall concentrate on these in the fol­
lowing section).
With respect to domestic industrialisation policies - those that could 
hettaken more or less in abstraction of the balance of payments; and whether 
in the context of the public sector or the planning of a mixed economy - due 
to the magnitude of the subject and the rcruired especialisation, they lie 
outside the scope of this work. Eor an introduction into the subject, see 
the bibliography (77)• However, it is useful to give a guideline of the 
structuralist policy thought in the matters.
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1.-
2.-
Tlie overall industrialisation objectives are;
The distribution of income*
Increasing the size of the mass consumption market (in other words, 
a higher- rate of growth).
From the domestic sector point of view these would involve the 
following policies:
1.- The selection of investment projects and priorities; that is, the
distribution of investment between light, medium, and heavy industry* 
2*- Fiscal measures:
a) Increased public revenues
b) Selective encouragement of industrial investment,
c) Industrial infrastructure expansion,
3»- An ad hoc monetary and incomes policy.
In other words the resulting structures of demand and supply, as well 
as the industrial habits, caused by MST stand in the way of restructuring 
the industrial sector. Policy measures should be aimed at this situation:
1,- Taxation should be used to alter the structure of consumer demand.
It is not sufficient to raise more taxes to finance more public in­
vestment, The tax incidence must fall on consumer durables and 
luxury goods, whether imported or domestic, with the object of cur­
tailing investment in such industries. This requires some combina­
tion of heavy indirect taxation on some goods and progressive taxa­
tion of personal indome, but one that does not discourage the type 
of investment desired,
2,- A large share of investment should be directed to essential consumer 
goods, some capital and intermediate products, and to those indus­
tries with an export potential (one is dealing here already with 
the external sector). This implies cost and market studies to 
identify such industries and input-output studies, which well have 
to estimate the final demand for foreign exchange. Given such in­
formation credit and capital controls, tax concessions, wage and 
profit legislation will have to be used to help this investment,
3*- Foreign investment should be put under legislation. *The autho­
rities, writes Hr. Felix, must not be seduced by the appearance 
of direct exchange-savings or by the fact that such investment 
(foreign) may not compete with existing industries, overlooking 
possible indirect effects of such investment in increasing the 
demand for foreign exchange and stimulating low priority comple­
mentary investment* (79)*
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4,- Foreign tecluiical assistance.
5.- From here structuralists go on to recommend the best policies for 
rationing the use of foreign exchange, managing the structure of im­
ports, and encouraging exports; hut there recommendations have been 
separated so as to be included in the structural foreign policy re­
form.
(ui) Redistribution of income policies
The theoretical concluision was reached that the regressive distribution
of income ought to be avoided in the inflationary setting of a semi—industrial-
*ised Latin American country • It was also agreed, cf course, that 'any* 
distribution of income in Latin America, whether regressive or progressive, 
could be potentially inflationary; because of the agricultural bottleneck, the 
MST process, and the constant deficit pressure of the balance of payments. 
Still, structuralists recommend a policy of progessive income distribution as 
a means to growth and stability. The conlcusion is based on the discussion of 
the following thesis: a regressive distribution of income in an UDC has seen to 
be accompanied by a low propensity to save and high propensity to consume non- 
essentials or consumer-durable imports, besides having distorting effects on 
investment and employment* Moreover, the same theory recommends the need of 
a policy to distribute income progressively, since market forces in UDC may 
not correct automatically regressive trends.
However, when this point of the argument is reached, structuralists re­
cognise that a progressive distribution of income may initially enhance in­
flation principally because of the supply bottlenecks in the agricultural, 
industrial, foreign, and public sectors, the fact, of course, is reflected 
on excess demand and inflated profits and wages. After some discussion, it 
was seen how structuralists, as monetarists, arrive at the need of creating 
an incomes policy that would make the main three economic objectives compa­
tible -growth, stability, and a progessive distribution of income. Dr.
Prebisch was quoted as saying: a measure essential to achieve monetary sta­
bility without detriment to economic activity is the stabilization of wages.
However, an incomes policy according to the structuralist reform has to 
be conceived as a •structural1 policy measure. Sim;3istically this only 
means that is should be an integral part of a developmental policy (the 
structuralist reform) and one that does not seek a wage freeze per se or a 
reduction of mass consumption. In specific terms then, what policy measures 
does a 'structural incomes policy' involve:
* See chapter III, section e.
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4.- Foreign technical assistance.
5.~ From here structuralists go on to recommend the best policies for 
rationing the use of foreign exchange, managing the structure of im­
ports, and encouraging exports; but there recommendations have been 
separated so as to be included in the structural foreign policy re­
form.
(iii) Redistribution of income policies
The theoretical conclusion was reached that the regressive distribution 
of income is an important cause of inflation in a semi-industrialised Latin- 
American country. It was also agreed, of course, that 'any* distribution of 
ii^ come in Latin America, whether regressive or progressive, could be poten­
tially inflationary; because of the agricultural bottleneck, the MST process, 
and the constant deficit pressure of the balance of payments. Still, struc­
turalists recommend a policy of progressive income distribution as a means to 
growth and stability. The conclusion is based on the discussion of the fol­
lowing thesis: a regressive distribution of income in an UDC has seen to be
accompanied by a low propensity to save and high propensity to consume non- 
essentials or consumer-durable imports, besides having distorting effects on 
investment and employemtn. Moreover, the same theory recommends the need of 
a policy to distribute income progressively, since market forces in UDC may 
not correct automatically regressive trends.
However, when this point of the argument is reached, structuralists re­
cognise that a progressive distribution of income may initially enhance in­
flation principally because of the supply bottlenecks in the agricultural, 
industrial, foreign, and public sectors. The fact, of course, is reflected 
on excess demand and inflated profits and wages. After some discussion, it 
was seen how structuralists, as monetarists, arrive at the need of creating 
an incomes policy that would make the main three economic objectives compa­
tible - growth, stability, and a progressive distribution of income. Dr. 
Prebisch was quoted as saying: a measure essential to achieve monetary sta­
bility without detriment to economic activity is the stabilisation of wages.
However, an incomes policy according to the structuralist reform has to 
be conceived as a 'structural1 policy measure. Siraplistically this only 
means that it should be an integral part of a developmental policy (the 
structuralist reform) and one that does not seek a wage freeze per se or a 
reduction of mass consumption. In specific terms then, what policy measures 
does a 'structural incomes policy' involve:
¥---------See chapter III, section e.
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1*- Its main theoretical component is an agrarian reform which would 
distribute income and property. Conceived by itself, a land-re- 
form, would have for multiple reasons, inflationary consequences.
2.- Legislation against industrial monopolistic tendencies, something 
which depends to a determinant extent on the behaviour of the ex­
ternal sector and public investment. The ideal objective would 
be, of course, the reduction of prices as productivity increased. 
Nonetheless, it is not convenient to be dogmatic on the subjects 
policy with some monopolies would be an economic solution, especial­
ly in the field of infrastructure. On the other hand, the mere le­
gislation on monopolies may lead to oligopoly or monopsony.
5«- An incomes policy, as such
a) In Latin America it should be based on assumptions of the 
structure of employment and the large existence of unem­
ployment and under-employement.
b) Careful assumptions about the introduction of technologic­
al changes and the measurement of sectorial and industrial 
productivity increases.
c) Wage reorganisation:
(1) Increased real wages in the labour sector.
(2) Minimum wage legislation (flexible).
(3) Induced consumption of essentials and the encourage­
ment of labour sector savings.
(4) Independent trade unionism.
d) Profit-sector reorganisation:
(1) Labour's participation in utilities or subscription of 
shares and bonds.
(2) Direct (non-fiscal) encouragement of re-investment 
policies and public backing of certain investment 
projects.
(3) A compatible distribution of profits with trends in 
productivity* employment, wages, and demand.
(4) Discouragement of the use of profits for luxury 
consumption.
4.- Fiscal measures
a) Progressive income taxation' and the taxation of wealth 
(a non-inf1ationary measure).
b) Public expenditure on the low income groups - services, 
subsidies, pensions, insurance, etc - (an inflationary measure).
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The general structuralist conclusion seems to be that in theory at 
some point in time and given the incomes policy, growth and domestic sta­
bility would be compatible in a Latin-American country which aims both at 
increasing its per capita rate oi growth and reducing its rate oi inflation. 
Nonetheless, such compatibility and opposite trends in the variables are 
particularly dependent on what is happening and what is done in the exter­
nal sector.
(c) Foreign structural economic policies.
The following comments should be considered a conclusion to the study 
of the foreign exchange bottleneck in section (b) chapter III. Let us then
resume very briefly the structuralist argument;
1.- The foreign exchange bottleneck, as a source of inflation and slow 
growth or stagnation, may initially derive from the behaviour of ex- 
ports and imports in our Latin-American countries.
2.- Simplistically, this implies the existence of three main forces that 
disrupt the domestic and external sector equilibria;
a) The rate of growth of income proceeds at a faster rate than that
of exports.
b) There are short and long run price fluctuations in primary pro­
duct exports which introduce chronic instability into the econ­
omic system.
c) There is an induced behaviour in imports which further affects 
the balance of payments and the elasticity of supply of factors 
of production. Inflation ensues because, from the latter factor, 
chronic devaluations are introduced; and because, from the form­
er factor, higher costs appear and the costly process of import 
substitution industrialisation is undertaken,
3*- From the angle of the induced behaviour of imports, in theory, two 
tilings could happens
a) If the rate of import growth is reduced to the rate of growth 
of exports external equilibrium may be achieved, but income 
growth has to be reduced,
b) The real tendency, however, has been for imports to exceed
exports and thus create a deficit in the balance of trade.
Still, here two situations are possible;
(i) Imports are reduced although not as much as the beha­
viour of exportw would require.
* See footnote in following page.
(ii) Imports keep.increasing but not as much as if 
exports were growing.
4.- The argument can be made more realistic by introducing the concepts
of the total capacity to import versus the total imports of goods
and services.
5.- The point that structuralists make is that either way - (i) or (ii) -
the export-import tendency results in a chronic balance deficit on
current account - to begin with. This deficit may be taken as the 
reflection of the existence of an inflationary foreign exchange bot­
tleneck. The two main features of the bottleneck are:
a) Lagging, stagnating or slowly growing capacity to import.
b) An MST industrialisation which with time creates a rigid 
import structure, in such a way that a further contraction 
or lag in imports endangers gravely the functioning of the 
domestic economy!
c) One could add the continous recourse of devaluation.
6.- The problem from the balance of payments angle - bridging the gap 
between the capacity to import and total imports of goods and ser­
vices - has tended to be solved through the obtainment of balance
of payments loans; short-run and long-run foreign credits, both pub­
lic and private; net capital inflows resulting from private foreign 
investment; and, free aid.
7#- However, with time, the contribution of foreign capital may, para­
doxically, further reduce the capacity to import when amortisation 
and interest payments are added to the total bill of imports of 
goods and services. The result has been that imports have to be 
reduced to bridge the 'new gap'.
8.- When this does not happen, there is a final deficit on capital ac­
count which reflects the final shortage of foreign exchange.
Assuming then the existence of a foreign exchange bottleneck in some
of the Latin-American countries, structuralists are faced withthe problem
of proposing a structural external policy to reduce inflation and maintain
the overall priority of growth. Superficially, this results intw two main *questions.
(from previous page The initial analysis abstracted in a formal sense from
the particular Latin iimerican international trade controversy between Bi-
cardian economies and I>r. Prebisch's Centre and Periphery theory. ___________ c
* . . . .. It also resolves itself, as we shall see, in specific foreign policies.
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1.- What can he done with the balance of trade and services? For struc­
turalists the solution lies in:
a) a 'new' MST policy, or , as Dr. Prebisch calls it, an anti- 
cyclical structural policy*
b) The encouragement of exports, which means industrial exports 
and is part of the MST process*
2.- What can be done with the balance on capital account?
a) A revision of the methods and sources of the foreign indebted­
ness process and aid*
b) ^he legislation of foreign investment.
Before going into the policy measures, it is convenient to stress the 
nature of the origin of the foreign exchange problem and the connection 
between the balance of payments and inflation. Insisting on the first pro­
blem, one can resume it following professor Seers (?9)*
The above author insists that the vicissitudes in the external markets 
for Latin America’s commodities, as well as the population trends and the 
political developments, forced some of the coimtries in the region a task 
of adjustment, involving further industrialisation and the creation of a 
diversified and integrated economy. For the task they were - and are - un 
prepared - economically, politically, administratively, and so on. The in­
flations that developed are one symptom of the failure to carry out proper­
ly the needed adjustments; other symptoms are stagnation, chronic reliance 
on foreign aid, and increasingly frequent political upheavals.
But, the reason that interests us here is that the increase in the
main Latin-American commodity exports has been slower, at least since 195C,
*than for other primary producing regionw. This is partly because the re­
gion’s exports consist largely of foodstuffs, for which income-elasticity of 
demand is not high (coffee, sugar, bananas); but also partly because its 
exports are directed towards the United States and economic growth there 
has been slower than in western Europe; and partly because discrimination 
agains Latin-American products has increased with the development of the 
European Common Market, as well as the sterling and French brand area pre­
ferences and the increased protection of United States mineral producers
Latin America has had to face competition - in many cases unsuccessfully - 
from African countries.
(petroleum and non-ferrous metals). In addition, several Latin-American 
countrieshave now reached difficult stages of industrialisation, particular­
ly the creation of heavy industries, without as yet getting much benefit in 
the form of saving imx>orts of capital goods or exporting manufactures.
With respect to the second problemk inthose countries, as in the gen­
eral case with our Latin-American countries, that have not accumulated for­
eign reserves, the theoretical analysis about balance of payments equili­
brium has to give way to a very specific policy issue; one has to learn 
how a given country will find the necessary foreign exchange to pay for 
its commitments abroad, both the purchase of imports and the payment of 
credits. 13ut, writes professor Uri, fthe link between inflation and the 
balance of payments iH a complex relationship. In normal situations it 
is accompanied by a deficit. This relationship affects the policy measures 
taken to combat both problems. Orthodox fiscal and monetary policies claim 
to have both a deflationary effect and a balancing effect on the balance of 
payments. A reduction of aggregate demand should amount to a check in pri­
ces and a reduction in the deficit (80)'. However, assuming that the pro­
blem is only a question of demand - something that abstracts from supply 
inflation -, such measures have to be accompanied by a devaluation. The 
contraiction is evident between a general policy and a specific measure 
when devaluation leads to short-run external equilibrium but to further 
inflation - and a fall in output structuralists do not want to implement.
A 'policy alternative' - which has been frequently used - consists 
of solving the domestic problem sacrificing the external one:
This may easily lead to failure.
1.- First, because foreign exchange reserves - if they were there - v . e 
tend to disappear rapidly.
2.- Second, because import restrictions may accelerate the rate of infla­
tion, credits are also sx>ent rapidly, and postponement of foreign 
payments discourages new creditors.
These features may, of course, be common both to advanced countries 
and underdeveloped countries. Structuralists, however, are stressing that 
the relationship between inflation and the balance of payments requires in 
Latin America special theoretical considerations and possibly different 
policy measures, at least because of:
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1) The demand and price trends in world markets for primary products.
2) The MST requirements and policy measures.
3) The behaviour of foreign investment and capital in Latin .America.
In theory and practice it is possible to recommend to an advanced 
country that fluctuations in its international trade should be met with 
alternative movements in the volume of foreign reserves. But, as M. Uri 
says: 'it is useless to have the pretention that a sharp (and possibly
a downward trend) drop in exports can be resolved with devaluation and 
deflationary measures' (81). Professor Seers also agrees. 'It is not 
wholly implausible to argue that industrial countries can enhance their 
balance of trade, at least in the short run, by financial policy if de­
mand for motor cars falls at home, there will be more pressure to export 
them and the elasticity of foreign demand is doubtless fairly high. Sim­
ilarly, many imports are nonessential, and can be reduced or eliminated 
easily and without great harm. Moreover, capital flows between industrial 
countries seem quite sensitive to changes in the short-term interest rates.. 
In the case of UDC like Latin America's, however, the reaction of foreign 
trade to domestic policy is, very much more sluggish. If home demand de­
clines, the effect on exportable supplies is not very significant in the 
case of coffee, sugar, bananas, petroleum, or metals (though it may be more 
considerable for livestock products and cereals), because they do not ab­
sorb a large proportion of total local demand. Moreover, except for petro­
leum, the income elasticities of demand for primary products are not large. 
In most of the large countries of the region, the margin for comprising im­
ports has become so smallthat mere financial devices are unlikely to affect 
foreign payments greatly. V.here staple foods, equipment, spare parts, fuel 
and materials account for the great bulk of imports the demand for foreign 
exchange is not going to prove very responsive to changes in prices and the 
level of activity, unless of course financial pressure is carried to the 
point of causing a fall in investment. Yet if the payments crisis of a 
country is not temporary but a chronic one, in fact an inevitable feature., 
there can be no question or righting it by mere monetary restriction or 
devaluati on' (82)•
The structuralist thesis, is of course, that the contraction in the 
external sector affects very delicatly the rate of growth of the economy.
The frequent policy response has been domestic anti-deflationary measures 
that lead to expansion of income the means of payment, and inflation. But, 
when our countries are vulnerable to an initial contraction in their in­
come, which is out of their control, special policy measures should be de­
vised, Specifically, the structuralist idea is that sustained grovrth would 
not be possible without *a more than proportionate increase in imports,*
•One may disagree on the exact measurement on the divergence between the 
the growth of necessary imports and the growth in output and the possibi­
lities of payment, but not on the direction of the phenomenon* (83), Thus 
it has been recognized that the problems of the balance of paymentsare 
closely linked with empbyment conditions. Nonetheless, what has also been 
seen is that industrialisation as a resTJonse to external disequilibrium 
creates a host of problems of its own. The train of thought is open hence
to unorthodox policy thinking with respect to the foreign exchange bottle- **neck. We can only mention here the well known structuralist external pol-
V V v
icy suggestions.
1,— A new MST policy, whether an anti-cyclical structural policy or a 
self-sustained growth model
2,- The promotion of industrial exports.
3*- A Latin-American common market, the development of ALALC and the 
new Southern common market,
4.- The financial compensation of primary producer countries for the 
deterioration of their terms of trade, Dr. Prebisch*s Genera pro­
position.
5*- The stabilisation of world markets for primary products, the com­
modity stabilisation agreements.
6,- The revision and development of GATT and the Kennedy ROund in 
terms of Latin America*s foreign trade.
7,- A revision of Latin America's protectionist policies - tariffs, 
subsidies, and fiscal measures - in terms of the degree of pro­
tection or competition for commodities in the fosign markets.
8,- An ad hoc exchange rate policy,
0,- The revision of the necessary role of foreign credits and the 
problem of increasing indebtedness.
See the united Nations Conference on Commerce and Development,- Geneva 1964,
International free trade is the part of the classical doctrine widely 
unaccepted in Latin America. 'It arrises, writes professor Seers, from 
the simple fact that Latin America does not face free trade. The region's 
exporters face a world full of restrictions. All the industrial countries 
(as it was said) protect their own farmers from imports of livestock pro- 
Kx ducts, cereals, sugar. The United States applies quantitative restrictions
v^ -Sorae of" these policies of" course are* not solely structuralist reeommendatio] 
(footnote ** continues on next page)
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Structuralists 'believe that a selection oi these structural foreign 
policies, would, at some point in time, guarantee the compatibility of 
the ambitious objectives of growth, employment, price stability and ex­
ternal equilibrium. That is, breaking the foreign exchange bottleneck 
would guarantee the compatibility oi growth and stability. Specifical­
ly, one should consider these measures as those most likely to be anti- 
inflationary. It is, oi course, impossible here to go into a significant 
discussion of these policy measures; however important they are in them­
selves and mainly with respect of inflation. In the context of this work 
the question remans* Is this the way out of inflation? Would not these 
policies be at least inflationary in the short-run? Hence, we shall dis­
cuss superficially some of these points.
(i) Dr. Prebischfs Structural Anti-cylic Policy (85)
To understand how structuralists cope academically with the problem 
of a foreign exchange shortage resulting from the balance on current ac­
count, it is convenient to make explicit two important assumptions that 
underline their policy thinking:
a) Policy has to he divised in the setting of a de facto industrialisa- 
. tion process.
b) MST has turned out to be costly both in terms of higher prices (in-
flation)and foreign exhhange (external disequilibrium).
Dr. Prebisch's conclusion is that 'it is essential to adopt import 
substitution measures in advance without waiting for the external disequi­
librium to appear... It is precisely in the ascending phase of the cycle 
when savings are mounting and imports of capital goods can be expanded, 
that emphasis should be had on MST policy'. On the contrary, in general 
MST is a policy of circumstance rather them a selective criterion. Usual­
ly, as a result of a contraction in the capacity to import, imports are 
reduced with a depressive effect on the economy and the creation a of a 
new external vulnerability. This is why it is important to device in ad­
vance an-MST policy - in the context of a development policy - which endows
*-*(from previous page)
on imports of petroleum, lead, zinc, sugar and wool and uses subsidies 
and/or tariff:: to help domestic producers of these and a number of other 
items for example, cotton and copper. It is intellectually possible (though 
I think mistaken) to argue that Latin America could benefit from a freely 
competitive international system. But there is no chance of such a system 
being created, and the circumstances to insist on multilateralism, free 
trade anc currency convertibility is to advocate that, Latin America alone 
open its doors to the full force of international competition. Finally, 
the existence of chronic unemployment, continually swelled hv the fllood 
of new recruits to the labour force, means that the classical doctrine of 
comparative advantage cannot be appliead without considerable modification^84;.
the economy with the strongest structural resistence to external fluctua­
tions. Dr. Prebisch's second conclusion is 'obviously the development of 
new exports', in addition to traditional lines and in the context of a 
Latin?American common market (we shall turn to this point in the following 
section). Let us then see how the author reaches this initial conclusion. 
He starts with 7 posing two questions:
1.- Is it possible to pursue a policy of expansion without inflationary
consequences?
2.— Can a fiscal deficit and monetary policy be used to counteract ex­
ternal contraction without inflation ensuing?
To divert excess demand for imports towards internal demand to com­
pensate in a non-inflationary way for the shortage resulting from the fall 
in exports,* is the problem. This involves serious difficulties, First, 
there must be a reducible margin of imports. These wrould be those that 
could be abolished without reducing employment nor affecting mass consump­
tion • Suppose then these are goods for high-income groups. Part of the 
surplus demand for imports can be absorbed by import taxes. And these 
taxes must be high enough to divert the rest of the surplus demand towards 
the internal market. The remaining demand would be absorbed by taxes of 
an internal nature, in the case there is no idle capacity. On the other 
hand* if the reduction of the import of such goods has been successful 
and their nature is considered non^eseential further taxation can reduce 
their domestic production. Either way, the surplus demand, to some extent 
would be collected by the government in tiie form of taxes. These resources 
enable the state to cover for previous investment done in an inflationary 
manner, In a nutshell, the operation consists essentially in shifting sur­
plus demand for imports to internal demand for the factors occupied in in­
vestment*
The second problem may be that, in order to restore external equili­
brium, the imports of the high-income groups are insufficient and that it 
is essential to resort to imports that are a part of mass consumption. If 
the above fiscal procedure is applied, however, there is danger of placing 
the burden on sucli consumption; and, if the burden is eschewed, inflation­
ary pressure will emerge. There is thus no alternative but to obtain fin­
ancial aid to cover investments to an extent equivalent to the inflationary 
pressure (with time, of course, there is the danger of reducing the total 
capacity to import). However, for a time, this is a way of maintaining a 
volume of investment which was previously made in an inflationary way, but 
covering it with savings provided by taxes and foreign loans. This is 
essential when imports vital to mass consumption or economic activity can­
not be reduced*
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Covering essential imports in this way, explains Dr* Prebisch, is a 
temporary device until structural transformations are introduced to restore 
external equilibrium * It is, therefore, essential to invest capital on local 
industries that will replace imports and in export activities, conceived in 
such a way that autonomous growth becomes a target* But, in so far as the 
absence of internal savings or to the extent or composition of the reducible 
margin of imports does not leave room for the import of capital goods, in­
ternational financial assitance will be required* In practice such a pol­
icy runs into two difficulties:
a) a greater internal savings effort, through taxes or new loans, is 
required just when a drop in exports has already weakened the sav­
ings capacity*
b) International loans become a normal part of anti-cyclical policy* But 
such assistance can be justified as a means of supjiementing the scant 
savings in our countries but not as a normal part of anti-cyclic pol­
icy to cover the imports required to maintain economic activity. The 
solution does not lie there, but in a policy of MST that anticipates 
the cyclic decline of exports so as to mitigate the consequences on 
the internal economy*
Let us then see what is the structural solution to the problem. The 
following is the problem: given the structural vulnerability, monetary
stability is usually incompatible with the maintenance of economic activi­
ty when exports decline, stability leads to a contraction of activity and 
measures taken to remedy it lead to further inflation* An anti-cyclical 
policy that is not inflationary is possible, but it requires a greater sav­
ings effort, as well as foreign loans* The ideal solution would be to 
make the internal structure of the economy strong enough to divert the 
effects of the fluctuations outwards, so that the internal activities 
progress without interruptions. The problem lies in the fact that the im­
port coefficient with respect to the state of exports is too high for in­
come to continue to increase at the maximum level of employment, despite 
the drop in exports. It is therefore indispensable to reduce the coeffi­
cient by changing the composition of imports and to transform the structure 
of production to ensure that factors are employed to the maximum in inter­
nal activities when exports are at the nadir of the cycle* When exports 
increase again, the increase in income will put pressure on the market, 
but excess demand would be met by feasible higher imports*
What imports are likely to increase? Dr. Prebisch divides imports 
according to the possible scale of their cyclical fluctnations: (i) the
raw materials and intermediate goods, essential to maintain economic ac­
tivity at a high level ef employment; (ii) consumer goods, mainly those 
to satisfy wage—earners; (iii) the consumer or capital goods requires 
to satisfy the demand of high-income groups, chiefly entrepreneurs.
If the level of employment is high when exports have reached their 
nadir there is no reason for imports of category (i) to increase when 
exports start to recuperate. Nor is there any reason why demand for im­
ports for consumer goods in category (ii) should he cyclic, since, if 
economic activity were to continue developing at a steady pace, there would 
he no fluctuations in wages and fixed income, except in the export sector. 
The repercussions of external fluctuations would focus on consumer and 
capital goods of category (iii)* As internal activity should not expand 
cyclically to maintain its normal rate of growth, the higher demand would 
he satisfied by an increase in imports, an increass which is cyclical.
These imports would go np as the cycle rose and decline as it fell. From 
this point of view the import coefficient would he divided into two: the
coefficient which corresponds to the imports not snhject to cyclical fluc­
tuations and the coefficient for imports of consumer and capital goods 
which can he made to fluctuate. Economic policy would affect differently 
the coranoditi&s that would , still have to he imported and those that would 
he replaced by domestic products. But both coefficients, may have to de­
cline to some extent while the growth of income exceeds sustainedly the 
rate implied and imposed by exports - one steadily, the other in accord­
ance with the fluctuations of the cycle.
The problem remains that MST will eventually increase the second coef­
ficient capable of fluctuating cyclically, and that then it becomes neces­
sary to reduce the import coefficient essential for economic activity, or 
to incur in foreign loans, and through their repayment in a possible fall 
in the capacity to import which would again affect the essential imports.
Thus the core of the anti-cyclical policy may he resumed as follows: 
1#— The lowering of the two import coefficients need not wait until 
an import surplus occurs.
2*- It must he a flexible policy planned in advanced and anticipating 
the requirements of domestic growth.
3.- MST should, in other words, start before the downward tendency in 
• exports begins.
4*- Foreign loans are required as a compensatory policy in terms of
the relative inadequacy of MST or an unusually steep drop in export.
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Tn addition to this, Dr, Prebisch contributes the following four
suggestions s
1.- A cyclic variation in certqin imports. The cyclic increase in demand 
will tend to push prices up. The intensity of this depdns, apart from 
the elasticity of existing capacity, on the margin of protection that 
exists for MST goods. If the margin is small - only offsetting dif­
ferences in costs - the rise in prices would be checked by an increase 
in imports, A slight cut in domestic prices will, if prices remain
= steadly, divert the impact of a fall in demand towards imports rdher 
than domestic production. In the absence of such flexibility a vari­
able duty is necessary; which could be lowered during the upward 
phase of the cycle in order to stimulate imports or raised during the 
downward swing in order to reduce them and safeguard domestic produc­
tion,
2.- Promotion of cyclic imports of capital goods. V/hen exports begin
to decline, the correlation reduction in the duty and the consequent
drop in the price of goods would stabilise effective demand for such
goods without leading to a drop in imports or internal production.
Applied in this way to goods with a high-income elasticity of demand,
a flexible duty would enable capital to be expanded at the expense
of the consumption in the high income groups. The government would
*use the revenue from such duties for the import of capital goods.
3.0 Investment to absorb cyclic unemployment in export activities. Un­
employment in export activities is not structural but cyclic aid tem­
porary. Hence it cannot be absorbed definitely, but only temporarily. 
Hence it has te be employed nonetheless in internal investment and 
this means that savings must be used if inflation is to be avoided. 
However, when these savings cannot be obtained at the expense of 
domestic consumption-because another form of insufficient demand would 
be created-the new investment must be covered at the expense of im­
ports. In fact what is requires is a mass of savings which would 
grow steadily as the economy develops. These savings would be used 
to import capital goods when exports are increased and for internal
The State must also introduce structural reforms with respect to its ex­
penditure. A clear distinction should be made between current adminis­
tration expenses and investment. The latter must grow at the rate imposed 
by the economic and social policy and the other by imports of capital goods. 
Current administrative expenses should be payed with resources coming from 
domestic activity, whereas imports of capital goods should reflect the var­
iable rate of exports.
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investment when they fall, In the latter, the savings achieved at the ex­
pense of inports would be converted into consumption by those for whom the 
new investment has provided enployment, filling the gap in demand cansdd
4by falling enployment in export activities.
4- Flexibility in the investment process. From the cyclic point of view in­
vestment consists of two parts: (l) one thatfluctnates and (2) another
that grows steadily as the economy develops. The fluctuating part is com­
posed by the imports of those capital goods in which the movement in ex­
ports is reflected. The second one is represented by the remaining inports 
of capital goods and by the total internal investments. If internal acti­
vity is to grow steadily, it may he assumed that the rate of savings is - 
maintained. To the stable internal savings, one must add the unstable ex­
ternal savings in the export sector. This, however, doew not solve the pro­
blem because internal investment is closely linked to capital goods' imports. 
This close link is a factor of internal instability. For this reason inter­
nal investment requires a measure of flexibility. The important element to 
introduce flexibility is 'the cycle in industrial construction1 in the 
broadest sense of the word. When the cycle of industrial construction in­
creases, other forms of construction should he curtailed. Through public 
works and low-cost housing schemes, the government is in the position to in­
troduce this anti-cyclic element.
Let ns then resume the nature of a structural anti-cyclic policy, which 
would make the three main policy objectives compatible:
1«— The internal economy to lose its vulnerability has to aquire a re- 
si stence necessary to ensure that export fluctuations are promptly 
reflected in thos inports whose movements do not affect internal 
activity.
2*- The induced fluctuations in over-all inports should he met by a 
flexible tax policy and foreign loans.
•3*“ The raise in the inport of capital goods at the expense of consumer 
goods imports by means of a differentiated tax.
4.- Earmark the fluctuating part of the government's revenues - closely 
linked to foreign trade - forcapital goods imports.
3.** Absorb cyclical unemployment in export activities with the funds that 
were used during the upward phase of the cycle for capital good im­
ports^ other than those mentioned above.
6.- Change the conposition of construction activities to compensate for 
the cyclical movements derived from capital goods inports.
7.- To sum up, demand has to he dealt in its rising phase by the public 
sale of bonds designed to absorb savings. By thus reducing demand,
and not using savings to import capital goods, the savings are available 
as monetary reserves to phase the declining phase* When it begins, the 
monetary authorities buy back these bonds and restore purchasing power 
without creating inflationary pressure because of the use of the previous^ 
ly accumulated reserves*
8- While these ideas are right from the anti-cyclic point of view, they leave 
aside the structural problems which are structural in nature.
The scope of such a policy, in the words of the author, is, in short, 
anti-inflationary policy calls for the combination of a series of measures 
if it is to be compatible with economic development. The first is to chan­
nel surplus import demand into domestic markets, and the second to replace 
inflationary investment by investment covered by savings before credit res­
trictions are applied, If the reduble margin of imports or if savings are 
inadequate, international fuhds are required. Devaluation is essential if 
internal costs have increased more than international prices. This will not 
suffice to arrest the price spiral if wages are not stabilised at a level 
which would absorb entrepreneurs inflation-swollen profits - nor would an 
attempt to tighten credit in order to stop wage increases provoked by ris­
ing costs, as both measures would have depressive effects* (86).
(ii) The promotion of industrial exports.
In general terms - mainly academical - structuralists obviously put 
much emphasis on the development of industdal exports in Latin America as 
part of a growth policy. This is obvious in structuralist thought because 
of the trends in their traditional world exports, the effect of the terms 
of trade on the capacity to import, the induced rigidity on the structure 
of their imports or the pressing need to expand them, an d so on. Despite 
the increasing theoretical knowledge, however, not much way has been made 
in this respect; foreign industrial trade has not even reached consider­
able volumes among Latin-American countries themselves. This, in fact, 
has been recognised for a long time. 'Obviously the development of new 
exports, in addition to traditional lines, writes Dr. Prebisch, would help 
to achieve this aim (the compatibility of growth and stability)... The need 
for MST and for consequent protection of substitution activities has been 
unavoidable. But there has been a failure to boost exports. There has 
been discrimination in favour of industrial substitution as against ex­
ports, mainly industrial exports. The ideal policy would have been to 
promote exports in order to place them on an equal footing with MST... 
there would be possibilities of using a smaller subsidy to develop new 
industrial exports, whereby a greater quantity of industrial goods could
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be obtained through trade than those manufactured by MST. By subsidising 
substitution production rather than production intended for new exports, 
export opportunities have been lost which would have reduced the scope 
of MST drmade more rapid economic growth possible. This is admittedly 
a problem for which there is no simple practical solution but is unquest­
ionably true that the lack of subsidy policy, especially for new exports 
and, even more, the negative subsidy that monetary overvaluation sometimes, 
constitutes, have caused the Latin-American countries tojniss export op­
portunities to the detriment of their economic development* (87).
The question that has to be answered is why the selected semi-indus- 
trialised Latin-American economies have failed to become exporters of manu­
factures on a significant sale* A good introduction into the subject is 
that of the work of Mr. D. Felix (88)* Let us here callect a few ideas 
around the question, although it is convenient to advance that structural­
ists, as far as one knows, policy-wise are rather vague on the subject*
The policy conclusions at which they arrive are indeed very general:
1*- The possibility of expanding industrial exports would simply lie 
in the acceptance of advanced countries of a certain number of 
Latin-America's manufactures* This would presumably have to be 
worked out in the revision of GATT, the implementation of the 
Kennedy Hoad to Latin America's benefit, and more so tith the 
revision of trade agreements between the United States, the Euro­
pean Comnon Market, EFTA, COMECON and the Lat in-American countries*
2*- A significant expansion between inter-Latin-American trade. That 
is, the development of the ALALC towards a Lat in-American comnon 
market*
3.- An agenda for empirical research, within the Treaty of Montevideo, 
to explore the growth and stabilisation potentials of such an in­
dustrial integration process*
Apart from the external demand for manufactures, .as it has been said, 
the proceeds of MST has determined to an important extent the failure of 
these countries to export industrial goods* The process of MST has tend­
ed to be one that advances from simple consumer goods to some capital goods,
*passing through complex consumer durables and some manufactured inputs*
The process, moreover, has significantly developed monopolistic tendencies
within a small market or demand* Thus, even with modem plants and lower
**wages than in advanced countries, costs have been higher* One reason 
.for the frequent widening of the 'industrial spectrum' has been that, the 
smore sluggish the capacity end the effort to import and the greater the
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more sluggish the capacity to import and the greater the effort to save 
foreign exchange, the greater the inducement to substitute a wider vari­
ety of products. There has been a correlated impossibility to specialise 
- in the sense of achieving large outputs and a high productivity - along 
a few industrial lines. Policy has not in general terms helped either: 
it encourages the creation of new industries, rather than the modernisa­
tion of the concentration of efforts of inefficient ones. Etaphasis on 
satisfying the demand of high-income groups has resulted in a large vari­
ety of duvable-consumer goods industries. The over-all result has been 
that output curves have risen rapidly when exports were being replaced 
but have flattened when demand has stopped to increase as a consequence 
of the growth of domestic income, and its distribution. Profits may also 
follow a similar pattern.
Specifically the criticism that is being made against traditional 
MST is that it produces a precarious widening of the industrial base. In 
the words of Mr. Felix: f... it has meant a rapid movement towards the pro­
duction of technologically sophisticated products in which complex economy 
of scale factors are especially critical determinants of production costs, 
even though the domestic market has often been inadequate to exploit such 
economies. •• Thus industries have moved rapidly from high profit and growth 
to precocious 'maturity*, at which point they fall back to monopolistic 
quiescence with lower profit ratew, a reduced level of investment, and 
aging plant and equipment (81)*.
The inability to develop export markets in our countries stems from 
the above factors. Thus export efficiency may be summarised in the fol­
lowing factors:
1.- The creation of external economies of scale (the effect of indus­
tries growth and productivity).
2.- The growth in productivity of competitors abroad.
3*“ Wage and exchange fate trends.
The first factor should be determined to see if the establishment 
of new industries lowers unit costs in the existing industries. If this 
is so the widening of industry would be justified, even from the aspect 
of future exports. But, on the other hand, industries also compete for 
scarce resources: foreign exchange and public services, namely.
*(from previous page)
For an empirical discussion on the subject see Chapter 3» section c.
■K*The main reason for this according to structuralists, iH the regressive 
distribution of income (Chapter 3» section 4).
Between specific groups of industries, complementary advantages may out­
weigh the competitive ones (the poles de croissance theory of Francois'! 
Perroux) but this would still mean that the choice of industries to en­
courage can affect a country's ability to become an industrial exporter*
The effect of the other two factors is harder to visualise* The 
idea, however, is that the more MST advances and the more sophisticated 
manufactured Latin-America produces, the lesser the probability that these 
industries (with higher productivity nonetheless) will achieve internation­
al competitiveness* Because the more sophisticated an industry is the 
more it will need a large scale operation (refledted in low cost units 
with respect to the international market) which is not feasible in the 
reduced market of a Latin-American country* It then follows that the 
industries which are further from optimum operations have a lesser chance 
of reaching export efficiency* At the same time, new investment in these 
sophisticated industries prevents the concentration of efforts on more 
simple industries capable of reaching a relatively easier optimum (in 
output and productivity) and hence export possibilities* The moral is, 
of coarse, that semi-industrialised Latin-American countries should con­
centrate on reaching export efficiency on simple manufactures, say tex­
tiles* 'The general presumption, writes Mr* Felix, is that economies 
which hage pushed MST industrialisation* * * tend to box themselves in*
As industrial growth slows down when imports become less compressible, 
the industrial sector (for the reasons suggested above) is unable to re­
vive its momentum by exporting' (87).
The moral may nonetheless be criticised from several angles*
1*- The future of exports of simple manufactures still depends on ad­
vanced countries' purchases* That is, of the liberalisation of 
import restrictions against them* 'The Alliance for Progress^, 
writes the same author, could well direct some of its efforts to 
promoting such liberalisation and to encouraging the industrial 
export potential of the relatively industrialised countries of 
Latin America* The benefit to their balance of payments and to 
their industrial confidence might lessen the danger of the Alliance 
becoming little more than a supplier of stabilisation credits to 
ddmoralised economies"*
336
337
2*- The world demand for simple manufactures (like textiles) has
risen less rapidly than for sophisticated industries (like el­
ectronics) * The only consolation is that demand for these less 
sophisticated products has expanded more rapidly than the one 
for primary products*
3.- The rapid rise in avanguard industries has been pulling up 
wages and labour costs for simple industries, but advanced 
countries have tended to protect and subsidise their production*
4*- The feedback on industrial skills and managerial experience is 
greater in avanguard industries than in the simple ones* Al­
though one should not overlook the favourable feedback on cost 
and quality control and marketing skills which would derive from 
exporting simple manufactures*
5*- Mr. J* Mendez reminds one that 'notwithstanding greater comparat­
ive advantages, or similar disadvantages in traditional industries 
as compared with industries with greater capital intensity, itis 
very difficult for the former to compete with the latter in world 
markets* Abundant and cheap factors that enter into the product­
ion of simple manufactures do not compensate for both the high 
cost of scarce factors and the low productivity of the technical 
process* I agree with Felix that in order to avoid distortion of 
an excessive MST we should try to expand those simple industrial 
goods which could be exported, (But) In reality, there is no true 
choice between MST industries and the expansion of simple manufac­
tures* In existing institutional arrangements there is avery limit­
ed possibility for exporting simple industrial goods' (83).
(iii) A Latin-American Common Market
The structuralist theoretical analysis of the external sector in the 
Latin-American countries usually reaches or supports the cohclusion that 
•the best solution' to the problem is a common market. The fact applies 
to the structuralist models of Dr. Prebisch, professor Seers, and ECLA, 
to the studies of close sympathisers to the structural economics of the 
region, like professors Kaldor and Uri and Lord Balogh and Mr. Felix; 
and, first of all of course, to Latin-American economists like Drs. Pinto 
and Sunkel in Chile, professor Ferrer in Argentina, Mrs. Navarrete and Mr. 
Urquidi in Mexico, and Dr. Furtado in Brazil, just to mention a few.
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It is outside the scope of this work to go into the problematic 
solution of a common market as a means towards external equilibrium*
An essential introduction into the subject, besides the Treaty of Mon­
tevideo, includes the pioneering work of Mr. Victor Urquidi, Trayectoria 
del mercado comun latinoamericano, as well as Mr. Dell's A Latin American 
Common market? and **r. m . Wionczek's In£egracion de la America Latina (8£).
The assumption is, of course, that a common market would allow for an 
expansion in intra-regional trade that would result in a more feasible ex­
ternal and internal equilibrium, together with the possibility of contin­
uing with a wider industrialisation and agricultural processes which would 
allow for higher employment and a faster rate of growth. The idea has - 
been in the minds of Latin-American economists since at least the 'mid
50's' and indeed took a policy and political turn in Montevideo when the
- *ALALC wax created in 1961. The only point that one can make here is that 
judging by the timidity of the treaty, the regional political consensus 
such apolicy implies, and the small practical integration advances it is 
not possible to be optimistic about it as a practical solution to growth 
without instability, although theoretically it is a sound and constructive 
policy. In other words, a structural reform which establishes such a pol­
icy as a sine qua non for the compatibility of growth and stability would 
be post-poning the feasibility of the pressing need. Thus it appears more 
reqlistic to evaluate the bleak possibilities of an external balance in 
terms of the other foreign economic policies.
(iv) The role of foreign capital
During the development of the core of structuralist thought along 
the 1950's - and up to the death of President Kennedy - the role of for­
eign exchange in reducing chronic balance of payments deficit and stimu­
lating growth gained much importance. One could add many qualifications, 
but the role remained essential both in theory and policy. It was right­
ly thought that a change in savings patterns plus tax reforms and other 
structural policies could improve the investment coefficient only to a 
point. It was highly doubtful whether, even if incentives to save were 
efficient, an adequate rate of growth could be achieved in view of the
♦Monetarists, and in general advanced countries, were very skeptical of the 
possibility. Numerous arguments are presented against such a common market. 
The most frequent one is that regional protection from foreign competition 
would benefit those Latin-American countries which have advanced further 
In MST industrialisation in detriment of the rest. This and other criti 
cisms have to be answered in the context of the future of the Montevideo 
Treaty and the asimetric protection measures which are envisaged between 
KMthe different countries.
The latest development in this direction, however^ has been besides fihe
C.American conmon market, the treaty signed at Vina del Mar by Chile, • •/««
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magnitude of unsatisfied investment requirements in our Latin-American 
countries* From this standpoint, international resources are necessary 
to supply the needs of question and moreover, to bring about the neces­
sary reforms in the structure of production which would first secure a 
rapid increase in income and then enable a sustained increase in savings* 
Thus the rising of the savings coefficient is not regarded as an automat—  
ic process, but one that depends on foreign dredits*
However, a word of warning was raised* *If the savings coefficient
were not to rise as per capita income increases, writes Dr* Prebisch, 
with the cooperation of international resources, the limit of absorption 
of such resources might easily be reached (as it did happen) without the 
creation of the capacity to maintain a high capital formation coefficient 
on the basis of the region*s own resources. Once this aim has been ful­
filled, further international contributions would be no longer indispen­
sable* (85)* There is enough evidence to suggest that in the majority 
of our countries this has not happened; economic policies have not suc­
ceeded in raising sufficiently the savings coefficient nor the rate of 
income growth so as to reduce the external disequilibrium. The result 
has been a recurrent or rather permanent reliance on foreign loans that 
has either reached the limit of absorption of foreign loans or has made 
the policy of ^indebtedness a contradictory one, in terras of growth and 
external equilibrium. In the section on ' foreign exchange bottlenecks 
we arrived at the conclusion that the policy of implementing growth and 
the equilibrium of the external sector with foreign loans had beoome 
a very delicate and contradictory policy. Because of the effects of int­
erest, amortisation, and the schedule on payments on the balance of pay­
ments as a whole and particularly on their contraction of the current 
capacity to import; this time because of movements on capital account.
It may be said that, i# during the 1950's the main bottleneck to growth 
and external equilibrium was the deficit on current account, during the 
1960*8, it is the balance on capital account which should worry structur­
alists* Thus the role of foreign credits has to be carefully revised.
The cleares case is when a net outflow of capital occurs on account of 
private and public foreign loans that imports paradoxically, have to be 
reduced*
. . . (from previous page)
♦xxPeru, Ecuador, and Colombia, and Bolivia,
For a discussion on the subject see Chapter 3» section b*
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Structuralists also hoped that foreign loans, besides helping the 
Latin-American countries to raise their own savings coefficient, would 
be channeled into a second objective, since the problem is not only one 
of achieving an increase in savings: that is, allocating international
resources to the import of capital goods* Such allocation on MST in­
dustries or export activities, besides other investments, would permit 
the creation of the necessary margin for the increase in savings to be 
switched to capital goods imports*
A second point relates to the international credit institutions 
stipulation that the proportion of investment which is effected within 
thb country must be covered by domestic savings, international credits 
being channeled solely towared import of capital goods* The difficul­
ties met by entrepreneurs or the government in complying with the re­
quirements - because of the obvious shortage of savings and the stagna­
tion of exports - may lead to an inflationary expansion of credit*
'What is at fault, comments Dr* Prebisch, is not only the lack of an 
ample capital market by means of which sectors with a deficit could 
avoid themselves of the surplus savings of other sectors, but the limit­
ations of the savings coefficient itself* (86)*
Still, the soluction to the policy problem structuralists offer 
is an ovenil development programme to determine investment requirements*
It must determine the volume of investment required to attain a specific 
rate of growth, establish the potential extent of internal savings, and 
the amount of foreign savings indispensable* *Qnce the amount of foreign 
loans has been established, it does not matter, continues the above author 
if in the case of certain investments these resources are used to cover 
some proportion of expenditure effected within the country, and in others 
only to defray the value of capital goods imports*• The essential points 
are;
1*- That investment as a whole can be affected in accordance with a 
programme, and the country undergoes a structural change that 
results in higher savings and relative external equilibrium with 
the aid of foreign capital*
2*- That all investment (to avoid inflation) be covered with savings, 
either internal or external, and that the amount of foreign loans, 
be related to the countries external payments capacity and its 
future evolution as a result of structural changes*
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Yet again this is not what has happened in the majority of the in­
flationary Latin-American economies, since the external capacity of in­
debtedness has resulted in a contradictory reduction of imports. Thus 
it has been difficult to solve the deficit on current account - created 
by the import cost of MST, the trends in exports, or both - passing it
on indefinitely to the capital account. This is not to say that the
rate of foreign loans is ill-conceived, although a chronic deficit on 
current account should have been considered as the main determinants 
of the capacity to receive foreign loans. It should be taken to mean 
that foreign loans will be powerless to guarantee growth and stability 
if domestic structural changes do not occur and if a future for Latin- 
America's exports is not found.
There are, of course,many other aspects that should be considered.
For example, it is obvious that movements of capital operate in both
senses. One cannot expect foreign credits to do their role if domestic 
capital is leaving the country at the same time because of political un­
certainty, devaluation or, even because, of indispensable fiscal reform.
No false optimisms should be maintained either about exchange controls.
In Latin America they have proven liable to a variety of evasions. The 
fact implies a reduction in potential savings and a failure of domestic 
policy.
The conversion of domestic currency and securities into foreign 
exchange, bank deposits, securities or other forms of transference should 
be limited by a rise in value of foreign exchange as demand increases and 
supply stagnates. But, this would have unacceptable unbalancing effects 
on domestic prices. Nonetheless, the role of advanced countries and of 
the international monetary system could do something about influencing 
the foreign exchange in Latin America, specially with speculative capital. 
For example, writes M. Uri, 'the more advanced countries - the group of 
ten - maintain agreements between central banks that up to a point neutral­
ise speculative movements in capital. In fact, those central banks restore 
speculative capital acquired through erratic movements of capital. Is it 
not irritant to find that such agreements only exist among those rich 
countries which have a more stable and resourceful international financial 
situation?' (8?). Without doubt - considerint the role of clue foreign 
exchange such as the dollar, sterling, the franc, and now much more the 
mark - it is fundamental for everyone to control speculative movements in 
these currencies. Advancec countries should extend to Latin America the
means and the techniques so that they may reduce and control the effects 
of the speculative flight of capital, hoth domestic and foreign. A simple 
solution would be an equivalent concesion of credits to cover not only def­
icits on current account but to create reserves. After all, if advanced 
countries are doing it among themselves, why should Latin America be ex­
cluded? That is, unless the international monetary system is definitely 
transformed into one where what some countries gain the other definitely 
lose (something outside the scope of this work)*
With respect to foreign credits and as a conclusion, it is necessary 
for Latin-American countries to achieve *a surplus' above the likely def­
icit on current account plus the repayment of interest and principal of 
accumulated debts, if their capacity to import is to be maintained. This 
implies, of course, the lagging of the external sector and the limitations 
of domestic policies. In practice the problem has been obscured by the 
short-run renovation of credits that secure the payment of interest and 
principal, and to a lesser extent the obtainment of long-run credits. 
However, when the rescheduling of foreign credits becomes chronic and im­
ports fall more than the behaviour of exports would demand the problem is 
explicit. The problem may be taken to be beyond Latin America's monetary 
policy: it involves the problem of financing ^atin America and creating
the minimum balance of payments surplus tolerable for stability, when 
some European countries accumulate reserves at the expense of United States 
credits and do not grant significant long-run credits themselves.
Aside from this, structuralists contemplate the possibility of Latin- 
American policy controlling to a larger extent foreign loans - with respect 
to the schedule of repayment - and foreign investment legislation along the 
lines of Britain or Japan. It should be stressed that interest and pfofit 
remittances tend to be quite a strain on the balance of payments of the 
selected countries.
(iv) Exchange-rate policy.
Let us resume the exchange rate policy recommendations expressed by
structuralists throughout the relevant parts of this work. As we have
*been seeing structuralist thought is against:
1.— The chronic overvaluation of the exchange rate
2.- Multiple exchange rates
3.- Recurrent, although mild, devaluations (something which is regarded 
as the result of the failure to apply a structural reform).
On the other hand, they recognise:
*There is agreement with monetarists along some of these lines.
• . s
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1.- The need, in some cases, of an initial devaluation.
2*- A 'free exchange-rate* policy, controlled through other short-term
policies*
3*— In some cases a double exchange-rate system.
•It is common knowledge, writes professor Uri, the proliferation of 
multiple exchange rates, both for imports and for exports, which encourages 
or discourages international trade. The disastrous consequences of the pro 
liferation of such rates is reflected in their arbitrary character; in 
their bewildering variations which impedes the working of any development 
plant; and, the complete loss of a sense of competition through the possi­
bility of compensating at will any advantages or disadvantages in any acti­
vity (88)*. Moreover, he says, that devaluation cannot be avoided when ab­
surd differences exist between an official rate and widely different rates 
applied in practice (there are cases when these differences amount to 1 to 
10 as between official rates and quotations in the free of black markets)*
Dr* Prebisch also says: 'One such anti-inflation measure, perhaps the most
disruptive, is monetary overvaluation. The desire to avoid increases in the 
cost of imports with its impact on mass consumption leads to the stabilisa­
tion of the exchange rate, while there is an inflationary rise in domestic 
prices or to establish rates favourable to certain imports* Naturally tnis 
policy cannot be maintained indefinitely. Latin-American experience shows 
that devaluation, and a consequent increase in prices, eventually appears
(89).’
With respect to the future, professor Uri says that a dual exchange 
rate may have short-run advantages, when compared to devaluation, and long- 
run advantages, when compared with extremely protective measures and widely 
different exchange rates (that is, if initial massive devaluation can be 
avoided)* Nonetheless, in another place, he arrives at the conclusion that 
•theoretical experience has proven than for Latin America a free exchange 
market is the least bad of all possible situations. However, this means, 
that the concept of a free exchange rate has to be qualified with alternat­
ive measures. From another angle, Dr. Prebisch arrives at a similar conclu 
sion. *The incentives given to exports through devaluation may bring about 
a deterioration in the terms of trade. Steps would be taken to restrict 
exports* •* The question is therefore one of economic policy and the advan­
tages and disadvantages of such a method have been compared in practice with 
other measures, such as difect export subsidies, MST and protective tariffs' (9^)
Hence the ad hoc exchange rate policy for a Latin-American country sub­
ject to a weak balance of payments and an MST process is a careful selection 
between a free rate complemented by export taxation, subsidies and tafiffs,
ZLf.to international trade or a dual exchange rate*
Before closing this long section, which has tried to organise structur­
alist thought on policy making - the structural reform, as we have called it - 
and to explore, however superficially, its implications with respect to price 
stability, it is convenient to stress the final claim of structural reform* 
Developmental policies, those which integrate the objectives of growth and 
internal and external stability, are conceived inthe context of an overall 
plan* 'There is a tendency, writes ECLA, to integrate piecemeal development­
al objectives and projects by fitting them into a general strategy whose pri­
mary aim is the acceleration of economic growth and social progress, and 
which will harmonise and co-ordinate such projects and objectives within the 
frame—work of an overall policy* The endeavour is apparent in the nature of 
the antiOinflationary policy (however academical) pursued by some countries; 
but its clearest formal manifestation is to be found in the preparation of 
overall plans and in the steps taken to establish a planning system (9l)'*
The statement should be taken more as a proposition or goal than as a de 
facto policy, whether in the context of the public sector alone or of the 
mixed econony (Cuba, of course, being an exception)* In the course of the 
last few years, however, 18 Latin-American countries, which include our in­
flationary ones, have set-up planning offices and some have made specific 
plans, more in the nature of preparatory work rather than an actual policy 
tool* For an introduction into the workings of these planning agencies in 
the relevant countries see ECLA's Planning in Latin America (92)* How much 
headway and what future do planning systems in Latin America have are the 
real questions* It seems that as far as the planning of the public sector 
(if such a policy may be called planning) much advance has been made in re­
cent years in the integration of programming techniques* The academic inter­
est on the plannification of the whole economy, however, fluctuates with 
political events* It was certainly high in the mid-60's after the loud fail­
ures of the orthodox stabilisation policies and with the predominance of civil 
governments in the inflationary countries* The political situation has chang­
ed today in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Peru; and political strain is 
quite severe in Uruguay and Mexico*
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Chapter 2.
B. The achievements and failures of stabilisation programmes.
At the beginning of the study on t:’e structuralists* reform, It was said 
that a second indirect way -besides the previous discussion of outright policy 
measure - to understand streutrral policy thinking was the criticism structur­
alists make against stabilisation programmes or orthodox policies. Indeed part 
of the structuralists' effort - besides the construction of a structural theory 
of inflation and growth and 'a structural reform - is directed to the analysis 
of the stabilisation policies that several Latin-American countries have under­
taken under the auspices and insistence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
As we shall see below, the influence of the IMF, of some orthodox theories de­
veloped in advanced countries and, of course, of Latin-American monetary autho­
rities has been very great in the region, although greater in some countries 
than in others. 'The balance of payments, writes professor Seers, is in fact 
the main concern of the IMF, whicn has played a big part in inducing govern­
ments to accept stabilisation programmes; after a certain level is reached, 
aid is made conditional 021 the programmes being accepted, and public and pri­
vate banks in the United States and Uestern Europe have often waited to see 
whether the IMF's conditions were accepted before they made loans themselves
In fact structuralistseconoraists, in Latin America and abroad, reacted 
violently against the orthodox recommendations - and their implementation - of 
the IMP. 'Considering the recent experience of stabilisation programmes in 
a nuraber of countries, writes Dr. Sunkel, I cannot understand how can anybody 
recommend the medicine of stabilisation. Classic stabilisation policies are 
a failure... they can only succeed by paralising the economy. The Latin-Amer­
ican experience of the last decade (the 1930's) is very instructive in this 
respect' (2). From the United States, Mr. Felix, in one of his articles, wrote 
'In the countries attempting the IMP cure, there has "been despite supporting 
foreign loans, neither a mark resurgence of economic growth nor social pacifi­
cation (3)1* In another place, the same*author writes that 'it is by now evi­
dent that the stabilisation programmes have been largely unsuccessful, parti­
cularly in the larger Latin-American countries... events seem, then, to have 
given the debating cup to the structuralists (4)'. The object of this section
The author, moreover, quotes the New York Herald Tribune (editorial of March 
2, 1962): 'President Frondizi was a victim of orthodox economic planning.
His goals, charted by the IMF. •. were politically impopular and, as we now 
see, almost impossible1. This is somewhat of an oversimplification, says 
Seers, and therefore rather unfair to the IMF, but nevertheless it contains 
a grain of truth.
is thus to describe the stabilisation programmes and to see why it is that 
structuralists have reached these conclusions.
Cne refers specifically to the following IhF stabilisation policies:
1.~
2.-
The so called KLein-Saks mission in Chile, which aimed at curing inflation 
during 1955-1958; and the second stabilisation intent of 1959-1962.
The Frondizi Plan in Argentina during 1959-1961 (with emphasis on the ante­
cedents of the so-called Prebisch Plan in 1955-1958).
3*- The Peruvian-IMF Plan during 195S-1960.
For such an objective it is necessary to go down to the case study leve 
something which will be attempted within the time and the simple means at on 
disposal. Hence this chapter will be divided into an initial or general dis 
cussion on the subject and into the three case-studies taken separately.
A) Structuralists versus the IMF
In the context of this work, the history of stabilisation programmes in 
the semi-industrialised countries can be traced to 1955. By that year, take 
on average, the policy dilemma created by a foreign exchange crisis presente 
a complicated situation. As it has been said, the short run problem present 
by the foreign sector, for structuralists, increased the long-run rigidities 
the domestic sector, that had been attenuated in the post-war years thanks t 
an exceptional bonanza of world markets. Since imports and government expend 
ture were not reduced substantially, countries ran into balance of payments 
and budget deficits, thus adding fuel to the inflationary process. The adju 
ments in exchange rates, taxes, and prices were followed by wage adjustments 
and increases in the supply of money, given rise to aa inflationary spiral. 
Thus, an account of the possible danger of hyperinflation and the difficulty 
to obtain foreign credits unless inflation was stopped, some countries folic 
stabilisation nrogrammes.
The things to ask oneself with respect to the programmes, and the contrc 
versy are really three questions:
. ' With respect to the first
A.- What did they consist of ?
B.- How were they implemented?
C.- What results did they have?
A) With respect to the first question they may be summarised very drasticc 
i y  in the following points:
1.1- Their objective was to achieve short-run equilibrium in the external ar 
internal sectors and create a stable setting for rapid growth in outpul 
This meant Returning* to the workings of a free price system. One car 
put it in the somewhat allegoric terms of Mr. A. Alsogaray: "Create an
economic system -which lias no place for totalitarism nor for deformations 
of the system of free enterprise; eliminate the obstacles, interferences and 
rigidities that impede economic activity; private property output to he con­
sidered as the basic factor in the preservation of individual liberties and 
as the incentive, natural and licit, for human work; everything that indi­
viduals and private enterxirise may do for the common good, ought to he left 
in their hands leaving the State to act supplomentally; the fundamental due 
to guide economic activity and individual effort is the functioning of a
system of free enterprise which oriented towards the objective of common
/ \ *welfare and through the competitive mechanism
Their main policy tools were a reduction or suspension in monetary expansion, 
postponement of wage readjustments; the elimination of budgetary deficits by 
reducing expenditure and increasing fiscal revenue; increases in public uti­
lity services; devaluation; particl liberation of price and import and ex­
port controls; IMF’s loans and other foreign credits, and the inflow of pri­
vate foreign capital, attracted by the stability and by the cheapness of in- 
**vestment*
These measures would produce a ddcline in real wages and price stability so 
that competition would be stimulated, raising efficiency and diminishing 
costs of private firms. There would then be growth on healthy basis.
Stabilisation, grant monetarists, does not bring an immediate increase in 
output* It may lead to a decline in the demand for investment and con­
sumption, if the corresponding monetary and fiscal measures are severe enough* 
There is a long lag between the production of capital and the actual con­
sumption of capital goods. Moreover, inflationary investment, side-tracked 
to some industries, would also presumably be reduced. Thus for monetarists 
it taken ’some time' for alternative industrial investment to appear, and 
to be profitable. The lag in consumption and investment resources will re­
sult in a decline of the production of goods. Under their assumption of ex­
cess demand, the reduction of demand caused by stabilisation, and its replace­
ment by other expenditures requires an adjustment in supply which will
For an academic discussion on this orthodox position see professor Seer’s 
discussion on the decline of classical liberalism in advanced countries, 
let alone Latin America. (6).
**The application of a stabilisation programme, not withstanding all its limi­
tations in advanced countries and considering that monetarists based their 
programmes on the policies of such countries, meets in Latin America with 
the following limitations: existing unemployment: the contradictory need
for recurrent devaluations and a chronic balance of payments deficit; a cos 
MST industrialisation process; the structure of the market (a weak demand 
for essentials and a corresponding we ale sux^ ply, which includes food); and ao 
on. These problems according to structuralists, cannot be generally changed 
w  rt-r+.Tinrlmr Treasures: noints which have been discussed. (*** 0n next page
take some fmore time'(there would “be dsinvestraent by inventories, improtect 
and inefficient industries, construction, etc.)* Tlie adjustment problems o 
the creation of the conditions for the working of the price mechanism will 
depend on the degree of distortion caused inflation, according to monet­
arists. Y/hen inflation has been rampant as with our countries, it is said 
that the problem of adjustment is serious. The depressive influences, they 
concede nonetheless, are temporary. They should ‘evaporate1 if the stahilis 
tion programmes are effective. It isusually hoped that after the period of 
adjustment, individual economic units may be expected to desire additions t 
their stock of physical and financial assets so that capital flight stops, 
foreign investment flows in, and demand increases.
B. With these assumptions, one can go into the second question - the natu
of stabilisation programmes. Around the mid-1950's there was much discussi
in Latin America whether these programmes should be gradual or violent-once
_ . * and-for-all,’ ‘shockers* they were called. In fact, the initial ones tendc
to be mild. However, soon monetarists tended to arrive at the conclusion 
that if stabilisation was to be effective it had to be vixLent. It was ar­
gued that, since the inflationary process was chronic and its rate high - 
some economists mentioned a 15£ rate of inflation and others would not com­
mit themselves to a figure the short-iun objective had to guarantee a s t  
bility that would allow the incorporation of the growth objective. Mr. Bor 
ranee puts it in the following words. "Might not the rate of inflation be 
brought to an end slowly) The answer to this question is that a gradual 
approach is frought with more danger than sudden stabilisation. Among the 
real damages done by inflation is the distortion created in the economy. 
There is need to reorient the system. Drastic changes must be made in the 
community's expectations (this, of course, is the main argument). These 
changes are not likely to occur if the community believes that the govern­
ment may be lukewarm in its attack on inflation (9)'« This type of opinior 
certainly carried weight and it w as reflected on the Argentinian Frondizi 
Flan and on the stabilisation measures taken recently in Brazil and Uruguay 
In effect, the general recommendation amounted to the achievement of stabi­
lity in the short-run, the raise in the rate of growth in the medium-run 
and the application of a continous and systematic orthodox policy.
For a criticism on gradual stabilisation programmes see M. Uri (8).
m x
KLein-Saks in Chile; the so-calld Prebisch Plan in Argentina; the shori 
lived and unorthodox attempt of Brazil in 1994-5; and, in general, the 
Mexican short-run policy of the second half of the 50's (although, for 
ideological reasons, in Mexico the terms stabilisation was not adopted), 
(from previous page) For a discussion on the subject see Mr. G. Dorrance
Hovever, before going ahead to the workings of these policies, it is
convenient to explore their nature a bit more closely:
1.- Although the E-IP's recommendations were primarily based on a credit con 
traction, the existence of supply ridigities was recognised. These, how­
ever, were considered a consequence rather than a cause of inflation (see 
Part II, Chapter 2). They were distortions created by a price expecta­
tions during the long inflation and supply inelasticities which were the 
result of distortions in the structure of relative prices due to control. 
That is, policy was geared towards the reduction of the distortions of 
inflation caused on savings and investment, expectations. The first type 
of inflation refers to inflated business inventories, fixed-asset invest­
ment, luxury construction, and so on. Serious empirical criticisms have 
been made against this simplistic approach 011 the theory of changing ex­
pectations. 'In fact, writes Hr. Felix, it is not at all easy to sort 
out behaviour due to inflationary expectations from that related to more 
enduring socioeconomic determinants (lO)'. Mr. A. S. Shoalan has found 
that UPC, inflationary or not, put twice as large a percentage of their 
grows investment in inventories than advanced countries (1933-9). (11).
Dr. Pinto advances the idea that luxury consumption and investment is 
more conspicous in stable Venezuela than in inflationary Chile of Argen­
tina. In general, what structuralists say that it is very doubtful that 
the progrannies changed expectations at all although a fall in growth
brought a short-term change on investment considering the persistent pat­
terns. .
2.- The seonnd type of distortion refers to price controls reflected on an 
overalvalued exchange rate, underpriced public services, and underpriced 
agricultural prices. For monetarists, this means that an inadequate ca­
pacity to import, an infrastructure bottleneck, and a poor rate of agri­
cultural production had to be met by some 'attainable' set of equilibrium 
prices' which would remove these bottlenecks. Thus prices por public 
services were allowed to increase: food prices went up §there was change in
in the domestic terms of trade in favour of agriculture); and there was a 
devaluation. Liberalisation, of course, was not perfect; i.e. devalua­
tion was accompanied by new import controls and some export taxes... a 
key dementin achieving such equilibrium prices was the further behaviour 
of export prices. Mr. Felix writes: "severe and unexpected declines in
international prices for .the major exports did complicate the effort of 
the Klein-Saks programme of Chile to attain an 'equilibrium' exchange 
rate. Copper prices fell from an average of 0.44 cents per lb. in 1955 
to a low of 0.24 cents in 195S. But no such decline disturbed the other
two efforts. During the second Chilean effort copper prices rose moderate 
to nearly 0.30 cents. Moreover, annual export volume of the foreign-owned 
mining sector in 1959-61 averaged 10£ higher than in 1955-58. Similarly, 
Argentine export prices and terms of trade were moderately higher during 
1959-62 than in the previous three years' (12)• Apart from the only par­
tial problem of international prices the problem of any programme was to 
limit the rise in the domestic prices of the private sector while bring­
ing about higher relative prices for agriculture, as well as of controlled 
prices so as to remove the induced supply rigidities. The above author 
finds this stress on the favourable effects which the removal of domestic 
price controls would bring difficult to fathom;
a) In the first place such controls were weakly enforced; at most they 
had a short-run delaying effect.
b) They did not alter the direction of movement of relative prices which 
excess demand conditions suggested would take place. If the long-run 
is taken (1940-1959), both in Chile and Argentina, agricultural prices
rose more than industrial prices, and still agricultural investment lagged
(13).
c) After the formal decontrol governments usually continued to use pres­
sure to restrain price increases.
The first part of the problem was met by an initial restriction on the ex­
pansion of credit and wages. The second part of the problem it was hoped 
would be solved by an elastic response of the private sector to more pro­
fitable opportunities to export and to increase agricultural production; 
both supplemented by an inflow of foreign investment which stable prices 
and exchange rate would induce. Investment in infrastructure would be 
met by loans mainly from the IEHD and eventually by the increase of public 
savings coning from cuts in current expenditure, increases in tax revenue, 
and higher rates for public services. In Argentina a relatively quick 
response was achieved in the position of the balance of payments. It hap­
pened thanks to an inflow of foreign capital into the newly opened petro­
leum field to foreign investment; to a reduction in imports, mainly fuels 
and to foreign short-term credits from the IMF, and various private and 
public credits from the United States and western Hurope. 'Domestic oil 
production, writes I j c . Felix, rose rapidly as a result, so that Argentina, 
by 196l, was largely self-sufficient in crude petroleum. However, the 
longer-run gain in foreign exchange savings from the reduced outlag on the 
import of petroleum products is being partly offset by the substantial pro 
fit transfers which the contracts entail* (l4). In Chile also short and
long-run foreign credits were obtained to maintain the balance of payments 
position, but imports were allowed to expand so that there was a chronic 
deficit on current account.
C. Structuralists, of course, claim as we have seen that the Argentinian and 
the two Chilean programmes were failures. The Peruvian case is somewhat more 
controversial. Fere monetarists claim success, while structuralists say that 
ony recovery was caused not because of the IMF stabilisation policy but in 
spite of it. Moreover, the Peruvian economy has continued to be inflationary 
in the post stabilisation x'eriod (1962-66); something to which we shall turn 
below. Concentrating on the first three programs, in neither country was 
there a sustained rate of growth, during the course of the programme or after 
it (Argentina became a stagnant economy - 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 -  and Chile’s per capita 
growth in output was insignificant), price stability was not achieved and the 
rate of inflation soon came to pre-stabilisation rates; and exchange rate 
stability was only achieved for a short time, never longer than three years.
Monetarists have argued, of course, that the programmes failed because 
th e y  were economically misconceived or miscalculated in political terms.
Would the Argentine or Chilean programmes have succeeded if the authorities 
had held on longer or turned the contraction tighter? The violence of the 
contraction measures, however, varied in each case in their attempt to re­
duce demand, liberalise,prices, and devalue. The IQein-Saks mission was 
gradual and cautions. 33ut the second Chilean effort tried to impose the ad­
justments more speedily (the 1951 devaluation was particularly sharp and 
credit was rather restricted). The Argentine measures were the severest of 
all. Thus, since all three eforts ultimately failed, the most evident les­
son is that differences in timing were probably unimportant in explaining 
the jiltimate failure of the efforts. For Mr. Felix, for example, the fail­
ure lies elsewhere because the programmes were simply not reallocating re­
sources in the directions needed to create viable growing economics ’It 
seems to have been due (the failure) in excessive confidence in the effi­
ciency of the price mechanism and to a failure to take account of the ad­
verse effects of the MST pattern followed... on the structure of consumer 
demand and the capacity to import’ (lp)« Professor Seers puts in a force­
ful manner: ’The charge that can be made against the monetarist school is
that it directs attention away from the fundamental problems of economic 
growth, and so discourages the search for political strategies and economic 
plans to solve these problems. It puts forward, instead a panacea, irres­
pective of social reality... the paradox is that thoughtthe monetarist is 
normally fer from revolutionary, and his preference is for peace and quiet, 
his policies may lead to social disorder and eventually regimentation of one
form or another. His nostalgic wish for a re-establishment of XIX century 
security is unattainable, and by pursuing it he may hasten the current dis­
solution' (l6). Let us then see what the general structuralist explanation 
of such failures is.
Tlie overall criticism, in the words of Dr. Sunkel, is 'In fact, neither 
stabilisation nor development was achieved' (17). In ECLA terminology this 
was no single or propagating factor -credit, public expenditure, wages, de­
valuation, or interference with the price mechanism - to blame. But, in all 
cases the collapse of exchange rate stability, after the previous massive de­
valuations, eventualle collapsed and resulted in the costumary price increas­
es. In each programme the exchange rate, moreover, was held only by drawing 
on foreign credits and reserves long after price increases had wiped out the 
initial cost-price gap created by devaluation. The balance of payments def­
icit, who&e elimination was the main purpose of stabilisation, in realisty in­
creased. This, according to Dr. Sunkel, was due to an excess freedom to im­
port and the long-run persistence of unfavourable conditions in world markets 
for basic products. Consequently high short-term foreign debt were accumulat­
ed, without such debts contributing to the increase of the productive capaci­
ty of the economy, as it will be seen in what follows. The most critical 
situation, as described by Mr. Felix, is that of Argentina: (18)
Despite a number of earlier debt renegotiation agreements,the short-term 
external debt obligations (five years or less maturity) were reported in 
1962, as follows:
1962.....................  277.2
1963.................. . 384.5
1964.....................  459.7
1965.....................  318.5
1966................ . 246.5
1,686.4 (millions of 
US dollars)
*In addition, the external debt of the private sector was 283.7» while 
the long-run was 751.6. This is even more serious in the light of the 
fall of the central bank gold and foreign exchange reserves from a high 
of 705 in 1961 to 215 and in 1962, and average annual exports of 1000 
millions. Moreover, profit transfers from the foreign petroleum con­
tracts and the inflow of private direct investment generated on addition­
al service demand for foreign exchange. (For the new renegotiations of 
repayments and the inability to meet them in 1965, see Part II, Chapter
III, section b).
y  —  ■ — ■ - 1 ■—All figures in millions of US dollars
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The conclusion was that stabilisation had not only failed to solve 
the balance of payments deficit but that it had made it worse.
Still, from the domestic -point of view, stabilisation brought on 
initial respite in inflation which soon evaporated. For structuralists 
the rate of price increases was reduced, but only at the expense of the 
low income groups and of a liberal policy of imports of foodstuffs and 
industrial consumer goods.. Both measures hurt domestic manufacturing in­
dustries whose level of demand declined, causing unemployment. As a re­
sult of the general decline in effective demand'*' greater competition from 
imported manufactured goods, the difficulty of exporting industrial goods, 
and insufficient agricultural output the level of investment declined.
This for structuralists amounted to a permanent harm to the rate of growth.
The insistence that the failure could bo found in the behaviour of 
wages was also unfounded. Since wages had lagged substantially during the 
early phases of stabilisation, it was unfair to blame the workers for later 
resisting further cuts in real wages (See Chapter i).
Superficially, the fact that accounted partially for failure was that 
deflation - through cuts in public expenditure, controls in wages, and a 
uredit squeeze- was eventually to become a contradictory policy. Monetar 
ists policy explicitly claimed that surpluses in current account would be 
achieved hoth through increases in tax revenues and reductions in expendi- 
tute. In fact, with deflation there was a failure to increase tax revenues; 
there was insignificant grovrth in the income of the private sector; defla­
tion increased the evasion of taxes; income tax revenues were reduced, etc. 
The credit squeeze, as conceived, resulted in the strengthening of 'other 
financial intermediaries' more speculatively oriented. The lag in real 
wages also resulted in wage increases. With tine, structuralists claim, 
it was no wonder that in the phase of growing unemployment public expendi­
ture cincreased (current expenditure expanded in the form of salaries and 
employment in the civil service), and budget deficits widened which soon 
resulted in a forced expansion of credit and wage allowances. Thus the 
following of orthodox policies at the expanse of growth can only last for 
a while. Failure reappears in the form of deflation accompanied by a re­
newed price spiral.
Leaving aside orthodox and incomes policy, the most obvious failure 
may be understood through the slow growth during the course of the programme. 
: That is, in none of the cases did the economy respond to the apparent op­
portunities created by a wage lag, devaluation, and foreign credits, either 
with increased exports or vith a sustained rise in domestic output, principal
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ly agricultural*
Insisting at some point in the programmes the stabilisation effort 
failed in terras of the propagating factor of inflation. 'in the face of 
the pressures from the business sector and unemploynent, says Dr* Sunkel, 
governments -were forced, after a period of strictly pursuing a stabilisa­
tion policy, to expand public investments and to slacken credit restric­
tions' (19)• V/ith such an increase in effective demand, structural in­
flationary pressures appeared once more as a consequence of an inelastic 
supply of food and due to the rigidity of certain basis services* Above 
all the balance of payments crisis became more acute, due both tbeincreas- 
ing imports caused by the recovery of activity and incomes, and to the dif­
ficulty of controlling excess imports as a consequence of the abandonment 
of the system of import controls. Countries found themselves with a situa­
tion similar to the one existing before the stabilisation programme, but 
v/ith a greater foreign debt. Also, for structuralists, the programmes had 
contributed to a more regressive distribution of income\ to discouragement 
of some investment in manufactures, and to the neglect of essential infra­
structure works, plus unemployment* Moreover, the much publicised tax re­
forms never came to existence during the programmes. 'The failure of the 
programmes to overcome the sluggishness of the postwar. • .economies strength­
en the view that the major rigidities are deeper-rooted than had been assum­
ed by the monetarists, says Hr. Felix, and were caused rather than results 
of inflation (20'* Structuralists, as we have seen, signal out the capaci­
ty to import, the institutional defects in agriculture, the contradictions 
of MST, and so on* So that from here one could incorporate the structural­
ist theory of Lat in-American inflation*
The final criticism may be summarised with professor Seer's words:
•if the payments crisis of a country is not a temporary problem but a 
chronic one, in fact an inevitable feature of the present period for most 
developing countries, there can be no question or righting it by mere mon­
etary restriction or by devaluation; indeed if such measures sueced in 
lowering investment, they will postpone the day when, the economy will he 
viable in foreign trade. So the III? is really grappling with a problem 
that cannot he solved within its terms of reference.••(The IMF) was set up 
in fact, to help industrial economies meet such temporary difficulties 
(so they would not have to indulge in policies of financial deflation]).
Its role in the economies of development was never envisaged (2l)'.*
*From $he excellent article on the subject De mii tiuo de inflacion latinoa- 
americana estamos hablando? by A. Lagunilla Inarritu in (jomercio Mxierior, 
Mexico City, 1966*
An important thing to underline is that the failure of the orthodox 
programme and the increasing diffusion of structuralist thought (mainly 
through the influence exerted by the Rio de Janeiro conference on growth 
on inflation early in 1963) had a short-run influence on the economic pol­
icy followed by the majority of the selected Latin-American countries. 
Nonetheless it should be taken as a short-run influence because by the 
second half of the 1960's the principal semi-industrialised countries of 
the region are hack on orthodox policy . Presumably this happened be­
cause the shock created by the stabilisation programmes had withered-off; 
military coup-ti'etats had taken over in Argentina, Brazil and Peru; and 
the Kennedy era was coming to an end, with its emphasis on the Alliance 
for Progress and economical and institutional reforms, 'It is evident 
that the I2fF's ability to impose terms had depended in good part on the 
willingness of US governmental lending agencies, writes Hr. Felix, to 
make the granting of credits contingent on an IMF agreement being reached. 
Such collaboration was the rule during the Eisenhower administration but 
under Kennedy's Alliance for Progress the two suppliers of credit have 
tended at parts to part company, and as a result the IMF's leverage has 
been weakened' (22).
It is thus important to emphasise the importance of structuralist 
thought well reflected in the ECLA literature of the period (23). In 
general terms one can say that such an influence was felt between 1963 
and 1966. Thus the exclusive preoccupation with stabilisation gave way 
to more complex plans, in which aims were rearranged in order or priority 
in terms of the objectives of development and domestic and external sta­
bility. These aims conflict with the previous assumption that monetary 
stability is sufficient to pave the way for development. The changes in 
the context and priorities of policy were made explicit either in growth 
policy itself or in government declarations:
This is an overstatement to bo taken with caution. The Peruvian military 
government appears to be nationalistically strong-minded (1969); the 
much publicised Brazilian stabilisation policies have come to an end 
(1969), and the Frei government in Chile has moved away from the ortho­
doxy of its initial years in office.
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1.- In Argentina President Illia's National Plan of Development stated its ob­
jectives in terras of income per capita growth, a progressive distribution 
of income, increases in consumption compatible with unused capacity, and 
a progressive elimination of inflation (24).
4.- In Chile, official declarations resumed the position of the new govern­
ment of president Frei in the objectives of 'a fight against endemic in­
flation, escape from output stagnation, the progressive distribution of 
income, agricultural and educational reforms' (25).
3*- Peru, recovering from the 1958-1961 stabilisation programmes, was in a 
full swing of public expenditure, a buoyant export market, and a high 
rate of growth (26). Although one cannot speak of a significant develop­
ment policy,
4,- In Mexico - although in this country important economic institutional 
changes had taken place since the 1930's - public investment and current 
expenditure were at their highest; there was further agricultural growth 
and new land donations; the capacity to import was increasing through 
tourism, higher exports, some industrial exports, and increasing foreign 
loans, later; to be followed by a foreign investment boom. The overall 
explicit policy objectives were a high rate of growth and a progressive 
distribution of income. Moreover, there was a fiscal reform being imple­
mented, The exception to the growth emphasis was, however, a cautions mon- 
etrary policy.
5*- In Colombia policy continued to be quite unorthodox, and there was no in­
tention of implementing a stabilisation programme despite pressure from 
the IMF; although by 1965 short-lived stabilisation measures were taken,(2 7)
6,- In Brazil, unorthodox policies were followed up until some pint in 1963, 
namely under the guidance of Dr. Furtado, after that the ideology of the 
new military regime is somewhat confusing. The New Programme de Accion 
del Govierno for 1964-66, headed by Dr. de Oliveira Campos (a monetarist) 
claimed the following; (a) 'the free play of market forces does not ne­
cessarily ensure the formation of adequate savings; (b) the price system 
does not always foster the creation of external savings given the disas- 
sociation between profitability and social productivity; (c) the free play 
of market forces does not necessarily result in a satisfactory distribution 
of income' (28). Nonetheless, a de facto stabilisation programme was in­
stituted. Its main tools were, again; a reduction of budget deficits, 
an incomes policy, which amounted to a wages freeze, and a selective cre­
dit squeeze which would favour the private sector (29).
#  1For a discussion on the Sstrategia da Estabiliza$ao in the programme see 
DH, Simononsen, Chapter 14, op. ct.
The intention of all these policies was to contain inflationary pressure 
through a graducal process of reduction in the rate at which prices increased, 
in such a way that it would not conflict with growth. The results are contra­
dictory, of course, because some countries did grow (Peru, Mexico and Colombia); 
others recovered (Chile and Argentina): and Brazil had a fall in the rate of
growth. As far as the gradual reduction of inflation, every country except for 
Mexico, continued to have a fast rate of inflation above at least 7$ and usual­
ly reaching more them 20;v
The next step is to go into the survey of the well known stabilisation pol­
icies implemented in Argentina, Chile and Peru. From the exposition of this 
work, however, it should be understood that full justice to structuralism would 
take the form of a complete survey of the different and varying economic policies 
adopted in the selected countries during the period between 19;±6 and 19&5• rfhat 
is, in principle, structural theory and policy thought has been developed to ex­
plain inflation and to device policies that reduce it without the sacrifice of 
the rate of growth.
Still, one is here interested in how actual orthodox economic policy in 
the inflationary countries may be interpreted in structuralist terms. This means 
going not only into the short-run policies of the semi-industrialised countries 
hut into those of Bolivia and Paraguay -which followed financial policies inde­
pendently of the trends in their foreign sector with resulting hyper-inflation- 
and of Ecuador, which has managed to have a rather flexible and successful fin­
ancial policy together with mild growth. Specifically, one thinks that a close 
analysis of the Bolivian and Paraguayan inflations and successful stabilisation 
policies would provide a greater insigutiinto the Monetarist-Structuralist con­
troversy. A study into Ecuador's economic policy would provide further under­
standing of the phenomenon of how cm expanding external sector Eiay he compatible 
with flexible short-run policies, price stability, and sustained mild growth.
Such comj^atibility would of course, h$ve to be confronted in monetarist and 
structurali st thought•
The cases of Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Uruguay are obviously an integral 
part of the controversy. As it has been seen they lend themselves clearly to 
structural interpretation, hut, paradoxically, in their greater complexity, they 
offer more scope for controversy. Over the long-run - the post-war period - they 
are faced with the dilemma of trying to achieve a stable rate of gvowth faced 
with chronic external disequilibrium, and varying rates of inflation. Moreover, 
economic policy has given priorities to different objectives at different times, 
shifting emphasis from growth policies to orthodox measures. Insufficient in­
formation may give rise to bewilderment not only when comparisons between countrie 
are tried hut when a sole country is contemplated, Per example, Mexico gives the
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impression of a country with structural objectives, a rather considerable rate 
of growth, increasing stability, and apparent external equilibrium. A closer 
look into the economic policy, however, reveals the recurrent appearance of 
rather orthodox monetary and fiscal policies and of the increasing importance 
of external financing, which maintains the rate of growth and the balance of 
payments position compatible with the domestic objective of price stability. 
With reference to this section, it is difficult - although not impossible - 
to study Mexican stabilisation programmes because they are never presented in 
such terms. One suggestion - which undoubtedly has been carried out - is to 
divide the analysis of economic policy into short-run terms so as to detect 
the workings of stabilisation measures, and on a different level, study the 
performance of long-run policies and structural measures. Later, both stu­
dies should be integrated so as to compare the compatibility of incompatibi­
lity of the short and longer run policies and to see which ones have had pre­
ference over the others. A simple introductory bibliography into the subject 
ought to include the United Nations, El desequilibrio extcrno en el desarrollo 
econdmico latinoamericano - El caso de Mexico (50); the joint work of the 
Mexican Government and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop­
ment, The economic development of Mexico; Professor Vernon's (Ed.) Public 
policy and private enterprise in Mexico and The dilemma of Mexico's develop­
ment; D. E. Shelton*s The hanking system, and Mexican financial development 
by D. S. Brothers, and L. Solis. Resuming, the question that one feels has 
to be answered is how efficient has Mexico's stop-and-go policies been in 
terms of the explicitly stated objectives of sustained growth, external equi­
librium and a progressive distribution of income. We think, nonetheless, that 
this work lias covered a small amount of experience leading to such an answer 
(Part II, Chapters 2 and 3).
The Brazilian and LTruguayan cases nay be taken as easier to explain in 
structuralist terms; in sc far as there were no stabilisation programmes up 
to the early 1960's, except for a breif stabilisation intent in Brazil in 
1954-5 which rapidly failed. Indeed Brazilian economic policy came to be 
known as one of "who-cares-industrialisation”. But, things have changed 
for both countries, By the raid-1960*s both were facing a severer external 
disequilibrium and record rates of inflation. By mid 1964 Brazil had adopted 
a considerable wage freeze which by mid 1965 was followed by a full fledged 
orthodox stabilisation programme. The same is true for Uruguay in 1966. 
Moreover, both countries have succeeded in reducing the rate of inflation
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from 60-80£ to 40-60;t, but the rate of growth in par capita terms is now nega­
tive in Brazil (1966) and Uruguay remains stagnant. In Brazil stabilisation 
measures were accompanied by the policies of the military authorities which 
ousted president Goulart and in both countries the political instability is 
high. The course of these recent events, of course, offers new material
which is relevant to structuralist analysis of orthodox policy, and whose
further evidence forms part of the controversy itself. A good introduction 
into the subject, besides the works of Messrs. Baer and Berstenetzky and M. 
Simonsen (3l), may be obtained from toe following BDLA studies: The evolution
of economic uolicv in Brazil and Chile; Fifteen years of economic nolicy in 
Brazil, and The growth and decline of import substitution in Brazil (32).
For superficial exposition of Uruguay's recent policies see the relevant num­
bers of the Economic Survey of Latin America; the 1965 one has a special
section dedicated to Uruguayan inflation.
(l>) Argentina: The Frosicliai Plan (1959-1963) and Prelininars.
From the experience of this work it is believed that Argentina offers an 
exceptionally good example fot e'le illustration of structuralist theories and 
policy thinking. The process of inflation in Argentina - which has been ac­
companied by growth, decline and stagnation from 19^5 to 1965 - shows clearly 
the relationships between inflation and growth and the behaviour of the extcr- 
nal sector, the costly and contradictory process of I:3T industrialisation, tne 
lag in agricultural production, the neglect of infrastmctvre, and the regres­
sive distribution of income. Cn the other hand, inflation has been obviously 
accompanied by severe fluctuations in the propagating factors of inflation, 
which monetarists stress - the supply of money, the deficit financing of public 
expenditure, wage increases, recurrent and massive devaluations, and domestic 
and foreign price controls. Moreover, the Argentine example offers a variety 
of intricate economic policies, which range from unorthodox public interven­
tionism to wishful reliance on the price mechanism; the former gaining ground 
as time passed. This section will emphasise the last experience. It should 
be clarified that the main object of this case study is to illustrate the fail­
ure of orthodox policies in Argentina. That is, how those policies will sacri­
fice the rate of growth and, what is worse, fail to bring stabilisation. But, 
for this case study to serve its purpose, it is also necessary to situate it 
in terms of the controversy, hTiat are the origins of the inflationary spiral 
- monetary or structural?
To further answer these questions it is necessary to:
1.- Situate the case study in the historical context of actual policy 
making.
2.- But, descending, to short-run policy measures 'may show the trees and 
hide the forest1.
3*- Thus it is necessary to refer policy measures back to the long-run 
trends observed in the general study of the controversy.
Summarising very drastically the experience derived from the previous 
work, the structural interpretation of the causes of inflation will now be 
adopted. It is necessary to emphasise that the structural causes of inflation 
'as an original cause of inflation', have been much at work. This granted, it 
is also obvious that the inflationary spiral has been accompanied by the mon­
etarist or propagating causes of inflation, although important reservations 
will he adopted.
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The long-run structural causes of inflation have heen (1945-1965)
a) A foreign exchange bottleneck. This was reflected in the insta­
bility of exports and imports, the stagnation of the capacity to 
import and the fall in imports of goods and services; growing 
foreign indebtedness and the inability to meet payments; and an 
eventual outflow of capital on current capital account which fur­
ther reduced the capacity to import (See Part II, Chapter VI,
section b),
b) A decline in per capitalagricultural and food production (see sec­
tion a).
c) Import-substitution industrialisation. This resulted in a fall 
in the import coefficient and a sharp visible MST in the import 
structure! An indirect correlation between MST and inflation 
was noted (See section c^ ),
d) Sharp falls in public expenditure and investment which enhanced 
the infrastructure bottleneck (see section d).
The monetarist or propagating causes of inflation which developed mainl;
within the inflationary spiral:
a) Increases in the supply of money and quasi money were continous.
In Argentira, however, they are not statistically correlated with 
increases in prices. In fact, the rate of growth in money and 
quasi-noney contracted and still prices increased, and vice-versa.
It is believed that, at best, monetary policy played a passive 
role. Rises in the exchange rate, money wages, and prices tended 
to be well above the raise in money and quasi money. Moreover, 
vhen orthodox monetary polcy was applied, the fact was compensated 
by a raise in the income velocity of circulation, financial resour­
ces outside the banking system, and liquidjty created by foreign 
capital. (See Chapter II, section a and below).
b)Budget deficits have been a permanent feature of the system, but 
they resultedmore from a fall in expenditures and revenue, than 
irresttrictive borrowing from the government. Moreover, they 
were weakly correlated with price increases (see section b).
c) It is usually claimed that Argentina is a good example of wage 
inflation. Vith respect to wages in industry, they manyhave 
played a part in the spiral but adjusting to prices with a year 
lag. It may be dangerous to claim that they are an originating 
cause of inflation, considering, among other things, the fall in 
real wages and the regressive distribution of income trend (see 
section £).
3<
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cl) Devaluation of the exchange rate lias played an important role as a 
propagating cause of inflation, although structuralists consider it 
areflection of the foreign exchange bottleneck (see section A), 
e) It is very likely that inflation has distorted and reduced domestic 
savings and investment. Private foreign investment and foreign loans 
however, cannot be associated with, movements in prices (See section cl).
The magnitude of the inflationary problem has been indeed very great. 
During 1945-1965 the wholesale price index and the cost of living index for 
Buenos Aires rose 23p per annum; but it was a highly irregular raise, fluc­
tuating from under 4p to more than lOOp. Moreover, as monetarists policies 
gained ground price increases were higher.
It is useful to obtain a quantitative idea of how the different sources 
on inflationary pressure - structural and propagating - interacted through 
time and to what sense anc! extent they can explain in ’statistical1 way the 
increase in the price level. Such analysis may also help to explain whether 
monetarist or structuralist factors bore greater or lesser responsibility.
Mr. Diaz Alejandro has done this with the aid of a useful model, which will 
be now summarised (l),
Ee uses the following propagating variables: credit expansion to finance
either public or private deficits, by the banking sector including the central 
bank, but specially the former; wage increases, and devaluation. No generali­
sation is valid, explains Mr. Diaz, but at different stages of the inflationary 
spiral some of the sources appeal- autonomous, while the others follow passively. 
After 1952, however, he thinks that the leading role was played by the deva­
luations. As a structural condition of inflation he considers the stagnation 
of output. Several price indices are considered and the period of study is
1945-1962. The independent variables included in the multiple regression anal­
ysis are:
1.- Annual rate of change of the supply of money in the hands of the public 
(n). The variable should be interpreted as a proxy of the rate of in­
crease of bank credit. A key element of credit expansion is borrowing 
by the public sector from the banking system (primarily the Central 
Bank) to cover budget deficits. It should he clear, however, that no 
simple link can be established between iuflati n and publie-sector 
burrowing from the banking system; indeed, in some years (1951 end 
1956) negative public borrowing was accompanied by high increases in 
prices, while in other years (l94?)> large public-sector borrowing took 
pla.ee while prices increases slowly.
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2.- Annual rate of change of hourly money-irage rates in industry (w)
Monetarists are inclined to blame inflation on the variable. As
we shall later see real wages declined in Argentina starting from 
19;i9; money -•/ages, however, have fluctuated above and below the 
price level.
3*~ Annual rate of change, expressed as the price of US dollars in
terms of pesos (if). The inflationary autnonomous role of this variable
is regarded as obvious.
4.- Annual rate of change of real available supplies (GUP plus imports) 
(s). Other things being equal, the greater the rate of increase, 
the lov;er the rate of inflation.
Moreover, Mr. Diaz, thoroughly uses the following measurements of in­
flation: annual rates of change in the general wholesale price index, the
wholesale index for rural products, the wholesale index for non-rural pro­
ducts, the wholesale price index for imports, and the cost-of-living index 
for Duenos Aires.
The findings are the following:
1.- The first result was that - after including a one year lag or unlagged 
variables in thea multiple analysis, on averagethe price level adjusted 
within a year to changes in the propagating and structural factors.
2.** The equations are:
P ,l=-l4.5+1.13m,+0.3tw,+0.30k*-1.05s; P^ =0.93 
P*2=-15.9+1.43n»+0.07w'+0.42k*-3.53s; P+0.88 
P l3=-14.1+0.99n,+0.49v,+0.22kl-1.07s»; ]i=0.93 
P'4=-20.2+1.40m*«f0.0Shf,+0.60k*-1.75s*; B=0.96 
P»5=-10.5+0.93nit+0.50w'+0.15k-!I.05sl5 ?a=0.93
3.- Vith respect to the four wholesale indices:
a) The general fit in the four cases was good (they explained at 
least 77? of the observec changes in the price level).
b) The significant coefficient for m imply that a 1? increase in 
the supply of money will result in less than 1? increase in 
rural and import"- . prices, but slightly more than 1? in the 
wholesale and industrial prices. The values of the standard 
errors were such that none of these coefficients can be said 
to he different from onel
c) The coefficients for the wage variable, however, turned out to 
be insignificant, except for a slight correlation (0.46) with 
the index for the production of manufactures. That is, only in 
this case, a 1? increase in money wages will result in a 0.5 in­
crease in prices.
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d) The coefficients for I*1 arc significant in all cases. The results 
showed that a 19$ devaluation world increase by 3/' the wholesale price 
index, by 4$ rural prices, by 2$ non-mrnl products, and by 6$ imports 
(3).
e) The most significant coefficient was s. It implied that a 1$ growth 
in total real supply would reduce by Ip the prices of wholesale goods 
and manufactures- the reduction being half of 1$ for rural goods.
4.- V/ith respect to the cost of living index (Pp) the fit was good, and the
results were the same as above for s_ and m, but lower for 1C and, in this
case, significant for w.
The simple conclusion that nay he derived from the exercise is that in 
the long inflation (1945-1962) hotli demand pull elements (reflected primarily 
in m 1) and cost-push elements (reflected in s and S) have heen at work. These 
results are relfected in ther correlation with changes in the wholesale index 
for manufactures and in the index for the cost of living. Mr. Diaz clarifies 
that since 1955 devaluation of the exchange rate has gained relative import­
ance as a source of cost-push inflation. The highest rates of inflation have
been observed in years wThere the exchange rate -was devalued and relative pri­
ces favoured agriculture. The latter may he taken as a reflection of the for­
eign exchange bottleneck, During the second stage, monetary expansion, which 
includes government deficit financing, has played a more or less permissive 
or passive role, when price increases originating in nominal wages and profits 
or devaluation were n& followed by a sufficient expansion in the supply of 
money, the result was for output to fall rather than for prices to decrease.
The cost-push nature of inflation is best illustrated in the not uncommon ex­
perience of Argentina where high rates of inflation persist when output is 
falling (1949, 1952, 1959, and 1962 are examples of this disquieting experience).
Having determined to a certain extent the amount of inflation and its 
nature, the nest step is to determine how* policy performed however unsuccess­
ful it was. That is, to follow the nature of economic policy which finally led. 
to the stabilisation programme of 1959-1963 according to its structural inter­
pretation
For the purpose of the case study, the inflationary experience ox Argentina 
will be divided into three periods:
(i) The Perdnil- regime (1945 to 1954) when initial favourable conditions 
in the external sector and a raj^ id industrialisation gave a certain 
character to the inflationary and growth process#
(ii)A transitional period (1955 to 195^) both economically and politically, 
when attempts were made to check inflation and recover the rate of 
growth.
(iii)The IMF1s stabilisation era (1959-1963) when reliance was placed on 
the workings of the price system.
(i) The Feronfe1 era (1945-1954)
The amazing international discredit which followed the death of Mrs. Pei 
and the downfall of general Peron, has shied economists - even structuralist 
from casting a favourable look into the regime. One thinks, however, that t 
policies of the time ought to he interpreted as an exercise of structuralist 
economics; considering Argentina a variant of the ideal structuralist model
Two sub-periods should be considered with reference to inflation, growt 
and short-term policies. The first (i) goes from 1945 to 1948 when inflatic 
was accompanied by a rapid increase in GNP, per capita income, imports and a 
progressive distribution of income. The second (ll) goes from 1949 to 1954 
and is characterised by an unfavourable turn in the external sector, sharpei 
price increases, a fall in the rate of growth, and unorthodox attempts to 
reduce inflation.
I. The peak of the Perdnfc;* era (1945-48).
Following structuralism, what are the main characteristics of this 
three-year boom?
1.- The average rates of grcj/th was 12^, gross fixed capital formation was 
extremely ^imnortant (852) and producers fixed capital expanded at recoi 
figures (See Table Ii). Thus income per capita grew very rapid!
2.*- The main factor that is signalled out is the very favourable external 
sector conditions. The external, terms'of trade improved enormously (S€ 
Table i). The external demand for Argentina*s products was so high thz 
the value of exports rose from 700 million dollars in 1945 to 1500 
millions in 1948. Cn the other hand foreign exchange reserves had beer 
built up during the war and stocks of export products had accumulated. 
Vith the end of the war shortages of imports were no longer an obstacle 
to renewing and enlarging the capital stock. Thus there was an expan­
sion in public and private investment and consumption and expansive 
monetary and fiscal policies. Moreover general Peron managed to natior 
alise the bankrupt railway system and to repay foreign debts, reducing
Argentina: External Terms of Trade ' 
(1933-9 = 100)
TABLE I
Year 1945 1046 194? 1948 1940 1950 1951 1952 1953 1934 1955 1956 1937
TT 82 112 134 132 109 193 102 70 95 84 82 75 68
Source: .Economic Survey of Latin America 1957, 001, N.Y.
TABLE II-
Argentina: Per central change in the Volume of GNP and its Major Components
(1945-1943)
(1950 prices)
Total Yearly
GNP 37 12
Consumption 22 7
Private 22 7
Public 23 8
Gross fixed capital formation 103 34
Construction COto 13
Producers' durable capital 256 85
Manufacturing Industries (1943=100) 137 7
Source: E Eshay and M. Thorpe, op. cit. 
Statistical Yearbook, 1950.
Argentina: ftivcture of M
(pag. 9) and
a nu f a c Yuri n g
i a—a -0 -^'
- -
United Nations
1943
_isX'C .• j. 1 t^.lousaiiuS j / O , t  y < j
Pover Installed (per capita) 1 ,1 8 7 1 ,9 1 3
l.Gc 1 .6 9
Employment (thousands) 536 -5 / ~ r C  ■J. f  V>W
.Tages (miliions) 0 4 ,3 4 8
Value adder per employee m r  —1 • o 5 2 .3 9
SourceT Patterns of industrial pro~ r % j . 1 , £ e U"'- ~d ^  >- --. r r r ~ L'VCn* '* ~“0. i , - • • — * j -*-> v. u
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*the servicing from 170 million dollars in 1945 to 10 millions in 1948.
The growth of activity, however, was accompanied by a sharp increase in all 
categories of imports so that, even with expanding export sales, there was 
a deterioration of the balance of payments position and the surplys on cur­
rent account of 1946 was eliminated. At the same time prices continued to 
increase. These increases, which were more or less in line with world price 
movement in the immediate post-war years, was only in part caused by excess 
demand. The prices of imports alone rose by 40$. Structuralists are going 
to claim that this sort of inflation in a booming economy is easier to handle 
and a result of rapid growth.
The government was thus following an expansionary policy which contributes, 
besides the rate of grov/th, to large employment, wage increases, public and 
private consumption in the context of easy money policies and world wide in­
flation. The money supply rose at an annual rate of 27$ and hourly money 
wages by 35$ par year, while retail prices only increased by 15$ a year and 
wholesale prices by 12$. Structuralists stress these relations because la.ter, 
when inflation was combated with orthodoxy, the rate of inflation increased 
together with a fall in output.
Despite these trends, both monetarists and some structuralists were 
highly critical of the Feronist economic policy, although for different reasons
Monetarists mainly signal out that price controls - in agriculture and public 
r-n. ' e services - and an over-valued exchange rate distorted private and
public investment, and discouraged exports and scared foreign investment, kage 
increases, the expansion of credit end deficit financing are blamed for the 
inflation.
Structuralists mainly say that economic policy disregarded agriculture, cer-
r \ * *tain sectors of industry, and infrastructure (transport and energy). kith
respect to public expenditure, for example, Eshag and Thorpe write that over
1946-1943 over one third of grows domestic capital was accounted for by public 
investment, of all this over one half was devoted to construction of ocher 
categories of non-industrial investment. * Still, an increase of 85$ per 
annum in durable capital seems a good order on any account. On the other hand 
it is claimed that maintaining the prices of food and rents low, at a time when 
employment was high and money wages were rising rapidly, allowed private con­
sumption (?$$ per annum) to absorb an unduly large proportion of the growth in
* ( \ For a discussion on these trends see hr. 3. hShn • and Miss H. Thorne (2)
ro  *  '  7
For a discussion on the subject see professor Maynard (3).
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in real income, Ifhat one has to remember is, that effective demand was he: 
created for manufactures, something which aimed „at reducing the ccsts of tl 
costly MST process. Other structuralists, like Dr. Prebisch, have said tin 
the exceptional foreign sector conditions were not used to proceed with MS" 
in petroleum and dteel, sectors that later accounted for a large and rigid 
part of the import schedule with contracting value of exports. This may a< 
count to saying that t e government did not forsee the fall in exports.
It is important to insist that the suh^oriod was characterised by rap: 
growth and increased inflation and that, henceforth, inflation speeded-up ; 
growth declined. Moreover, as it may be seen from the structure of manufa< 
ing (See Table II) the advance was enormous. Structuralist signal out two 
causes: with the deterioration of the external sector the full force of s~
tjnral bottlenecks could not be held back, economic policy started to move i 
wards orthodoxy, and, what is paradoxical for monetarists, the propagating 
causes of inflation accelerated.
(fl)The first round of severe inflation (1949-1954).
The thing to note about this sub-period is that non-orthodox (Peronisi 
if one wants) anti-inflationary measures were introduced in 1950-1952.
As long as export demand had been strong and the country had ample fo: 
eign exchange reserves to finance its import surpluses, the structural im­
balances were not obvious. It was only after 1948 when the foreign exchan; 
reserves had been depleted and export demand began to slacken, that the se: 
forces behind inflation became evident. Inflation accelerated very fastly 
GNP fell rapidly (1950-1952). Professor Maynard, a structuralist, says th; 
'the rather paradoxical resultthht steps that eventually hove to be taken * 
alter the fundamental imbalance of the economy tend, at first, to accclera 
rather than dampen inflation (4)'. Before turning to the policy measures, 
is convenient to see how structuralists explain inflation in the short ten 
There are, again two main causes:
1#- I]y 1950 the external terms of trade was 30^ below the 1948 level and, exce; 
for a brief respite during the Korean Mar, they kept declining. Thus expo: 
value fell and, since there were insufficient reserves, the desequilibrium 
the balance of payments led to a p6p devaluation of the free exchange rate
2.- Agricultural output declined sharply (See Table IV).
3.- The effects on the economy were noticeable. Prices increased on average b; 
34;'. GK? declined by 3,- and gross capital formation fell at least 18g. h 
contrast with the previous period, hourly-noney wages in industry rose by ! 
than prices (27^) and the rate of growth of the supply of money also lagge< 
behind (23, )• Moreover, public expenditure fell slightly, but public con­
struction kept on growing. Still private consumption increased (See Table
TABLE III
Argentina: Indices for Ghr and its
( m s
Major Co 
= 100)
mnonents, 1948-1955, at I960 pr:
Year GYP Consnnption Gross Fixed Capital Formation
Private Public Total Construction Durable
Public Private Carital
1949 99 111 92 86 129 93 . 63
1990 100 107 94 84 122 111 •54
1951 105 112 95 92 143 115 61
1952 97 106 96 82 119 105 55
1955 105 104 94 85 154 103 56
1954 108 114 99 81 119 104 55
1955 115 127 104 90 105 115 64
Source: Eshay and Thorpe
Argentina* Indices for the Cost-of-Living and Industrial Earnings, 1948-55
(1948 = 100}
Year Cost of Living Money Earnings heal Earnings
1949 151 156 104
1950 165 165 100
1951 225 209 95
1952 312 257 82
1955 324 281 8?
1954 357 527 97
1955
I
COto 567 97
Source: Idem
TABLE IV
Argentina: Output Indices for Agriculture and livestock
(i960 = 100)
1945-49 1950-52 1953-55 1956-53 1959-1961
Grand Total 92 83 100 98 100
Agriculture <-*<oC 72 95 94 98
Cereals 98 60 99 92 96
Industrial crops 74 85 87 97 99
Livestock 100 93 105 102 101
Cattle 93 92 105 103 103
17ool 107 95 98 91 99
source: Cuentas Nacionales de la IJenublica Argentina, Buenos, Aires
1964.
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Uhat A/ere then the non-orthodox stabilisation measures?
1.- The immediate reaction of the eiithoritiss in 1949 was to restrict imports in 
various mays (tariffs, prior import permits, price controls, and so on). The 
official exchange rate mas fixed throughout the period. Thus imports declined 
steadily and steeply from 1949 to 1953 no that the volume mas in the end less 
than half of mhat it had been in 1948. This amounted to a sacrifice of the 
rate of grcnrth.
Cn the other hand, policy was geared towards the encouragement of agricultural 
production and exports by means of price incentives. Thus food prices in­
creased nore rapidly than the cost of living index and the einternal terms of
■X--X-trade favoured agriculture. The policy had little effect in stimulating 
agricultural activity, partly due to uncertainty and partly due to bad harvests 
in 1950-1952. Structuralists emphasise that the land tenure system mas result­
ing in a bottleneck, plus the fact that landlords mere rallying against the 
regime •
5.- Faced with this situation - inflation and a fall in agriculture, imports and 
exports - the government introduced the first restrictions on fiscal and 
credit variables, which mere particularly severe towards industry. There was, 
however, no devaluation and wages continued to increase, and public construc­
tion kept on growing. Since mono was scarce monetarists blame inflation to 
those factors. Devaluation would have almost certainly made inflation worse, 
while wages probably played a part in the spiral. But, in the face cf the 
contraction of supply and imports, it is hard to see why wages should take 
the brunt of the responsibility, (real earnings in industry fell 135')• I11
fact, the results of the external and agricultural bottlenecks resulted in 
what were to become permanent characteristics of the system: a decline in
the capacity to import and higher prices for food which initiated a wage- 
price spiral and a tendency towards stagnation. The fundamental issue, writes 
Hr. Diaz, in the inflation since 1949 has been the struggle among the three 
powerful groups of rural producers, industrial wage earners and non-wage 
earners' (6). Judging by income distribution figurew the wages sector" lost.
* * Food prices for 19p0-1955 increased 37, 37# 45 and 55# while prices 
wntup 33, 33, 38 and y (United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1956).
*  , VSee Eshay and Thorpe (5).
h0- The above policies were accompanied first by a stagnation and later by
a decline in industrial production and employment. Manufacturing outpi
fell by some fron 1951 to 195- and remained at the level in 1953.
dustry 't/as forced to work well below capacity - at 50^ level in some c<
■*and bankruptcies were widespread* These measures probably led the en- 
preneurs and the banking interests away from general I’er<5n, whose sole 
port became the wage sector*
5.- Nonetheless, these costly measures were stakingly successful in checdi 
inflation: * prices in 1933 were only hfc above 1952, and rose only anotl 
in 1954. This coincides with a striking recovery during 1953-55 (oi 
put rose 13/^ )o Agriculture, however, only contributed to this growth ( 
recovery in the production of cereals and cattle slaughter*
6.- Tile point is that by 195$ the financial and industrial situation had b? 
come unbearable, so that financial restrictions had to be eased. Masi€ 
credit was allowed, public investment and consumption recovered, and tl 
were higher imports.
£.- The short term compatibility between growth and relative prices, in the 
circumstances, is hard to explain in monetarist terras.
But, in the midst or recovery, the political forces against the regime s 
ceodedwith the intervention of the army in deposing general Peron. A new j. 
for economic policy thus began. I’rom the economic point of view it is difi 
cult to understand why the first interest of the new government was a stabi 
lisation programme. Indeed, income was growing and for the first time in i 
decade, there was virtual price stability! Aside ihrom politics, it is true 
that the new government was commit&d to devaluation and the balance of pay­
ments situation was precarious. This, however, returns one to the foreign 
change bottleneck. The next three-year period will be considered a transit 
towards more orthodox monetarist policies.
On these points see professor Maynard (?).
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(ii) The so-calleu Prebisch Plan (1955-1953)
Dr. Prebisch1s propositions appeared in his Provisional and final report
and economic recovery rtrcrTrr::!e and Sound Honey and rncontrol3.od inflation (8). 
Ilis first recommendation was devaluation, and one official exchange rate instead 
of the multiple system, plus a free exchange rate marhet for trasaciions not 
covered by the official rote. The new exchange rates, in effect, were accom­
panied by nonunifora surcharges and taxes on imports and exports. The exchange 
reform freed about one third of all imports, host invisible and capital trans­
actions mere permitted through the fr;e exchange market. Quantitative restric­
tions, however, ’-ere maintained on most imports and prohibitions on some, main­
ly consumer durables and capital goods. The reform was only a step towards a 
uniform and free rate. However, devaluation and the exchange rate policy pro­
posed by Dr. Prebisch should be taken in the following context: they were
measures taken to face the critical situation in the balance of payments, with 
mild inflation and economic recovery.
From the author's theoretical work, as it has been gathered, the aim of 
his stabilisation programme was to ensure industrialisation with increasing 
compatibility with price stability, he stated the need for a transfer of real 
income from the industrial and urban sectors to the rural sector and to increase 
investment, domestic and foreign. He foresaw that devaluation would lead to 
a 10-15£ rise in prices. Thus he suggested that initially money wages in in­
dustrial workers should be raised by the same increase. The government was 
to ensure that such wage increases wo Id not be passed on to consumption in 
the form of higher industrial prices, through a selective monetary policy and 
fiscal measures. Additional real income for rural producers was to bo obtain­
ed by a cut in industrial rjrofits and from expected rises in industrial and 
agricultural productivity. But, further wage increases were to be severely 
limited to increases in labour productivity.
Dr. Prebish stressed the necessity of avoiding deflationary policies and 
unemployment. He explicitly linked the obvious need for increased imports -raw 
materials, iniemediie products, and new capital gooes- to the efforts .of at­
tracting foreign capital, since export possiblities were not attractive. lie 
was more interested in controlling the import of capital goods than intermed­
iate goods and raw materials. Implicitly he was recommending that some HST 
should move in the direction of capital goods, mainly, steel and the potential 
oil industry. Another reason for his interest was that a cut in consumption, 
especially wage earners consumption, would tend to reduce imports by much less 
than a cut in investment. Tims, given a certain availability of foreign ex­
change, Argentina would find the substitution in the import bill of investment 
goods for noncapital goods a burdensome process in terms of the living standards 
&(See footnote in the followi page)
Year Gil? Consumption 
i-ersonal iYVhl i c
_ L-ross uxriol _ nvesa'O a/O.x . 1 .Cousurnctxcn
rrivato
ClilOxi l>
durable
Capital
I ianuf a ctur in 
(1955=100)
113
1956 102 101 107 105 .103 33 109 117
1957 10? 104 105 120 115 107 123 121
50 115 110 107 123 105 143 129 125
Source : ii. dshag ~ A gU*vl .A. Thcrpe and Statistical 
rT Y . 10511«• J.• 9 — J.
Yearbook, U.M.
Argentina: Indices ox the Cost of Living and Industrial darnings
(1955 = ICO)
Year Cost of LivinV_> Money darnings Meal darnings
1956
I
1^T—
1
vH
iI} { !
£ 
I ! 1 i
100
1957 141 152 10/
1953 186 212 114
Source: Ider.i
Terns of Trade
(195s = : ICO)
•
1950 15-55 1555 1957 1953 1959 i960 1961 1362 15-63 1964*
142 109 10C 102 100 111 113 1C3 92 119 125
Source: bulletin 2stadfstico de America Latina, CM, M.Y., 19--5«
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and unemployment. Yet, investment in key sectors was a long-yon necessity to 
expand output simultaneously with balance of parents equilibrium. This dilem­
ma led Dr. Prebisch to recommend some forms of state cooperation with foreign 
capital in the development cf oil resources, as well as in industrial sectors.
In summary, Dr. Prebisch, hoped to escape the inflationary effects of de­
valuation, initial wage increases, and a weak export market through a cut in 
industrial profits, increased agricultural and industrial productivity, and 
foreign capital. Moreover, the expansion ox trie capital stock was to be small, 
and monetary and budgetary policies were to be relatively restrictive.
Economic events and policies were, however, different. fIt would be wrong 
to consider these recommendations, write hr. Bshay and iliss Thorpe, as being 
wholly responsible for the subsequent economic developments, since the govern­
ment for one reason or anothe.v did not fellow some of the most important pro­
visions urged by Dr. Prebish in his reports* (9}«
This period ought to be taken as a 'peculiar transition' towards orthodox 
stabilisation policies. In this context what were the main characteristics of 
economic policy?
It is said that the growth plans of Dr. Prebisch to increase agricultural pro­
ductivity, infrastructure investment, oil and steel investment and substantial 
foreign loans were neglected. Put, on the other hand, there was a 'self-defeat­
ing' emphasis on orthodox monetary and fiscal measures, except for the need of 
wage control. Clear price incentives were given to the agricultural sector. 
Besides devaluation, a free exchange rate policy was adopted in principle 
i— although some import and price controls were maintained - as well as a multi­
lateral system of trade and payments, as against the bilaterism of general Peron* 
regime. Thus there was a peculiar mix of tentative economic policies.
The desire to achieve external equilibrium, paradoxically, was accompanied by 
mild growth and increasing prices. After the setback in 1953 - caused by the 
political upheaval - GM? rose at more than 55' Per annum, consumption increased 
and a gross fixed investment rose 1 Op’(something which only amounts to a recovery 
from the 1949-1952 figures, see Table V).
The 1955 devaluation did increase rural prices and import prices. In fact, the 
terms of trade became favourable to agriculture. lilt by 1958, in spite of small 
doses of devaluation, domestic industrial prices caught up and the who!0 of the 
cost of living index soared-up from 1955 to 1958. The removal of import controls
ic
however, moderated import prices.
(From previous page) Dr. Prebisch expressed serious doubts as xo how his re­
commendations were followed end withdraw his nemo, 
(On this page) See hr. Dxez Alejandro (lO)
- I Monetarists and structuralists find different explanations for the incr 
in inflation. The former emphasise the role of wage increases in indrs 
1 Passive increases were indeed granted, perhaps to compensate the powerfi 
trade unions for heron’s ousted. In fact, industrial-monetary earnings 
wages increased 112,' and real earnings 14 ' (See Table V). I/hat is impo: 
ant, is that non-wage income in the industrial sector also increased, i] 
spite of the- price controls to avoid higher industrial prices." Since m  
wage income in the industrial sector did not suffer and the agricultural 
prices inproved, the brunt was presumably talien by the service sector, : 
eluding the civil service. Judging by the outcome in the redistribution 
income, the result is rather confusing: the share of wage income fell
(nonetheless) from 47.Op* in 1955 to 44.8;' in 1957* but recovered to 46.1 
in 1955. This changes can only be taken as relative evidence of the ro' 
of wages in the price spiral.
Structuralists, 0:1 the other hand, are going to blame inflation to the 
behaviour of the agricultural sector and the erroneous policies foilowe c 
in industry and the external sector superimposed 011 the long-run trends j 
the economy.
a) In fact, net all was well in the stagnant agricultural sector (see 
Table IV), again). Technological improvement and investment, desjjii 
price incentives and the retention of some subsidies, was presumably 
insufficient. The institutional arrangements in agriculture are 
then blamed for the bottleneck. Any increase in production was a 
result in the cultivation of land used for cattle raising, which 
was slaughtered. Cattle population declined 149 between 1956 and 
195S;* This trends, aside from external demand, affected the ex­
ternal sector unfavourably.
b )  The external terms of trade were 50p below their 1950 level and 
nucli more with reference to 1943 (see tables II and V). Exports 
only increased 49 between 1956-53. A closer llok at the quantum 
indices of the major export items, shows that the increase arose 
from rather perverse reasons. Thus exports of wheat, maize and 
wool commodities whose prices were favoured by the domestic pol­
icies, decreased substantially between 1954 and 1957*
*See Exhay and Thorpe (ll).
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Cn the other hand the export of meat increased by 64p and for hides 
40'f, while their prices hardly rose. Moreover, increases in exports 
that deplete the capital stock can hardly form the base for a sub­
stantial improvement in the balance of trade. The basic discouraging 
fact was that neither agricultural nor livestock production rose, in 
spite of the expansion of acreage and the incentives.
The volume of imports, which only declined in 1956, was allowed ti 
increase in 1957 and 1958. In the context cf structuralists’ inter­
pretations - the growth in income - this was a sine qua non. Similar­
ly, this resulted in deficits on current account and short-term for­
eign loans. The quantum of imports increased under the influence of 
a sharp increase in capital formation and more liberal import licen­
ces. The deficits on current account were mostly financed by foreign 
capital, although a further drop in gold and foreign exchange reserves 
took place. By 1955 the current account deficit again grew for beyond, 
the foreign capital inflow, further reducing exchange reserves and in­
creasing the official external debt.
It is important to emphasise at this stage that t:_e policy to create 
stability was failing in a rather contradictory manner. The situation 
was the same as in 1955, but with a severer external imbalance and 
raises in prices from a minimum ox 4Q- in 1954 to a maximum of 52)7 in 
1953. The two trehs accompanied a substantial rate ox growth. As it 
was said, the growth in output, employment and specially in capital 
formation was high. This is expained by the fact that MST continued 
to proceed, and imports recovered. Fiscal and monetary policies, de- 
si>ite the claims, turned out to be more permissive than the i-eronist 
measures] Only in 1956 was public sectoi' borrowing negative, later 
it increased considerably. Budget deficits were not reduced and public 
expenditure and investment increased while no significant raises in 
taxation were a; parent. Bank credit to the private sector expanded 
by about 24;' until 1957, although afterwards tight credit measures 
were taken. The point is that, had the authorities followed their or­
thodox monetary policies, there might have been a deflation with price 
increases and perhaps external equilibrium. As it turned out,neither 
objective was achieved: prices had reached a full force again and net
official gold and foreign exchange were negative. The structuralist 
lessen fcr 1955-58 although simplistic, is relevant: pursuing equi­
librium disregarding the foreign exchange, agricultural and infrastruc­
ture bottlenecks appears to be doomed.
* .  _ < . f o r t ' sSee Diaz .-.le^ anarc
Nonetheless, the general disequilibrira only helped to convince Argen­
tinian monetarists and the DIF that 'more stabilisation1 was necessary. 
Moreover, the political reins v-ere in their hands. Hence the next period 
became a rigid, however absurd, exercise on monetarist policy.
(iv) The Frondizi-DJF Stabilisation Programme (1959-1963)
It is said that in late 195Sthe IMF suggested several stabilisation 
plans and that president Frondizi chose the harshest and the most austere 
one. Die interest of the new administration in attracting a large amount 
of foreign capital - mainly in the form of loans and oil investment- may 
have been the cause for such an attitude, as veil as the state of the bal­
ance of payments. Die president asked Argentinians for two years of austei
*ity and sacrifices. Mr. C. Alsogaray, minister of both Economy and Labovj
declared himself a disciple of post-war German liberalism and urged Argent: 
na to copy Germany's example (l4). The ideology of the plan presumably ear 
from the previous 'softer' plans and from the Chilean experience. It was 
felt that failure could be overcome through a sharp turn towards free ente: 
price economy; and thqi the trasfer of real income to the rural sector coi 
only come from the wage sector (a post devaluation money-wage lag was con­
sidered essential). All in all it was shock treatment, which enhanced an 
era of severe social and political difficulties and culminated in the coup 
d'dtat of 1966.
The recommendations made by the DIF to Argentina may be summarised 
grossly in the following points:
1.- Achievement of internal and external equilibrium and the restitution 
of the freely operating market mechanism
2.- Inflation was said to be mainly caused by excess demand resulting from 
an expansion in the supply of money and public deficits,
3.- The growth of demand should be curved through monetary, fiscal and 
wage policies.
4.- There was to be devaluation and the elimination of controls both in 
external and internal activities; so that market forces operating
in an environment of stable prices would in due courseeisure a 'sound* 
rate of grovrth in output and employment.
These were, of course, more than recommendations. 'Throughout their 
period of five years, write Eshay and Thorpe, the Argentine authorities fo 
loved closely the policy recommendations contained in the DIF reports. Th 
successive missions of the DIF to Argentina ensured a continous and close 
supervision of the measures taken by the Government (lp)»
¥ For a discussion of these issues see Hr. Diaz. (13)
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Judging by these reports and from the analysis of the author's cited 
what were the measures token in 19597
1»- There was to he a reduction in the budget deficit, principally by 
the cnrtailmantcoi total public expenditure (reduction of payments 
to state enterprises, wage controls, elimination of cost-of-living 
adjustment clauses, and so cn. Public revenue was to he increased 
through higher taxes and penalties for evasion.
2.- A severely restrictive credit policy to control hank advances to the 
government and private sector. The moves to restrain the supply of 
money were higher and compulsory liquidity requirements (raised from 
20 to pOp); total reserve requirements against new net demand dep­
osits became 609^ rediscount facilities were limited and total mort­
gage 1 o an.? r e dr c e d.
*A free exchange rate policy.P.~
4.- 1/ith respect to foreign trade, all direct controls were abolished.
The government could onl" retain im-ort surcharges and export roten-
-X--X-tions or taxes which the I.b1 permitted as temoorarv measures. .
5.- Producer subsidies were eliminated (except for sugar); virtually
all internal price controls disappeared (meat, interest rate, urban 
rents, etc.) minimum support prices had no effect since transactions 
were carried out at prices above the official levels; and public 
service prices were allowed to increase. So that price distortions 
were eliminated
* According to ECLA in 1953-9 the foreign exchange value of the peso fell by
50,9 after three months.
vfvr}jr. Dias rightly complains that although all requirements for import licences 
were abolished, new rdvalorem import surcharges were decreed, thus coming clos 
to multiple exchange rates. In fact, surcharges ranged from zero for some raw 
materials to 500,'" for some manufactures produced domestically and non-essentia 
gools. Advanced deposits on imports were increased and about 8G;9 of ‘the items 
listed for inert surcharges were affected. Asport retentions were announced:
10,9 on the fob value of exports of most livestock products and 20,..; on most 
cereals. Axports of manufactures were exempted from any tax. bhile the 
increases in import surcharges tended to increase the effective devaluation of 
the peso, the ex out taxes had, of course, an offsetting influence cn the de­
valuation. However, the author concedes, most of these taxes were removed dur­
ing 196c and I9il in a further move towards a free international market (lo).
6.- Special measures were taken to attract foreign capital, besides the im­
plicit loans from the IMF, Total short and medium term loans amounted 
to 329 millions and came mainly from the United States government, the 
Export-Import Bank, and ten other United States private banks. Other 
measures, besides the oil contracts, were taken to improve the climate 
for foreign capital. The plan also expressed its commitment to multi­
lateral trade and announced that bilateral payments were to be terminat 
ed
V.liat were then the immediate 1959 results of the stabilisation programm
- There was a sharp fall in output (5k) > industrial employment (4fi) and
/
capital formation (9/0 (See Table VT) • Among the major sectors, output 
fell in all except for petroleum where t?iere was an ad hoc anti-deflati 
ary exception. Manufacturing more closely connected with non-durables
1 .
2 .
consumed by the wage sector were to be hit harder, although constructio;
*and services also contracted.
3 .
4.
- Agricultural output, despite the incentives, remained rather stagnant 
again. Devaluation and the fact that the domestic terms of trade had 
now favoured agriculture for eight years in the past decade, plus the 
liberalisation measures, did not result in increases in output (see alsi 
Table IV;.
- In these circumstances inflation (114)3) could not be blamed on the wage 
sector. There was a sharp fall in private consumption (S£<) caused main­
ly by the decline in the level of employment and in real earnings of 
labour, and to a lesser extent by the redistribution of income towards 
the rural sector. It is true that industrial wages increased (57/3), Un­
real earnings fell (27$)» prices increased by more than double, wages 
laged behind the other propagating causes of inflation. The result was
of course, an unusual number of strikes in 1959 and frequent interven- 
* *tions of the array.
- Very likely the main propagating factor of inflation in 1959 was the de­
valuation of the exchange rate. The now free exchange rate moved from 
32 pesos for the official exchange rate and 66 pesos for the free markei 
rate to S3 pesos per dollar, where it remained with the help of the Cen­
tral bank until 1932. Mr. Diaz discussed with great care its impact on 
prices (19)* iie arrives to the conclusion that its impact was very sig­
nificant on all cases: import prices increased,203'; on average, export
prices by 1/7/3, retail food prices by 143,3 and manufacture prices by 132
Both footnotes * and ** on the following page.
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(indices, 1958=1G0)
The Volume oi Gross m.c •omiCu ay inca •ial
1959 I960 1961 1952 1963
GPP 95 101 107 103 SOV O
Ila-r.ix acturi ag 95 OPpo 105 99 95
Durables 92 107 125 110 98
Ncn-Gnral>l o s 95 94 96 rr-c-/ J 91
1 lining 117 155 CIS 243 2>o
Construction 91 99 106 100 06
Agriculture 99 99 97 98 96
Services 96 105 110 107 100
The Volume oi CSS and its llajor Comp one; 
(i960 prices)
.a i/o jT-pe~iditure
GI ri­ 95 101 10/ 103 nopU
per son a 1 consmup.-tj.cn 32 94 104 96 no c ./
Foblic consumptior ICO 10? 109 103 no
Gross an it ital total 91 124 136 133 112
Construetier 00— ICO 1 n<-A. w W 102 91
Private 95 93 93 100 90
Public 85 114 124 105 92
Puralle capital 90 148 163 153 1~2
Changes Pi- <'•*"' - ^xu ij v> n. 0 (=111 ion3
of pesos >J 9 rO -4 -10
Srports 105 105 132 J--/
Im:orts 0 r> OO 111 a <•* —j .  j j 127 99
Poreign Palance (l.'ill pesc i -lo -48 O—O r> C
Indices of the Cost of Li'v-ing acid Inch 0 cr jl<il Parrings
L»0».' 0 O 1iving 214 r>* r\ — i - • T^O rn < j .' ~ 491
Poney e::rriags 157 r> ^ —j 1 rnf. /. 00~Zo r > * p> vuiiigs_ 73 r>U \J n n > r\ ^ - Sv. J
Industri.0.1 Punic yicent 35 89 <- /*oO oi; 73
'•*- ry,"’ ““‘oU  V-/ \*r t c e In legullica *jrgcntina,
1964
x!i • .c; . a -1.— —■• t^ orv9, cc. cn. c«
Iniomational PinnnciadL Statistics.
TABLE VII
Argentina: Percentage Changes i:a Hcneiary Variables , 1959-61
1539 I960 1961
honey supply 45.8 2d •? 13.0
Quasi-noney and other 23.6 44.8 26.5
ranking credit to the
Public sector 45.5 4.7 18.1
Net Banking credit to
the Private sector 21.4 36.5 31.4
Source: D. Diaz Alejandro, op. cit. (pag. 160).
Argentina: He venues and Expenditures of the Public Sector, 1958--61
(As a ]'a of GAP? at market prices)
1958 1959 I960 19'
I. Current -avenues 16 .2 15.3 18.5 19
Taxes 11.0 10.9 13.4 14
Indirect 8.5 8.6 10.5 11
B Direct 2.7 2.5 3.1 3
Social Security . 5.0 4.2 4.6 5
Other 0.2 0.2 0.3 0
II.Total Expenditure 21.6 17.8 18.9 20
Consumption 9.6 8.5 8.7 9
Interest on public debt 0.2 0.2 0.2 0
Net subsidies 2.5 1.1 0.8 0
Transfer payments 5.9 5.9 4.1 4
Total public sector 
Heal investment 5.4 4.2 5.1 j
III.Balance 5.4 2.5 0.7 0
P/.Eet borrow/tag from the 
Hanking Sector 5.8 3.1 0.4 1
1. - I Lore': andi s e
3t;ports P a 10C-9 1079 r» C >. 12lo 1366
Imports -1233 -1249 “1460 -133 6 -331
Balance -239 IS a— a. / 0 -495 -140 334
o _ Trnasoort and services 1C 33 P* V IP d rv—  v-/v3 _~o^ *w
Investment income
Credit 11 21 31 £1,Vj» ~r r\O
Bel) it -42 -61 0 0 -Oo A r  ^—loo -20
Blance “31 h O — ir'^ n r “77
J— • 27o:i~l lenetary Capital 
(Receipts +)
44 l i e 373 434 -32 -35
1 . - l)i re ct Inve st sent 120 o.\n 42? “13 72 34
2.- Ct'ier private capital -113 -143 -61 303 -124 -174
3.~ Government 37 14 r»O lo 2 21 6
C. Current and Mon-1 lone tor}’ Capital 
(A+3)
-213 12 / 159 -129 “303 171
D. Monetary sectors (increase in
not assets ~) 214 -119 “173 • 140 313 “175
1.- Net liabilities (increase -f) 60 99 134 -61 9 -44
2.- Gold and Poreign lie serves 
(increase -)
134 - 21? —-ry<“ . W O 201 30 5 -131
Brros and omissions 
(C+2)
-1 8 -4 11 10 -4
Source: Intema t ional Pinnncial Statistics,
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Eesides devaluation, price increases vers caused "by the dismantelling oi 
most official controls, higher prices for public services, higher indus­
trial costs, and perhaps a lagged effect of wage increases* 
p.- The ‘peculiar* thing about the ‘stabilisation1 measures was that monet- 
ary policy, at best, was neutral. The initial Frondini plan had i-rongly 
estimated that, as a result of devaluation and the freeing of controls 
prices would increase by 35-455. It was thus felt that if the expansion 
of credit was not above such a figure, it would have a deflationary ef­
fect. This was assumed, that investment took notice (something that with 
shock treatment dit did). In Table VII it can be seen that monetary chan­
ges (4p.op) were kept in line with the original estimates, and were sharply 
reduced after 1959. Concentrating 0:1 1959> the increases in the money sup­
ply were well below the increases in the level of prices. Cther considera­
tions, moreover, suggest that monetary policy should have had a depressing 
influence on output. There was a lagged effect of increases in money wages 
during 13ph, and monetary policy was discriminatory in so far as the dis­
tribution of bank credit tc the public sector instead of the private sector. 
It is thou hht that the credit expansion in 1959 actually resulted not so much 
in deliberate monetary policy as from unforeseen events: the Central Bank
incurred on heavy losses 011 exchange-rate guarantees issued before 1959* 
which resulted in an expansion, of the supply of money; while a len+hy strike 
of bank clerks, resulted in a reduction in commercial bank reserves below 
their legal limit. Then these two special circumstances ceased to operate, 
the rate of growth of bank credit dropped sharply and the money market be­
came tight. The income velocity of circulation of the money supply, which 
had increased from 5.12 in 195*3 to 6.24 in 1953* remained at the sane level 
(6.30) until 1962, but later increased again.
(^"bVon previ oils p-a'ge j
* Ur. Diaz notes that special attention should be given to the erroneous 
deflation policies in industry; policies that not only reduced effective 
'demand but later enhanced the balance of payments position mainly through 
the high propensity to import of the high income groups which were to be 
favoured by the deflation. ‘hithin the category of private consumption, 
those products that are primarily wage goods appeared to have decreased 
the most... The recovery of private consumption during 19-0 and 19Sl was 
rather slow, anti seems to have been mainly concentrated on durable consum­
er goods purchased by relatively high-inccme groups (bee Table 71 again;, 
while in 1361 real expenditure on durable consumer goods was more than 2Cy 
above 1953 levels, real expenditure 0:1 consumer goods plus manufactured 
foodstuffs and other items were nearly 3. below 1953*. (l?).
-X-”.The influence of this wage policy and the regressive distribution of 
income and inflation in Argentina was discussed in the previous chapter. 
For more details see Ibr. Ferrer (iS).
With respect to fiscal policy (see Tables VI and VII, again), while 
public borrowing from the banking system remained at a high level in 
1955 > it foil considerably fron 195*-> ond public consumption. stagnated* 
Tliere was thus part of the desired cut in the budget deficit. A cut 
in expenditure, rather than an increase in revenues, was responsible 
for this, since the last item fell abruptly (as a consequence of the 
fall in external sector taxes and evasions)* The reduction in the def­
icit came as a result of a contraction in expenditure (subsidies to 
public enterprises consumption and real investment). Then measures 
obviously contributed significantly to the decline in output.
In 1959 what has to be emphasised is that devaluation plus the freeing 
of the price system - together with restrictive fiscal and wages pol­
icies, as well as neutral monetary policy - resulted in the highest 
inflation in the history of dir gent ina, together with a major fall in 
©TP m d  its components * The cost of living index increased by llhc}m 
Although the above policies contributed to this, it is also true that 
they had helloed to enhance the by now severe long run bottlenecks 
(19^9-1959) in the structural variables, a regressive distribution 
of income included.
The HIF, however, secured its other prized objective: external equi­
librium only in 1959* The decline in output and aggregate demand led 
to a reduction in the volume of imports. Exports rose moderately 
-despite a fall in beef production- through a moderate rise in the 
terns of trade and a sharp fall in domestic consumption. (See Tables 
VT and VIIl). The import cruantum also fell because inventories of 
imports were reduced in anticipation of the relaxation of import sur­
charges and deposits. The regressive distribution of income however, 
tended to reduce the fall in imports, due to the observed high margin­
al propensity to import of non-wage earners (this was obvious in I960 
and 19 6 1). In 1959* however, it is said that the deflationary poli­
cies more than compensated the raise in the propensity to import. The 
effects of devaluation on exports were also somewhat contradictory; 
the sector most favoured, in this case meat, reduced its contribution 
to exports; while the less favoured one, in this case grains, expand­
ed its contribution and kept tiie over-all quantum index unchanged.
Larger exports were really due to favourable crops, and by the fall 
*in consumption.
The significant improvement in the balance of payments, however, was
really scared both by the increase in foreign private investment and
large foreign loans (see Table VIII, again). The favourable impact
on capital account, over and above the current account surplus, would 
*(Cn next page)
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have been larger had not private Argentine capital loft with the help of 
the free-exchange policy.
The lift's mission at the end ox 1939> despite the record inflation and 
the severeness of the deflation, was happy with the results. The recommen­
dations set for the two coming years were similar to the previous ones:
1.- A further reduction of - the budget deficit in 19-50, with the aim of 
balancing accounts in 1961.
2.- Nov ceilings were placed on the expansion of central bank assets.
3.- There nore to be no wage increases in the public sector and any 
increases in the private sector were not to he financed by credit*
In fact, there was to be a reduction in public employment and high­
er rates in public services.
4.- The free exchange mrhet was to be maintained, only with short-term 
intervention of the government, and in foreign trade there was to be 
further elimination of bilateral trade agreements and a decrease of 
import surcharge s•
The years of I960 and 19-51 present a peculiar recovery in some of the 
economic fsectors, mainly the durable manufactures and imports. Moreover, 
the rate of inflation decreased considerably. Thus, on the surface all was 
well: there was recovery with increasing stability. Structuralists claim 
that the recovery and the stability were somewhat illusory, and that 'any 
way * t ey arc hard to explain in terms of the orthodox monetary and fiscal 
policies adopted. lUiat were then the effects of these policies?
1.- Turning again to Table VII, it is true that monetary policy was re­
strictive, but more so with the public sector than with the private 
sector. In fact, a number cf stops, allowed by the IIH, were taken to 
relax the credit conditions for the private sector as early as 1981.
The ceilings on certain kinds of loans to the private sector were re­
moved, the granting of mortgage credit was resumed; and there were 
reductions in the reserve requirements oi commercial banks. But 
even granting this, throughout 1960-1961, the credit squeeze seems 
to have been offset by several factors that support the general struc­
turalist thesis. As it was noted,, there was an increase in the velo­
city of circulation. The liquidity and credit conditions were really 
influenced by foreign capital movements and by the external payments 
position. There was also growth of the domestic capital market. The 
free market for foreign exchange facilitated foreign borrowing. Buenos 
Aires stock market, despite the political uncertainty, expanded con­
siderably and allowed long-term financtu . That is just as important
nonbankin'; financial intermediaries expanded, mainly in the field ox
*   / \(Mr era previous page) Bor a discussion of these factors See Diaz A. (20).
hire purchase. They attracted liquid forms since they were not subject t
the 10^ interest rate fixed by the Central Bank (by 1961) their influence
on the money market was very strong and they controlled at least 10y of
\ *the supply of money). Hie so circumstances may explain the .economic re­
covery but, in orthodox terms, they do not explain stability.
2.- The recover}', nonetheless, was accompanied by a sharp reduction in public 
borrowing from the Central Bank and a reduction in the budget deficit (Se 
Table VTl). But, from the structural point of view, it is important to s 
that this was a result of increased tax revenues from foreign trade taxes 
some tar: reforms, and a reduction in subsidies. Indeed there was grow 
in public investment.1 Moreover, by the end of 1961, the fiscal deficit 
started to expand once again: higher salaries for the divil services (sa
aries which took the initial burden of deflation); nothing was done to r 
chice t:,e expenditure in the armed forces (they amounted to 40/' of current 
expenditure; and, foreign capital and the rural sector were favoured by 
tax concessions. In these cimmstances fiscal policies could have contr 
bated only slightly to price stability, while they probably reinforced th 
recovery,
3.- A reduction in the inflationary spiral is very likely explained by the fa 
that, for all practical purposes, the exchange rate was kept practically 
constant, through the frequent interventions of the Central Bank. It is 
also true that monetary wages increased very moderately, and that real 
■earnings recovered, and unemployment increased. The level of real wage 
earnings %/as in 196l lOpi&werj.than;$her1938 figures'.: (See,.Table VI).
The structuralist thesis is that the short-term recovery and the twist to 
wards lower price increases was only caused by the 1959-1961 massive inflow 0 
foreign capital, while orthodox policies were at best neutral. The analyses 
is thus an exercise on the behaviour of the external sector and its impact on 
a sick economy:
1.- Recovery in domestic production was considerable, although only 7p’ above 
the 1958 level in 1962 (See Table VT again). The result of the inflow of 
foreign capital %/as only a moderate recovery in industry. Nonetheless, 
both public and private consumption increased and the rate of capital for 
ation was very impressive (35p in terms of the 1959 drop). Eo%/ever, as %/
*  „For a discussion of these points see again Diaz, Sshay and Thorpe.
■Sfr*The greater reliance on indirect taxes, says Mr, Diaz, such as the sales ta 
and import surcharges, plus special tax concessions that benefited high-inc 
groups appear to have reinforced the regressive distribution of income that 
followed devalaation.
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said, two tendencies are present. First, the most dynamic sectors, were 
mining and durable manufactures; the recipient sectors of foreign capital. 
Thus, the recovery was led by petroleum and capital intensive industries 
producing consumer durables and intermediate and capital goods. Impressive 
output gains were registered by vehicles and machinery (6lp), rubber manu­
facturing (ply), and electrical machinery and appliances (34y). Second, 
the production of ncn-drruble goods, mainly for the labour sector, stagnated 
at a lower level than the 195G figure. This is a reflection of the regres­
sive distribution of income caused by the orthodox policies enhanced in 1959 
While in 1961 the real expenditure on durable consumer goods was more than 
20;j above 1953, real expenditure on rural products and essentials was 5; be- 
low 1953. The slow recovery- of private consumption seems to have been main 
ly concentrated in durable consumer goods purchased by high-income groups. 
The output of tranches of manufacturing mainly producing wage goods remained 
at depressed levels, often below 1953 levels. The concentration of domosti 
and foreign investment in capital intensive industries explains the conti­
nued high unemployment. Over-all, the expansion of aggregate demand was 
brought about by a recovery in fixed investment, financed by the foreign 
capital to a great extent, and in consumption, as well as luxury construc­
tion.
2.- Structuralists emphasise that such a regressive distribution of income terms 
itself into inflation. Indeed, as it will bo seen below, imports got out
of control and reflected Tiurpcry consumption. The criticism to the illusory 
recovery is that the possibilities of creating vage-seccor effective demand 
and the corresponding investment were neglected; while investment was con­
centrated on both luxury and capital goods industries, without really consi'e 
ing the priority of feasible MxT in capital goods. Stable growth could not 
be expected, since a good part cf the domestic market was being reduced; 
there was a long-run trend reduction in the capacity to import; and some 
of the foreign exchange avialable was being squandered on a high propensity 
to import non-essentials or mi s sal1oc ate d in consumer durable industries.
3.- The most disappointing failure took the form of the stagnation of agricuitur 
al output. Despite devaluation, price incentives, a shift in the distribu­
tion of income towards the rural sector, output continued tc stagnate.
This affected exports.and consumption, although inflation was contained by 
the depressed situation of the labour sector. What is clear is that the 
set of orthodox measures failed to reallocate resources towards agriculture 
so as to guarantee equilibrium in the balance of payments, other things bein
Sec ih*. Diaz Alejandro (2l).
equal in the context of economic growth. Indeed, a major objective of 
the Frondizi plan was to produce changes in agriculture I that did become 
clear, as early as 1960, was that external equilibrium was again precar­
ious,
4,- Again, the 1950-1961 recovery was characterised by a sharp rise in impor1
(25/5)011 average) which resulted in an immediate deficit cn current accour
(See Tables VT and VIIl), Mxports, on the other hand, after the brief re
spite of 1959 declined again. Thus the debt section of the external sect
expanded very considerably. Nonetheless, in 1960-61 the deficit on curre
. account wore offset by the massive inflow of foreign capital. In I960 ii
took the form of private foreign investment, and in 1961 when the forei
investment boom evaporated, recourse was taken to massive short and me din
term loans. Then this turned out to he insufficient there was a loss in
gold and foreign exchange reserves. Meanwhile it was clear that domestic
capital was leaving the country. '/That should be stressed is that the for
*>£cigh indebtedness measures were equivocal. Already in 196l the current 
count deficit was well above the capital inflow, and experts were on the 
downfall. The high marginal propensity to import of Argentina was very m 
in evidence under the freeing conditions. The change in favour of fixed 
vestment and durable and luxury consumer goods, which reflected the regre 
sive distribution of income, influenced a similar change in the structure 
of imports. The contradiction in the external sector policies became a 
painful fact in 1952,
•The rise in the country's ecchange reserves during the first three years 
of the IMF era, write Bshay and Thorpe, tended to produce the impression of 
general improvement in the country's external position. This was, however, 
an illusion; the increase in reserves was primarily accounted by the influx 
of foreign capital rather than by any fundamental change in the Balance of 
Payments on current account, Moreover, the reliance on foreign capital, con 
bined with the establishment of a free exchange market, had introduced a naj 
element cf unstability into the external equilibrium of Argentina' (22). Thu 
the Frondizi-EI? policies left Afgentina with a huge foreign debt plus the 
chronic deficit on current account. The negative impact of such policies, n 
to say their failure, should not be underestimated. In 1952-63, the country
■itThe expansion of capital goods was the main factor, although durable ccnsum 
goods also increased (for a discussion on the structure of imports see Fart 
Chapter 3> section £),
■iHtInvestment went mainly into crude petroleum production and refining, the p 
chemical and chemical industries and metallurgical industries. Public for 
capital also contributed, mainly to finance infrastructure works (electric 
An iirdmown fraction of the nrivate canital inflow was of a short or medium
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plunged into political and occnor.ic chaos. The stabilisation pel icy not oxOy 
finished President Frondizi and brought in the nrriy, hot res 7 ted in renewed 
inflation, a further dramatic fall in the rate of growth, and external dise­
quilibrium.
The 1962-63 Recession
The recession, according to the strnctvralist thesis, illustrates two 
trends. First, It shows further how a country that pursues stability at the 
expense of growth may finish with neither. Second, it shows how the stractur 
r.l bottlenecks full}' result in inflation - prices 110%: increased by °f;* on aver­
age - and, how the propagating factors of inflation are activated, in this case 
mainly the devaluation and the chaotic situation of the financial mar' ets, and 
less so wage increases.
It is important to see that orthodox monetary and fiscal policies contri­
buted to the recession, and did little to stop prices from climbing:
1.- Orthodox monetary and fiscal policies had boon compatible with growth 
during 1950-1 as long as the inflow of foreign capital, both in the form 
of loans and direct investment, was very large. This was because foreign 
capital compensated for the domestic monetary restrictions, and allowed 
for financial recovery. Put by the end of 1951, the contraction of fer- 
eigh capital inflow, together with the repayment of foreign debt and the 
flight of domestic and foreign expeculative funds, had a deflationary im­
pact on domestic credit. This happened at a time when the demand for 
money was increasing as a result of recovery. It would have been possible 
to offset the restrictive effect of the external sector restoring an ex­
pansion in monetary and fiscal policy. The authorities, of course, could 
not do this owing to their commitments to the Ikbh In fact, early in 195*2 
a new limit on borrowing from the Central hank %/as set.
2.- As a consequence of this measures, fiscal policy had to be restrictive 
and the budget deficit had to be reduced further. Unfortunately this was 
very difficult since there %/as a sharp fall in revenues from international 
trade taxes induced by the liberalisation of the programme. According to 
official figures, this revenue declined from 41 billion pesos in 1951 to 
about 35 billion pesos per annum in the follo%/i::g two years. The only 
%/ay open to the government %/as to raise prices of public services, further 
(electricity, rail%;ays, bus fares, telephones) and to reduce employment in 
the public sector. Emergency mtax measures %/ere also taken in the fora
of income tax surcharges, a capital levy, and sales taxes. Despite all 
these efforts total government revenues declined in 1952 and only rose 
in the follo%/ing year. Besides the fall in international trace taxes, the 
decline in domestic activity and a pronounced increasedin tax evasion, re­
sulting from the liquidity shortage, had an adverse effect on revenue.
3At the same time tie 196l-o2 rise in prices and wages was responsible 
for a substantial grou*th in public expenditure, despite a fall in the 
volune of public consumption and capital formation (fable ¥l). In fact, 
the budget which was reduce! in 1350-61 when production was expanding 
rose substantially in 1062—53 with deflation.
It is important to notice that the fiscal measures - mainly through 
higher tariffs in public services and higher taxes - induced price in­
creases and higher wages, which renewed the wage~x>rice spiral. Thus 
inflation, in the midst of contraction, gained momentum.
The government under these circumstances, restored to delaying the cost 
of servicing the foreign debt of public enterprises; the payment of con 
tractors bills; and even the payment of current wages and pensions.
The relation was a worsening of lahour-business-govermnent relations and 
political uncertainty.
To counteract the shortage of liquidity which resulted from the govern- 
nent policy, businessmen resorted increasingly to the issue of commercial 
paper, the extension 01 trade credit, and the distribution of dividends 
in the form of shares rather than cash. Nonetheless, commercial andpri- 
vate failures, which were 800 in I960, rose to 1300 in 19o2and over 2500 
in 1963* The banhs* reserve deficiencies rose from 3 billion pesos at t! 
end of 1951 to lo billion at the end of 1952, which rendered them liable 
tc the payment of penal rates of interest (30p). The real value of the
stoch of money fell by about 20p in 1952, as compared with a fall of 5p
*in GNP expenditure.
The next step is to see the extent of the damage done to the economy 
Tor structuralists the government’s fiscal and monetary policies and the 
setting created by the BIT, were largely responsible for the fall in the 
volune of demand and output in 1952-63* There was a fall of nearly 5? 
per annum in C'T (See Table VI again). The sharpest fall was registered 
in industry, while agriculture continued to stagnate. The fall in privat 
consumption was very severe and public consumption stagnated. Aggregate 
demand was also affected by a sharp decrease in fixed investment. The fa 
was caused by renewed import restrictions, tight credit and bleal: expecta 
tions. The decline in private consumption (lpp by 1963) was caused by/ un 
employment, the redistribution of income towards non-wage earners and agr 
culture resulting from devaluation, the lag on real and monetary wages an 
the delavs in the naymenis of salaries to the civil service. The ccnse-
Sce Nshag and Thorpe (2 3).
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qnence of the recession was also im employment; widespread under-utilisa- 
tion of industrial equipment; a sharp fall in the manufacturing cf dur­
able consumer goods; a fall in capital goods for agriculture and trans­
port and. a further decline in the production of essentials.
2.- There was, moreover, a do facto devaluation in 1962, which accelerated
inflation. The orthodox need of accompanying stabilisation with devalua­
tion once again resulted in an inflationary recession.
3«- In the external sector there was an important recovery inexports in 1362, 
this was the result of good harvests, a fall in domestic consumption and 
a reduction in cattle population. The decline in demand, on the other bond 
was reflected in a sharp fall in imports ( also inclined by renewed import 
surcharges during 1962). Thus the balance of payments recovered in 1962, 
while the balance on current account became pcssitive in 1963 (fee Table 
VIIl). The improvement would have been larger had not the price of meat 
' decreased in 1962. Thus economic recession achieved external ecgnilihrian 
for only one year. It should bo notecj however, that despite the improve­
ment on current account, the country faced a severe foreign exchange crisis 
in 1962. The reason was an outflow of capital which resulted from repay­
ment of foreign debts and the capital flight occasioned by the system and 
the political uncertainty. The crisis resulted in a further 0evaluation 
of the peso from 83 pesos per dollar to Ip8. The loss of gold and foreign 
reserves was very severe in 1962. However, the reserve position of Argen­
tina by the end of 1963 had increased to 250 million dollars, some 150 
million more than at the beginning of the IFF era. This improvement in 
reserves was, nonetheless, reduced by the increased liabilities to the 
III? from 155 million in 1953 to about S00 million in medium and long­
term indebtedness.
4.- Before the climax was reached, president Frondizi had been deposed early
in 19o2. The opj>osiiion group - led mainly by the Peronist Justicialistas - 
won sweeping gains in the elections. A military revolt took place in late 
1962 as a result of a quarrel between different factions in the arvy, and 
there was a failed attempt of coup d'etat. Finally, elections were held 
in 1965, after the proscription of the Feronists, and Dr. Jllia became 
president. His government, tried once again nen-orthedox measures, but 
only lasted three years in power. In 1966, General Cnganfa led a success­
ful take-over and, what seems bewildering, indulged in a classic orthodox 
thinking supported by the IIIf.
'The.'IHF' stabilisation programmes, write Hshay and Thorpe, promised 
that Argentina could attain internal price stability and balance of tiay- 
sent s equilibriun by relying on the operation of price incentives in a 
free market and by following a restrictive monetary and fiscal policy...
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tlic interplay of market forces would generate a 'sound and durable1 rate 
of groirth in income (24'. The results of following these policies durin, 
1959-53 as vc have seen, were the folloving:
Production fell and stagnated, if allowance is made for increases in "co­
pulation, the per capita level of consumption nut have- declined by nearl; 
20fr. The growth in fined investment \vhich by 19c2 declined) vas financi 
by the fall in consumption and the increase in foreign capital. The min­
eral sector made exceptional progress but this vas because of the induce' 
expansion of the petroleum exploitation and the role foreign capital pla; 
ed.
The heaviest penalty for economic stagnation vas paid by vage and salary 
earners, in the form of unemployement, higher prices, and lover earnings, 
The whole period vas plagued by labour unrest.
The index in the cost of living rose about 400;’ between 1335 and 1963, a 
higher rate of inflation than in any other comparable previous period. 
The domestic losses in production, consumption,, and employment did not 
mitigate the country's balance of payments position. External equilibrii 
was more precarious at the end of the stabilisation era. There was a de:! 
icit in current account, except for 1959 and 1953; when imports declines 
as a consequence of a fall in activity and import controls. The outflow 
of capital increased in terns of service and interests of foreign loans, 
dividends of foreign investment, and speculative private and foreign cap: 
al. Eut the most important factor was the internal capital position thai 
emerged as a consequence of the programme: the increase in short, median
and long-run foreign debt.
Hr. Esltay and Hiss Thorpe conclude with a note of oirony 'Viewing the abc 
economic social and political developments impartially, it would not be 
easy to claim that the II2? policy and efforts in Argentina in the years 
1959-1953 were crowned with success'. For our purpose, the case study 
illustrates the structuralist thesis of the intrinsic failure of orthodox 
stabilisation programmes in Latin America, with, reference to the problem 
of stability and growth and short-term policy measures. Structuralists' 
alternatives were discussed in the previous chapter, with the disquieting 
doubt about the possibility of achieving growth with stability in the J. 
short-run.
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(2) Chile: The IfLein-Scks hi,scion (1935-1398), prclininars and developments.
This section will attempt to describe the two major stabilisation efforts 
undertaken in Chile, which followed - although no re loosely than in Argenti­
na - orthodox policies. The bibliography cn the Chilean case is quite nu­
merous. A systematic introduction into the subject should include at least 
the works of such Chilean economists as herrera, I'into, Escobar and Cunkel, 
and the articles cf foreign authors like .daldor, helix, Caxinwold, lUrsch- 
sian and Harberger, the majority of which have already been citecl. Special 
notice should be given to professor dal dor1 s Hroblemas economicos dc Chile, 
Dr. Sunkel *s La inf la cion c-hilenn and Mr. Felix Ctimctnral irhalar.ee, social 
conflict and inflation (25)*
Our aim, as with Argentina, is to study those stabilisation measures ac­
cording to the structuralist thesis. The study is divided into an intro­
ductory background (i), the period of ICLein-Saks (ii), and the Alessandri- 
IiA? plan and its developments (iii).
However, before going into policy measures, it is useful again to situate 
Chilean inflation in the context of its long-run and structural causes and 
propagating factors. Two things should also be clarified. In Chile both 
causes of inflation have interacted in a rather complex fashion, something 
which springs from the fact that economic policy has neither leaned on 
structuralism - like Heron's Argentina - or on monetary orthodoxy - like 
the IMF-Frondizi plan -. Moreover, it is not simple to make of Chile, as 
it has been seen, a clear-cut case for structuralist interpretation.
The long-run trends in the structural variables were found to be the 
*following®
1*- For the 1946-1965 Chile had an agricultural bottleneck reflected in a de­
cline in agricultural and food production per capita. Thus agricultural 
prices increased more than the overall consumer prices (see chapter 5, 
section a^ ).
2.- The foreign exchange bottleneck is not severe for the period as a whole.
It is true, however, that exports and imports were unstable suffereing 
* frequent short-term setbacks as a consequence of trends in the copper 
market. Nonetheless, there was growth in experts and faster growth in 
imports. There was growth in the capacity to import and increasing re­
course to foreign capital. Although foreign indebtedness expanded as a 
consequence, Chile has had a net inflow of capital however meager it may 
have become by the mid-1950's (see section b).
3.- Intensive import substitution industrialise,bion, unlike the other countries 
does not aorear to be present. The import coefficient fell only very*
*Their relevance ourht to be seen with reference to interregional comparisons.
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slightly; industry as a percentage cf GNP has not increased; and not mu cl 
visible import substitution was seen in the import structure. If intense 
industrialisation is taken as one of the inflationary features of the 
structuralist model, the fact is only relative present in Chile. It may 
be argued, on the other hand, that the 'lack of industrialisation'was re­
flected in the poor perforaance of the rate of grovrth (see section c)«
/i• - Public expenditure, revenues, investment, and budget deficits have in­
creased in Chile. A good part of the expenditure and the deficit finan­
cing was spent in infrastructure and social services (see section d).
5.- Very incomplete statistics were found on the distribution of income. Be-
*tween income groups, bov/ever, it may be said that the redistribution of 
income tended to be regressive up to 1956, while afterwards it took a 
progressive turn (see section e).
’with respect to the monetarist-propagating causes of inflation the folio* 
ing tendencies were obtained:
p
1.- The supply of money and quasi-money lias indeed expanded very fastly, and 
the liquidity of the financial system has been considerable. Mo correla­
tion, however, was found between these variables and prices. As with 
Argentina the rate of increase in the money supply may be made to con­
tract in some years, and still price increases (see Chapter II, section s
2.- Budget deficits as such are inversely correlated to prices: the larger
they were the slower the pace of inflation. That is, the reverse of the 
monetarist position (see section b).
3#- Industrial wages are significantly correlated to price increases, but wit 
a year lag. In these circumstances wages probably played ‘a lagged' role 
on the inflationary spiral (see section js).
;i.- As with all the countries taken, there was a close relationship between 
devaluation of the exchange rate and consumer prices (see section b).
5*- ’./hat is peculiar to Chile is that the ratio of money to income has increa 
ed although savings have been poor. Moreover, there has been an increase 
in the real value of monetary holdings, althovgli the holding of public 
debt has declined. Thus inflation does not seem to have affected savings 
in a negative fashion. Moreover, no correlation could be found between 
the inflow of foreign savings and the increasing inflation. Inflation, 
on the other hand, may have induced distortions in the investment process 
(inventory formation increased and construction v;as expansive) (See secti
£)•
It may be thus gathered that the matured of Chilean inflation is rather 
intricate: both structural and propagating factors seem to be at work in a
that the 'origins' of inflation are obscured. Moreover, unlike Argentinawa
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- or Hcxico, for the natter, which is the opposite - the siructural 1st thesis
has to he applied with great care considering the w i  V-.' .Vi. i c r e im r *
public; investment and a weak incbustrialisaticn. It is hoped that a loot into 
the effects of short-torn policies Trill help to clarify one’s position.
This ’nine!’ nature of inflation* in Chile has heen quantitaiively studied 
over the 19501 s hy professor hurborger (9.5). the author, liho hr; Dias, uses 
aggregative regression analysis of the rate or price change in Chile in terns 
of monetary and structural factors:
1.- Pi, change in consumer price index from year (t-l) to year (t)
2.- At, change in price level during year (t-l) ninus change in price level 
during year (t-2) - the acceleration factor.
3*~ lit, change in money supply from year (t-l) to year (t).
4.- i:t-l, change in money supply from year (t-2) to year (t-l).
5.- hTt, change in minimum wage for public employees from the first quarter
of year (t--1> -*■ J to the first quarter cf year (t).
6.- Yt, change in real income from the fourth quarter of year (t-l) to the
fourth quarter of year (t).
Ho presents his results in three equations with adecpiate ’fits’. The first is 
purely monetary, allowing for a two-year lag. The others add the variables 
At and ht, with marked improvement in the fit*
Pt= -1.03 - 1.05  yt + 0 .30  mt 4- 0 .34  Mt - 1 (2*=0.84)
Pt= -0.52 - 0.91 yt -5- 0.74 At -j- 0.54 lit - 1 -i- 0.20 At (dfhO.G?)
Pt= -1.15 - 0.89 yt -l- 0.70 lit + 0.29 lit - 1 + O.lGAt-i-OolJJ (E2=0.87)
’The constant terms(indicating what would happen to the price level if
real income, money, etc. remained unchanged) are not significantly different 
from zero. The coefficients in the change of income indicate that a l£ rise 
in real income, other things equal, causes close to a Id fall in the price 
level. The coefficients of “both current and lagged changes in money arc sig­
nificant when added and indicate that a Ip increase in the supply of money 
causes a rise of lp in the price level, other things being equal. h:en the 
acceleration of prices (At) is added, is only significant at a yt\ level, 
l/hcn, however, the change in wages is also added, the coefficient (At) loses 
significance, hliilc ’,7t itself adds nothing to the explanation of the rate of 
inflation.* ’While Hargerger’s results support the demand explanation of infla­
tion, write Tronfenbrunner and I-Tolsman, they dc not attempt refutation of the 
structuralist claim... that is to say, they treat Yt as independent of the two 
monetary variables ht and xlt-1 which begs one of the questions at issue in the 
controversy’. The wage coefficient is presumably not significant because wage 
adjustments in Chile fellow changes in the cost of living in the previous year, 
as vo shall see. 1 loreover, the main limitation is that the inflationary nature
~ee loo'cnoue on next noxe.
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of exchange rate devaluation, "both in supply and in liquidity, ancl thus of th< 
behaviour of the external sector were not included. Devaluation, as in Argen­
tina, plays a loading role in propagating Chilean inflation. Professor Harbe: 
ger liiuself reached later this conclusion in his following article (2?), vhic] 
has been discussed (see Fart II, Chapter 2). So, in conclusion, this only te! 
one that the nature of inflation was again presumably mixed. Let us then, as 
X»roposed, approach the subject in terms of economic measures.
(i) A background discussion.
•Chile's very severe depression of the 1930's and the influence of the wa: 
years, says professor Grunwald, brought a very erratic pattern of price move­
ments d ring those two decades ' (28). The annual rate of price increase, on 
average, was lO^during the 19301s and 20 p during the 1940's (see part I, Chap- 
l). The inflation rate increased during the early 1930's and by 1953 reached 
a price explosion which brought pricv* up to SOp in 1955* Nith the 1955-57 
stabilisation programme inflation was reduced to 26^ in 1958. But prices in­
creased by 39d in 1959. With the new stabilisation programme in 1959-1960 
prices were reduced to an all time minimum of Sp in 19«1. However, despite 
the programme, prices continued to climb up to 44> in 1963 and 469 in 1964. Ca 
the whole, it way be claimed, that Chilean inflation has been as violent and < 
erratic as that of Argentina over the post-war period.
The Chilean economy is usually selected to illustrate how inflation may 
become *a way of life' and an 'institution' within the system:
1.- Pages and salaries, pensions, social security benefits have followed legalise< 
cost-of-living adjustments.
2.- There have been persistent periods of price controls and subsidised incomes.
3.- The profit earners, as a natter of fact, have increased prices regularly in 
advance of expected cost rises.
4.- The credit system, generalising, has been permissive and used to cover price 
increases and income adjustments.
§.- Deficit spending has become unavoidable as government revenues were based on 
the previous period's assessments compared to current pricing for government 
expenditure•
6.- Devaluation, despite exchange rate controls, has been chronic.
Hithin this permanent inflationary setting, the growth per capita of the 
economy has been rather poor (l.4$ Nonetheless, as vith the other semi-indui 
trialised Latin-Anerican countries, two periods should be distinguished. 
Throughout the war years and up to 1952, when the export markets for Chile we: 
more buoyant, GNP rose on average by 53 per annum. Prom 1963> when the oxter] 
*(yroh previous page) Latin American inflations tend to bo, of course, mixed
cost-push denend-pull inflations.
setbacks began, output only rose by 0.3;’ annually up to 1953. Because of 
population growth, which has increased at a rate of 0.3/ per annum, the per 
capital incone oi 1959 was "below the 1953 level. However, ii the period ire:.: 
1953 to 195- is chosen - because there was an external recovery in the early 
I960*s, mostly as a consequence of foreign loans - the average annua! rate oi 
growth of GU? is slightly higher (3.15), and leaves per capita income only 
above the zero mark. The Chilean economy recovered during 19-33. Unfortunate­
ly this was followed again by a recession in 1933.
Although there is no intention to discuss Chile's economic stagnation, 
it is useful for the understanding oi structuralist thesis to describe super­
ficially what wore the economic characteristics before dllcin-.daks arrived 
•x-late in 1955* This merely means making a statement about the propagating 
factor of inflation, the distribution of income, the industrial and agricul­
tural trends, and the external sector.
1.- Before 1953 when GUP was growing (5.15 on average between l.UG- 1953), there 
were sharp increases in government expenditure. This was reflected in the 
expansion of bank credit on government accounts (145)in 1950, 595 1- 1551, 
and 445- in 1952). Private credit expansion, while less, was also substantial
(BO, 29 and 3 9 respectively). This was reflected on a. high rate of consump­
tion , for the private (5.35') t?na public sector (l2.1u). I lore over, there
were wage increases. Although it is probable that consumption cf lower in­
come groups did fall because of the adverse effects of inflation on the dis-
393,
tributicn of income. •Tha official ccst-of-living r> '•I ■? 1 ? ct. of manuel work-
ers wages since 1953 1lave not kept up with the iirdeX  cf c 011 sum:ir pri
*K~/r
C O G #
Since incrcases in prices were above, t^ece figares, it is ccnc]Luded ly.Mcl I* LjAC
increase in the sunnl*r of money was acconnaniod lyy a hi :her lieiuid.ity , while
the income circulation velocity* decreased.
2.- On the whole (although in some years there are exceptions) it has been dif­
ficult to blame Chilean inflation on the wage sector. The distribution of 
income was rather regressive and wages adjusted to prices with a lag. hhilo­
th i s has reduced effective demand, ic docs not scorn to have led to large sav­
ings and investment in the private sector. Cn the contrary, the propensity 
to consume of the upper income groups appears to be big . The structure of 
production from l>4-5 to 1955 shows a decline in the share cf agricultural
production fro:; 17 to 135* a raise in the share of industry from 13 to 195
and a considerable increase in the share of personal services and trade 
(from 435 in 19-7-0 to 57;' in 1955). Three fourths of the 69/; in GBP Ledwecu
1950— 55 took the form of services. Since demand for services constitutes
a more important component of the expenditure of upper income go imps, it is 
clear that the distribution of income must have moved accordingly, and in
x ?ot a structuralist discussion on 1955-1555 see hr. fJunkel, op. cit.
See professor C-runwald (2 9 ) .
fact it did become more regressive (see section ja). It is also clear, that 
there is a lower limit to the level of real consumption of the poorer sec­
tions; and when, as in 1953» external factors tended to bring about a fal 
in total real income, stems have to he taken to prevent on absolute fall i
39^
standards. .Thus, when prices rose further in 1953 end 1954 as a result of
devaluation, the compensation of wages was adjusted. Heal wages which ha
improved bdore 1953 > however, fell sharply after that year.
3*"* *Two other factors that affected inflation during the pre-1955 period were 
agricultural and industrial output (sec table l). 'The outstanding imures
sion is a relatively slow growth of agricultural production, writes profes 
sor Grunwald, which has barely been able to keep up with the population in 
crease. Chile not only was self-sufficient in Agriculture some twenty yea 
ago (1939) but in some products even had an export surplus. Yet now the 
country is spending close to one fifth of its import budget on fdodstuffs' 
(3l)* The agricultural bottleneck, however, is not present for the brief 
and inflationary period of 1950-53 (output grew on average at 5.4 per annu 
This was only a brief respite since before 1950 it was stagnant and later 
declined 0.4$ per annum. Industry, on the other hand, had been expanding 
at a fast rate (27$ in 1951 and 12$ in 1352). This leads one to believe 
that a costly HST process was going on. Fixed investment was growing, but 
relatively slow in capital goods and buoyant in building. It should be no 
that investment in Chile is inclined to hedge against inflation in luxury
constructions, conething that has reduced industrial growth and its poten- 
tial inflationary role. k. , u 15:'",
Cn any event, after the external crises of 1953> fixed investment in capit 
goods increased at 9$» although industry as such only grew at 2.4$
4.- The factor that structuralism most emphasises to explain the Chilean infla 
tion that exploded in 1955 (and the fall in the rate of growth) is the be­
haviour of the•external sector (Table l). In summary, an important factor 
in restraining inflation before 1953 had been the rise in imports (50$ be­
tween 1950 and 1952) together with an increased in the capacity to import, 
produced by large exports and improving terms of trade, k'ith the external 
crisis in 1953» as we shall see below, the situation changed. The capacit; 
to import fell, while government expenditure rose. Hising costs and wages 
Were net by credit creation and prices reac-ied their all tine high in 1955 
(80$). The immediate cause of increasing inflation, was the particularly 
severe 1 devaluation of 1953: the exchange rate moved from 12S escudos pe
dollar to 220 in the free narket= while the official rate was devalued fr 
Si escudos to 110.
*  / VSee professor Maynard (30;.
ft-He sources tended to flow, says Frof. Maynard, into speculation in real e 
and luxury typo residential building: in 1953 the latter absorbed more t 
45$ of fixed investments (52}.
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nuts in the following words:- as a censeaueuee of the exnanrive  a. o
of the Morean xnr on expert markets, export earnings rose by ~9.t ’ in 1,. “1 end 
by 275 in 1952, while industrial o e h d  rose by 45,'- between 19"'; end 1955.
After 1953 these trends were reversed and growth slowed down (in per capita 
terms it was negative between 1953-1955) and there was a dcterioraticn in the 
fiscal and foreign exchange situation. Although export oaruinps were 21/ 
lower in 1953 > the correspondiug decrease in imports vas only 8/. Government 
revenue fell by 3. , while expenditure rose by 2.4;' (in 1952 the corresponding 
coefficients were 84/ and 14/ in positive terns) (33).
In Latin .haerica the Chilean case in usually used to support the thesis of 
of how external disequilibrium introduces into the domestic economy price in­
stability or stagnation, or both. This happens via the supply of imports and 
public revenues. The problem of achieving price stability with a sustained 
rate of growth is complicated by the fact thaththe economy is very dependent 
on one commodity - copper - for both its supply of foreign exchange and its 
public revenue. In fact, copper exports account for more then 50/ of total 
exports and make the most significant part of the capacity to import. More­
over, public revenue is dependent on a rather complex exchange rate system.
(See below).
'It is true, writes professor Maynard, that inflation in Chile accelerated 
after a brea'* in copper prices in 1958, in the same way that Argentina's dif­
ficulties were made worse by external factors in 1048-49... the expansion of 
Chile's gross product ceased in 1953» and per capita income fell in the fol­
lowing years: and this development provides yet a further illustration that
anti-inflationary measures cannot work without having serious adverse effects 
on growth, -unless the las id causes of inflation are removed at the same trio* 
(34). Let us then follow the lino of thought that leads to the author's con­
clusion.
Prom 194/ to 1952 the Chilean economy expanded under the influence of a 
substantial rise in the dollar value of its exports and in its capacity to 
imports. The government was thus able by the increase in its revenue*to ex­
pand expenditure. Prom 1947 to 1952, indeed, real public expenditure rose by 
more than 40/. Imports rose at a very fast rate which, des* ite the improvement 
in export receipts, prove excessive. Pressure on the balance of payments was
met by continual exchange rate devaluation. This sort of depreciation ' .was
obviously very inflationary and contributed to the formation of a wage-price 
spiral. Mages perhaps kept pace with prices; which su ryesis that the distri­
bution of income must Lave shifted considerably in favour ox the upper income 
groups. The fact that such a redistribution change did not affect the rate ex’
•X*The last ^oint has been annlv discussed by the MCLA literature and for the
~ v / \meriod that concerns us, by the cited work of professor Maynard® (Overleaf,
inflation - prices rose abort 200? in this period ~ is a reflection of the
high propensity to consume of the upper income groi Hence capital for­
mation did not benefit as it world presumably would have: instead the
structure of production began to reflect the consumption demand ijattem 
associated with income inequality, something which added to inflationary 
pressure (Sec Tables II and III}.
An abrupt fall in copper prices in 1953 and the consequential fall in 
export receipts, far from producing deflationary effects on the domestic 
level of income set up forces which accelerated the rate of inflation (the 
Prebisch argument). In Chile this was exacerbated because of the heavy de­
pendence of public finances on copper sales and the exchange rates which 
were used to subsidise imports, particularly consumer goods. Subsequent 
fiscal and credit policies accentuated these forces.
*How did the exchange rate policy play such an important part? The 
government obtained its revenue by means of a 50? (later raised to 60?) 
direct tax on copper income. In addition toother custom taxes and special 
taxes and surtaxes, there was also an 'implicit' tax on the production costs 
of the industry, arising out of the difference between the rate of exchange 
at which the government sold pesos to the copper companies in order to en­
able them to cover their expenditure in Chile and the rate at which the 
government sold the dollars so obtained from the companies tc importers. 
Taxes on the copper companies amounted to a well over 50? of their pnss 
value added, and contributed between a quarter and a third of all govern­
ment revenue, iloreovor, the exchange rate system and its associated impli­
cit tax on production costs operated to give a substantial subsidy to imports 
between 1950 and 1955 the subsidy as a proportion of import prices amounted 
to over a third on average, and to over tO? cn imported consumer goods. 
Capital goods were loss favoured, the subsidy running at the rate of about 
25?. The element of import price subsidy arises because the official ex­
change rate is overvalued, more so for offical sales than for official pur­
chases of domestic currency.
Now, if export sales of the copper companies fall, the implicit tax and 
the exchange rate income are reduced and import subsidies have to be cut.
If public revenue falls, and current expenditure is fixes, then a budget 
deficit is created or increased. If sufficient foreign exchange reserves 
exist (which is not the case of Chile because of the trade balance) then 
imports can be maintained and the budget deficit can be covered by the sale 
of dollars taxed out of the copper companies. If reserves are inadquate, then 
importers must be made to buy loss dollars and to pay more dollars for them.
*{from prcvious page)
In relation toother Latin American countries, however, the thesis may be put
j. to question. \*See ECLA and S. Undurraga (ppj.
Hationing of dollars solves the first problem but not the second. A solution-x-
to both, problems is only found in devaluation, which is inflationary.
In 1953 a fall in copper sales produced a 265 fall in copper revenue 
from copper, and a 10/ fall in total government receipts. The exchange'rate 
was devalued sharply, by more than 80, , thereby reducing import subsidies, hut 
even so the budget deficit rose to 20;' of total expenditure. This of course, 
was somehow inflationary, but more im ortant was devaluation and the reduc­
tion in the subsidy of import prices; the cost cf living rose 70/. Consumer 
goods, being the most subsidised, rose the most in prices, and consequently 
adjustments were made in wages. It was at this point, when exchange rate de­
valuations had been continuous when budget deficits kept increasing, because 
of falling revenues and increasing expenditure, when nominal wage adjustments 
wore constant; and, when prices had increased by 2505 between 1952 and 1955* 
that the Mlein-Saks Mission was called.
(ii) The JQein-aaks Mission (1955-1953) (53)
The price explosion of 1957-55 alarmed very much public opinion and the 
administration of President Ibanez so that the need for price stabilisation
-X-'X-was publicly stated. The priority of price stability over the rate cf growth 
of tho economy - something which at the time was not fashionable in the rest
of tho sen-i-industrialised countries of the region - was established. Economic
policy statements, however, did not make explicit the laissez-faire overtones 
of the later Argentinian programmes, although- implicitly the intentions were 
orthodox.
x-The policy of devaluation, reduced taxes to the copper companies, and main­
tained public expenditure, however, ray be self defeating. Assume, that the 
government sells pesos cheaply to the companies after the devaluation induced 
by the fall in copper exports; imports have to bo reduced; and it is im ossi 
ble to reduce the deficit, revaluation would work if exports increased, and 
thus revenue too. This is entirely unlikely in Chile because her income and 
price elasticity for exports are not the same, and even if they were, they 
may be the wrong ones. Moreover, in the Chilean case it is unlikely that im­
ports can be reduced if the level of employment is to be maintained, b’or the 
policy to work devaluation would have to be accompanied by import controls, 
plus an investment ‘policy. This would be inflationary, but so is the other 
case. Mith the difference that a devaluation followed by protectionist in­
vestment policy would, with time, d ec' inflation and isolate relatively the 
niiblic sector from the external sector fluctuations.
For a discussion on the subject, which, emphasises a political interpretation 
of inflation, see professor llirschman, op0_cit.
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•The recoiur.endet.ions oi the UleiorSaks Kissicn, a United States rivate 
consulting firm which was employed in the second half of 1953» writes profes­
sor Grunwald, to everybody1 s great surprise, won relatively vide political 
support (3*,)1 , Private and public opinion had cone to believe, mainly as a 
consequence of the experience (hiring the previous three years, that wit'-out 
monetary stability the structure of the economy could not be changed (not 
that there was a development policy during President Ibanez1 government, or 
professor Uirschman notes), Uhet were then the reasons for this movement 
towards economic orthodory that created a setting for the programme?
There was support from tho wage sector. UCLA writes that wage earners were 
discontent with the effects of inflation on their real income. In fact, the 
minimum wage for workers in the private sector, which represents the group, 
with more coherence, actually fell in real terms in 1953-55 (see table Ii).
The second favourable circumstance for Ulein-Saks was the behaviour of the 
external trade sector. Trade conditions suddenly changed for the better in 
1955, mainly because of the improvement in copper sales* (See Table III). 
Export earnings rose from jCl million dollars in 1954 to 441 in 1355 °nd 433 
in 1956, while the corresponding import rises were moderate (from 400 to 405 
and 440 million). Thus Chile could roly to a certain extent in its export 
earnings to achieve external a:id domestic equilibrium, while Argentina was 
forced into a foreign indebtedness pattern that proved fatal*
A factor that acted against the programme was the fact that the external re­
covery vas short-livedl In 1957 and 1258 export earnings fell noticeably. 
Imports, 011 the other hand, continued to increase until 1957• This represent­
ed a burden to the balance of payments which vas reflected in snail but con- 
tinous devaluation from the initial one in 1956 to the one in 1958. In ef­
fect, the free exchange rate moved from 600 escudos to 1120 escudos per dol- 
*lar in 1958*
The main criticism of the programme, from the structuralist point of view, 
was, of course, that it was ill-conceived. The programme was implicitly bas­
ed on the supposition of flexibility in. the productive and financial systems 
with respect to deflationary orthodox measures, and how from such measures it 
would reallocate factors and monetary relationships. As we shall see, hopes 
never materialised because, according to structural thought, attention was 
not given to the structural imbalances of the system.
Thus early in 1956 the government introduced Ulein-Saks *gradual anti­
inflation programme *• This ought to be taken as the classic example of the 
cautious approach towards Latin-American inflation, the Argentinian being 
the opposite. According to official statements, the policy excluded the 
drastic action entailed by - sudden restriction of the liquidity by means
of a monetary reform. In practice, although the measures were not shockers, 
*The rate was revalued however to 1.053 pesos in 1959 with unified rate system,
monetary restriction vas indeed introduced (see Table II again). Still, 
this vas considered politically impracticable in the initial phase of the 
ulan. 'ilia aim vas •gradual deflation1, based on the progressive moderation 
of the pressures that led to monetary expansion. The immediate objective 
vas the reduction of aggregate demand by eliminating the main causes cfhat 
had led to an expansion of the means of payments. Ihatavere then the pol­
icy tools of the programme? They included monetary, fiscal, vage, price 
and foreign sector measures. The main objective, of course, vas to reduce 
the rate of inflation by half in 19>5 and again in 1957 and achieve virtual 
stabilisation in 195&-9*
Professor Grunvald rightly states that credit restrains vere instituted (de­
spite other claims.) 'To control the monetary system, vrites ECLA, use vas 
made of instruments that are clearly described in the report of the KLein- 
Sahs mission* (pC). Tlie purpose of the plan, in fact, vas the redaction ii 
the expansion of the supply of money, something vhich together vith legali; 
ed vage control, vould reduce costs and prices. There vas also the inten­
tion to strihe a decisive blov at the speculative abuses of credit that 
characterised 1955* The specific measures vere a reduction on credit ex­
pansion cgaotas; a substantial increase in the central bank's rediscount 
rates; the introduction of a gradual rediscount rate that vould penalise 
banks making excessive use of rediscounts in relation to their ovn capital 
and reserves; limiting the establishment of ncv banks; reducing the Cen­
tral Bank's ovn loans to the public; and strengthening the existing sel­
ective credit controls. It should be clarified, however, that although 
those measures vere implemented, thy vere not followed perfectly.
Explicit emphasis vas placed on reducing the monetary expansion originat­
ing in the public sector through the budget deficits. A clear objetive 
was the transformation of the methods of financing the government deficit. 
,T.71iereas in earlier years the bulk of the funds for this purpose vas provi( 
ed by a direct issue made by the Central hank, writes ECLA, from 1956 thes< 
contributions vere provided by foreign loans, reduction of reserves and 
obligations in foreign currency, vhich entailed the sale of foreign curren­
cy to importers and an increase in the flow of goods and services from 
abroad' (59). Fiscally, the measures vere a reduction in expenditure and 
a rase in incomes; both left much to be desired and, as ve shall see, vers 
contradictory.
The keystone to the programme vas vage control. A limit to vage adjustment 
was agreed in Congress, although after only a majority of one vote. Profes­
sor Grunvald gives the following figure: adjustments in vage3 and salaries
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were to increase only k3;l in the face of a 90;:' increase in the cost-of- 
living (tO). It was hoped thereby to reduce or relax the overall pressure 
on sunvlv and on public and private, expenditure which, to a greater or les­
ser degree, were transferred, to the nonetary system. The objective was 
• only achieved in 1955, later to give way to higher wage increases. None­
theless, the measures were deflationary. In 195? the wage increase was 
SOy of the price increase, but in 1953 it was ICC;', The divorce between 
the two increases had the effect of reducing wages and salaries. * In real 
terns (.1950 prices) the minimum wage fell by 159, writes TCIA, ond the pay 
of government employees by 41, , between 1955 and 1953J apart from any other 
effect, this had a restrictive effect cn effective demand’ (41)• from the 
structuralist point of view the wiseness of the measure may be put into 
question. According to professor )aynard the wage control caused the dis­
tribution of income to move yet further away fro . the lew income groups, 
and in consequence the demand for industrial consumer goods declined..*The 
need to bring about a regressive shift in income distribution in order to 
chech inflation, even then with only partial success, throws considerable 
light on the causes of Chile’s economic difficulties. It should be consid­
ered in conjunction with two other facts: first, that the distribution cf
income was already very unequal before the 1955 stabilisation measures, and 
second, that despite the considerable income inequality the level of private 
investment, in relation to national product, was very low. Tn other words, 
it seems doubtful that the shift of income could be explained by expected 
favourable effects on savings, since the propensity to save of the upper in­
come groups was very low’ (42).
40- Other complementary measures were envisaged in terms of freeing the system; 
namely the reel ic bio l of price controls and those of foreign trade. It was 
excpectei, as in the Argentinian experiments, that price signals and market 
forces would bring the productive and financial systems into stability.
The measures taken in this area were the replacing of the multiple exchange 
rate system and import licences, which had become very difficult to operate. 
The exchange rate was reduced to two, one for trade in goods and the other 
for capital transact!ons ant tourism. In 1555 the average rate represented 
only 45? of parity, but this percentage rose to p5 in lyj., and £4 in 1953. 
The adjustments wen, of course, inflationary, In addition the system of 
detailed administrative permits was replaced by the system of prior import 
deposits. Cn the other hand, the relaxation of the price controls went 
hand in hand with the reuncti n of subsidies, here, however, the measures 
were not related to t e short-run problems of stabilisation, but were based 
on the assumption that a freer operation cf the market froces would encourage 
a better allocation of resources.
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Perhaps these two factors help to explain the persistence ox inflation, i.< 
'open inflation1.
The next question to ash is vhat vere the results of the staoilisatioi 
programme:
1.- hrith respect to vage control, as vc have said, the measures vere not complc 
ly effective, out they succeded in introducing a vage lag into the inflatic 
ary spiral. The fact that real earnings vere greatly reduced (in terms of 
1953) very lihely had a deflationary effect on demand vhich contributed to 
the reduction ox prices in 1957-3S. Although they probably helped to redue 
fixed investment, i. e. in the consumer industries.
2.- ivhereas the means of payments increased by 65p in 1953 their annual varia­
tions fell to 43/s in 195-6, 23^ in 1957> and 32;* in 1933. But, vhat vas al£ 
important, the amount ox government botroving from the Central Bank vas gre 
ly reduced. 'It is alvays possible to say that the expansion of the supply 
of money, writes professor Sranvald, permitted price increases during this 
period, but in the absence of any serious demand pressure, this is not a ve 
useful statentnt (between 1956 and 1953 the money supply increased at an av 
age rate of 337’ while consumer prices increased at 3 on average' (43; Bel 
supports this idea, although it remains somewhat eclectic. 'In brief, the 
monetary instruments used in Chile played a subsidiary role even i:i their o 
field of action... a greater influence vas exerted by decision and factors 
lating to other areas (foreign trade policy) more vital to the course of ev 
It is clear that the effect of measures used in the field of foreign trade 
felt beyond the area of foreign trade and the balance cf payments, and they 
vere in fact key elements in the fiscal and monetary operations undertaken 
in general in the process ox stabilisation' (44).
3.- Both BCIA and professor Grunwald seen to agree that any success of Blein-Sa 
with price stability/, however doubtful, vas due to some aspects of the exte 
sectors. Foreign loans, but more so the temporary 1955-56 rise in exports 
possible an increase in imports and the postponenentoof a foreign exchange 
crisis.^
4 . -  Bath respect to fiscal policy, public expenditure vas only reduced inasmuch 
as salaries vere kept down. Transfer payments, which vere regarded as an i 
portant potential source of the reduction of public expenditure, remained 
stagnant during 1956 but increased sharply in 195" end 1953. The same oceu 
red with public investment. In both cases there vas a conflict of aims. B 
thoagh the attempt to balance the budget vas a major policy issue, it vas
seen that a reduction of subsidies vas a threat to price stability and that
*p, reduction of government investment vould've aggravated the stagnation ox 
the economy. In this dilemma - never acknowledged by the HQ? - the immedia
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consequences carried more wlg.it than the orthodox measure of balancing the 
budget. The use of instruments to improve revenue collection also failed 
to effect any significant change. Government errrout revenue .id no more 
than maintain the real level attained in 1955» mainly due to the inorca.se 
in income from the external sector and increases in sales tax. The balance 
of expenditure not covered by current ineon expressed as a percentage of 
total expenditure, fell in Ifgo to 12.o but then rose to 1 5 .2  in 195V and 
17 .3 in 1358. however, these figures conceal a hoy point of the stabilisa­
tion plan: the transformation of the methods of financing the government
deficit. As it was said before, borrowing from the Central hank was reduc­
ed from 1956 and financing came from obligations in fonigu currency, reduc­
tion in reserves, and sore foreign loans. The Institute of Economics of hue 
University of Chile states that in this period the policy on debt financing 
was aimed more at restoring the balance of payments than at financing the 
government deficit in national currency, although the two aims were clearly 
related.
5.- before going ahead, it should be pointed out that the price stabilisation
results cf the fbin-Saks mission - however dubious the implementation of or­
thodox measures seems - were rather illusory. Die rate oi inflation vas re­
duced to 54;. on average curing 1956-1958, but by 1952 it had again increased 
to 39; • Moreover, the temporary respite - if 34;; inflation may be called 
that - was mainly due by the recovery in exports and the inflow of foreign 
cqpital. bhr.t structuralists point out, of course, is that these reductions 
in the rate of inflation were obtained at the cost of domestic economic growth. 
'Although development vas not one of the main aims of the programme, writes 
ECLA, it was not assumed that the pursuit of financial stability should bo 
at the expense of the pace of economic activity or the standard of living.
Cn the contrary, it was held that the containing of the price rises...would 
open the way for improved conditions in all areas' (4 5 ) .  Economic growth 
was, however, negatively affected.
60- Although the average rate of growth for 1956-1959 was 4.2p, high for Chilean 
standards, it does not reveal the impact of stabilisation in output (see 
Table l). In the same period total fixed investment declined by 4.2 on 
average and capital goods by 2.2;" on average. Moreover, agriculture remain­
ed stagnant, while industry grew cn average at a rate of 5p. The fact that 
the rate of growth was higher is reflected on the mining sector (lb.2;.’ rate 
of growth) and in the expansion of copper exports. Cn the other hand, the 
measures were successful in creating a desired decline in building, mainly 
private; which, however, vas responsible for difficulties in other indus­
tries, services, and increased unemployment. 'This decline, writes
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had its origin in the exclusion ox building activities from the system of 
bank credits, and could have been avoided by a corresponding expansion of 
public investment in construction, but such a course of action vas ruled 
out by the increase in the government deficit1 (45). Professor Grunvald s 
says that the loss of purchasing pover - through the vage and credit re­
straints, and the change in public financing - reduced aggregate demand. 
Producers found themselite squeezed between loss of sales and tight noney. 
Industries that could not reduce costs to maintain production, found them­
selves wither bankrupt or operating below capacity. Cn the basis of a broci 
survey, the manufacturing industry* was found to operate at an average of 47 
of capacity in 1957. Significantly1" unemployment ensued. The University oi 
Chile measured unemployment at 7? of the labour force at the end of 1956, 
a level from which Chile did not recover until 1961 (4fj), 3CLA says that 
the effects of the policy had the further result of reducing the real in- 
• come of the working population, and increasing registered unemployment, nai 
ly among the manual workers, which reached its peak in 1953, when 9-57’ of 
the labour force of Greater Santiago vas unemployed. Hie rate of per capii 
gro*. .’th declined in 1956 and 1959, it vas stagnant in 1953, but did increase 
in 1957 (See Table II).
7*- The IfLcin-Saks i'ission} as it was said, obtained some results in stabilisir 
prices, "hit, instead of virtual stabilisation by 1959, prices increased 4C 
ijhile this represents some improvement considering till 1953-55 experience, i 
cannot be considered a success considering its short-lived results, the red 
tion of consumption i:i the wages’ sector, unemployment and the reduced leve
of activity. ECLA puts it in the following words: 'In summing up the re­
sults of this first integrated programme with the central aim of stabilisa­
tion (gradual) it can be concluded that it succeeded in halting the progres 
sive spiral of prices, without fully controlling it... Furthermore, the so­
cial and economic cost cf the programme, although it vas not overwhelming, 
was very high, in its total impact, for the most defenceless sectors of the 
urbanlabour force, and for certain production activities, especially those 
linked with construction and manufactures goods for mass consumption: the
high cost helped to keep down the pace of development* (43).
Uhat are the reasons for the failure, both in achieving price stabilii
and growth in output?
1.- The most important reason, for professor Grunvald, seems to have been the 
sharp drop in the copper price in 1957. while the price of copper rose 
sharply up to the first half of 1956, thus undoubtedly aiding the programme 
.the drop that followed was considerably greater than the previous gain. As 
a consequence a substantial government deficit emerged, while domestic acti 
viiy geared towards the domestic market slackened even more.
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2.- The stagnation in economic activity and nnemploymeut brought pressure to 
case credit and wage restraints, so tbat prices rose again sharply in 155>* 
For ECLA the lac': oi success oi the programme is a reflection of the un­
steady political support for the government of procidont Ibanez and ox the 
direct effect on the level of econcede activity and employment. 'Ey the 
side of these two major factors others that have been mentioned, and which 
in most cases arise oat oi the first two, face into rising significauce.
The vacillations or reversals in the fiscal and monetary measures, for ex­
ample, can only ho understood in the context of the above two factors (49j. 
For professor Grunwald the following is im: ortaut* 'Abe board of directors 
of Chile's Central hank, dominated by private banking interests, which often 
neglected the public interest in favour of their own, was not keen on enforc­
ing effective credit restraints' (pO). It is interesting, for example, that 
the average bank rate of interest could only be raised from ltd’ in I'ffo to 
15.vh in 195b, which was hardly sufficient to have an effect cn the demand 
of credit, in view of the price rise,
3.- IGLein-Saks insisted on a fiscal reform which was not implemented.
4.- As it was said, from the beginning of the programme there was inadequate 
financial support. It was felt that sufficient resources co Id not be ob­
tained, from the I.ik, and that the I:'ID maintained itself completely alloof
*from Chile's need.
5.- For our purpose the exercise shows the failure of soft stabilisation pro­
grammes, that nonetheless sacrifice the rate of growth. Judging from the re­
covery in the external sector and the growth of the public expenditure, for 
the structuralist model to operate inflation should have been milder. The 
opposite points out to deficient policy making in the field of public in­
vestment. The agricultural bottleneck', however, was much at work as the 
high prices for fcod indicate. Perhaps the wain contradiction lay in deva­
luation and high import prices.
Still, early in 1959 it is probable that Chilean authorities thought 
that, apart from foreign leans, failure lay in the gradual and contradictory 
fiscal and monetary measures. A least, this is what is reflected i;i the 
forecoming stabilisation programme.
* Judging from Argentina and from the later events in Chile herself,, it is 
hard to understand hew foreign loans could, detain inflation on account of 
tthe capacity to import.
. v y ■
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(iii) The Alessandri Stabilisation Elan (1959-1962) and developments.
The administration of president Alessandri, which came to power late 
in 1?5^ >> proposed to carry on its own stabilisation programme; this time 
with closer supervision from the IMF. The economic policy followed throng 
out tr.is period, however, is particularly complex if one tries to analyse i 
either in 'classical orthodox terms' or with'classical structuralist though 
Cno can claim that economic policy from 1259 to early 19 2, in so far as ac 
demic propositions, is a compromise policy between orthodox measures - that 
did, inot turn out to be very orthodox - ana unorthodox measures — which ca: 
not really be called structuralist-. The alessandri plan, if one may call 
so, was orthodox in principle in the following policy tools: monetary rest:
wage control, liberalisation of prices and foreign trade, and massive relaii 
on foreign credits. 'In some important ways, writes ECLA, action proceeded 
along the lines laid down in the previous period: stability was still the
central aim' (pi)* Cn the other hand, the policy followed was unorthodox ii 
these respects: there was a fixed frozen or overvalued rate of exchange; tl
reliance on imports was massive; public investment increased sharply;
And economic recovery was hinted as an overall objective. ECLA. explains hoi 
the new administration, for political reasons in its first year at office az 
to win labour sector support, had to suggest the need for economic expansioi 
Moreover, these were the days of the Alliance for Progress and the Charter < 
Punta del Este. Since all negotiations for External credit and aid were lau 
iy guided by those precepts, the concern for development as the means of pin 
moting it assumed importance. The intention went as far as including the tc 
year development plan which had been drawn up sometime during the Ibanez Pre 
sidency and which had. remained stored away. This plan, duly brought up to 
date, was supposed to serve from 19-0 as a general fguide for public invest­
ment and as evidence for the foreign development agencies of the intention i 
follow* the Charter of Punta del Este. Today almost everyone would agree, 
however, that president Alessanari vas a conservative - mainly interested it: 
liberalisation - who, nonetheless, talked about fiscal and agrarian reforms 
and public investment; public investment which he indeed increased very cor 
sierably.
The hypothesis this st dy wants to propose - as a simple means of undei 
standing the economic policy of 1953-62 - is that policy in 125? started on 
general terms with emphasis on orthodoxy and moved away from it towards un­
orthodox measures, which nonetheless, can be branded as structural tc a very 
limited extent. It is useful tc advance that this 'compromise( economic pel 
icy led to the 1961-52 crisis; a crisis reflected in a severe external dis­
equilibrium, a renewal of the price spiral, and a lew* rate of growth.
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As in the previous sections 
and the results ot the Ales; 
control, fiscal r.m. ac--.ro s, external sector policy and liberalisation aims.
Deforo going into this - a/d as t ic risk ot being ot repetitive - it
v n  'n"i*[* ^  a  »■» •< ' a  *»’ a  * • a  I *<■'*» ***n •' ** '** a  f\* 1 ? c  r% *-» a  s*i 1 •* r* ' ** ,N~n —  **--% a^  v- X  A l   .v*OvU v.'~. O  W«. : t l . l i  I.-Q -• J. U.'.s ; * *. O  •*“
gramme accordin': io h'TLh.
lo- olrapli sti cally t ■,e obj e ctfvo s *. oro • S GU *Jllisacion, o rev■ival of 0 V -
and 1iberali sation.
c• As regards stabilisation, the principle vas i/O prvx * Oil sj i .,gregahe do o. *
rram growing through a severe control oi t: .0 none c*— ? j  •-•j -■tern. :i c 5 in
addition, these was to be sup;plenentod on the six 1 ~r c; -J , ur— J >J± ' by r0 0c*ar
imports (this proved to be overvhelmingly true).
j; * — Some major intermediate cbjectives vere femulate d to speed gro.:Cj. 1 • -T-X
phasis was laid on expanding exports and obtaining forcig;n ere;pj-L ., Co Ax- \ —
vero also true - boo Table III;J altncsgn accent shifted sped oai*■'»/
an increase in public and private investmout, which would llcTv 0 o be b;
on larger imports.
t.- As far as liberalisation it vas to be pursued in foreign trade r(gi:cO •VnVp V*
the rate of exchange), prices , and wages (which vas true only in \r r: o
vere controlled later). A decisive role was again placed. cn t> ^ pan;
of imports as a requisite for reducing or abolishing contrcls on e:otor
transactions, but also for regulating price increases and in c or -> -v tro. -vb
5c~ The compatibility ot tlie objectives vas rationalised in these words: 'inas­
much as the stability objectives vere reintorced by concern for supply, a 
visible link vas established with the intention ot reviving production ac­
tivity: and both targets vere assumed to be garde& by the greater flexibi-
lity or fluidity of the system vhich vould stem from the intention to liber­
alise.
6.- A highly favourable factor that started with and accompanied the policy vere 
the trends in the external sector (See Table XI and III), tirports - vhich 
are, of course, relatively outside the bonds of economic policy - expanded 
with relative and abnormal stability and improvement in the terns of trade. 
Imports expanded partly due to external credit and can he considered a by­
product of economic policy.
7.- It should bo stressed that the academical compatibility between stability, 
growth and the contradictory liberalisation vas to rely almost completely on 
the inflow of imports and foreign capital. This over the long-run proves to 
be a short-lived possibility.
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T/hat was then tho "behaviour of policy measures and to what sense did 
they achieve their objectives.
1.- The monetary system's liquidity depended-even to a greater extent than the 
previous period- on foreign assets and import deposits, which permitted the 
expansion of the means of payment and of the credit to tho public and privai 
sectors without pushing prices up. Cn the surface the monetary policy appe* 
expansionary. However, from the domestic assets and measures point of view 
it was not so. (The rate of growth in money plus quasi-money was again below 
1955-58). 'Credit restraints, writes professor Grunwald, were tightened, 
finally reaching the point of eliminating completely the rediscount privileg 
of the private banks. Marginal reserve, requirements were also raised shaz 
ly on peso and dollar deposits (52).' Also, interest rates and incentives ‘J 
long-term deposits were raised. The Institute of Economics cf the Universii 
of Chile says that in order to reduce the inflationary effect primary is­
sues b y the Central Bank, requirements for marginal cash hole rose in 1; 
to 87.5;- The rise in the interest rate was not high (from 15* in 1958 to 
16.7? in I960); but it was accompanied by a slackening in price increases, 
co that the real cost of money was higher. The higher interact rates on srn 
ings deposits and on authorised foreign exchange deposits resulted in a. sub­
stantial increase in the share of quasi-money to the total means of payment, 
which was about 60;f in 1961, as against 26f  on average during 1957-58* (55). 
The result cf t h o s e  measures was that monetary trends differed from price 
trends* khile the total means of payments rose by 44 and 11;-, and internal 
bank credit by 50 and 33’ » during I960 and 1961, consumer prices for the sar 
period only rose 12 and 8p (a virtual stabilisation for Chile). It is impo] 
ant to note that the velocity of circulation fell.' Ihi3 situation, accord!- 
to professor Grunwald has to be considered as one of monetary restraint. k 
yet, he writes, by mid-1960 the banking system was liquid and it looked as : 
of all things, bank loans might go begging* By the monetarists this was in­
terpreted a.s a victory; by the structuralists it was seen as a demonstrate 
of a weak demand and a lazy economy' (54). Bor practical purposes, price ii 
creases were reduced remarkably during 1960-1961.
2.- kith respect to a wage incomes policy, although superficially it appeared co: 
tradictoiy, their rational) is not difficult to interpret. During 1958 and 19! 
liberalisation was much in the minds of authorities and for political reaso; 
wages were allowed to increase in unison with the cost-of living indes. TIm 
new government also attempted a level of wage differentials giving higher v< 
adjustments to the lowest paid workers. Both things, for monetarists, coul<
have been iflationary. However, early in i960 the policy changed. In eff<
It should he noted that no official publications did publish wage figures :
19S0.
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during I960, wage and salary adjustments were left virtually to i .divi-. aal 
and collective bargains. Thus the average wage increase was IV, as com­
pared to the consumer price increase of 595’ in the previous year. hat by 
the end of the year, the authorities dicided to put an end to such a. liberal­
isation and tried to keep wage increases at a raaxiraun of 18/. Inter in 13Cl 
wage increases were reduced by legistlation to 15/. The existence of this 
wage lag is taken by monetarists as cause in the sharp reversal of price in­
creases. For structuralists it played an insignificant role, whilst this 
course was being fillowed (1939-1961) salaries and wages improved in real 
terns with respect to the previous period (1955-1958), though they failed 
to return to the 1959 level. The average salary earned by government cn- 
plcyoes (in 1950 pesos) fell from 10 escudos in 1955 to 5.9 in 195*3, recov­
ering in 1961 to 6.8 escudos. The minimum salary, which had reached its peak 
in 1953-4 at 4 escudos, fell to 5 in 1953-9 and rose to 3.10 escudos in 1961. 
ECIA's conclusion is that salary and wage trends were evidently not ebe most 
important factor in the policy followed during the period, either as a means 
of curbing inflation or of propagating it* (36). As for as prices are con­
cerned, the check came from expanding imports, reducing import controls and 
maintaining a fixed rate of exchange as wo shall see.
'.T nat should not be underestimated, according to both hCJLA and Griurwald, 
is vigorous 'moral* campaign that the government carried out during 196'-- 1 
to reduce consumer price increases. Consumer cov.reitteos were cstabI.hk.od to 
induce voluntary control (in prices) in entrepreneurs and surprisingly they 
had some effect. Although the experience was short-lived, during the first
two years of its existence the central body of those committees played a not
unimportant part as the spokesman of the consumers in defending their claims 
and petitions before public opinion and the political authorites.
3.- From the fiscal angle, the programme sot out to increase tax revenue and uo 
alter the structure of expenditure. The objects of this were to eventually 
reduce the need for foreign loans and to increase public investment. Ire- 
gross was made in both respects, although here pro ;th had priority over 
stabilisation end still prices fell.1 (The reason, of course, lies in-the 
behaviour of the extern!a sector that made this possible), fax revenue was 
increased in absolute terms and as a percentage cf GIF"; it was loss than U p  
on average during 1356 and 195*3 end over 14/ daring 1 9 6 0 -5 3 . The same applie 
to capital expenditure (bee Table 17)• It went up by over 50/ in real terms 
in 1339-61 with respect to the previous three years. Its share in
penditure rose from 13/ to over 22/’ between the same periods.
•J on.
* /This data-is based on estimates from the Institute of Economics \ 5 5 j »
Sec also Table II.
4.-
But, in spite ihe increase in revenues, fiscal borrowing did not dirain: 
on the contrary, the deficit in current income with respect to total expend: 
tr.re increased, so that public investment was financed almost entirely by c: 
ital inflows, consisting mainly of foreign currency liabilities. The surpli 
on current account covered less than o f  cf public investment in I960 and 19' 
Moreover, 8p' of the inflows of ca ital represented foreign currency commit- 
raents. The reasons for the steady increase in the fiscal deficit were nob c 
ferent from those of the previous period. Tnile public investment was beiiw 
increased, the priority objective of containing prices had the same effect c 
transfer payments, above all the part destined to subsidise public and priv< 
enterprises (transfer payments to railways alone rose 50,7). The same thing 
happened under the head of financial payments, as a result cf heavier borroi 
iag. Thus budgetary policy could hardly be considered stabilising from an c 
thodcx angle, although, from the domestic financial angle, its potential in­
flationary impact was tansferred to the financing through the balance of paj 
meats.
The heart of the Alessandri Elan, as well as its results, lie in the foreign 
sector measures that were adopted and the small but steady growth in exports 
and terras of trade relationship. The liberalisation of foreign trade -excep 
for the rate of exchanje- was enforced and large foreign loans were contract 
Unifying, fixing and overvaluing the rate of exchange - something which has 
nothing to do with liberalism - proved crucial in obtaining virtual price 
stability (although both stabilisation indices were only temporary). Brora 1 
to 1961 the rate of exchange remained fixed at 1053 escudos per dollar, whil 
consumer prices increased 12E in i 960, 8 f  in 1951 and 14;■ in 1952.; somethin 
quite unusual in Chile. Cn the other hand, local banks were permitted to ac 
cept dollar deposits at a high rate of interest ( 8 f )  a n d the government issu
dollar notes and bonds of high yield. These measures were designated to re-
*patriate private capital.
ECLA’s interpretation of the programme places a somewhat different em­
phasis (57)* They write that the crucial element of the whole policy was, 
namely, external borrowing. The expansion of imports stands out as the inter’ 
mediate objective of all basic targets. Sat it was only feasible on the sea 
demanded by economic policy if recourse was had to external credit. That is 
how t’10 instr ment (which was to be the pivot of the whole model) came into 
being. The main influence of the external contribution was its immediate 
effect on the supply of imports, which increased above the real export earn­
ings thus reducing the disequilibrium between GNP and expenditure, which oth
In this new regime the banking system was committed to extend dollar leans 
which were then used as monetary substitutes and increased the supply of 
money.
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vice hove re suite:' in an increase in prices. The m notary system, by roociv- 
ins; foreign exchange and selling it to importers, accrued means of pay ent 
vhich financed a considerable part or t e piblic budget anc" also of private 
sector’s demand tor money, thus cushioning the expansionist effect of such 
measures. The folloving Table sieve hcv for tho ref trade "balance brio gen. 
the gap betveon GI".? and expenditure in 1353-32.
Chile: 81:? and Gross Expenditure,  and net Trado balance
(ifillioas of 19Cl escudos)
1958 1953 I960 19cl 1 9 6 2
Ghr? 1919 1920 5191 5123 5706
G Expenditure 1969 1877 5300 J  w .-.w 5786
Net Exports or imports ( - }
“50 13 “106 ■1 0 "7  “ - l - f  l o r »- u u
Source:  i i C I A , op. cit. (pag. 318;.
It is no vender then that -again in the shcrt-term _  |  Lr ■ t o vy
vas fast and inflation vcry mild'
If a policy based on these mechanics is to operate, the volume 0f ext:
financing must be consider■able, as ia practice it vas. fTP- ~ -------- I . - , , .  -P7! &.€ O x  G O  a  i lb . 3 cot
the Table belov) almost trebled in an exceptionally brief period. The A varr-
ing, hovever, vas raised by t’.ie minister of finance in 1951: 'the total cvuii-
inents contracted bv Chile as at December 1965 represented an outflov of abort
535 million dollars in 19Cl. To appreciate the fall magnitude ox this amount
it should be borne in mind that Chile's total exports daring the present year
i-rill be belov/ 600 million dollars; hence, considerably more than half its cx-«port earnings vill have to be carmarred for servicing commitments.
Chile: Estimate of the foreign Currency Debt
(millions of dollars)
1953 I960 1955
Public sector 388.9 401.0 1,106.3.
Private sector 180.1 579.5 550.d
Total 5C9.0 803.5 1,677.1
Petaming to the theoretically devalued exchange rate in 1953/ as it 
vas it vas fixed at 10J1 e s c u d o s from 1959-6.1. The move vas obviously Cone 
to preserve stability. This amounted to holding prices doom in a part of sup­
ply vhich is vital because of the proportion of basic consumer goods (See sec­
tion c), vhich, moreover, vas no:; increasing faster than the total sapply of 
goods and services, as shovn by the ovalation of the import coefficient: 90,- 
of GNP in 1353, 9.6p in 1359, 12. Sf’ in i960 and 11.0,3 in 196l.*w
(Footnotes * and ** on following page)
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That is nore, the decision implied a drop in the relative prices of imnorts 
(they rose by 16.S in 19 5 v and by 1.2;. in I960, while demos tic prices went 
up hy 32 anu S.7;*-')• ~A2 measure, moreover, dit net seem to affect negative
ly the export sector, as monetarists would have it. Chile’s traditional ex 
ports verc now finding a market, despite the overvalued currency, "because o 
high productivity in mining, the improvement in the terms of trade, and som 
facilities given to secondary' products, Neither did overpricing appear to 
a threat on the import side, since demand could he satisfied with the ample 
support of external credit, this approach, of course, had to lead to the f 
thcr liberalisation of the import system. No that end, prohibitions on wha' 
were regarded as non-essential items - luxury goods cr those prejudicial to 
national interests - were abolished; import deposit rates were reduced and 
in some cases replaced 1 'j additional custom charges.
In any case, tho combination of these factors - relatively high,-thou gi 
not increasing, export earnings; a fixed rate of exchan c; import Xacilit: 
and sustained imports; and ample foreign borrowing - created a decidedly e: 
plosive situation which came tc a crisis in 1961 (see fable III). The defi< 
on current account multiplied tenfold between 1939 and 19-1, from 24.7 tc 2J. 
millions, furthermore, the balance on capital account, which was sufficient 
in 1939 to offset the deficit, was completely inadequate in 1960-61 in spite 
of its absolute growth. Hie 1961 baleucc-of-payments deficit was 135 millic 
dollars which resulted in the depiction of the supply of foreign exchange ar 
the suspension of exchange operations.
A surprising thing was that although purchases of imported capital gocd 
rose in absolute terms, their share of the total decreased as compared with 
the previous period. Iheir average vas 137 million in 1936-39 and 139 mil­
lions in 1933-61, but as they represented an average 37;-* °3 the total in the 
first period they only represented 35;- in the second. The behaviour of wav 
materials and fuels was similar (see section c). Cn the other band, consume 
goods increased faster both in relative and absolute terras: from an average
of 140 million they passed to 152 and from 29;3 they came to represent 52;6. 
Clearly the abundance of foreign exchange and the liberal policy were net 
safeguarding the future rate of growth and the external equilibrium. This 
state of affairs wh.ich led to the lfol crisis put an end to price stability 
by the end of 19-62.
(from the previous page)
The average e x ch a n g e  dropped from 8 4 . 2 ,: of the theoretical parity in 1 9 3 8  
to only 80.7 in 1959 (see Table III).
The fact, on the other hand may point out to a weak 1ST process and hence 
to the instability of the system: where imports were to fall, income wovJ
too.
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The economy was stagnant during 1939
the Alessandri Flan, considerin; that i b •
and that the economy had been rather step:
Table l). I 'orcover, the rate of growth r
it was slack in 19 Si Indeed over 1333-1
•> 4 c* "■>r ^  1'* /V:*^ # *"vv!T ‘*‘1 *1 c* *•* ^  *> •!• *» f- ij. o o  ,4. j.J. o  I# j  vVju t.-— i ;.L.i i J. »_ v.—  v-* wa. w —
t during the previous years (Ceo 
ecovered, in 19CO and 1952, although 
: the average rate oi' growth -.-as 
considerably high (f5• •-;-) ^cr Chilean standard* Cn average the rate oi gross 
fixed investment moved at 19. 4; per annum - this was mainly a re salt of the
Loom in Lull ding* (2?//) - which public consumption increased at 9*5;' annually*
Fixed investment in capital goods, although slower, achieved a high rate of 
growth (16. h /  } • This is explained considering the inf lev/ cf foreign capital 
and the availability of imports, by professor Grunwald in the following terms: 
high labour costs made labour-saving investment more attractive; output per 
man-hour increased, and efficiency was also forced upon the domestic producticr 
through the competition of foreign goods (59). In relative terms, private 
consumption grew very slowly, presumably as a result of the wage-1ag and the 
reduction in real earnings. Consumption of high-incorne groups, on the other 
hand, is reflected in the relative and absolute increase of consumer-durable 
imports.
Summarising, the relative high rate of growth was reflected in the expan­
sion of the public sector, construction, and the external sector. The build­
ing industry achieved an alltime rate of growth cf 20'/. per annum. Public in­
vestment was mainly a consequence of the growth of energy (?.2b per annum) and 
transport ( 7 * 0 /  per annum). Fxports, for the same period, grew moderately at 
6.Ip on average. Imports, on the other hand, achieve ; a surprising rate of 
increase of IT.Ip per annum. Put, the fact that the domestic sector was de­
flationary is seen in the following percentages: agriculture decreased at an
annual rate of -?..4‘!, while industry and mining only grew at 2 . , that is, a 
rate lower than increases in population.
•Before trying to evaluate the results of the second stabilisation pro­
gramme, it is uscf.1 to see what its immediate ccnseouences were:
1.- The crisis in the external accounts, which became obvious at the end of 13'6l, 
was responsible for the abrupt change in economic policy during 1362. The 
first reversal occurred in feeember 19-61: foreign trade operations were sus­
pended and the dual exchange rate //as established. Official devr.l".ation fol­
lowed in 1952, when the official rate was devel: ed by more than j 0 /  and ti e 
free market rate escalated to more than alCO;„. The official rate, hovever, 
could not be held at this figure and fr.m iffl to 19:2 was, in fact, also de­
valued by at least ICO;.', while the free rate followed accordingly. The con­
sumer price index responded imuediaely - aby 1953-4 prices ■'/ere up 44 and 46, 
respectively - and it was clear that stabilisation had failed c-r.ce more.
In other words, the reversal in liberalism of the Alessandri policies,
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h’conomic policy on the whole became defensive. Together with devaluation, 
liberalisation of foreign trade was reversed: controls were reinstated on
imports, less essential items were again banned; special taxes were impose 
dnd the prior import deposit was escalated. These measures succeeded in im 
proving relatively the balance of payments, at least as compared with the 
critical position of 1961. (fee Table VI). The deficit 011 current account 
ifas reduced progressively from 1962 to 1965. And, the aggregate deficit 
fell from 135 million dollars in 1961 to 29 million in 1963* This evoluiio 
ifas caused by the significant drop in imports (1962-1965) and a continuing 
inflow of public foreign loans. The net balance for public foreign capital 
increased progressively from 4S millions in 1961 to 208 million dollars in 
1964. As we have said, however, the anasing recourse to foreign loans has 
left the balance ofpayments - namely through the service and amortisation - 
in a very weak position that, in effect, verges on chronic external disequi 
librium from 195l to 1966.
In fiscal matters, tendencies were maintained somewhat neutral. Current in 
cone increased slightly in 1963-64, while current expenditure remained stab 
(sec Table P/). Surprisingly enough publicinvestment was allowed to expand 
considerably. SCIA writes that with exception of monetary policy, which co 
tinued to follow the established pattern, it was necessary to adopt a new a 
proach to price and wage controls and intervention (59). In fact, the airfch 
rities attempted to introduce price controls and to fix wages and salaries; 
and real wages declined. I3CH4, from different sources, comments the out com 
of 1961 in the following words: 'At the beginning of 1963 wages were inere
cd by less than the praceeding rise in the cost of living, but pressure was 
too strong to permit a continuation of this policy. Credit restrictions we 
re-imposcd, but these were offset to a considerably extent by a rise in the 
velocity of circulation^?).. it must be taken into account that bank lendin 
to tho private sector is already at a very low level in Chile1 (60).
GNI5 growth performed poorly at an annual rate of 2.4y from 1962 to 1964; th, 
is, slightly below the rate cf population growth. Horcover, the rate is in 
flatcd by the performance of 1952, when the rate cf growth was relatively 
high (7;-) because of the availability of imports and the fact that controls 
in the foreign sector were not introduced until the end of the year. Total 
investment did increase at a rate of 3.3p per annum, but only because piibli 
investment continued to expand. Tlaerx^ and Transport grew respectively on 
average at 6.Op and 6.4'. Total conc;.r.ipticn was stagnant and agriculture, 
raining and industry were slack, specially considering their poor rates of 
growth, (hiring 1959-1952,
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Late in 1964- the new administration of prosdident 7rei - cortsidsrad on inter­
ventionist as compared wit?' president TTLessandri, '• t io tbo rigl t of the . e- 
feate’ socialist candidude dr. All endc - too1: office. It was mil tie new r._* 
ministrati0:1 would give ^reference to structural changes that would gradually, 
achieve lasting grout’ ant. stability* (Si) • That is, a structural change in 
priorities. Although we co net propose to co into the natter here, it is in­
teresting to note that public invesiuo it ’::r co rtiuuod to expand. ACLA claims 
nonetheless, t*:at in 13:3 tlic "basic 'rcblcms ant ir .a.laaees ot t.ie ec novy,
c - 1 0 “  ’ o*J;n 1 1 *•'r>■»»r*i v . ypf  1 n g *  •'.I ' UV-  S’ ' 'O ~ % ’TCUG; - * '  " . nGv- C c t H . V C
system had made no farther headway; the inflationary pop had widened; an p 
public expenditure and imports were still dependent upon an increased vol-one 
of foreign loans, The outstanding role during Id of continued to be played by 
the fiscal sector in production and social services, and by entered cradle 
as an expedient for securing these aims without cpyravatir.y inflationary ten­
sions (53).
Let us then a. \j vn t0 our iniontion of sur.u.ari 3ing th0 res 1ts of tho
stabilisation gro'-ran :c, accord!ng 10 str: ctnrali st •w'-hlGd^.-1* •
Uith respect tc >''p_ Q0 stability, after the fast ra■ ■ 00* V* O'X inj..in vi on in 11 “r\; i
the policy was ahie t0 reduco price increases to v tnal Chilean stabili
from 1960 to sou9 tin0 C ring th0 last cpuarter of 19/CO T-, v-V # .u. -L <yt. i U ,  . U I jx 1362 on-
wards, inflation gathere cl strong th and became alnoC) 0 as rapi cl as before 1533
(See Table II}. Thus , in the last analysis, both J.-l.u..0 1933 L j  j <-< and the 1959*
1961 programme s failed to vq-* 10 civ inflation.
The relationship bet:;eon the evelution in prices a,nu the bc-hav.i ou •o
external sector, CIS 'Well as the policies foilowed in this sector, i s “uis
core of the matter. As it has been seen the 1951 f creign exchange crisi, y~f
and the sub seguent devaluation in lb:2 restored thC» inflati onary spiral to
its traditional linensions. * Other factors or pressures, writes ltd Id, ori­
ginating in the wage sector or in the monetary and fiscal fields, scan to 
have played a lesser part, as the relative price stability in that year 
(l9bl) clearly indicates (5b)1.
a) The situation is a classical one where external cli sequi 1ibrinn coin­
cides with price instability. The point to stress, however, is that- 
in this case (rnlihe with, say, Argentinian or Brazilian inflationary 
outbursts) the immediate cause was not a sustained fail in exports 
and its consequent chain reaction in the domestic economy, beginning 
with fiscal income. The decline in exports, as we have seen, vas in­
significant and, on any event, it was offset by an increasing flow of 
foreign loans.
*?C y-It is important to note that the econom y recovered again in If Gy, and that 
-price increases fell (See Table I, II and III). In structuralist terms, wove:
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Disequilibria should be attributed to the monumental increase in imports, 
for exceeding the capacity to in orb despite the increase in loans. This 
led to the sharp devaluations of 19*62-3*
In principle, the responsibility for the crisis and fcr inflation may be 
placed on having kept the exchange rate overvalued from I960 to 1962 and 
on a totally inadequate liberalisation of import policy. However, one 
should be caref 1 here because it was after all, devaluation itself which 
renewed the inflationary spiral. 'It should be remembered, writes HOLA,  
that the resulting overpricing of the escudo was no greater than in prev­
ious years or periods for the obvious reason that prices climbed very 
little. During the first half of the fifties, for instance, the gap be­
tween the average exchange rate and the theoretical parity was much wider 
than in 19 6l (it had been y k ’ cf parity, while -in 1961 it was 69y)...Tho 
more recent crisis should therefore be associated vith another factor, thai 
of import liberalisation. It was the conduction of this factor with the 
fixed exchange rate that really destroyed the stability of the balance of 
payments' (65)• but, this amounts to saying that either way - before or 
after the 1962 devaluation - the policy followed was making price stabilil 
incompatible with external equilibrium. Tire former, unavoidably, was sa­
crificed for the latter.
The reasons why the authorities followed this dangerous policy and, in 
fact, alio,zed the external accounts to deteriorate to a completely untencu 
point, are probably rather complex. Superficially it may be said that ihs 
’./ere caught by their 'compromise' policy: trying to achieve price stabili
ty and external equilibrium overemphasising the role of imports and forei/ 
credits, while failing to undertake structural changes in domestic activi­
ties and exporting, despite the advances in fiscal policy. One can under­
stand that if authorities had defended the balance of payments before 196' 
- by devaluation - this would have destroyed the stabilisation intentions 
from the beginning leading to higher wages and costs which could only be 
met by further deflation in the monetary and fiscal fields. This would 
happen in an economy which was already badly deflated as a consequence of 
the previous stabilisation programme. Cn the other hand, if precautions 
had been taken to defend the balance of payments from the beginning - i.e, 
1959 - this would have implied lover i m-iorts ana less sooru—n m  aoroi'/n 
loans in a year when the economy was stagnant and inflationary. Clearly, 
a devaluation in 1353» together vith the deflationary situation, would
*/ %(fro:: previous page;..one may insist that this is merely a recover;* cause
by the short-term growth in exports, imports and foreign capital and that
long-run imbalances are quite present. The policies of President Frei hav<
tended to bo rather unorthodox, but whether they have led Chile out of he:
chronic inflation and stagnation is still not clear (l964S196S).
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have mode the political situation close to unbearable• There seens to have 
been an unrealistic reliance on foreign loans and imports per co, without 
the built up defences in the domestic economy.
That is, there vas no nolieg to diversify experts, reduce imports or en­
hance industrialisrticn.
ACLA takes the view that roc onsibility of the failure lies in the groups 
(both of entrepreneurs and workers) that defended the overvaluation of the 
exchange rate, while other defended the liberalisation of imports. 1 A for­
midable combination of foroces had united to thwart every effort made to 
postpone the balance cf payments crisis as, indeed, they succeeded in doing, 
dal though, in the past, opposition to devaluation had always been concentrat­
ed with the broad masses of consumers because devaluation had a particularly 
severe effect on the price cf imported consumer goods in Chile, it now had 
become more extensive, hence, it is not surprising that the process vas al­
lowed to continue until it had reached a point in which neither reserves nor
credits were able to make the system workable any longer (l9'l). hut, even
■2;-though stricter measures had been taker, the operation of the plan would 
have had to depend in an y  case on external credit whenever export income 
failed to increase sufficiently or AST in agriculture and industry lacked 
the vigour to bring about a greater autonomous expansion on the part c.f the 
production system and thus reduce the propensity to import or at least pave 
the way for i k  control. In. default of these conditions, it is understand 
able that, in view of the increasing service and amortisation payments on 
the external debt, the continuity of the programme should have been subordi­
nated to the need of enlarging the flow of foreign capital. If the possibi­
lity of obtaining a steady end increasing flow of external credit is deemed 
to have been unlikely, the plan, as conceived and developed, had little chrue 
of lasting and the misguided decisions taken with respect to the exchange 
rate and import facilities that provoked the 195-1 crisis merely precipitated 
the collapse. This again implies that the plan as conceived, made price 
stability incompatible with external equilibrium.
Thick world have been inflationary.
4f-A*h'e shall return briefly to this point of structural changes. Hut, as 
s t a t e d  here by 231A, it appears to indicate !mut failure lies parti ally 
in the inadequate res onse of t' e domestic bector. Hut, how could domestic 
production - deflated from the monetary and. real income aspects, as it vas 
bo expected tc revive when, the size cf the market had: b een delit ora tel .* re­
duced; who.: If T industrialisation vas weak; when cutlets f 
exports vers slack and there was no export diversification; 
ture, left to itself, was on the decline?
trad i tic. ;nl 
' eu a :ricul-
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3*- Jknong the surprising factors of the period, was the fact that fixed invest* 
went grew very favourably. As major component (fixed-capital) accounted f< 
nearly 13/-’ of Ctf? in 1961-62, having normally been below 9/6 in 1957-13. A; 
wo saw, investment in capital goods increased rapidly (l6.4p) and buildingi 
activities boomed (27/)• Altho gh i iports of capital goods did not add to 
their share of the total, their value rose sharoply from 151 million dollai 
in 1957 to 237 million in 1953-61. Lkch of this investment and construct!/ 
was carried out by the public sector.
4.- Indeed - from the structuralist angle- the public contribution to the invei 
ment process i/as promising, This was greater both in volume and proportion 
t:\an in previous years (See Table IV). ACL/1 writes that there was a start! 
ing recovery and progress in public housing and infrastructural works, trai 
port and electric energy.
Housing Units Puilt by the Public Sector
1953-1953 1959-1963
lumber 25,070 84,460
Square metres 1,691,000 4,692,000
Investment in Public '.Jerks and Capital Goods in Transport
1954-1953 1959-1963 £ Variati
P.oads and airports 124.5 267.6 115
Ports 10.7 24.1 125
Pail ways 4C.9 209.2 411
Installed electric energy capacity increased by 32..5 /  in 1953-62 agai 
14.Sf! in the previous five years. It may be possible, however, that pr.bli 
expenditure was not geared sufficiently to production activities.
5.- These remarkable developments were of course, reflected in the high rate o 
growth of GUP for the period, 5.4p on average, -/hen locking at yearly fig 
ures, as we have said, GUP trends according to the above source do not rev 
a clear cut expansion, as indicated by the fluctuations 021 the product and 
the fact that the highest rates generally follow upon a recession, in othe 
words, t ey represent a recovery rather than an actual advance.
6.- 7-hat appears puzzling from the structuralist- angle i s tna ^ wii ile's capacit■vfto import, unlike with other inflationary countries of the region , was ri 
and favourable during this period. That is, the economy counted with a re
Pern may also be considered an exception in this sense, although inflation wa 
milder. Mexico fits the structuralist thesis better because the capacity to 
ineort, however supplemented by foreign credits, expanded naripisan with pric 
stability.
u C ' G i V O l g  O I C I a  O X -5 . jl  c l . i C .  trC »y j .  G 13 - i A y --*/ -*• - t i l t  0 . 0  s>. « 1.1?. Cl o  v l J - O o  a ■ — . 11 ^  <.»
any le seiy It co Id ha argued, however, t at in t ocry the ex .an. .ieu cf 
imports through additional borrow! r; cannot he compared with the expansion 
tirCui 2 txio xro . •-•. o^. ex ../ v « .. a secc tc cam c« txis  m. 1 an 6ij.ec w
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on t-.o comes'cic econorxv is very :ro..-a,;ly greater C'.-v *1 '•
imports were derived from foreign loans* In fact, in tho last onelysis, 
this is whore the structuralis t nrg. moat loads go in terms cl t e diversi- 
fication of exports and the dhdAd. till, given tie capacity tc i'.port cur­
ing this period, the Chilean case does not fit very well the main clement of 
the sirvcturalist thesis: tho lover the capacity tc import the higher the
inflation, other things being.equal* Arguing that there was in fact almost 
price stability iron i960 to 15*52 is not very convincing because it was a 
short-lived stability. Arguing th.at the capacity to inport was accompanied 
by incone growth and hence inflation, is net toe convincing cither, veer/ se 
income growth was slow. 2?or the structuralist model really to apply, special­
ly considering t a long run grcvth in CII, either income grcvt.i snc"ld have 
been faster or inflation milder.
7.- bnat is very important from the structuralist angle is that, with stabilisa­
tion, the activities directly connected with the production cf goods, with 
agriculture and manufacturing, developed at a very slow rate (lee Table l).
The fact that both public and private construction was booming nay explain 
the rate of growth; but, 0:1 the other hand, construction absorbed much ox 
the investment in non-production activities. This nay amount to saying th.at 
foreign loans and ingoris were wasted and enhanced the domestic bottlenecks 
that then led to further inflation. Special attention should be given to 
the decline in agricultural production, which for economical one institution­
al reasons, a pears to be one of the weaker points of the Chilean economy. 
Industry developed at a faster rate, but again this is more a recovery of 
the deflation left by the first stabilisation programme than an ex,.ansicn.
Hie structuralist proposition - that against the policy of stabilisation in 
practice - would amount to achieving a rate of growth m/itI the allocation of 
the productive resources in these two complementary ways: one intended to
increase and diversify export activities and the other to continue or ;o re­
activate HIT in respect to both agriculture and industry, i. the light of 
economic, technological and financial conditions, as well as their export 
potential. The fact is that the resources for this purpose were available 
in the form cf the previo s industrialisation process ’which included in bor­
ne di ate and capital goo' producing industries), and in the feu. cf an expand­
ing capacity to import. It should have been hoped that under whoso circum­
stances, productivity com Id have been increase!, heedless to say, this './eld
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have required expanding the domestic market and enploynent, potential exte: 
al markets, La t in-American ccopcr.tion and an expansive policy (something i' 
*,ras not really encouraged b y  the Alessandri plan). Judging b y  t h e  failure 
of the orthodox policies, this arguments appear to present a Letter, altho 
theoretical, solution to inflation.
8.- As regards exports they grew mildly and were outstripped b y  the rapid grow 
of imports, hut, for structuralists, what is important is that the tradit 
al structure was maintained: copper still a c c o u n t e d  for almost d-Op of the
total value throughout 1959-53• Industrial and. agricultural exports, on t 
other hand, remained much the same: industrial goods exported were worth
23 million dollars in I960 and 30 million in 1353, agricultural goods were 
31 end 32 millions, respectively-.
9.- Vith respect to 1ST, in another place the structuralist argument of hew 
industrialisation in inflationary Latin American countries hecame the 
source of growth was discussed. The Chilean case during t h e  period 1258- 
6p illustrates how the process can reverse itself. The data available 
suggests t  at a kind of structural recession has taken place, since indus­
try has become less important as a whole. (Gee section c j . 1 anufactaring 
industry fell from 23.5;' of total Cf” in 1954-55 to 18.i;* in 1952-55. Thi 
also applies to employment. In 1940 the labour force employed in manufact 
ing was ICy of the total; in 1>52 it was 12, and, in IjbC, l ' l ( [ There was 
even a greater loss of ground by the agricultural sector, which in Chile 1 
important in terms of LAT and some export development.
10.- In view of these facts, it is probable that the investment during this 
period improved infrastructure and housing, but did not establish the con­
ditions that would have stimulated industrialisation and agricultural pre- 
gross. Resuming, the fact that export promotion end industrialisation war 
not given an important role may explain why stabilisation was not achieved 
Cnly structural changes could have provided the basis on which external cr 
dit should be used. If not external borrowing becomes a self-defeating pr 
ccss, which on any event can cnly be temporary.
11.- Thus, in Chile, one returns to the initial structuralist thesis. The two 
main issues on which economic policy rests seem to be closely connected or 
even interdependent, hkruever wise and selective theeffort to achieve stab 
lity may be, it can hardly hope for success unless it is based on changing 
the economic structure in the c nfcext of a favourable external sector, tho 
would allow for a faster rate cf growth and a lesser vulnerability to exte 
nal factors. Under these conditions,-growth in industry, agric Iture and 
public investment, together with an expanding capacity to import - growth
* and stability may be attainable. Although, it is unlikely that price sta­
bility wall bo achieved over Tie short-run.
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whole period cl 1943-1265* cne Is left with the doubt of how 
well Chile can bo made a case for structuralism. The alternative point is 
that inflation has been chronic, together with an expanding capacity to im­
port. Allowances have- to be made, cf course, for frequent and sometimes 
severe falls in ex orts, vhich thro gh tie fiscal system have endangered 
public finance, hut even so, the long-run trend resulted in a considerable 
expansion both of Ch and total imports, plus a net inflowf foreign capital 
(this is partic- I nly relevant in comparison with the other inflationary 
countries cf Latin America, the structuralist ncdel is one based cn the rel­
ative comarison of the region). Arguing that inflation is explained by the 
fact that income was growing beyond what the fluctuating capacity to im.ort 
could contribute to stability is not convincing. Again, the performance of 
output was too poor to account for fast inflation and growing foreign ex­
change. her the structuralist model to really operate either inflation
-x-shculd have been milder cr grco.th faster.
It could be argued that the capacity to import - i;e. ier orts ar.d for­
eign exchange - was wasted in the domestic economy.' Ant this amounts to ad­
mitting that the foreign exchange bottleneck was relatively unimportant in 
explaining inflation. Still, it is quite true that the agricultural bottle­
neck was much at work and led to liigherfood prices. The import food bill
was burdensome and little roadway - because of institutional reasons - was 
made towards her. It may also be probable that public expenditure vas con­
centrated cn public building and social services and not on productive pblic 
investment. These two 1 structural factors1 in domestic policy may account 
for inflation, dorsever, structuralists are going to argue that hST indus­
trialisation -.-as very we ak and hence the rate of growth poor and high the 
vulnerability of the econcry in terns of the fluctuations in the external 
sector, hat, ether things being eq al, inflation should have been weakeri 
After all, structuralism argues that one cf the causes of inflation is in­
tensive hdI industrialisation net present in Chile. These factors point out 
that structural inflation was caused within the domestic economy, especially 
if the role of vage inflation is convincingly minimised and monetary policy 
io regarded as neutral. It is relevant to rote that brasiieut Aral's policy 
has turned towards these issues: laud refer:., productive public investment
and the diversification of exports, as veil as the no.ti .nalisation of the 
copper mines.
In si Suing, x-.o i-.ea is aenveu irem one experience oi r::.e owner mi.La orcnary 
countries of the region.
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(4) The Peruvian - IMF Stabilisation Programmes (1958-1959)
The Peruvian case, for the purposes of this chapter, will be again
treated as another variant of the structuralist thesis. This is, however, 
a controversial issue. During 1957-1959 Peru suffered a rather severe 
balance of payments crisis, which was accompanied by two devaluations and 
a considerable increase in the mild but persistent inflationary rate.
Late in 1957 the IMF stepped in, with it s customary package of orthodox 
policies, and guided the Peruvian economic policies untial the end of 1959* 
And, what is very interesting, from I960 onwards the economy recovered re­
markable in terms of its rate of growth, and the balance of payments; al­
though prices continued to increase mildly. Thus it was claimed, in the
aftermath and there onwards, that the IMF's stabilisation programmes (there
♦were actually three orthodox drives) had been a success. Our object is 
to try to see what was the role of these programmes in achieving price 
stability - something which as will he seen is obviously very question­
able as prices have continued to increase throughout athe 1960's - and 
in achieving external equilibrium and a sharp recovery in output growth 
- something which superficially is less questionable -. The second paral­
lel objective is to try to interpret these policies, as with the previous 
two sections, following structuralism.
The behaviour of the external sector in Peru deviates somewhat from 
the general trends of the rest of the selected countries. During the im­
mediate post-war period, Peru, unlike the other countries, was relatively 
inflationary for its own standards, while its export sector was relative­
ly stagnant (67)« B y 1950, and more so with the Korean boom, its external 
sector started to expand rapidly and continued to do so at least until 
1956. The experience was different in the main inflationary countries of 
the region. Their post-war export boom was earlier and more short-lived: 
in Argentina it was over by 1949, in Chile recovery lasted only until 1953; 
in Mexico there was an external crisis in 1954, and Brazilian and Colombian 
export expansions were over with the coffee crisis. But, what is more im­
portant, the external crisis in Peru only lasted for two years (1957-1958). 
It was during this period that the DIF, with a year lag, 1958-59» recom­
mended its policies. By 1959» Peruvian exports started to increase and, 
for the region's standards, have done very well ever since (except for a 
small setback in 1963)* With respect to export sector and the mild rate 
of inflation, Peru may initially be considered a relative success as com­
pared with Argentina, and less sowith Chile. But, on the other hand,
*See, for example, Mr. D. Felix who says this is the one victory of the
DIF in the inflationary Latin-American countries. )66).
it has to be remembered that Peru is a ‘more* underdeveloped country in 
terms oi structural characteristics: the economy is largely dependent
on the external Hector (as seen“in the import coefficient; these non- 
export or traditional agricultural is very backward; intensive MST in­
dustrialisation has yet to start; the infrastructure bottlenecks are 
considerable; and, income distribution inequality is probably very..cofc--- 
siderable.
Resuming, the behaviour of the external sector - together with its 
fluctuations - has been closely correlated with the rate of growth, at 
least from 1950 to 1965» Indeed, Peru's growth rate is among the fast­
est, if not dhe first of the region. Thus Peru has to be interpreted as 
a successful case in terms of the structuralist model. That is, one where 
in the long-run the absence of a foreign exchange bottleneck has permitted 
a fast rate of growth, although mild inflation (over 7$ per annum) has 
been a permanent feature of the system.
ANother qualification is important, as compared vith the rest of the 
semi-industrialised countries. Peru only started to industrialise until 
veil after the end of Second World War. Although, from then onwards it 
has continued to do so at a realtively fast rate. Still, it is fair to 
claim, the MST - as represented by the import structure - has not reached 
the fdifficult position it has in some of the other countries; and is 
thus less vulnerable to the external sector, which in any case has been 
relatively favourable.
Important too is the fact that throughout the 1950's Peru was char­
acterised by a liberal trade policy, a free exchange rate policy, and 
low levels of taxation. The fact was accentuated by the stabilisation 
plan. The IMF, as in the other cases, granted credits and encouraged 
other foreign creditors upon the condition of restrictive monetary, fis­
cal and wages measures. Although it is unnecessary to describe again 
the premises of the IMF, as in Argentina and Chile, they were based on 
the belief that market forces bring a satisfactory rate and pattern of 
growth and that inflation and external disequilibrium in Peru were also 
caused by an excessive demand. The cure ought to be a restriction of 
aggregate demand, through the restriction of credit, the elimination of 
budget deficits, and the control of wages. The implementation of these 
assumptions and policies has had very negative results in Argentina and 
Chile; where the cost paid was high in terms of growth, external crisis, 
further inflation and political upheaval. Superficially, however, it 
seems that Peru is an exception since, after the 1958i?i959 programmes, 
there has been fast growth and external equilibrium, if not price sta- 
(Both footnotes on the following page)
bility, from I960 to 1965. Structuralism rejects this conclusion or 'ex - 
ception.'
The discussion will cover three aspects: (i) a description of the
general trends in the Peruvian economy during 1950-1956 that culminated 
with the 1957 disequilibrium; (ii) the study of the 1958-59 stabilisation 
measures; (iii) and the developments that followed it from I960 to 1965*
The exposition relies largely on the research and conclusions of Miss Rose­
mary Thorpe, from the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statis­
tics (68). A severe limitation of the exposition is the unreliability of 
the National Account statistics in Peru. The fact is well reflected in the 
divergences between the two main sources of official information - the Cen- 
tral Bank and the Instituto Nacional de la Planificacion. Following 
ECLA, we shall rely mostly on the second source.
Before going ihto the subject, as before, it is useful to give a sum­
mary in the long-run trends in monetarists and structuralist variables.
With respect to monetarism the following has been obtained:
1.- No statistical correlation was found between increases in the supply of 
money and quasi-money and inflation. Indded the supply of money may be 
made to contract and prices remained the same, or viceversa (See Part II,
Chpter 2, section a).
2.- Budget deficits have been relatively small as a % of GNP. No correlation, 
however, was found between them and jjrice increases. Budget deficits,
may fall or increase, and prices remain the same on average (see section b). 
3*-With respect to nominal industrial wages they are, again, correlated to 
prices with a year lag. As before, it is concluded that their role is 
limited to the inflationary spiral (see section jc).
4.- Exchange rate devaluations in Peru have been less severe and infrequent, 
and hence inflation milder. They are taken to be a reflection of setbacks 
in export demand (which creates a temporary foreign exchange bottleneck).
With respect to the structural causes of inflation the trends are the 
following:
1.- Peru's food production per capitalhas grown very slowly and with a tendency 
to stagnate. Moreover, food price increases have tended to be above the 
cost-of-living index (see Chapter 3, section a).
2.- It was seen that Peru's exports and imports present a certain yearly 
instability, but over the period as a whole the rates of growth in the 
capacity to import and imports of goods and services has been remarkable.
From previous page*For a discussion on the subject see ECLA's El desarrollo industrial en Peru
** A qualitative interpretation of the rate of growth, whether in terms of the
stand ard  of l iv in g  or th e  n a t io n a l ownership of p rop erty  may le a d  to  o th er re s u l 
*"*l''Or a disCUSSion . On th e  nr>+. See Miaa 'PlinY'no.
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Moreover, Peru presents a net inflow of foreign capital mainly in the form 
of direct investment; and, after the 1957-1959 crisis, there has been 
little foreign indebtedness. The favourable and growing external sector 
thus explains the fact that inflation has been mild (see section b). 
Although industry has expanded fastly as a % of ©?P, the import coeffi­
cient has kept growing and not much visible MST is visible in the import 
structure. Thus the industrialisation that has taken place has done so 
in favourable circumstances, i.e. with an ample capacity to import. If 
this may be called a structural change, it has been a change undergone 
vith relative stability and flexibility (see section c).
In Peru there has been growth in public revenues (mainly for the external 
sector), expenditure and investment. It is interesting to note, moreover 
that those periods when public investment has fallen price increases have 
been higher. It should be note, however, that Peru is a relatively back­
ward country in that infrastructure is limited and public accounts rudi­
mentary; i.e. there is a very large predominance of indirect taxation (see 
section d).
In these circumstances, the experience with inflation has been varied. 
Before 1950, a period we shall disregard, prices increased 19$ on average. 
Vith the export boom, 1951-1965, prices came down to 8$ on average. It is 
important to note that during the 1957-1959 external crisis, which coin­
cides vith the stabilisation programme, prices increased to 9*7$ on aver­
age.
(i) The growth of Peru during the 1950 to 1955 and the 1957 disequilibrium
A brief look in the sectorial composition of the economy in 1950 
showed the existence of a large and diversified export sector; an ineffi­
cient agricultural production for the domestic market - which had to be 
supplemented by imported foodstuffs - and a small industrial sector. More­
over, regional income inequalities, as well as for income groups, have been 
*very sharp. The per capitalfoodproduction is very poor and the land tenun 
system concentrates the good land on- a few estates, while the majority of 
the agricultural population lives3 in appalling conditions in the Sierras, 
vith minifundia and subsistence levels.
Hosever, it has been Peru's regional differences which have allowed 
her to achieve a remarkable export diversification for Lat in-American 
standards, despite its primary nature (see Table ll). While the coastal
Miss Thorpe writes that in 1954 the per capita income of the Andean 
region (the Sierra) where 60$ of the population lived, was less than 40$ 
of that of the Coastal region (the Costa), while per capita income in the 
jungle J&gre a further lp^ of the population lived, was evei
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region specialised in agricultural exports (57$ of the total and mainly 
cotton and sugar), the Andes are vast in mineral resources (24$)of the 
total, which was composed of copper, lead, solver, zinc, iron, etc.). 
Petroleum also has an important, hut stagnant, share of the total. Fish­
meal, on the other hand, underdeveloped yet in 1950 was to become a boom­
ing export. This diversification, among other things, has protected Peru
*from international price fluctuations, and accounts for its fast rate of 
growth from 1950 to 1956 and for the flexibility of MST. That is, the op­
posite of Argentinal
Unlike the other countries of the region considered, Peru faced a 
relatively stagnant export sector from 1946 to 1949» something which was 
accompanied by fast inflation (19$ on average). The period was thus one 
of import controls which, however inediccient, stimulated insutrialisation. 
fln army coup d'etat in 1949, which removed president Haya de la Torre, al­
tered the economic policy. Peru moved into a period of labour restrictions**freer trade and a free exchange rate. Intervention was reduced to some 
price controls and import and export taxes.
What were then the developments of this regime?
1.- The dominant characteristic was the recovery in exports, arising both 
from the recovery of world markets during the Korean War and from a large 
inflow of private foreign investment, especially into mining. This inflow 
was encouraged by two factors: theynew exchange rate system and the new 
mining code, which guaranteed mining companies tax exceptions for 25 years 
from any increase in the present very low level of taxation. The inflow 
of foreign capital, says Miss Thorpe, rose from 4 million dollars in 1950 
to 42 million in 1951 and 69 million in 1952. This was followed by a rapid 
expansion of mineral exports (See Table Ii) and by an overall rate of growth 
of some 10$ per annum both in volume and value from 1950 to 1956. This
was despite an external setback in the prices of cotton and sugar in*1952- 
53* Export growth and the net inflow of capital, which permitted a def­
icit on current account, meant that the freedom to import could be met 
without running down exchange reserves or incurring in foreign debt.
2.- The growth in the external sector was reflected in a very high rate of 
growth: per capita product increased by 24$ from 1950 to 1956; something 
rather amazing, at least for Latin-AMerican standards. This, does not 
mean that there was a progressive distribution of income, scanty evidence
For a discussion on the subject see Part II, Chapter 3> section
In fact, during this period Iftein-Saks made its first appearance in 
the Latin American scene.
TABLE I
Per Capita Indices of Domestic Food Supply, Food Consumption and
) 1)) c)GNP 7 and Annual Price 7 and Industrial Wage Increases 7
(1963 prices, 1950 = 100)
Y e a r Domestic Food 
Supply
Domestic Food 
Consumption
GNP PriC6S
Annual rate incr.
Industrial
Wages
1950 * 100 100 100 14 -
1951 105 102 108 10 -
1952 107 107 110 6 16
1953 107 107 110 9 10
1954 106 105 118 5 32
1955 103 105 121 5 3
1956 94 97 124 5 5
1957 94 97 122 8 20
1958 98 100 123 8 4
1959 100 104 123 13 17
I960 102 104 131 8 12
1961 108 111 138 7 8
1962 111 114 146 5 11
1963 107 110 147 7 -0
Sources: a) R. Thorpe, Inflation and Orthodox Economic Policy in Peru, op. cit.
b) IMF, Internacional Financial Statistics, 1967*
c) P. Uri, Una polftica monetaria para America Latina, op. cit.
TABLE II
Peru: Indices of Major Exports, 1950-56
•
(1950=100)
Y ea r Total Agricultural Mineral Fuels Fishmeal
1950/sjare 100 57 24 13 3
1951 128 134 152 81 106
1952 121 119 159 70 136
1953 113 109 154 57 132
1954 127 113 182 67 212
1955 139 116 212 85 221
1956 160 130 255 92 275
C A rfn /tn t T) 11k A <i«no
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points to the opposite. Moreover, the rate of inflation was reduced from 
14$ in 1950 to 5$ in 1956 (See Table I).
3,- The availability of imports - capital goods, consumer articles and food - 
the external demand, and government expenditure resulted in the steady 
growth of output. The policy, from the monetary and fiscal angles, was 
quite expansive. The growth of public expenditure - from 12$ of GNP in
1950 to 17$ in 1956 - was made possible in part by rising revenue from
import and export taxes and from budget deficits. Thus the rate of growth 
increased, inflation was reduced, and public expenditure increased,
4,- bhat is interesting is that the rising trends in output, exports and im­
ports seems to have reduced the inflationary impact of the 1953 devalua­
tion, This was, however, a small devaluation followed by a revaluation:
TABLE III
Peru: Variations in the Rate of Exchange, 1950 to 1966*
(sales per dollar)
Year 1952 1953 1954 1958 1959 I960 1967
Exchange rate 15.60 19.90 19.00 24.50 27.70 27.76 38.0
Source: IMF, IFS, 1967-8
5.- The main reason for the move towards stability was the fast rate of growth 
of imports. But, other factors also contributed. This period is charac­
terised by the relatively weak position of the labour unions under the mi­
litary didctatorship which lasted until 1956. In contrast with Argentina 
and Chile, the authorities were able to restrain wage increases (something 
which is not reflected in industrial wages, Table i). without provoking 
widespread strikes. It is believed that real earnings of the wage sector
fell during the period and accentuated the already very regressive distri­ctbution of income. The decline in income experienced by lower income
groups is suggested by the figures on food production and consumption: 
the data (which are not reliable) indicate that while GNP per capita’rose 
by 4$ up to 1956, per capita food consumption decreased. Moreover, accord­
ing to the Central Bank, whereas between 1954 andl959 per capita income in 
the Costa rose by 4$, it fell by 7$ in the Sierra. This picture is sup­
ported by data on the real income of the self-employed in the agricultural 
sector, which in aggregate failed to rise over the period; since the in­
come of the self-employed in the export sectors must have risen considera­
bly with the growbh of exports, the income of some groups must have fallen.
6.- The expansion of the export sector was thus accompanied by a poor perform­
ance in agriculture in general, but it enabled industry, construction and
transport to expand rapidly. From 1950 to 1955 'agriculture grew; on aver - *-    .See. R. Thorpe, op, cit.
age at 2.1#, industry at 7*8$, construction at 10.6# and transport at 815#. 
Industry rose from representing 15.6# of GNP in 1950 to 17>6# in 1955* (70) '
So all vas veil until early 1957. During this year export demand 
weakened, output per capita fell, and prices increased* (See Table i).
The trends culminated in 1958 and 1959 when an external crisis vas obvious 
and the IMF stepped in* The figures for this period are very unreliable, 
those of the Instituto Nacional de Planificacidn contradict the figures 
of the Central Bank
GNP barely rose in 1957» in contrast to an annual growth rate of 6# 
since 1950. The levelling off of the rate of growth, originated chiefly 
with exports and vith food production for the domestic market (See Table 
IV). Over the year as a whole, total exports were stagnant in volume as 
compared vith a rise of 14# in 1956, while some exports declined (See Table 
IV). Private investment did rise, but only by 10# as compared to 40# in 
1956. Further, the increment was entirely in foreign einvestment, it form­
ed part of a long-term plan and had little effect on domestic incomes* It 
vas chiefly reflected in rising inq>orts of capital goods, which rose 50# 
in 1956 and by more than 20# in 1957. On the other hand, public investment 
fell/
Despite the stagnation of production the value of imports rose by 28# 
in 1957» owing partly to the increase in imports of capital goods brought 
by foreign investors and in food imports following two bad harvest. This 
rise in imports combined with the fact that exports were now growing very 
slowly led the .end of the year to a difficult balance of payments position 
(See Tables IV and V). In fact, the surplus on capital account was insuf­
ficient to cover the traditional deficit on current account and the Central 
Bank's reserves fell to 33*5 million dollars, the equivalent of one month8s 
imports. This vas when the IMF stepped in.
(ii) The Stabilisation Measures of 1958-1959.
There were actually three stabilisation efforts accompanied by IMF 
Missions and reconsnendations, during this period. Early in 1958 the first 
mission and loans of the IMF came to Peru. Heavy pressure on the sol in 
the first quarter of 1958 had further reduced the foreign exchange reserves 
to 3 million, while the ixxq>ort bill for 1957 amounted to 400 million. The 
The Central Bank was thus forced to withdraw from the foreign exchange 
market. The IMF granted standby credits to 25 millions, which were supple­
mented by further credits of the United States government to make up a 
total of 60 million. t SNOS SNmo3 >
i
See ECLA, Economic Survey for Latin America, 1963*
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The recommendations for stabilisation followed the customary pattern:
1.- The balande of payments disequilibrium was explained as the result of in­
flationary pressure, arising from the expansion of credit to the public 
and private sectors. In fact, in 1957 the supply of money had expanded 
by 8$, while the growth of GNP at current prices had been 10$. Nonethe 
less, the volume of credit granted by the Central Bank to the state banks 
was not bo be increased and legal reserves of the banking system were to 
be enforced with a raised penalty rate on reserve deficiencies. Moreover, 
official deposits then held by private banks were to be kept in the Central 
Bank.
2.- The budget deficit was to be eliminated in 195S by reductions in public ex­
penditure, tetter tax enforcement, and temporary duties on certain imports
3.- The overall system of free trade and a free exchange rate was to be main­
tained. This amounted to an immediate devaluation from 19 soles per dol­
lar to 24.50.
\fliat were the immediate results of these first measures?
1*- Monetary restrictions, which had been introduced in 1957 > were maintained 
and tightened in 1958, though with little success since the government con­
tinued to borrow from the Central Bank and a prolonged bank strike make 
controls impossible to operate. (The supply of money increased by 24i$, 
although quasi-money was sharply reduced). However, it was possible to 
curtail credit to the state development banks •
2.*» To reduce the general budget revenue earmarked for investment purposes 
were reduced. The result was a fall in public works. Government current 
expenditure was not reduced, since it comprises largely wage and salary 
payments. Other measures induded some increases in indirect taxes.
3.- The government was allowed to raise import tariffs up to 50 and 100$ 
for luxury imports.
4.- The rate of growth of output was only 1$ higher in 1958, while prices con­
tinued to increase at 8$, a relatively low rate considering the amount of 
devaluation and the import restrictions.
5.- The implementation of these measures coincided with increasing labour un­
rest and political tension. It should be remembered that in 1956 the dic­
tatorship of General Ondrfa was over and that president Prado was elected 
democratically. In such a setting, the labour sector was able to express 
discontent against the policy. In 1958 numerous strikes broke-out: taxi
drivers, petroleum employees and other miners, hospital staffs, building 
workers, bank clerks and the police. Most wage demands were for 40$ salary 
increases; but, in the end, government granted increases which on average 
represented about 11$
TABLE IV
GNP and its Major Components 137 Expenditure
(1957 = 100)
I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
GNP 109 118 129 134 144 150
Personal Consumption 102 109 121 135 146 153
Public Consumption 110 126 132 139 155 161
Gross fixed capital form 
Total 130 148 165 156 163 208
Public 90 163 183 112 231 238
Private 109 134 155 156 152 203
Exports 126 147 155 150 162 160
Imports 119 145 164 179 193 230
Source: B, Thorpe, op, cit.
Indices of Prices and Volume of Exports, 1956 - 1965*
(1958 = 100)
Year Prices Volume Fishmeal Cotton Sugar Lead Copper
1956 95 91 26 101 105 - -
1957 96 91 58 76 122 88 94
1958 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1959 119 111 262 107 116 84 91
I960 120 147 479 93 127 86 312
1961 115 172 670 106 133 104 369
1962 118 182 998 129 113 106 319
1963 123 179 982 116 118 88 303
1964 139 194 1350 107 101 122 333
1965 140 185 1230 107 87 11G 334
Source: Intemacional Financial Statistics, IMF, 1967.
External Terms of Trade, 1957-1965
• (1958=100)
Year 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964
T of T 113 100 95 100 97 98 105 123M 120 100 83 96 124 141 154 154
X 114 100 106 152 174 190 190 234
TABLE V
Peru: Balance of Payments, 1957 - 1965 (millions of dollars)
1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
snt Account -143 -123 -36 19 -8 -36 -81 16 -123
Merchandise
Exports 332 292 323 444 510 556 555 685 687
Imports -402 -345 -281 ©341 -429 -478 -518 -518 -643
Balance -71 -53 42 1©3 82 78 37 167 43
Services -56 -49 -44 -50 -54 -66 -65 -95 -106
Investment Income -34 -36 -44 -55 -63 -66 -72 -70 -76
Cransfers 18 15 10 21 27 18 19 15 15
aonetary capital (receipts ¥) 121 105 51 8 12 69 62 61 140
jong-term private direct 
Investment 51 30 18 11 14 16 -5 10 18
Dther private long-term 
Investment 48 59 31 5 -10 2 9 1 4
Private short-term investment 15 8 8 1 16 29 4 -22 -6
•rovernment 8 8 -7 -9 -8 22 54 72 125
mt  and non-monetary capital
mts (A+B) -22 -18 15 26 4 33 -19 77 17
bary Assets (increase -) 27 12 -23 -28 -36 -13 -35 -48 -22
tfet liabilities (increase +) - 11 4 -15 -1 - 1 -1 - -
Commercial banks reserves (increase
-7
+)-1 -6 4 -1 -6 -16 -23 -7
Central Banks reserves (in­
crease -) 34 2 -21 -17 -34 -6 -18 -25 -14
s and omissions (C+D) g -6 -8 -2 -31 20 -54 29 -5
ce: Banco Central, Las Cuentas Nacionales del Peru.
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The labour unrest and the resistence to increase wages forced the cabinet 
to resign in May. Y7ith respect to ethe inflationary aspects of the in­
crease, both Miss Thorpe and ECLA, clarify that the statistics are unre­
liable. It is peculiar to see, however, that nominal wages in industry 
only increased 4$ in 1958, while prices increased 8$ (See Table i).
These wages, however, had increased 20$ in 1957* Wage demands were a re­
sult of the devaluation early that year, import controls, less subsidies 
on food, and rising food prices. Before 1957» as a result of high imports 
and subsidies, food prices were below the cost of living index and after 
they caught up.
Thus the new cabinet started a second stabilisation effort in the 
second half of 1958.
1.- in additional credit was negotiated with the Export-Import Bank for 40 
million.
2.- Credit restrictions were to be maintained after the unavoidable relaxa­
tion during the bank strike. Between July and December a net contraction 
in commercial bank credit took place, despite rising prices. But, govern­
ment borrowing from the Central Bank rose, despite the fiscal effort.
3.- The reduction of the budget deficit was again met by a cut in public 
investment, since it was seen impossible to reduce the civil service or 
their wages. Sales taxes were to be raised and stiffer penalties for tax 
evasion were introduced. Import duties were to be raised from 100 to 200$ 
on luxuries.
4.- Only part of this policy was successfully implemented. Import taxes 
-which were not mentioned in the programme - were raised again. But, wages
in manufacturing appear to have increased by 10$ in the first months of 
1959* Fiscal and credit restraints were notably unduecessful. Public 
investment was reduced sharply (25$) but public consumption rose by 18$ 
Food subsidies which represented a burden on the budget, were continued.> 9
There was a second bank strike early in 1959 which again resulted in the 
. relaxation of credit. Despite the authorities commitment not to increase 
borrowing from the Central Bank, it had to continue doing so. Thus, in 
June 1959'*: the cabinet resigned once more.
5.- By 1958-9 however, the reversals in orthodox measures had affected the 
domestic economy severely. That is, the continous reversals in credit 
conditions to the private sector each semestre, as well as the contractions 
in public investment followed by increases in a consumption must have af­
fected investment demand. The growth of GNP stopped and inflation reached 
an all-time maximum .of 13$ (1951-63). Thus, not so paradoxically, the pro­
gramme had only succeeded in stopping growth and increasing inflation.
However, the explanation of the recession lies chiefly in the cut in inves 
ment demand and in a further weakening of the exports and imports. Miss 
Thorpe estimates that the fall in total investment in 1958 was 14$ in real 
terms and that the downward trend continued in 1959 • The shapp fall in 
public investment has strong repercussions on domestic incomes. Total exp 
port revenue was below the 1957 level. Cotton recovered a little this yea: 
but there was s sharp fall in copper prices and a reduction in sugar and
fishmeal prices ( See Table IV ).
Despite the fall in export revenue, the balance of payments on current 
account improved owing to a fall in imports. Thus the recession and the 
import controls (not supported by the 3>1F^  were the factors that contribut­
ed to this* The balance of payments also recovered* (See Table V),
The rise in prices - devaluation, scarce imports, wage increases in the 
public sector - made it impossible to balance the budget deficit as the 
programme required it* In fact, the budget deficit increased. As a re­
sult there was considerable borrowing from the Central Bank, By mid 1959 
it was clearly that the agreement with the IMF had been broken; not only 
was the government drawing heavily on the Central Bank, but falling export 
demand was coupled with some capital flight occasioned by the lack of con­
fidence in the economic policies.
The failure of the programme to achieve either external of internal sta­
bility may be blamed on deflating demand without considering the trends 
in the export sector. While export demand was falling the attempt to 
achieve external equilibrium by orthodox measures (at the cost of produc­
tion and employment) simply led to pride rises, scarce imports, lagging 
wages, social tensions, and a persistent external imbalance* The lesson 
seems to be that if a foreign exchange bottleneck appears and creates 
disequilibria, trying to solve the problem with orthodox measures may 
lead to a contradiction in the implementation of the measures themselves 
although they succeed in depressing the economy.
In synthesis, the problem with the stabilisation programme up to mid-1959 
lies in the reversal of the orthodox measures together with the increasing 
price inflation aid the standstill of output. One has to be careful, how­
ever, in saying that the programme was both inefficient in bringing stabi­
lity and efficient in bringing deflation. One cannot have it both waysJ 
With respect to monetary policy it is best to consider it neutral. Al­
though the successive contraction and expansion of credit to the private
sector obviously affected investment decisions,' and credit to the public
:ctor vas drastically reduced." Monetary policy, however, was neutral in ie sense that the lexpansion of credit through the 1958-9 period was siraila —or slightly higherj— to that of previous or following periods. With respec
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to fiscal policy, the budget deficit was large in 195S but it was reduced 
in 1959* It results are ineffectual, public consumption increased and in­
vestment was reduced, something hardly helpful either in the short or long 
run. It is true that revenues increased, hut they did so because of import 
surcharges (xmwanted by the programme) and higher indirect taxes. In this 
context orthodox policies were insecure and harmful. Inflation is thus 
hest explained by devaluation, higher food prices, wage increases, and the 
external bottleneck which resulted in lower imports. It is the external 
bottleneck which in the final sense explains the increase in inflation and 
the stagnation in output (the fall in external demand, import controls and 
devaluation).
Yet again, in mid 1059» the new cabinet drew up a new stabilisation 
• porgramme and a new agreement with the IMF:
1*- The time the measures were to he more wholeheartedly orthodox: a balanced
budged, a severe credit squeeze, all food and petroleum subsidies were to 
be ended; wages were frozen; the remaining controls on foreign trade were 
removed, and the exchange rate was devalued further.
2.- Special measures in the monetary field were an 18# penalty interest rate 
on reserve deficiencies and a raise in Bank Rate from 6 to 9*5#* The pro­
blem of eliminating the budget deficit was made difficult by the declaration 
that taxes were not to he increased. Thus a further drastic reduction in 
public investment followed. Public investment was cut by a third in real 
terms in 1959, investment in agriculture and industrial development being 
cut with severity.
3*- As it was said, over the whole of 1959, growth came to a stand-still and 
inflation was severe. The surprising thing is that the decline took place 
during the first half of the year, while economic recovery was on its way 
on the second half. Since the orthodox policy coincided with the recovery 
- and its results could not have been instantaneous - other factors, have to 
explain sucli a recovery. It is, of course, tempting to attribute the reco­
very and the boom that followed to this last stagilisation effort. In fact, 
this is what monetarists have done. The structuralids thesis maintains, 
however, that recovery was not achieved by the programme hut in spite of it,
4.- By the end of 1959 production began to rise, inflation decelerated, the 
balance of payments improved, and foreign exchange reserves had risen so 
much that the authorities were able to pay back ahead of schedule a large 
part of the drawings made on the IMFJ Price increases fell again to 8# in 
I960 and production gathered momentum so that per capita income rose by 8#. 
Moreover, the economy, despite a slowdown in 1963, achieved a real rate of 
growth of 7# on average between i960 and 1955*
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Let us then turn to the structuralist explanation of this remarkable 
recovery.
(iii) The Post-Stabilisation Recovery of 1960-1965.
The structuralist thesis states that the.recovery is not jto he found 
in the contradictory orthodox trend, hut in the growth of exports vhich oc- 
cured at a crucial moment in the second half of 1959. Monetarists, however 
have atributed the recovery of exports to the stabilisation measures of the 
latter semester. There was in fact a small devaluation in 1959 which reduc 
ed further the.exchange rate from 24.50 soles per dollar to 17.70 soles; 
yet this was followed by a revaluation in I960, which reduced the rate to 
26.70 soles (See Table II). As we shall see below, it seems arbitrary to 
atribute to devaluation the short-run and high elasticity of export supply.
If defaluation, in fact, would stimulate supply there was simply to time 
for it to work. In Argentina and Chile it has been seen how slow the respon 
in primary sectors - because os institutional reasons too is to such prise 
incentives, if indeed there is any response and a price gap that is not soon 
wiped out by inflation. Prices in Peru were increasing at 13$ in 1959 and 
8$ in I960. Moreover, according to Latin-American experience and to Mr.
Diaz'theory based on Argentinian devaluation, it has been seen that devalua­
tion and external equilibrium move pari passu %/ith a fall in output, which 
affects both production for the domestic and the foreign markets. It is 
best to look for the fast response in Peruvian exports elsewhere. With these 
precautions, let us examine the behaviour of exports from 1959 to 1965, fol­
lowing Miss Thorpe's intelligent discussion. (See Table IV again).
1.- As ve have seen, it is true that Peruvian economic policy - and its approach
*to foreign capital - has favoured the development of exports. But, the
point is thqt the remarkable recovery in exports in 1959* - after two years
of depressed prices - occurred independently of any immediate policy measures
taken, i.e. devaluation. It rather reflected on part, the maturing of large
*
investment made years earlier and in part the revival of world demand for 
Peruvian products at a crucial pint in time.
2.- During the first half of 1959, the world prices of all Peru's important 
exports except copper had continued depressed or had fallen even further 
below their 1957 level. But in July and August 1959, for a variety of 
reasons, world prices began to improve on all sides. Thus cotton prices 
rose, sugar prices stabilised, copper prices continued to rise and lead 
and zinc quotations recovered. The IMF export index shows an increase of 
7$ between the second and third quarters of 1959 and this was followed by 
a further rise in the dast quarter.
^ m e s ^ F e b S i a r y ^ h ^ 6 suffered a Poli*ical reversal in 1969 (See The Sunday
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What is more important for growth and external stability - although not
*so much for domestic prices in Peru during this period-, the recovery in 
export prices was sustained with minor fluctuations over the next five 
years. Average export prices rose 40$ between 1959 and 1965* Again, the 
d iv e r s i t y  of Peru's exports ensured that an unfavourable trend in the de­
mand for one or two products was normally counterbalanced by rising trends 
elsewhere. Good fortune also helped; the long-fibre cotton of Peru was 
less affected by international price falls than the other varieties. In 
1961, the year of least buoyant prices, sales of sugar benefitted from an 
increased USA quota, following the Cuban crisis.
The next point to explain is why Peruvian supply was able to respond to 
rising external prices; while Argengtina's supply was inelastic and Chile 
was unable to diversify. Export volume, in fact, rose 60$ between 1959 
and 1965. It was again partly good fortune that helped Peru. In 1959 two 
sources of foreign exchange facing a strong world demand - fisbmean and 
iron - were able to increase their volume substantially, despite the defla­
tion. The continous growth of the fishmeal industry is fundamental. Of 
the total increase in exports during 1959, 75$ was formed by fishmeal and 
other fish products. But, exports of fishmeal had heen doubling on average 
since 1956, so that 1959 was only part of the trend. It was Peru's good 
fortune that this dramatic rate of growth had reached the point hy 1959 
where the increment made a significant and decisive impact on total exports. 
Irson ore expansion was the result of the opening of the large mine of Acarf, 
whole development started in early 1958.
Thus rising prices and the Previous expansion in supply combined to bring 
about a sustantial rise in the value of exports over the period. In the 
third quarter of 1959 their dollar value rose from a quarterly average of 
69 million over the previous 18 months to 86 and to 94 in the last quarter. 
In I960 exports rose by a further 40$. From 1961, the rate of growth was 
more sober, but still resulted in an increase of 10$ on average in export 
value, chiefly caused by the continous grovrth of fishmeal.
The next point is to see what the developments in the economy were;
The stimulus to p roduction provided by the grovrth in exports, specially 
after mid-1959 was enough to offset the impact of the stabilisation mea­
sures. In fact, deflation did not prevail in i960 as one would have ex­
pected after the orthodox measures in the second half of 1959* Production 
was stimulated not only directly by the growth of exports, but also indi­
rectly, with the de facto elimination of some credit constraints via the 
balance of payments. The improvement in the balance of payments was re­
flected in an increase in foreign assets during 1959 which was more than
*J^ j‘05 j^.lg0ggd manageable inflation of 1960-64 could be attributed to the
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enough to outweigh the effect of the credit squeeze on commercial banks, 
resulting in a larger increase in the supply of money. The Chilean exper­
ience points out clearly how an increase in foreign assets, specially if 
there is a free rate of exchange, results in an expansion of liquidity.
The steady growth of external resources after 1959 (See Table V) continued 
to ease the credit position so that by 1961 the authorities relaxed credit 
controls. The exchange reserves (except in 1963) improved remarkably from 
I960 to 1965.
2.- The improvement in the external position also meant that there was no need 
to further reduce imports. The Chilean mistake was not made: surcharges
on certain imports were maintained, although no additional measures were 
taken. Imports actually rose in the second half of 1959 and by 1961 they 
had surpassed the depressed level of the 1957 crisis. Thus the value of 
imports rose rapidly in response to the growth of external demand (See also 
Table IV). But nonetheless, foreign exchange reserves rose from 30 million 
in 1959 to £75 million in 1965 both owing to exports and the inflow of 
foreign capital. Other things being equal, there was no foreign exchange 
bottleneck and GNP rose on average at per annum.
3*- Moreover, the rise in exports and the recovery of economic activity result­
ed in a substantial increase in public revenue after midi 1959* This meant 
that the struggle to balance the budget could be relaxed without further 
cuts in public investment. It should be remembered that the drastic cut 
in public investment in 1957-59 was accompanied by three years of stagnatio: 
in output and increasing inflation. The recovery in public consumption was 
sharp and that in public investment rose dramatically (it more than doubled 
during 1960-65). Part of the increase in public investment was made possi­
ble by the inflow of foreign loans, which no longer demanded restrain. (See 
table V).
4.- Although less gignificantly, there was also a sharp rise in private invest­
ment which almost doubled itself between i960 and 1965. This was stimulat­
ed by the relaxation of credit, the flow of foreign capital and the expan­
sion of the public sector. Additional factors were the increase in tariffs 
exceptions on imported machinery and the Industxial Formation Lqw (tax con­
cessions to industrial investment, particularly if made away from Lima). 
Thus the growth of exportsl public expenditure and private investment led 
to a sharp rise in production. ECLA estimates that manufacturing during 
19t065 grew at an average of 7*4^; construction at 13*3^ and agriculture 
at (71).
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But %/hen all has been said - foreign exchange bottleneck ir not - inflation
still remains a feature of the economy (see table i). It is true that the
rate of inflation %/as reduced from 13$ and 8$ in 1959 and I960 respectively*and to 7$ on average between 1961-1964 . But this hardly seems significant 
considering that inflation %/as milder before 1957. The fact that inflation 
has been persistent must thus be examined in terms of the domestic economy 
and booming external sector. One can only suggest here that special atten­
tion should be given to the follo%/ing factors. There is evidence that the 
domestic agricultural sector which caters for domestic consumption is rather 
inelastic (See Table I). It is also believed that the domestic market for 
essential manufactures is very reduced on account of the low level of income 
and its probable regressive distribution. Importance should be given to 
the sort of public investment that is taken place; it is significant that 
military investment and public luxury construction have been rising. Al-
4Hithough it is still early, the inflationary aspect of MST has to be explored.
On the other hand, although data are very unsatisfactory, Miss Thorpe points 
out that wage inflation has not been prevalent in Peru. The stabilisation 
pogramme failed to create a %/age-price spiral, as it did %/ith a d a g in real 
earnings in Argentina and Chile. Certainly the devaluation and the removal 
of food subsidies contributed to the rising inflation of 1959; hut this 
sharp rise %/as reduced in the following years, specially by 1961. The fact 
that a wage-price spiral is highly improbable is, of course reflected in the 
external recovery, the development of activity, rising employment and the 
traditional lo%/ levels of %/age income; and the fixed exchange rate (1960-66).
Finally, let us try to summarise the 1960-65 trends in economic activity, 
%/ith respect to inflation and the stabilisation programmes:
The xois of external factors in moderating inflationary pressures %/as two­
fold. First the rapid recovery in production as a result of the stimulus 
to demand via exports helped to increase enployment and to reduce labour 
tension. Second, the elimination of the external disequilibrium as 'early 
as 1959 meant not only that there was no further need to cut imports, by 
tariffs or devaluation, hut that imports could gctually rise very fastly 
to reduce bottlenecks in supply. And, %/hat is just as important, there was 
no need to take recourse in large foreign loans %/hich in the end destroy ex­
ternal equilibrium. Thus the external vicious circle into which Argentina 
and Chile had fallen %/as not present and as a result price increases were 
much milder.
Over the long-run (1950-1965) exports have played a dominant role in deter­
mining the rate of gro%/th, and less so the rate of inflation. The correla­
tion bet%/een the growth in exports and GNP may he seen in Part II, Chapter
3, section h.
(See both footnotes on the follo%/in£? oasre)
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It can be argued, hovever, that when export and imports recover - spec 
ly in a setting where MST has not reached a difficult stage and where trade 
unions are w&ak - an orthodox stabilisation programme either is relaxed or 
does not do the harm it does elsewhere• Revenue from the external sector 
rises and public accounts become more manageable. Foreign capital and invc 
ment create liquidity in the system, together with the rise in domestic su] 
Rising imports maintain production and consumption going and reduce wage pi 
sure s. The favourable setting may come to an end, as it did in Peru in 19f 
when despite the trends in exports external disequilibrium becomes precari< 
That is, when the fast rate of growth induces first a disequilibrium on cip 
rent account and later on the balance of payments, when the net inflow of 
foreign capital is reduced - as a consequence of interest, profits and amo] 
ti sat ion- and the current capacity to import is reduced.
(From previous page)
For a rather ill-fated external sector projection, but for a good discus- 
si on on industrialisation process see ECLA's El desarrollo industrial de]
(72 y ■#By 1965-68 inflation accelerated again - initially through the sharp deva* 
luation of 1966- creating a new era of political tension which culminated 
with the military dictatorship of general Velasco in 1968, who took over 
from President Belaunde. The new dictatorship - unlike the rest in South 
America has taken a marked controversial and unorthodox policy standing 
towards foreign capital, land tenure systems industrialisation and so on.
- It is improbable to attribute a significant role in the growth of exports 
to the orthodox policies. The argument was that devaluation had played a 
part; there is, however, little evidence for its role in the expansion of 
exports. Mining has shown little or no short-run supply elasticity.. The 
value of sugar exports was a consequence of the Cuban crisis; and, cotton 
which accounts for a small contribution, faced less favourable conditions. 
A case might be made out for fishmeal, but as figures show there is every 
sign that a highly profitable boom was already underway as early as 1956.
- In consequence, the revival of exports and domestic activity - and not the
.
programmes - provided the incentive to foreign private and public capital; 
without the growth of exports, as it has been seen in other cases, the bur­
den of foreign debt would have become a severe hadicap to the country.
- The sharp cuts in public investment during 1958-9 probably served to aggra­
vate the infrastructure bottlenecks and the food deficit; moreover budget 
deficits persisted.
- If what has been said is true, it is not valid to argue that stabilisation 
programmes in Peru have succedded in either stabilisation or growth object­
ives. Hence, from the Peruvian, Argentinian or Chilean experiences, it is 
not valid to recommend these policies to inflationary Latin-American econo­
mies.
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S§neluding
It is not the intention to neks here a summary of the work. 3/hcre it 
was thought relevant each chapter or section has its own conclusions. Here, 
rather than conclusions, it is convenient to state some final reflections. 
Several points ought to he made. Firstly, these remarks should not he taxen 
in isolation of the thesis; least tkey should appear more venture some•
Each comment is an opinion resulting from previous research. Secondly, they 
will he simplistic - perhaps commonplace - so as to clarify the empirical ex­
perience obtained from the controversial and complex subject of inflation in 
Latin America. Thirdly, they will insist on these things: some of the result:
obtained in the work, its purpose, and the approach used.
1.- The purpose behind the thesis is the ideal possibility of achieving 
growth with stability in Latin America. It is thought, generally 
speaking, that the experience of the region presents two different 
situations: either instability with output growth cr instability 
with stagnation. This dual problem is then approached in the follow: 
ing context:
a) The main objective eserges as the failure of Latin America to 
achieve this ideal proposition. The failure, however, is set 
Within a certain context: the 1946-1955 period (later with 
special reference to 1955-19637; the ’universe1 composed by 
the unstable economies (not all Latin-American countries are 
inflationary) and the relative comparisons between the long- 
run trends in the different countries that form the universe 
(i.e. the most inflationary countries as one extreme and the 
least inflationary as the other).
b) The specific objective is then an empirical research on (l) 
the ’causes' of inflation and (2) its 'cures' in the universe 
formed by the following countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Peru and Uruguay, on the one hand; Mexico by itself; 
and, Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay on the other. The initial 
criterion to select these countries is simply chronic price 
increases in a historical sense.
2.- With respect to the study on the causes of inflation several points 
have to be made explicit:
a) The subject in Latin America - in terms of the main and specific 
objectives - takes the foixi of the so-called 'Monetarist-Structur­
alist Controversy'. Thus the first step is to interpret and to 
place the controversy within a frame of reference. That is, an 
abstraction that should define ideally what monetarism and struc­
turalism are; the main qualified variables that explain inflation
in each school; hoi/ convincingly each one explains in simple 
empirical terms the inflation; and, should lead to the adoption 
of a personal interpretation (more of this helow).
h) It is important to note that inflationary theories in Latin America 
should he studied against the background of the underdeveloped na­
ture of the region. This means that the causes of inflation have 
to be referred back to the problems of growth with a poor structur­
al setting and the need for a financial policy for development.
Now, theories of inflation, however controversial, were made to in­
terpret inflation in advanced countries. ' This establishes a rel­
ative theoretical difference between Latin America and, say, West­
ern European countries. Still, it appears that inflationary the­
ories as such remain useful in the context of the latter. They 
are thus applied to Latin America, but ■with cautious and revised 
assumptions that incorporate the underdevelopment background. It 
is fair to assume that to explain inflation requires a different 
approach in the region, although not a different theory.
c) The monetarist-structuralist controversy is in one sense (say, at 
the general level) an extension of the demand-pull and cost-push 
controversy. Structuralists have then taken up the subject in Latin 
America, stressing the nature of underdevelopment and, with certain 
qualifications, cost-push as an original cause of inflation. Monet­
arists have also taken-up the subject; but, with less interest on 
the underveloped - or structural - characteristics of the region 
and more interest in demand-pull, again with certain qualifications. 
But, in the final sense both argue th.at inflation is 'mixed* (More 
of this below).
d) The explanation of the causes of inflation (say, at a second level) 
involves two problems: the 'original' causes of inflation and the 
development of a price spiral where the causes interact and it is 
hard to see which lead and which follow. Structuralists emphasise 
as original causes a certain interaction between demand-pull and 
cost-push, but with more emphasis on the latter. Monetarists do the 
opposite. In fact, monetarists, on the one hand, say that the origin­
al causes of inflation -are arbitrary expansions in the supjily of money 
public deficit financing, wage increases and devaluation of the ex­
change rate (in other words defficient economic policy). They grant 
later, that the inflationary spiral develops other cost-push tenden­
cies in the manner of price 'included* supply bottlenecks; the uis-
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tortion of the price mechanism (repressed inflation), the savings 
and investment process, and foreign investment. But, placing this 
in an extreme sense, it may he taken to mean that underdevelopment, 
among other things, is a consequence of inflationi Structuralists 
on the other hand, say that the original causes lie in the grovrth 
and change in the structure of demand (population grovrth, urbanisa­
tion and education) and in the original existence of sectorial bottle 
necks in the external sector, agriculture, industry and infrastructure 
as well as in a regressive distribution of income. They also grant 
later, that the monetarist causes of inflation - propagating factors 
for them - may appear although not necessarily, within the inflation­
ary spiral. The differences between the two sides of the controversy 
should not be underestimated. It does not only involve as a conse­
quence a different economic policy, but a philosophical and ideologic­
al gap which leads to opposite and conflicting economic worlds,
e) Monetarists and structuralists arc defined in the above way and treat­
ed as ideal representatives. That is, it would be difficult to find 
a single author that fits perfectly vith the definition. With respect 
to general inflationary theories, it is misleading to simply identify 
monetarists v/ith, say, the Chicago School around professor Friedman; 
or, structuralists with the Neo-Eeynesian tradition. Superficially, 
monetarists both in Latin America and abroad, support the quantitat­
ive theory of money, the reliance on monetary policy, the free work­
ings of the price system, liberalism in international trade, and so 
on. But, a closer loo;: reveals emphasis on wage inflation, certain 
controls on foreign trade, public investment in infrastructure. hr.at 
helps to define them in Latin America, however, is their very close 
identification with the policies of the ILF. For example, they might 
support seme import controls, but they maintain that a free exchange 
rate system is conducive to growth and stability. Also, they might 
defend public agricultural works but shy-away from a land reform or 
merely drat/ up a plan and then store it away. Structuralists are 
closer to bring together in their identification with revolutionary 
propositions. Simplistically, they are a consequence of the heynes- 
ian revolution; but they go beyond it and have borrowed from Marxian 
economics, Lizt,* Veblen, and Leontieff. Moreover, they centre around 
- or are disciples cf- ECLA. A way to define them is as public inter­
ventionists, to coin the Latin American phrase, which may range from 
authoritarian centralists to mild interventionists in certain sectors
and aspects of economic activity. Strictly referring to inflation, 
their emphasis on structural changes in demand and cost-push results 
in the recommendation of ambitious structural policies - aimed both 
at growth and stability - and not relying much on orthodox monetary 
and fiscal policies. But, their emphasis on growth makes them fper- 
missive' towards inflation - seldom explicitly - and "brings in the 
attach from monetarists. In academic terms - perhaps slightly dog­
matic - "both opponents finish up claiming that their aim is growth 
vith stability. From the experience of this work, however, monetar- 
ists, are identified with a stabilisation priority and a dangerous 
and ineffectual emphasis on deflation, hhile structuralists are iden­
tified with a growth priority and a certain permissiveness towards 
inflation. Another major difference is that monetarists are more 
‘general theory minded in the sense that the policies recommended 
by the IMF to, say, European or Latin-American countries do not dif­
fer basically; while structuralists, in their concern for underde­
velopment, are more regional minded*
f) As the research advanced one comes close to adopting the structural­
ist thesis. The multiple issues at stake and the relative diversity 
of experiences between the countries, however, does not conclude in 
the whole adoption of one and rejection of the other. That is - and 
not wanting to sound opportunistic - the simple statistical testing 
of the two sets of variables showed that in some specific cases the 
monetarist analysis of the causes of inflation was relevant. For ex­
ample, the correlation coefficients between prices and the supply of 
money and quasi-money (tested for both the structure list?: and monetar­
ist assumrrtions) were not significant in the majority of cases, with 
the exception of Frazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia where a case 
could be made for the monetarist hypothesis. The same was true, after * 
qualifications, vuth budget deficits as such: either they are not
correlated with changes in prices, or the higher the deficit the lower 
the pace of inflation, but, again, with the exception of Brazil and 
Bolivia. Vith respect to wage push it was concluded that, although 
it is dangerous to generalise on the Erazilian and Uexican experiences, 
wage increases as an autonomous sorce of inflation is not the case in 
Latin America. It cay be said, on the contrary, that within the spiral 
nominal industrial wages followed price increases with a lag. Evidence 
may be found for minimising the role of wages in inflation, in the re­
gressive distribution of incocte, the fall in real wage earnings, the 
weakness of trade unions, unemployment and so on. Vith devaluation of
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the exchange rate both sides are correct in agreeing that its inflation­
ary impact is enormous. Bat, here agreement stops. Monetarists blame 
devaluation, other things being equal, on overvalued, multiple or peg­
ged rates; and, seem to condemn Latin America to small but continous 
inflationary devaluations. Structurelists, may defend pegged or free 
rates, but insist that devaluation is merely part of the foreign ex­
change argum ent. There is over ike long-run a clear relationship be 
tween massive and frequent devaluations and faster inflation (i.e. Ar­
gentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay) and lesser in­
flation with rarer devaluations (Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru).
On the other hand, empirical evidence shows, that structuralists are 
correct when they blame high and increase rate of ^inflation on severe 
and long-run bottlenecks in agriculture, export markets and foreign ex­
change (except in Chile); on a costly import substitution industial- 
isation; an infrastructure bottleneck; and perhaps, an inequal and 
regressive distribution of income which limits effective demand, the 
possibility of reducing costs and competing in the international mark­
ets. The weighing of these factors and the determination of the ori­
gins of inflation lend themselves, however, to the adoption ox the 
structuralist thesis (more of this below)• 
p.- Ifith respect to the study on the cures of inflation several points also 
have to be made exx^licit:
a) Among the many possible ways of undertaking the subject of anti- 
inflationary policies in Latin America two are adopted, so as to 
continue the study in terms of the controversy. The first, is the 
elaboration of a 'personal' framework, derived from the previous 
study of the causes of inflation, with which to interpret and adopt 
the academic, solutions structuralists propose for dealing with the 
ideal solution. The second, is to select some cf the monetarist 
or orthodox stabilisation programmes adopted in some countries, so 
as to see how well monetarism works in practice. The system used 
is 'unfair' to monetarism in that it is judging monetarists on what 
they have actually done to combat an inflation which they blame to 
structuralism. Uhile structuralists are comfortably judged on what 
they would like to do, nob on what they have really done. There is, 
however, a rational to the use of this approach. First, the contro­
versy is usually stated in such terms. Second, monetarists have 
had a chance to enforce their policies, however imperfectly, and 
. they have promised, stability. Third, structuralists, faced with 
the depression of the 1930's, only promised growth and not stability;
and, it can be argued, that their initial policies were emergency mea­
sures that never constituted a ‘structuralist reform' in the proper 
sense. It was only later - after the war - that they worked on the ex­
perience and decided that Latin America should aim at grovrth v/ith stabi­
lity. But, in this sense, structuralists have not had a 'full chance' 
to demonstrate the effectiveness of their policies, while monetarists 
have.
h) Thus, the first part, which was called the structuralist reform, deals 
with what an academic policy that seeks stability should he, not on what 
it really is. Cnly in this sectiion did the thesis drop the emprical 
approach followed throughout. The 'problem' v/ith the structuralist ref­
orm is that it seeks a stabilisation compatible v/ith fast economic grov-th. 
In fact, it seeks to achieve price stability through ambitions - and ex­
pensive J - structural changes that range from land freform to a Latin- 
Araerican Common Market and exporting manufactures to advanced countries; 
passing through in more immediate measures public deficit financing, in­
dustrialisation, protectionism, a redistribution of income, reforms in 
orthodox monetary and fiscal policies, foreign credits, and so on. In 
the last event, this may be interpreted as giving growth an over-riding 
priority over stabilisation (for practical purposes it may appear impos­
sible to stop, let alone reduce, the pace of inflation in the short-run 
and in the face of a massive development policy). Structuralists, how­
ever, argue that their objectives are compatible (at best, presumablv 
over the medium term;, bbiat is more, they prophesy that if a structural 
reform is not adopted the outcome will be a cyclical pattern of growth 
v/ith inflation or, more likely, inflation v/ith stagnation. Their reform 
seems to promise growth - but can it guarantee stability, or a manage­
able rate of inflation? The answer, at least partially, lies in the con­
temporary development of ad hoc policy measures (a structural reform if 
one insists) v/ith reference to general economic policy in the inflation­
ary ecbnomy; the short-run compatibility - or not - of the different 
objectives; and, the selection of 'new or special' financial policies 
for Latin America. For example, the adoption of a mixed cause origin of 
inflation, stressing the structural or underdeveloped characteristics, 
ought to place monetary policy in a strict framework of reference.
Not unlike what the Badcliffe lieport and the Joint Economic Committee 
did for advanced countries. Thus the scope of monetary policy may be 
reduced, but its role in achieving growth with stability is crucial (Dr. 
Prebisch's false dilemma, between growth and stability). The foie calls 
for a 'new* monetary policy/that works under the assumption of the predomin
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of cost push,.a certain velocity of circulation and the need to devise 
selective monetary measures - that extend from the banking system to non 
financial intermediaries and foreign savings - and which will ensure a 
simultaneous and sustained investment process and the control of inflation. 
The vagueness and ambitiousness ox structuralism should not put one off, 
at least for two important reasons. In practice, the policies monetarists 
offer look bleak, expensive in terms of growth, and in the cases that 
matter incapable of achieving stabilisation. In addition, structuralism 
is only an extension of the economic policy dilemma which faces the world 
today. That is, the structural change structuralists want may he made 
equal to a planning policy or not, according to ideological tastes. Struc­
turalists may only want a change in terms of mild public intervention (say, 
planning only the public sector); more extended intervention objectives 
(say, planning a mixed economy or radical priority of the public economic 
system (say, authoritarian central planning). Cne should bo careful to 
note, however, that monetarists may also defend a certain public inter­
vention. For example, the Hd7's policies, the Alliance for Progress, 
and the policies ox private and public foreign banks have required from 
Latin America the elaboration of development plans.1 In this sense, mon­
etarists too range from absolute classic non-interventionists to mild in­
terventionists (say, public sector planning and indicative planning) pol­
icy}. The difference in tho degree of intervention is, of course, large 
and the ideological gap a fact. But, in this sense, the I'onetarist-Struc- 
turalist controversy, as far as economic policy, is only a reflection of 
what economic theory has to offer in advanced countries, whether in the 
light of orthodoxy or neo-keynesian economics in the capitalist econo­
mies; or, in the light of soviet or Cuban economics. There is, of course, 
a third possible outcome: a development ox a special economic policy pe­
culiar to the economical, historical and political characteristics cx 
Latin America, which would take the form of Latin American nationalism, 
and a new community of nations. If stricturalists in the last outcome 
sound idealistic or far-fetched, one only has to remember the complexity 
of the problem of growth with stability and the failure of traditional
measures m  Lanin nnenca.
,  ^ TIT-.c) The seccnd part of the policy-cure approach, may be taken as a guide to 
the failure of orthodox stabilisation programmes inspired by the Xld? in 
Latin America. In fact, most cf the countries have undergone at one time 
or another such, programmes. Vith the exception ox Eelivia and Paraguay 
(where a case could be made, after qualifications for the ILP's policies) 
it is concluded that such programmes either failed or are doomed to 
failure (perhaps with a tentative theoretical exception in Frazil, where 
nor»«tn.Tists have a case: or. with hexico, where orthodoxy in monetary
policy could claim a certain success). Concentrating on the clearest 
monetarist cases - Argentina, Chile and Peru - there was a contraction 
of credit, semi-deflationary policies in the public sector, wage con­
trols, elimination of price controls, devaluation and a semi-free ex­
change rate, a liberal attitude towards foreign trade, and recourse to 
foreign capital. In all throe cases either stabilisation failed - to­
gether with a fall in the rate of growth - or their short-lived success 
could not be really attributed to the orthodox measures. It seems that 
all countries’ which fail to adopt structural refonus, over the long-run, 
keep presenting chronic inflation, external disequilibrium, and slow 
growth, despite the stabilisation programmes. The cases of Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Paraguay are special inasmuch as stability is compatible wifh 
orthodoxy when the structure of demand suffers little change, little at­
tempt is made to undergo intensive MST industrialisation, and the econo­
my is primarily geared towards foreign trade and inflow of foreign capit 
al, grants included.
The above regional inierccmprisons should clarify the conclusions in 
terms of the different country classifications resulting from the study:
a) The initial classification based on (l) inflationary and semi-in&us- 
trialised countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Feru, Uru­
guay, and Mexico, as a special case) and (2) inflationary and non­
industrialised countries (Bolivia, Paraguay and Ecuador) was use­
ful. The classification remains valid for the end of the period 
(1965) with two major changes with respect to inflation. Mexico 
achieved virtual price stability and Bolivia and Paraguay reduced 
their almost hyperinflation to very mild price increases.
b )  bhen the per capita rate of groirth in output is incorporated into 
the picture, the first group was subdivided into (l) inflationary 
and stagnant economies (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay); and (2) 
inflationary and grouting economies (Brazil, Colombia, Feru and 
Mexico). For the end of the period, the classification remains 
the same, except for Brazil and Colombia which now move into the 
first ur/up; and for Mexico, now a stable and growing economy.
In the aon-industrialised group, the initial picture was one of 
stagnation and almost hyperinflation (Bolivia and Faraguay)or very 
mild inflation with growth (Ecuador). For the end of the period, 
Bolivia had fast growth and mild inflation; and Paraguay and Ecua­
dor mild inflation and slow growth. It is concluded that, mild in­
flation seems to accompany growth, while fast inflation seems to 
bring stagnation (except in Brazil). Moreover, mild inflation and
445.
growth nay, with tine, result in stable growth • if structural reforms 
are adopted well in advance, as in Mexico; or, if structural reforms 
are not adopted, when there is a buoyant external sector and little 
attempt to change the domestic economy.•
c) Trying to classify the countries according to the origins of inflation 
in structural or monetarist factors leads to the following. Miih re­
spect to the monetarist variables only Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mem 
Mexico and Ecuador are for structuralism; while Brazil, Uruguay, Boli 
via and*Paraguay are for monetarists. New, with respect cnly to the 
structural variables, a case may be made for $11, except with the par­
tial exception of Chile. Adopting the structuralist position, the con­
troversial cases left are Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay on the 
one hand; and Chile on the other, A good monetarist case as it was 
said, may be made for the former, with a major structural qualifica­
tion: . all four countries* chronic inflation was accompanied by a chron­
ic foreign exchange bottleneck resulting from the conflicting trends in 
income, exports, imports and foreign capital accounts (when the overall 
bottleneck was reduced, as in Bolivia, inflation fell). Moreover, in 
all countries the lag in agricultural production, infrastructure bottle­
necks and a regressive distribution of income may be stressed; Brazil 
in addition, has the most intensive MET process of the region. In Bra­
zil, contrary with what other monetarists arg e, growth and high infla­
tion coexisted for a time. Arguing that the rate of growth fell does 
not convince structuralists, since this can always be blamed on the or­
thodox programmes adopted in 1934. Bolivia's inflation, incidentally, 
should be interpreted in the context of the 1952 devolution. So one is 
left with a Chilean case that is neither a clean-cut case for monetarists 
or structuralists. That is, in relative terms Chile has not experienced 
stagnation in her foreign exchange neither has her growth been sufficient­
ly fast to account for structural inflation. If a case wants to be made 
for structuralism, one has to look into the domestic economy: namely, 
the agricultural sector and public investment policy, but in the context 
of a weed: and receeding industrialisation.
d) Trying to classify the achievements of orthodox stabilisation programmes 
will lead to the following: (l) a group co..posed by those countries *here 
the policies have failed, at least judging by the continued pace of in­
flation (Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, and Peru); (p.) 
another where the policies were relatively successful (Bolivian and Para­
guay); and (p) Mexico where the siop-and-go policies during part of the 
period present a problem. The Mexican case is partic larly interesting 
in that it presents a mix of long-run structural reforms together with
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short tern cautious financial policies in some periods, plus a suhdued 
external imbalance - tourism and a not inflow of foreign capital, ex­
cept in sone years. Could this then he interpreted as a compromise be­
tween structuralism and monetarism? Mot very convincingly because of 
the inkrinsecally different economic theory and policy of both tliesis. 
Mexican economic policy can be interpreted as s somewhat accidental 
switch from structural policies permissive towards inflation, to monet­
ary semi-orthodoxy, specially in terms of the different public interven­
tion approaches of the successive presidential regimes. She gjolicies 
throughout the past forty years, however, present a stream of public in­
tervention and nationalism - where there is nonetheless much domestic 
and international compromise - and emphasis on non-orthodox financial 
policies.
e) Pjesuning, the final performance (1965) of the economies leads to the
following results: (l) unstable and stagnant (Argentina, Chile and Uru­
guay); (2) unstable and experiencing a fall in the rate of growth (Bra­
zil and Colombia); (3) mildly unstable and growig (Peru); (4) stable 
and growing (Mexico). In the second group Bolivia presents a rise in 
the rate of growth and a remarkable reduction in inflation; Paraguay, 
stagnation and almost stability; and, Ecuador, slow growth aid little 
instability. These relationships may be interpreted also according to 
the availability of foreign exchange (except for Chile).
5*- The controversy has now covered a good part of the last two decades, and 
for several reasons, will presumably continue and lead to further radical- 
isation. Inflation, external instability, and slow growth remain a feature 
of the region. Thereis still, despite the dreadful experiences, little 
consensus on growth and inflationary theories. Monetary and fiscal ortho­
doxy - and classic international trade assumptions, although mainly in 
economic and political circles abroad - still prevail and have official 
support. Even after the failures of Argentina and Chile in the early 
1960*s, there were sorthodox stabilisation programmes in Brazil, Colombia, 
Uruguay and, again in Argentina. The policy dilemma present to underde­
veloped countries is a reality, assuming that they can freely chose to move 
towards central planning and revolution, as Cuba did; or, pacifically to­
wards a mixed economic system closer to Uestem capitalist countries. There 
is, as it was said, athird alternative in the increasing feeling of ‘contin­
ental* solidarity and nationalism — and hence a third world approach to 
economic policy - as in Chile, Peru and Bolivia. The results of this trend 
are weak and obscure, but however discouraging they point out to the Latin- 
American Common Market, the Soiih American Pacific Association, and the
447.
and. the proposals of The Commission for .Economic Cooperation in Latin 
finerica QLTLL at the 195> Conference of Vina cel Mar. The controversy 
is in the ultimate analysis a reflection of conflicting groups in the 
domestic economy and conflicting economic and political relationships 
tovards advanced countries!
flic usefulness of the controversy*, if one sistematises the issues, 
lies in the fact that it shovs the experience of these countries, both 
v.dth uncerdevelopnent and the lac': of a suitable economic policy, The 
experience furthermore may he projected tovards a future understanding 
and remedy of the groirth i/ith stability solution. The controversy as 
one has tried to do here in a modest vay, may serve as a background for 
case study vorlr, both of financial end structural policies, that vill 
lead to valid generalisations and the c-nstruction of a general theory* 
for the region. Cn the one hand, Latin America still has to revolution­
ise its land tenure system, achieve a competitive industrialisation pro­
cess, expand its foreign trade (perhaps the comerrtone of the vholo 
future policy), creaste a suitable infrastructure and raise the standard 
of living and educa tion of the majorities, .had, cn the other, it has to 
develop a peculiar and selective monetary and fiscal system to finance 
her gron*th process, as veil as the best vay to incorporate foreign savings 
and technology. Luiile these problems remain (alloving for the fact that 
a theoretical and practical hoad-vay has been made) and opinions are dia­
metrically opposed, the controversy vill remain and serve a purpose. In­
flation in Latin Aaerica is a consequence of underdevelopment i:i the vil­
est sense of the vcrl, and the controversy a reflection of the fact that 
no general theory or development nclicy exist as such.
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